Davis v McNeilly
[2025] NZHC 2090
•29 July 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE
CIV-2024-412-109
[2025] NZHC 2090
BETWEEN ARTEMIS INDIGO DELILAH DAVIS
Appellant
AND
HAMISH NICHOLL MCNEILLY
First Respondent
KAMALA HAYMAN
Second RespondentSTUFF LIMITED
Third Respondent
Hearing: 6 May 2025 Counsel:
Appellant in Person (via audio-visual link)
J Edwards for Respondents (appearance excused)
Judgment:
29 July 2025
JUDGMENT OF MANDER J
This judgment was delivered by me on 29 July 2025 at 2.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: .
DAVIS v MCNEILLY [2025] NZHC 2090 [29 July 2025]
Introduction
[1] Artemis Davis appeals an interlocutory decision of Judge Turner of the Dunedin District Court of 22 July 2024, declining, at her request, to adjourn the respondent’s successful application for unless orders in relation to proceedings brought by Ms Davis under the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015.1
Background
[2] Ms Davis’ appeal has its genesis in proceedings brought by her in December 2022 seeking orders under the Harmful Digital Communications Act (CIV-2022-120- 360).
[3] On 25 September 2023, Judge Robinson declined Ms Davis’ application for orders that would have required Stuff Ltd, and two of its staff members, to take down and disable public access to certain online articles regarding Ms Davis.2 Her application was for interim orders, strike out and suppression (the first interlocutory decision). In what was subsequently described by Dunningham J as a thorough and carefully reasoned 140 paragraph judgment, Judge Robinson largely declined Ms Davis’ application, although he made two limited orders in her favour.3 Judge Robinson ordered that Ms Davis pay costs to the respondents jointly in the sum of
$1,000.4
[4] On 24 October 2023, in a second interlocutory decision, Judge Robinson made directions for discovery, with an exchange of documents to occur within 30 days,5 and dismissed a further application by Ms Davis (the second interlocutory decision).6 Ms Davis was ordered to pay costs totalling $477.50.7
1 Davis v McNeilly [2024] NZDC 16971.
2 Davis v McNeilly [2023] NZDC 267.
3 Davis v Robinson [2024] NZHC 344 at [8].
4 Davis v McNeilly, above n 1, at [139].
5 Davis v McNeilly [2023] NZDC 23615 at [36].
6 At [30]–[34].
7 At [41].
[5] The respondents complied with the discovery order, Ms Davis did not. That failure resulted in the respondents filing an interlocutory application for unless orders. The decision the subject of this appeal granted the respondents’ unless orders.
District Court decision
[6] In his decision of 22 July 2024, Judge Turner recorded that Ms Davis had, on the morning of the hearing at around 3.30 am, filed “memoranda seeking adjournment”, in which she sought an adjournment of that morning’s hearing of the respondent’s application for unless orders. Ms Davis also filed a document headed “Without-notice interlocutory application for interim relief in respect of judicial corruption”. Ms Davis requested to appear at the hearing by “telephone link”. That request appears to have been communicated to the Judge approximately 20 minutes before the hearing commenced at 11.45 am. The registry had earlier advised the parties of the start time of the hearing in the ordinary way when advising the hearing date.
[7] Counsel for the respondent had travelled to Dunedin to appear at the hearing in person. The Judge directed that Ms Davis appear in person, but Ms Davis did not appear. At the hearing on 22 July, her name was called twice over the public address system at the Court. Ms Davis had emailed the registry at 11.32 am that morning saying she had no means of attending, blaming what was described by her as “the ongoing misconduct of the New Zealand Police”, but noted she was available via phone or audio-visual link (AVL).
[8] The Judge found that there was nothing in Ms Davis’ “memoranda seeking adjournment” to justify an adjournment.8 The document headed “Without-notice interlocutory application for interim relief in respect of judicial corruption” sought a stay of the proceeding before the District Court pending the final determination of
8 Davis v McNeilly, above n 1, at [12(a)].
matters described as being due to be heard by the Court of Appeal,9 the High Court10 and Human Rights Review Tribunal.11 The Judge declined to issue a stay.
[9] Ms Davis also sought various suppression and non-publication orders. The Judge declined to make such orders:12
The plaintiff seeks an order granting an interim name suppression of her name, and also non-publication orders in respect of the current application before me, and in respect of each of the [Court of Appeal, High Court and Human Rights Review Tribunal] proceedings I have just referred to, along with any and all personal information, contact information, and information in respect of the geographical location of the plaintiff. There is no basis for name suppression in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the instant application, nor an order for non-publication in respect of this application. There is no basis or even jurisdiction in these proceedings for the Court to make an interim name suppression order and non-publication orders in respect of the matters which may be or are before the Court of Appeal, High Court or Human Rights Review Tribunal …
[10] Ms Davis also sought leave to commence a “private prosecution in the criminal jurisdiction for the offences of causing harm by digital communication being committed by the defendants on a daily basis”. The Judge found that Ms Davis had not followed the correct procedure to commence a private criminal prosecution.13
[11] The Judge rejected Ms Davis’ interlocutory application and made unless orders to the effect that unless the plaintiff complied with the discovery order of Judge Robinson made on 25 September 2023 and paid the costs, as awarded by Judge Robinson on 25 September 2023 and 24 October 2023, by 1 pm on 16 August, her proceedings would be struck out.14
9 Ms Davis issued proceedings against Judge Robinson, alleging various torts arising from his judgments of 25 September 2023 and/or 24 October 2023. The Court of Appeal has since dismissed Ms Davis’ appeal: Davis v Robinson [2024] NZCA 599. The Supreme Court denied Ms Davis’ application for leave to appeal: Davis v Robinson [2025] NZSC 25.
10 The Judge’s enquiries with counsel satisfied him that there were no relevant High Court proceedings for this matter.
11 The Judge’s enquiries with counsel revealed that there were no proceedings before the Human Rights Review Tribunal that related to the present proceedings.
12 At [12(c)].
13 At [12(d)].
14 The intituling to Judge Robinson’s decision under appeal is described as a results judgment, and the Judge noted at the conclusion of his judgment at [14] that reasons were to follow. However, enquiries with the Court registry indicate that no reasons judgment was ever released.
The appeal
[12] Ms Davis filed a notice of appeal on 13 August 2024. She appeals Judge Turner’s refusal to adjourn the hearing of 22 July 2024; his refusal to issue a stay of proceedings;15 and his referral to, and reliance upon, the determinations and orders of Judge Robinson, the subject of his two interlocutory decisions.
[13] I note at the outset that Associate Judge Lester, on 16 October 2024,16 at Ms Davis’ request, stayed the District Court proceeding (CIV-2022-012-360) without opposition.17 In doing so, he noted the unless orders that are the subject of this appeal had already come into effect, meaning the proceeding had already been struck out. This aspect of Ms Davis’ appeal therefore has already been determined.
[14] Ms Davis’ first ground of appeal essentially attacks the first interlocutory decision of Judge Robinson. She alleges that Judge Robinson was biased in favour of the respondents, defamed Ms Davis and acted with disregard for the law, including by acting towards her in a tortious manner. She asserts a reasonable and “well-minded” Judge would not have made any of the orders, and argues that Judge Turner’s decision, in relying on Judge Robinson’s rulings, amounts to a miscarriage of justice.
[15] Ms Davis further alleges there were no legitimate grounds for the District Court to have awarded any costs in favour of the respondents, and that Judge Turner’s making of unless orders on the basis of Judge Robinson’s costs orders is repugnant to justice. She argues she cannot reasonably be expected to pay the costs ordered, citing her earlier critique of Judge Robinson as justification for that assertion.
[16] In Ms Davis’ written submissions, she submits that Judge Turner acted with partiality18 by failing to provide her with an opportunity to be heard by AVL. She cites the following excerpt of the Protocol for remote participation in District Court civil proceedings in support:
15 Ms Davis in her notice of appeal said that if a stay was not issued, she would seek leave to appeal every order made by Judge Robinson in the substantive proceeding.
16 The order staying the District Court proceeding was issued on 17 October 2024.
17 High Court Rules 2016, r 20.10(2)(a) permits this Court to order a stay of the proceeding in the District Court.
18 Ms Davis submissions largely mirror the grounds of appeal identified in her notice of appeal already noted.
Where a hearing (other than one at which evidence is to be given) is to be conducted in person by default, counsel or a self-represented litigant who is located outside of the centre in which the hearing is to take place can expect that any application by them to appear at the hearing by remote means is likely to be granted.
[17] Ms Davis submits the District Court failed to engage in case management and that this “prejudiced” her “standing” to address “the plainly unjustifiable perversion of justice”, which was said to comprise Judge Robinson’s “unintelligibly nonsensical determination”. She also alleges breaches of s 19(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and s 66(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993.
[18] Ms Davis submits there are no grounds for the District Court to have made any order for costs or discovery. Ms Davis also seeks leave to “adduce evidence of other persons having been encouraged to engage in related harmful digital communications, so as for all such persons to be subject to the above orders”.
[19] By way of memorandum dated 15 October 2024, the respondents advised they will abide the decision of the Court with respect to Ms Davis’ appeal. They do not consent to the appeal, but did not intend to take active steps.19 Judge Lester recorded that counsel for the respondents was not required to appear at the hearing.20 Ms Davis must still convince this Court, albeit without active opposition, that her appeal should be granted.
Discussion
[20] To the extent Ms Davis directs criticism at Judge Robinson’s interlocutory decision and argues that what she considers to be his flawed reasoning or approach resulted in a miscarriage of justice, it is sufficient to note this is not an appeal from those decisions. Ms Davis has already made the same complaints. She sought to file proceedings in this Court against Judge Robinson, pleading 15 causes of action in defamation, as well as a cause of action in malicious falsehood and a claim of
19 Davis v McNeilly HC Dunedin CIV-2024-412-109, 18 October 2024 at [2].
20 At [3].
misfeasance in public office.21 This Court struck out those proceedings as an abuse of process.22 That finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal23 and Supreme Court.24
[21] The Supreme Court observed that Ms Davis’ intended appeal was a collateral challenge to the correctness of the District Court Judge’s decision in circumstances where an appeal was the appropriate remedy.25 It follows Ms Davis’ criticism of Judge Turner referring to and acting on Judge Robinson’s findings do not assist her in making out any appeal grounds. Nor does her unsubstantiated allegation of bias against Judge Turner, which largely echo her grievance against Judge Robinson that was held to warrant strike out.
[22] I reject the submission that Judge Turner acted with partiality when refusing to allow Ms Davis to appear by telephone link at the hearing on 22 July 2024. It was open to the Judge to refuse Ms Davis’ request considering she notified the Judge of her intention to communicate with the Court by telephone link at what appears to have been a mere 13 minutes before the hearing. Ms Davis knew a time and date had been set for the respondents’ application for unless orders. She was unable to provide any compelling excuse or reason for her failure to appear, or explain the tardiness of her request to appear by audio link. The respondents’ counsel had travelled to Dunedin to argue the application and been put to that cost.
[23] The Judge’s frustration at Ms Davis’ efforts to delay the hearing of the respondents’ application is understandable. When it became clear that the Judge would not brook her attempt to avoid the hearing, Ms Davis fell back, some minutes before the hearing, on offering to make herself available by telephone. The Judge declined. The better course may have been for him to have permitted Ms Davis the opportunity to have been heard orally notwithstanding how circumstances had unfolded to that point. However, strictly, it was not necessary to convene a hearing for the purpose of making unless orders.
21 Davis v McNeilly, above n 3, at [9].
22 At [22].
23 Davis v McNeilly [2024] NZCA 599.
24 Davis v McNeilly [2025] NZSC 25.
25 At [4].
[24] Ms Davis had filed written material with the Court, none of which addressed her fundamental non-compliance with the earlier orders, or offered any explanation for her non-compliance. There were no good reasons for not making the unless orders as sought by the respondents. None were articulated in the material Ms Davis put before the Court, nor were any advanced on the appeal before this Court that would suggest that, on the merits, the orders should not have been granted. The breaches of the Court’s orders were obvious. Ms Davis has now been heard by this Court on the unless orders. Apart from embarking on a discursive attack on the integrity of the District Court Judge, she has failed to identify a reason they should not have been issued. I do not consider there is any basis upon which to conclude the orders were unwarranted.
[25] Ms Davis submitted that, circumstantially, the District Court’s failure to engage in case management prejudiced her standing in the proceeding, and that the allocation of a conference (presumably in respect of the respondents’ application for unless orders) would have addressed her concerns about Judge Robinson. These were ultimately the same concerns that prompted Ms Davis to bring proceedings against that Judge in the High Court, which she appealed to the Court of Appeal and then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. I do not consider that a case management conference would have assisted Ms Davis in the manner she contends.
[26] I can see no basis for Ms Davis’ claim there were no grounds for the District Court to have made any order for costs or discovery “in the proceeding appealed from”. No grounds capable of argument were proffered. The District Court imposed an unless order that Ms Davis pay the costs arising from the first and second interlocutory decisions. It was entirely conventional for the District Court to have made such orders in the ordinary way with costs following the event.
[27] Judge Turner also awarded indemnity costs in favour of the respondents. That was a decision open to the District Court Judge. He explained why he made such an order:26
Put bluntly, [Ms Davis] ha[d] persistently and deliberately refused, over a lengthy period of time, to comply with the orders of the Court. The
26 Davis v McNeilly, above n 1, at [13(d)].
[respondents] ha[d] previously consented to extensions of time to enable [Ms Davis] to comply with the discovery order, and have advised the plaintiff of steps it would take should those orders not be complied with. [Ms Davis’] failure is deliberate, prolonged and inexcusable.
[28] Similar comments were made of Ms Davis by Judge Robinson in the first interlocutory decision:27
[137] The plaintiff’s conduct of the matter has been far from satisfactory (even allowing for her being a litigant in person). The pleadings, evidence and submissions filed have been prolix, unfocussed, repetitive, and in several respects advanced matters that were plainly irrelevant or unarguable.
[138]An award of costs against the plaintiff is appropriate. …
[29] I also reject the submission that the costs order made defeated the purpose of the Harmful Digital Communications Act. As noted, a costs order is a general juridical consequence of being the unsuccessful party to a proceeding. I can find no error in the Judge’s decision to award indemnity costs in favour of the respondents. I also cannot find any breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act nor the Human Rights Act in the terms Ms Davis alleges.
[30] Lastly, Ms Davis seeks leave to “adduce evidence of other persons having been encouraged to engage in related harmful digital communications, so as for all such persons to be subject to the above orders”. Because I have not granted the orders sought, I see no basis upon which to allow the unparticularised evidence Ms Davis seeks to introduce to be admitted, none of which appears to have any bearing on the appeal.
Outcome
[31]The appeal is dismissed.
Solicitors:
Russell McVeagh, Auckland
Copy to:
Artemis Davis, Dannevirke
27 Davis v McNeilly, above n 2.
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