Davis v SM Build 2017 Limited
[2024] NZHC 423
•1 March 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2022-409-028
[2024] NZHC 423
UNDER the Law of Contract IN THE MATTER
of an alleged breach of contract and negligence
BETWEEN
CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND DAVIS and
LAURA CATHERINE DAVIS as trustees of THE DAVIS FAMILY TRUST
Plaintiffs
AND
SM BUILD 2017 LIMITED
First Defendant
SEAN LOGAN McINROE
Second DefendantCORBETT CONSULTING LIMITED
Third DefendantCHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL
Fourth Defendant
Hearing: 16 February 2024 Appearances:
M J McKay for Plaintiffs
K R Narayanan J J Retter for First and Second Defendants (by VMR)
WJ Hamilton for Third Defendant No appearance for Fourth Defendant
Judgment:
1 March 2024
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on 1 March 2024 at 4.30pm
pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
DAVIS v SM BUILD 2017 LIMITED [2024] NZHC 423 [1 March 2024]
[1] The plaintiffs own a property at Westmorland, Christchurch (the property). They entered into a written contract with the first defendant, SM Build 2017 Ltd (SM Build), in or around December 2020 to build a house on the property. Problems arose with the build which led to the plaintiffs cancelling the contract. They have brought this proceeding against the defendants who had involvement in the project seeking damages. They plead breach of contract and negligence against the first to third defendants, and breach of statutory duty and negligence against the fourth defendant.
[2] The proceeding has been on foot since February 2022. In September 2023, the first and second defendants applied for a stay pending the making of a determination by the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Education (MBIE) under s 177 of the Building Act 2004 (the Act). This judgment deals with that application.
[3] The first and second defendants argue that, under s 182 of the Act, the Court should stay this proceeding until the determination by the Chief Executive has been made or refused. In addition, they say a stay should be granted because the determination will be beneficial to all the parties in resolving matters put in issue in the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim, assist with expert engagement and also in the advancement of settlement discussions.
[4] The plaintiffs oppose the application. They argue that s 182 is not engaged and the granting of a stay will not be beneficial but will cause significant prejudice to them and unnecessary delay.
[5] The third and fourth defendants do not take a position in respect of the application.
The facts
[6] At an early stage of the contract the plaintiffs were concerned about SM Build’s workmanship and as time passed their concerns increased. On 14 December 2021, the Christchurch City Council (the Council) issued a notice to fix under ss 164 and 165 of the Act. The stated particulars of contravention and non-compliance were that the building work was not in accordance with the relevant building consent and was in
contravention of s 40 of the Act. The areas of work that did not comply with the building consent were said to be the:
(a)siteworks, being excavations and fill placement in proximity to the foundations;
(b)construction of the framing, connections and bracing of the structure; and
(c)installation of the wall and roof cladding systems.
[7]The remedy for the contravention and non-compliance was said to be:
Undertake remedial building work to the following areas to bring the building back into compliance with the building consent and/or amend the consent to support compliance of an alternative solution for the:
(1)The siteworks, being excavations and fill placement in proximity to the foundation or foundation design.
(2)The construction of the framing, connections and bracing of the structure.
(3)The installation of the wall and roof cladding systems.
[8]The notice to fix required the remedial work to be completed by 1 June 2022.
[9] It was not until 31 May 2022, however, that the second defendant applied to MBIE for a determination under s 177 of the Act. On 8 July 2022, MBIE confirmed receipt of the application for a determination and noted the matter for determination:
… in terms of s 177(1)(b) and (2)(f) of the Act, is the Council’s exercise of its power of decision in issuing the notice to fix dated 14 December 2021 (reference number NTF001 in respect of building consent BCN/2020/10093). In determining the matter we will consider the particulars of contravention or non-compliance alleged in the notice to fix, specifically:
(1)compliance of each of the 3 areas of building work specified in the notice with the building consent; and
(2)compliance of the foundations with Building Code clause B1.3.1.
In determining the matter, we will also consider the remedies required in the notice to fix. This will be based on the applicant’s comments in relation to the
“temporary” versus “permanent” fixes he believes are implied from the notice to fix and the Council’s site notice dated 19 November 2021.
[10]MBIE advised that the issues outside the determination were as follows:
Issues the Determination will not consider include:
(a)The Council’s decision to grant and issue the building consent BCN/2020/10093.
(b)The compliance of any elements of the building work that are not identified in the notice to fix.
(c)Any contractual or financial arrangements between the parties.
(d)Issues relating to the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, or access to the property.
(e)The enforcement powers exercised, or not, by the Council in respect of the NTF.
[11] Under s 185(2) of the Act, the statutory timeframe for the making of a determination is 60 working days from the date on which the Chief Executive receives the application or any further time that the Chief Executive and the parties may agree. Here, that has not occurred. The plaintiffs can be forgiven for considering that the determination process has stood still. It was only on 1 February 2024 that MBIE advised that “Determination 3429 is confirmed to be in our next round of current allocations and a case manager will be in touch this month”. Counsel are unable to predict when a determination might issue.
[12] The plaintiffs cancelled the build contract on 25 October 2022. The building work remains unfinished, and the house is not suitable for habitation.
[13] This proceeding was issued on 8 February 2022, initially against only the first and second defendants. The third and fourth defendants were joined as parties on 19 June 2023. The plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim was filed on 20 June 2023, to which statements of defence have been filed. I understand all parties have given discovery, although I am advised there are some outstanding issues in this regard between the plaintiffs and the first and second defendants.
[14] The first and second defendants raised the issue of a stay in a memorandum of counsel filed with the Court dated 18 July 2022. The plaintiffs’ counsel filed a memorandum in response on 20 July 2022, arguing that there was no basis for a stay.1 I issued timetabling directions following a telephone conference on 21 July 2022. My minute of 26 July 2022 provided for the filing of interlocutory applications and a hearing of them on 1 October 2022. No application for a stay was filed.
[15] There was correspondence between counsel in August, September and November 2022 where the plaintiffs followed up on the issue, but this did not prompt the first and second defendants to apply for a stay either.
[16] The plaintiffs then raised the issue in a memorandum of 3 April 2023 and, in in a minute of 3 April 2023, Associate Judge Lester recorded his view that s 182 did not bar continuation of the proceeding and did not stand in the way of further directions being made.
[17]The present application was not filed until 7 September 2023.
The Building Act provisions
[18]Section 177 provides:
177 Application for determination
(1)A party may apply to the chief executive for a determination in relation to either or both of the following:
(a)whether particular matters comply with the building code:
(b)the exercise, failure or refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by an authority in subsection (2), (3), (4), or (4A) of a power of decision to which this paragraph applies by virtue of that subsection.
(2)Subsection (1)(b) applies to any power of decision of a building consent authority in respect of all or any of the following:
(a)a building consent:
1 Referring to Minister of Education v Hawkins Construction North Island Ltd [2016] NZHC 1836.
(b)an extension under section 52(b) of the period during which building work must be commenced before a building consent lapses:
(c)an extension under section 93(2)(b)(ii) of the period during which the authority must decide whether to issue a code compliance certificate:
(d)a code compliance certificate:
(e)a compliance schedule:
(f)a notice to fix.
(3)Subsection (1)(b) applies to any power of decision of a territorial authority in respect of, or under, all or any of the following:
(a)any waiver or modification of the building code under section 67:
(b)a certificate of acceptance under section 96:
(c)an exemption from building consent requirements under clause 2 of Schedule 1:
(d)an amendment to a compliance schedule under section 106, 107, or 109:
(e)a notice to fix:
(f)sections 112, 113, 115, and 116 (which relate to alterations to, or changes in the use of, a building) and 124 and 129 (which relate to dangerous, affected, and insanitary buildings):
(fa)any power of decision of a territorial authority under subpart 6A of Part 2, other than a power of decision under section 133AS (territorial authority may carry out seismic work):
(g)a certificate for public use under section 363A:
(h)a certificate under section 224(f) of the Resource Management Act 1991.
(4)Subsection (1)(b) applies to any power of decision under this Act of a regional authority in respect of a dam.
(4A)Subsection (1)(b) applies to any power of decision of a responsible person under—
(a)section 133BS (measures to keep people at safe distance and protect building); or
(b)section 133BT (notices and signs on buildings); or
(c)section 133BW (works to remove or reduce other risks); or
(d)section 133BX (works for long-term use or occupation of building).
(5)Nothing in this section limits or affects section 70(4) or 446(1)(c).
(6)In subsection (4A), responsible person does not include—
(a)the Minister acting as responsible person under section 133BJ(2)(c)(i); or
(b)a territorial authority acting on direction by the Minister under section 133BJ(2)(c)(ii); or
(c)a territorial authority complying with a direction given by the Minister under section 133BJ(4).
Section 182 provides:
182 No proceedings until determination made
(1)A person may not commence proceedings in the District Court or the High Court if the matter that gives rise to those proceedings can be the subject of a determination.
(2)However, a person may commence those proceedings if that person, or any other person, has already applied for a determination of the matter and the chief executive has—
(a)made a determination on the application; or
(b)refused to make a determination.
This section—
(a)does not affect injunctive proceedings; and
(b)is subject to section 381.
Counsel’s submissions
The first and second defendants
[20] Ms Narayan submits that the amended statement of claim pleads the building work performed by the first and second defendants did not comply with the Building Code and that the allegation also directly gives rise to the causes of action against the third and fourth defendants. She notes that the appendices to the amended statement of claim, spanning 59 pages, also contain allegations of breaches of the Building Code.
[21] She submits that while s 182 states a proceeding must not be commenced if the matter giving rise to the proceeding can be the subject of a determination, in practice the courts will be reluctant to strike out a proceeding. She argues where proceedings have already been commenced and “allegations of breaches of the Building Code give rise to some of the issues, granting a stay is appropriate under section 182”. Ms Narayan contends this is consistent with the purpose of s 182, which she says is to ensure that a specialist body can make a determination in relation to compliance with the Building Code, which can assist all parties and the court.
[22] Ms Narayan then argues that it would be in the interests of justice, and also the interests of efficiency, for a stay to be ordered for several reasons. First, as the plaintiffs plead breaches of the Building Code in all causes of action against all defendants, a determination on that issue would reduce the issues the Court will ultimately need to decide. This, she submits, will significantly shorten the trial. Related to this, she submits it is difficult for the parties to estimate the likely length of the trial or agree to further directions in the absence of a determination.
[23] Second, if the issue of whether work was compliant with the Building Code is determined, the experts engaged by the parties would not need to form an opinion on the matter or would be unlikely to reach a different conclusion on that issue than the specialists at MBIE who, Ms Narayan says, regularly deal with allegations concerning breaches of the Building Code. The determination would, she says, remove or narrow technical issues in dispute and reduce costs of engaging expert witnesses.
[24] Third, Ms Narayan argues that with fewer issues and reduced costs, the parties will be able to engage meaningfully in settlement discussions and at an earlier stage.
The plaintiffs
[25] The plaintiffs argue s 182 is not engaged and there are no other reasons for a stay. Mr McKay argues that Parliament did not intend the determination procedure to apply to the resolution of contractual disputes between parties to a building contract, and nor did it intend the determination procedure to operate as a mandatory referral system in every building dispute.
[26] Mr McKay submits it has been held that a determination is not binding on the court and that the process adopted in a determination is streamlined, in sharp contrast to the in-depth factual and legal review undertaken in court proceedings. He argues that factual findings made during the determination process should not preclude a deeper and more extensive factual analysis being undertaken by the court. He notes also that the procedural processes and safeguards present in litigation before the courts are absent in a determination proceeding. These include there being no requirement for discovery, no ability to compel witnesses or the production of documents, and no particular burden or standard of proof. He also submits it has been acknowledged that if a determination were regarded as giving rise to an issue estoppel in subsequent civil litigation, councils would likely take a much more adversarial and litigious approach, undermining the efficiency of a relatively informal process.
[27] Mr McKay also submits that a determination will not have practical benefits for the parties but will, instead, prejudice the plaintiffs. He submits the parties are not required to accept factual findings made in the determination and can lead their own evidence in subsequent proceedings to obtain a contrary ruling on such issues.
[28] He also argues a stay cannot be justified on the basis it will reduce costs and is a false economy. He submits that while the proceeding is delayed the plaintiffs’ home is degrading and in an incomplete state. The costs of repair, he argues, will only increase over time. Mr McKay also notes the plaintiffs have not been able to live in their home and that delay represents a fetter on their right to prompt access to justice.
[29] Mr McKay is critical of the first and second defendants’ delay in filing this stay application, particularly in circumstances where, in my minute of 26 July 2022, I had imposed a timetable to allow such an application to be made. He submits that the first and second defendants have actively defended the claim by participating in case management conferences, undertaking discovery and filing amended pleadings, and must be taken to have given up any right to a stay.
[30] Finally, Mr McKay says there is no evidence of when MBIE will release its determination, and some determinations have taken years to complete. He says this
case is largely ready to be set down for trial and there is nothing to prevent it continuing in parallel with the determination application.
Analysis
[31] The starting point is that s 182 makes no mention of proceedings being stayed. It does state that a person may not commence proceedings “if the matter that gives rise to those proceedings can be the subject of a determination”. However, Ms Narayan does not contend that the proceeding is a nullity or should be struck out.
[32] There is, to my mind, no authority to support the submissions that underlie this application, that the courts will grant a stay because they are “reluctant” to strike out a proceeding under s 182, or that the courts take the view that where proceedings have been commenced alleging breaches of the Building Code granting a stay is appropriate under s 182. Ms Narayan took me through several authorities which she relied upon to support her submissions to which I now refer.
[33] Davidson v Palmerston North City Council concerned an application for an order prohibiting the Palmerston North City Council from progressing an application it had made to the Building Industry Authority to hear a dispute between it and Ms Davidson.2 The case was decided under the Building Act 1991 (the 1991 Act). The background was that Ms Davidson had filed judicial review proceedings challenging the decision by the Palmerston North City Council to refuse to grant a building consent. Ms Davidson contended that the Building Industry Authority did not have jurisdiction to determine the dispute because it was outside the range of disputes the 1991 Act authorised it to consider.
[34] Ms Narayan relies on this case as authority that where Parliament has provided a clear statutory process for the determination of disputes, that process should be followed without interference from the courts. Ronald Young J was not prepared to intervene in the process then being undertaken at the request of the Palmerston North City Council by the Building Industry Authority and said:3
2 Davidson v Palmerston North City Council HC Palmerston North CIV-2004-454-670, 10 December 2004.
3 At [22].
…
The courts have long taken the view that where there is a statutory process for resolving an issue then decision making bodies should be free to make decisions about their own jurisdiction and their own process as governed by the statute defining them. This is especially so in a case such as this where the body involved is a specialist body.
[35] Davidson has little in common with this case. It did not concern the Act. It was a challenge to the Building Industry Authority’s jurisdiction to determine a dispute under the statutory process. There is no suggestion from the plaintiffs in this case that MBIE cannot make a determination.
[36] The next case is Flynn v Scotson, which again concerned the 1991 Act.4 It involved an application to the District Court for adjournment of a trial pending determination of a dispute between the parties to the Building Industry Authority. The District Court Judge granted the adjournment, holding there was a dispute about whether some or any of the work in issue complied with the Building Code, which was a dispute within the terms of s 17 of the 1991 Act. He considered that was a matter for the Building Industry Authority to determine, and once it had done so the case could be referred back to the District Court to make any other determinations necessary.5 While this decision could be argued to support the first and second defendants’ position, it was not decided under the Act, is a mere seven paragraphs long, and it has not been followed in this Court.6 It is also difficult to see that there was any justification for granting the adjournment when the case was set down to be heard in less than two weeks.
[37] In Gouveia v Clifford Judge Field refused a stay of proceedings made on the grounds that the plaintiffs should first obtain a determination from the Building Industry Authority under s 17 of the 1991 Act.7 It appears the stay application was refused on other grounds, but notably the Judge said:8
Further, the plaintiffs submit that a referral to the Authority will achieve nothing except to unnecessarily delay the resolution of these proceedings, the cost of referral will substantially increase the costs of litigation.
4 Flynn v Scotson DC Tauranga NP1098/00, 28 May 2002.
5 At [5].
6 See Ministry of Education v Hawkins Construction North Island Ltd, above n 1 at [31].
7 Gouveia v Clifford DC Auckland NP 2555/97, 12 February 1998.
8 At 5-6.
…
It is further submitted that it is inconceivable that Parliament could have intended every owner who wishes to sue a builder for bad workmanship, and whose building does not incidentally comply with the Building Code, should be forced to take this expensive preliminary step. I accept the submissions of the plaintiffs on these matters. …
[38] Ms Narayan also refers to Maggs v In Accord Properties Ltd, which was an application for adjournment before the High Court of an appeal against an arbitrator’s award.9 The application was made on the basis that since the award had been issued Mr Maggs had applied to the Building Industry Authority under s 17 of the 1991 Act for a determination, which was not expected to issue for some time. The Court refused the adjournment. Relevantly for present purposes, Paterson J said:
[12] Section 17(3) of the Act does not prevent this Court from proceeding with the hearing. On a purposive construction of the Act, it is arguable that applications under s 17, which allow applications to the Authority to be made where there is a doubt or dispute on the issue of any Code Compliance Certificate or compliance with the building code, do not apply to a contractual dispute between two parties. The matters which appear to be covered in s 17 of the Act are disputes or doubts arising between the territorial authority and the builder or owner. In the absence of submissions on this point, I do not intend to determine it.
[39] Paterson J then went on to find that the interests of justice did not require an adjournment to be granted. I do not consider this case provides any support for the position of the first and second defendants.
[40] In Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd an issue arose whether a determination from the Chief Executive gave rise to an issue estoppel against the council, precluding the Court from making different findings to those previously made by the Chief Executive.10 Katz J held that recognising a broader issue estoppel than that required by the statutory scheme itself was not appropriate and, in the circumstances of the case, that was limited to the finding that there were currently no compliance certificates for certain remedial works. Her Honour said:
[122] I am satisfied, however, that no issue estoppel broader in scope than that should be recognised in this case. Recognising an issue estoppel based on factual findings of the Chief Executive in the course of considering whether
9 Maggs v In Accord Properties Ltd HC Auckland M1115/SW02, 7 April 2003.
10 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd [2015] NZHC 2080.
to revoke the code compliance certificates would likely produce unfairness that is disproportionate to the object of achieving finality in litigation.
[41] Katz J also undertook a thorough analysis of the determination process. Ms Narayan refers to [108] of the judgment where Katz J said, “Any court proceedings relating to the same subject matter are stayed until the outcome of the determination is known”. The only authority Katz J gave for that proposition was s 182 itself yet, as I have noted earlier, the section does not refer to the granting of a stay.
[42] The authority most directly on point is Minister of Education v Hawkins Construction North Island Ltd, which concerned building work to the administration block at Aranui High School.11 The second defendant, Higgs Construction Ltd, had been engaged to construct the building and applied to strike out the proceeding on the basis the matter that gave rise to it was non-compliance with the Building Code, which under s 177 of the Act was a matter on which a party may apply to the Chief Executive for a determination. It was submitted that s 182(1) of the Act prevented the plaintiffs from commencing the proceeding.
[43] Associate Judge Matthews dismissed the application. He considered that whether the building work complied with the Building Code was not “the matter which gave rise to the proceedings in terms of s 182(1)”.12 He found the matter which gave rise to the proceeding was the condition of the administration block, as it was because of that condition that the plaintiffs maintained that the workmanship of Higgs Construction Ltd was not up to the standard required to comply with its duty of care in tort. He considered that imposing a requirement that the plaintiffs first seek a determination would: 13
… achieve nothing in this case or similar cases where civil liability for breach of duty (in tort or contract) is alleged, with non-compliance with the building code also pleaded.
[44] The Associate Judge referred to Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd as authority that even if the plaintiff had referred the question of whether the administration block had
11 Minister of Education v Hawkins Construction North Island Ltd, above n 1.
12 At [23].
13 At [28].
been built in compliance with the Building Code for determination,14 that would have had no effect on the civil proceeding before the Court. He stated:
[29] … All that would have occurred is that there would have been a delay before this proceeding was commenced while that process was followed through, but to no practical avail. In the end, however, this is not the point. The point is that no-one is prevented from commencing a proceeding in this court unless the matter that gives rise to it can be the subject of a determination, and the matter which gives rise to this proceeding is not compliance with the building code, or otherwise. It is the condition of the Administration Block. Whether or not it was built in accordance with the building code is a factual issue which may be relevant to determining whether or not Higgs is responsible in tort for that condition.
[45] Following the hearing Mr McKay referred me to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Butcher v Body Corporate 342525, where it was argued that the plaintiffs in the High Court had been precluded by s 182 of the Act from arguing the requirements of the Building Code had not been complied with in certain relevant respects because that was a matter that could be the subject of a determination by the Chief Executive under s 182.15 The Court of Appeal rejected that submission, noting that while the requirements of the Building Code were relevant “it was not the critical issue”.
[46] Turning now to this case, while I accept that the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim pleads many times that the building work did not comply with the Building Code, I do not accept that it is the matter that gives rise to this proceeding so as to engage s 182. The plaintiffs principally allege breach of contract and breach of tortious duties of care. The matter that gives rise to all their claims is that their home is said to have been constructed in a defective manner in breach of the defendants’ contractual and tortious obligations. Whether the building work complied with the Building Code is relevant but is not the matter that gives rise to the proceeding.
[47] Ms Narayan argues in the alternative that the Court may order a stay under r 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 in the interests of justice. I do not accept the interests of justice will be served by granting a stay for any of the reasons advanced by the first and second defendants. The advantages Ms Narayan identifies are entirely speculative.
14 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd, above n 10.
15 Butcher v Body Corporate 342525 [2018] NZCA 19.
[48] While it is argued the determination will reduce the scope of the issues, it cannot seriously be contended that it will, of itself, avoid the need for a trial. Further, I accept the submission of Mr McKay that insofar as a determination will create an issue estoppel it will be limited to whether the Council properly issued the notice to fix.16
[49] The submission that the issues in dispute may be reduced and the trial shortened appears to be based on the dubious assumption that the parties will accept the factual findings in the determination, and that the experts engaged by the parties would not need to form opinions on matters contained in it. I consider that unlikely.
[50] It appears that, in large part, this application has been motivated by a desire on the part of the first and second defendants to avoid having to instruct experts at this stage in the hope of saving some costs. I do not consider that is a realistic expectation either. Further, it is unlikely that any trial would commence before the end of 2025. That leaves plenty of time for a determination to be issued by MBIE before the parties would need to brief their experts and exchange evidence. A stay would simply not serve any purpose.
[51] Similarly, I cannot see that the prospect a determination might assist settlement discussions could justify granting a stay. Given the history of this matter there is no reason to believe that would be the case, but in the meantime there is no reason at all why this proceeding cannot be advanced towards a hearing while the determination proceeding takes its course.
[52] Most importantly, I accept the plaintiffs’ view they will be prejudiced by the granting of a stay. The period of delay while the parties wait for a determination is entirely unknown and outside their control. It may be a very lengthy delay during which period the plaintiffs will lose the opportunity to have a hearing date allocated.
[53] I consider the plaintiffs’ concerns that their home will degrade further, and the cost of repairs inevitably increase, over the period of a delay to be very real ones.
16 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd, above n 10.
[54] Further, I consider imposing a stay on the plaintiffs in circumstances where the first and second defendants failed to pursue the stay application promptly would be entirely unjust.
Result
[55] The application by the first and second defendants for a stay of proceeding is dismissed.
[56] The plaintiffs are successful and are entitled to costs on a 2B basis plus reasonable disbursements.
[57] The Registrar should set the case down for a telephone case management conference no sooner than three weeks from the date of this judgment. I expect counsel to have conferred as to what steps need to be taken before the case is set down for trial and to propose suitable pre-trial directions. Counsel should file a preferably joint memorandum at least three working days prior to the telephone conference addressing those matters, but in the event they cannot agree separate memoranda are to be filed.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Allen & Yee Lawyers Ltd, Christchurch Martelli McKegg, Auckland
Chapman Tripp, Christchurch Heaney & Partners, Auckland
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