Davis v Stuff Limited

[2025] NZHC 2739

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE

CIV-2024-412-47

[2025] NZHC 2739

BETWEEN

ARTEMIS INDIGO DELILAH DAVIS

Plaintiff

AND

STUFF LIMITED

Defendant

Hearing:	On the papers
Appearances:	A I D Davis (plaintiff) in person
Judgment:	19 September 2025

JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE J

[1]                 The plaintiff seeks leave to appeal a judgment of the Court upholding a Registrar’s fee waiver decision (the Judgment).1

Some history

[2]Some history is required.

[3]                 In early-2024 the plaintiff presented to the Registry for filing seven sets of proceedings.

[4]                 Three of the sets of documents, including that in this proceeding, were referred to a Judge under r 5.35A High Court Rules 2016 for consideration of whether the proceedings were plainly an abuse of the process of the Court. Harland J declined to

1      Davis v Hussey [2025] NZHC 1987 [Judgment].

DAVIS v STUFF LTD [2025] NZHC 2739 [19 September 2025]

make an order under r 5.35B(2) for this proceeding, leaving the Registrar to release the notice of proceeding and attached memorandum of service.2 The Registrar did so.

[5]                 The Registrar refused the filing of four other sets of proceedings the plaintiff presented for filing around the same time, by reason of the wrong form of notice of proceeding being provided. The plaintiff has not since provided alternative documents for those proceedings.

[6]                 In 2025, the plaintiff requested the Registry to have the seven sets of filed or proposed proceedings “proceed simultaneously”. The Registrar responded by explaining, in relation to this proceeding and to similar proceedings, that the plaintiff first needed to make an application for extension of time for service of the proceedings.3

[7]The plaintiff filed an application for review of the Registrar’s decision.

[8]By Minute dated 3 June 2025, I upheld the Registrar’s decision, recording:

[6] It appears from the court’s records the applicant did not at the time respond to the Deputy Registrar’s request. More recently (30 April 2025) in relation to the Lambert and Treloar proceedings the applicant emailed the Deputy Registrar stating that “the summary judgment applications will all be moving simultaneously.”

[9]                 The plaintiff next applied for leave to appeal my decision. She applied for a fee waiver in relation to the application.

[10]             The Registrar on 7 July 2025, declined to grant a fee waiver. The Registrar identified the discretion that exists in determining whether to waive a fee, citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in relation to that discretion in Duncan v Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc (Duncan).4

2      Davis v Hussey HC Christchurch CIV-2024-412-28, 17 April 2024 (Minute).

3      High Court Rules 2016, r 5.72(2) requiring that service be effected within 12 months after the proceedings are filed or within such further time as the court may allow.

4      Duncan v Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc [2024] NZCA 628.

[11]             The Registrar recorded, having regard to the grounds identified in my decision, the plaintiff’s proposed interlocutory application (for leave to appeal) lacked merit.

[12]             Next, the plaintiff applied for review of the Registrar’s decision. That led to the Judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s application for review of the Registrar’s fee waiver decision.5

[13]             The application for review was dismissed on the basis the Registrar’s articulated reasons for declining to waive filing fees on the proposed appeal were plainly correct.

[14]             On 18 July 2025, the Deputy Registrar, on reviewing the Court file, identified the statement of claim and notice of proceeding in this proceeding had still not been served. As the proceeding was filed on 7 March 2024, the plaintiff had failed to effect service within 12 months as required by r 5.72(2) High Court Rules. Given that circumstance and the fact the plaintiff had not applied for an extension  of time,        r 5.72(2) required the proceeding to be treated as having been discontinued by the plaintiff against the defendant.

[15]             On 18 July 2025, the Registrar recorded, pursuant to r 5.72, that the proceeding was now being treated as having been discontinued.

Discussion

[16]             The discontinuance of the proceeding means there is no purpose to the plaintiff’s proposed appeal. As this proceeding is at an end, there is nothing meaningful to be achieved by an appeal.

[17]             On that basis alone, it would be inappropriate to consider the grant of leave to appeal.

[18]             Had that not been the case, it would still have been inappropriate to grant leave because the proposed appeal wholly lacks merit. The Registrar’s underlying fee

5      Davis v Hussey, Judgment, above n 1.

waiver decision was an appropriate exercise of the Registrar’s discretion recognised in Duncan, given the lack of any merit in the plaintiff’s expectation that the Court should have all seven 2024 proceedings “proceed simultaneously”.

Result

[19]             The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. I confirm that, as the proceeding has been discontinued, no further documents may be filed in the proceeding.

Osborne J

Copy to: A I D Davis