D v Police HC Auckland CRI 2006-404-141

Case

[2006] NZHC 747

30 June 2006

No judgment structure available for this case.

This case has been anonymized

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI 2006-404-000141

BETWEEN  D

Appellant

AND  POLICE Respondent

Hearing:         30 June 2006

Appearances: Appellant in Person

MR Harborow for  Respondent

Judgment:      30 June 2006

JUDGMENT OF COOPER J

Solicitors:

Meredith Connell, Crown Solicitors, PO Box 2213, Upper Shortland Street, Auckland.

Copy to:

MRC D  , PO Box 22707, Otahuhu, Auckland

D V POLICE HC AK CRI 2006-404-000141  30 June 2006

[1]      Mr D   was convicted in the District Court by Justices of the Peace who found him guilty of three offences under the Transport (Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licensing) Act  1986.   He faced two  charges of using a  motor vehicle that was not licensed, respectively on 1 and 24 October 2004.   The third offence charged was that he had used a motor vehicle without registration plates affixed in the prescribed manner, again on 24 October 2004.

[2]      All of these charges were laid under s 5(1)(b) of the Act.

[3]      The appellant gave evidence before the Justices.  In it, the only issue raised as a defence concerned allegations that  the vehicle  in  question  was  registered  and licensed by an entity described as the “Maori Government of Aotearoa”.  Mr D   stated in evidence before the Justices that:

At the time when I was pulled over I told the officer that the vehicle was de- registered in their system which they found true, and re-registered with the Maori Government.  The answer from the officer at the time was “well these plates belong to our Government, tell your Government to get their own”. So there was no denying or trying to hide Sir, that the fact was put across that  the  vehicle  was  registered  lawfully  to  the  Maori  Government  of Aotearoa, Transport.

[4]      Another theme that was part of the defence was that Mr D   should not have been charged;   the charges should have been brought against the Maori Government of Aotearoa as it was the authority upon which he relied for the validity of the plates.

[5]      Consistently with that kind of argument I was at the outset of today’s hearing addressed by a Mr Travis Rapanatahu, who informed me that he was the Minister of Justice  of the  Maori Government  of  Aotearoa  and  a  lawyer  authorised  by  that Government to practise.

[6]      He was not seeking to represent Mr D   or to be his McKenzie Friend.  I asked him to withdraw as I did not see that he had a relevant right to address me.  He withdrew accordingly.

[7]      In advancing his appeal, Mr D  , who has presented to me as an articulate person, has rehearsed the argument which has become familiar in this Court about the ability of an alternative government to  make laws, which can be applied  in substitution for those which apply generally to persons who do not recognise the Maori Government.  These arguments cannot succeed.

[8]      Comparatively recently Lang J dealt with an appeal by the same appellant, involving similar charges.  Lang J in his decision delivered on 30 September 2005 referred  to  the  well  known  authority  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  R  v  Mitchell (CA68/04, 23 August 2004).  At paragraph [14] of that decision the Court said:

[14]     This Court has made it plain on a number of occasions now that arguments  that  are based upon an assertion  that  the Parliament  of  New Zealand was not authorised to make law affecting some or all of the persons living in New Zealand cannot succeed before it. Our courts are bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament, including the Land Transport Act

1998.  Although  this  issue  does  involve  a  point  of  law,  Mr  Mitchell’s

proposition has been squarely rejected on many occasions in the High Court and Court of Appeal. No useful purpose would be served in retraversing the authorities. Mr Mitchell was perfectly familiar with them, and indeed was physically in possession of some of those authorities before us, including Knowles. He just does not accept them. He is not entitled to put himself outside the law of New Zealand.

[9]      Lang J  recorded  at  paragraph  [18]  of  his  judgment  his  view  that  the arguments advanced by Mr D   in the case before him were along similar lines to those that were advanced in Mitchell.  I am of the same view.  I acknowledge that there is here a difference from the arguments that one sometimes hears because Mr D   contends that he is not seeking to challenge the authority of the New Zealand Government, rather, he is seeking to raise as an alternative source of authority the Maori Government of Aotearoa.  That argument, of course, nevertheless rests on the possibility that there are parts of New Zealand or persons living in this country who may elect as to which authority they choose to recognise.  The possibility that there might be two governments in this country is really no different from an assertion that the New Zealand government that is generally recognised lacks legislative capacity, which is the argument one more often confronts.

[10]     Ultimately, there can only be one government of New Zealand and that is the government whose legislative actions the Courts must accept.  I have no option in

accordance with the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Mitchell but to dismiss the appeal and it will be dismissed accordingly.

[11]     Mr Harborow, for the Crown, however, also seeks an award of costs in the sum of $750.  Once again he is able to rely on what was said by the Court of Appeal in paragraph [16] in R v Mitchell.  He also referred me to the decision of Frater J in Manukau v Police (unreported HC AK CRI 2005-404-000368, 9 March 2006).  That case, like this, was a situation where very similar arguments had been advanced notwithstanding their rejection in previously decided decisions of this Court.

[12]     I agree that this is an appropriate case for such an award and I direct that on the dismissal of the appeal Mr D   is to pay $750 in costs to the Crown.

[13]     For the reasons I have given, the appeal is dismissed.

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