Davis v Hussey

[2025] NZHC 2056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2025-485-443

[2025] NZHC 2056

BETWEEN

ARTEMIS INDIGO DELILAH DAVIS

Appellant

AND

SARAH LEE HUSSEY

First Respondent

BATH STREET TAP ROOM LIMITED

Second Respondent

CIV-2025-485-441

BETWEEN

ARTEMIS INDIGO DELILAH DAVIS

Applicant

AND

WELLINGTON HIGH COURT

Respondent

On the papers:
Counsel:	Appellant/Applicant in person
Judgment:	25 July 2025

JUDGMENT OF GRAU J

[1]                Artemis Davis’ notice of appeal dated 27 March 2025 and statement of claim for judicial review dated 15 July 2025 have been referred to me by the Registrar under r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) on the basis that on their face, they are plainly an abuse of the process of the Court.

DAVIS v HUSSEY [2025] NZHC 2056 [25 July 2025]

Relevant law

[2]                If I consider that the documents amount to such an abuse of process, under     r 5.35B of the HCR, I may make any orders or give any directions to ensure the proceeding is disposed of, or that it proceeds in a manner that complies with the HCR, including striking out or staying the proceeding under r 15.1 of the HCR.

[3]                When deciding to strike out a proceeding under r 5.35B of the HCR, the Court must determine:1

(a)whether it would be manifestly unfair to the defendants that they be required to respond; and

(b)whether right thinking people would regard this Court as exercising very poor control of its processes if it were to allow the document to be regarded as a proper document, or if it were to allow the proceeding to proceed further.2

[4]                The power under r 5.35B must be exercised sparingly, and only in the clearest of cases, given that the rule contemplates a litigant being denied the fundamental right of access to the courts, with the possibility of the proceeding being halted before it is even served.3

[5]                When considering the application of r 5.35B, the Court must take into account the broad public interest, as well as the private interests of individuals who may otherwise be drawn into entirely unmeritorious proceedings. That must be weighed against the right of a litigant to bring proceedings.4

Notice of appeal

[6]The notice of appeal states that Ms Davis is appealing:

1      Mathiesen v Slevin [2018] NZHC 1032, (2018) 25 PRNZ 116 at [6] citing Mathiesen v Fildes

[2017] NZHC 2258.

2      O’Neill v Judicial Conduct Commissioner [2023] NZCA 152 at [30].

3      Te Wakaminenga o Nga Hapu ki Waitangi v Waitangi National Trust Board [2023] NZCA 63.

4      Jones v New Zealand Bloodstock Finance and Leasing Ltd [2021] NZHC 3220 at [20].

against the determinations of the Human Rights Review Tribunal of New Zealand, appealing the entire minute of the Deputy Chairperson dated 25 February 2025, in respect of the Tribunal having acted with reckless disregard for the truth when seeking to pervert the due course of justice  in  contravention  of  the  provisions  of  the  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27.

[7]                Two specific grounds of appeal are listed. Both involve an allegation of the Human Rights Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) acting with reckless disregard for the truth. The second ground also includes that the Tribunal failed to provide Ms Davis an opportunity to advance submissions in respect of issues to be determined at trial and appears to allege that she never agreed to the restrictions the Tribunal imposed.

[8]                The relief sought is an order setting aside “every minute” issued by the Tribunal since November 2024, an order that the Deputy Chairperson recuses himself, a declaration that the Tribunal has breached s 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and a direction to the Tribunal to allocate a case management conference to determine the trial issues.

[9]                The decision Ms Davis purports to appeal is a minute of the Deputy Chairperson “regarding interlocutory matters” which followed a telephone conference. The minute noted Ms Davis’ opposition to the issues for determination set out in a previous minute and said the Tribunal declined to discuss the trial issues further. It also dealt with discovery, a concern Ms Davis raised about s 109 of the Privacy Act 2020, and an extension of time for filing evidence.

[10]            The Wellington High Court Registry received Ms Davis’ notice of appeal on 27 March 2025. Ms Davis sought a fee waiver. The Registry asked her for evidence to support her application for a fee waiver. It appears that Ms Davis did not provide that evidence to the Registry until 15 July 2025 when she also filed a statement of claim for judicial review. It also appears Ms Davis believes she did earlier provide the requested evidence. She told the Registry that “all information was provided months ago you fucking blubbering morons”.

Statement of claim for judicial review

[11]            Ms Davis’ statement of claim refers to the notice of appeal sent to the Wellington Registry appealing against the Tribunal minute, as set out above. It states

a cause of action, being “Breach of MagnaCarta 1297, c.29, misfeasance in public office”.

[12]            The statement of claim asserts that the Registry has caused undue delay when failing to allocate a case management conference for the appeal, despite that more than three months has passed since the notice of appeal was filed. The relief sought is a writ of mandamus, ordering the Registrar to allocate a case management conference for the appeal, and an award of punitive damages of $10,000.

Discussion

Notice of appeal

[13]            It is apparent that the Tribunal has not yet made a final determination in     Ms Davis’ proceeding before it. Her appeal relates to decisions made on preliminary matters.

[14]            Section 123 of the Human Rights Act 1993 provides for appeals to the High Court from the Tribunal and the basis upon which such appeals may be brought. Two provisions are relevant. The first is s 123(1) and the second is s 95. They are set out as follows:

123     Appeals to High Court

(1)Where any party is dissatisfied with any interim order made by the Chairperson or a Deputy Chairperson under section 95, that party may appeal to the High Court against the whole or part of that order.

(2)A party to a proceeding under section 92B or section 92E may appeal to the High Court against all or any part of a decision of the Tribunal—

(a)dismissing the proceeding; or

(b)granting 1 or more of the remedies described in section 92I; or

(c)granting the remedy described in section 92J; or

(d)refusing to grant the remedy described in section 92J; or

(e)constituting a final determination of the Tribunal in the proceeding.

…

95       Power to make an interim order

(1)In respect of any matter in which the Tribunal has jurisdiction under this Act to make any final determination, the Chairperson of the Tribunal shall have power to make an interim order if he or she is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to make the order to preserve the position of the parties pending a final determination of the proceedings.

(2)An application for an interim order may be made,—

(a)in the case of proceedings under section 92B(1), (2), (3), or (4), by the person or body bringing the proceedings; and

(b)in the case of proceedings under section 92E, by the Commission.

…

[15]            In Attorney-General v Child Poverty Action Group Inc, the High Court observed that Parliament has prescribed that final determinations of the Tribunal are the only decisions that can be appealed.5 The Court said:6

Parliament has decided that the only decisions of the Tribunal that can be appealed are final determinations of the Tribunal in one form or another. They could if they had chosen, have allowed appeals from rulings on preliminary points. They chose not to do so.

[16]            In that case, the High Court held that a decision not to strike out or dismiss a claim was an interlocutory decision and there was no right of appeal from such a decision.

[17]            Similarly in this case, interlocutory decisions have been made by the Tribunal. The decisions are not final determinations. Nor are the decisions within the ambit of s 95. They are not orders made to preserve the position of the parties pending a final determination of the proceedings.

[18]            Accordingly, the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against this interlocutory decision of the Tribunal.

5      Attorney-General v Child Poverty Action Group Inc [2007] NZAR 67 (HC).

6 At [21].

Statement of claim for judicial review

[19]            This purported judicial proceeding is an abuse of process. I have reviewed the correspondence between Ms Davis and the Registry that relates to the filing of this appeal. Ms Davis did not respond to the Registry’s request for information to support the application for a fee waiver. The Registry did not refuse to accept the appeal for filing, nor did they cause any delay. Although Ms Davis believes otherwise, Ms Davis did not respond to the Registry’s request until the day she filed her statement of claim for judicial review. I note here, however, that the misapprehension may have arisen because it appears Ms Davis earlier this year filed an affidavit setting out their assets and liabilities pursuant to a direction of Grice J made in relation to a different appeal.7

[20]            In any case, however, decisions of Registrars are not amenable to judicial review. The appropriate course is review under r 2.11 of the HCR or s 160 of the Senior Courts Act 2016. However, even if judicial review was available, there is no valid cause of action.

[21]            Finally, the application for judicial review is moot, and the relief sought is unavailable. As noted above, Ms Davis has now provided the information the Registry asked her for on 4 April 2025, and, as above, I have found there is no jurisdiction for this Court to hear her proposed appeal.

[22]            In such circumstances, it is clear it would be manifestly unfair to require the defendant to respond, and the Court would be regarded as having very poor control of its processes if it were to allow what is clearly an unmeritorious claim to proceed.

Result

[23]            The Court has no jurisdiction to hear Ms Davis’ proposed appeal and it is struck out.

[24]The statement of claim for judicial review is also struck out.

7      Davis v Hussey [2025] NZHC 783.

[25]            Under r 5.35B(3), I am required to advise Ms Davis that, under s 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, she has the right to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal in accordance with the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.

Grau J