NOTE: THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE APPELLANT AND OF HER CLAIM OR STATUS MUST BE MAINTAINED PURSUANT TO S 151 OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT 2009.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2015-404-001315 [2015] NZHC 2458
UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1908 IN THE MATTER
of an application for judicial review of a decision under s 194 of the Immigration Act 2009
BETWEEN
D Applicant
AND
IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND
First Respondent
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT Second Respondent
Hearing: 16 September 2015 Appearances:
J R S Lewis for Applicant
C Fleming for Second RespondentJudgment:
8 October 2015
JUDGMENT OF GILBERT J
This judgment is delivered by me on 8 October 2015 at 2.30 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar
D v IMMIGRATION & PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NZ & ANOR [2015] NZHC 2458 [8 October 2015]
Introduction
[1] Ms D, a Fijian citizen, arrived in New Zealand on a visitor visa in 2009. She applied for the grant of refugee status in September 2013 but this was declined in January 2014. The Immigration and Protection Tribunal dismissed Ms D’s appeal and notified her of its decision on 12 May 2015.
[2] Ms D wishes to seek judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The present judicial review proceeding was accordingly filed in this Court on 9 June 2015. However, Ms D’s solicitors overlooked the requirement under s 249 of the Immigration Act 2009 to seek leave before filing the proceeding. In terms of s 249(4), an application for leave must be made not later than 28 days after the Tribunal’s decision is notified to the person bringing the proceeding. The 28 day period expired on 10 June 2015, before her solicitors discovered the error.
[3] The second respondent contends that this oversight is fatal because there is no jurisdiction to consider an application for leave made outside the 28 day period unless an application to extend the time limit has been made before expiry of the time limit. The Second Respondent therefore appears under protest to jurisdiction and applies for an order that the proceeding be dismissed pursuant to r 5.49 of the High Court Rules. Ms D cross applies for “out of time leave” to bring judicial proceedings. This application is brought in reliance on r 1.9 of the High Court Rules which enables the Court to amend defects or errors in pleadings or procedure.
Statutory requirement for leave
[4] Section 249 of the Act provides:
249 Restriction on judicial review of matters within Tribunal’s
jurisdiction
(1) No review proceedings may be brought in any court in respect of a decision where the decision (or the effect of the decision) may be subject to an appeal to the Tribunal under this Act unless an appeal is made and the Tribunal issues final determinations on all aspects of the appeal.
(2) No review proceedings may be brought…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read D v Immigration and Protection Tribunal and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2458
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the application for leave could be treated as having been made in time and whether the Court had power to extend the time limit. The court found that none of the documents filed on 9 June 2015 could be treated as an application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings. The affidavit filed on that day was a sworn statement of evidence and not a pleading or a procedure. The court found that the Court’s broad powers of amendment under r 1.9 of the High Court Rules could not be used to reconstitute the affidavit as an application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings. The statement of claim could not be treated as an application for leave because it was filed outside the statutory time limit. The court found that s 247(1)(a) of the Act, which provides for an extension of time in special circumstances, did not apply because leave was required under s 249(3) and the time for applying for leave was governed by s 249(4).
Ms D’s application for “out of time leave” to bring judicial review proceedings was dismissed. The Second Respondent’s application was granted. The proceeding was dismissed. The Second Respondent was entitled to costs of the proceeding calculated on a 2B basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.