Crowley v Police
[2025] NZHC 2757
•22 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE
CRI-2025-454-20
[2025] NZHC 2757
BETWEEN DANIEL CROWLEY
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 3 September 2025 Appearances:
J J Harvey for Appellant
A R Barham for Respondent
Judgment:
22 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF McHERRON J
[1] On 23 May 2025, Mr Daniel Crowley (the appellant) was sentenced by Judge Krebs in the Palmerston North District Court to two years and seven months’ imprisonment on the following charges:1
(a)possession of cannabis plant for supply;2
(b)intentionally manufacturing a firearm x 2;3
(c)unlawful possession of a firearm;4 and
(d)unlawful possession of ammunition.5
1 Police v Crowley [2025] NZDC 10845 [Judgment under appeal].
2 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(f) and (2)(c)—maximum penalty of eight years’ imprisonment.
3 Arms Act 1983, s 55D(1)(a) and (2)—maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment.
4 Section 45(1)—maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment and/or a $5,000 fine.
5 Section 22B—maximum penalty of a $1,000 fine.
CROWLEY v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 2757 [22 September 2025]
[2] The appellant appeals against his sentence. He says home detention or a lower sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed.
Background
Criminal history
[3] The appellant has only one prior conviction, for possession of cannabis. His counsel, Mr Harvey, submits that the appellant was about 20 at the time, that it was a very small quantity of cannabis, and that he was fined $175 plus court costs.
Revocation of the appellant’s firearms licence
[4] On 21 December 2021, the appellant’s firearms licence was revoked following a suspension review deeming him not to be a fit and proper person.
The offending
[5] On 5 August 2024, police executed a warrantless search for firearms in relation to a threat made by a person living at the appellant’s address. A large quantity of cannabis was located by police in a bag next to the appellant’s bed.
[6] Later that day, a search warrant was granted by Palmerston North District Court relating to firearms and cannabis at the address. Further searching of the address yielded 1.403 kg of cannabis along with scales and ziplock bags. Of the total seized, police assessed 886 grams was useable, comprising 624 grams of cabbage leaf/material and 262 grams of cannabis head.
[7] A 3D printer was also found in the appellant’s lounge during the search of the address. Police located boxes containing a large number of 3D-printed parts for a Harlot .22 single shot pistol, a VP-22 single shot pistol and an HD22 semi-automatic rifle.
[8] Police located an operational 3D-printed Harlot .22 single shot pistol in the appellant’s bedside drawer, alongside an operational 3D-printed VP-22 single shot pistol. A Magtech .22 long range semi-automatic rifle was found under the appellant’s
bed. Police also located 29 .22 Remington rounds, two shotgun shells and 16 rounds of .22 ammunition.
[9] The appellant admitted to possessing the cannabis and selling small amounts, but said most was for personal use only. He also acknowledged possessing the .22 rifle and ammunition, and said the rifle had been missed when his other firearms were removed by police after his licence was revoked. He admitted making the 3D-printed firearms.
Pre-sentence report
[10] The pre-sentence report completed on 6 May 2025 assessed the appellant’s risk of reoffending as low, given his lack of conviction history. However, he was assessed as having a medium risk of harm, as his convictions involved firearms manufacture and possession. The report writer noted that the appellant said he had been too busy to drop the Magtech .22LR semi-automatic rifle to his uncle, who had his other firearms. The appellant stated that he manufactured the firearms as he could not accept the loss of his firearms licence and wanted to retain the option of going hunting to provide meat for his family. The report writer says the appellant did not demonstrate regret for his actions. Rather, he only verbalised remorse after realising the serious nature of his offending and the impact it had on his partner and children, among other matters.
[11] The report notes that the appellant had sole custody for one of his children, who is 14 years old. He also shared custody of his two other children who are 12 and 10 years old. His children experience a number of challenges. The appellant attended Te Manawa five times in April 2025, to support his children with their counselling.
[12] The appellant is also the primary caregiver/helper for his partner. The appellant assists her to perform her daily activities like going to appointments, transport, and assisting her with shopping. The report observes the appellant also has health issues of his own, namely diabetes and recurrent episodes of gout that affect his ankles.
[13] The report writer recommended intensive supervision be imposed on the appellant to allow community probation oversight of him while he addressed his offending related factors.
District Court decision
[14] In his sentencing decision, Judge Krebs described the appellant’s “sense of entitlement around firearms”. This suggested he lacked regard for the need for a licence to possess firearms, but was determined to possess and use them for hunting regardless. The Judge also considered the appellant’s expression of remorse to be somewhat self-centred on the effects for him and the way he is perceived by his family. However, the Judge acknowledged the appellant’s significant remorse for manufacturing the firearms, noting he accepted it was a dumb decision.
[15] The Judge referred to McLaren v Police where a starting point of three years’ imprisonment was upheld for manufacturing a 3D-printed pistol, a large number of other printed firearm parts, and ammunition.6 He noted that at the appellant’s address a box containing numerous firearm parts was found, alongside the two operational pistols and 40 rounds of ammunition.
[16] The Judge also referred to Rawiri v R, in which possession of a single firearm with no mitigating circumstances attracted a starting point in the vicinity of two to three years.7
[17] Judge Krebs adopted a starting point of two and half years on the lead charges of manufacturing 3D-printed firearms, uplifted by 12 months for the semi-automatic rifle found under the appellant’s bed. He considered the sale of cannabis charge was in band two of Terewi,8 and added a further six months for that. Considered together, these offences resulted in an overall starting point of four years’ imprisonment.
[18]The Judge applied reductions of:
6 McLaren v Police [2025] NZHC 518.
7 Rawiri v R [2021] NZHC 1573.
8 R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at [4].
(a)25 per cent for the appellant’s guilty pleas, which were at “a relatively early opportunity”; and
(b)10 per cent for the appellant’s health issues, noting they mean a sentence of imprisonment would be more difficult for him.
[19] The end sentence was two years and seven months’ imprisonment. The Judge observed that even if the sentence was of a short duration, given the seriousness of the charges he would not have considered home detention to be the least restrictive outcome that was appropriate in the circumstances.9
Approach to sentence appeal
[20] I must allow the appeal if I am satisfied that, for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction and a different sentence should be imposed.10 I must dismiss the appeal in any other case.11
[21]An appellate court will not intervene:
(a)where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles;12 and
(b)unless the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.13
Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
[22] Mr Harvey, for the appellant, takes no issue with the starting point of two and a half years’ imprisonment for the lead charge of manufacturing firearms. However, he submits that the uplift for the possession of the Magtech semi-automatic rifle was
9 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(1)(g).
10 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).
11 Section 250(3).
12 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].
13 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
excessive, given this was a case of careless and illegal retention of a firearm, rather than purchasing or stealing a firearm. He argues an uplift of six months would have been appropriate, on the basis the stand-alone starting point for possession of that rifle would have been 12 months.
[23] Mr Harvey also submits that the uplift for the cannabis charge was excessive. This is because the volume of cannabis head or ‘bud’, which he says is the only properly useable part of the cannabis plant, only amounted to 262 grams. Mr Harvey refers to R v Coe, in which Brewer J excluded a quantity of cannabis leaf from the amount to be considered in sentencing Mr Coe on the basis that “[i]t has little or no commercial value and the quantity here is not worth worrying about”.14
[24] He accordingly argues that the cannabis offending here falls well below band two of Terewi and that therefore an uplift of no more than three months would have been appropriate.
[25] Additionally, while no issue is taken with the guilty plea reduction, Mr Harvey says the appellant should have been treated as having no previous convictions and received a reduction. The appellant was convicted and sentenced for possession of cannabis in 2008. But Mr Harvey submits that if it had occurred in more recent times the appellant would not have been convicted.15 Mr Harvey says a reduction of five to 10 per cent should have been available.
[26] Mr Harvey also submits that the 10 per cent reduction for personal factors was inadequate. He says the appellant’s own health problems and background factors were capable of warranting a 10 per cent allowance on their own. He notes the appellant suffers from gout, diabetes, and an abnormal lipid profile, as well as severe anxiety, making his prison stay significantly more difficult. He also observes that the appellant was raised around firearms, and that they are a key component of his identity. He says the Judge was wrong to say the appellant’s attitude showed entitlement. Rather, the appellant’s illegal conduct was a desperate attempt to hold on to an important part of himself. Mr Harvey also points out that the appellant has attended counselling
14 R v Coe [2012] NZHC 3242 at [6].
15 Given the amendment to the provision in 2019.
sessions and has engaged with Te Kete Hauora o Rangitane to work on his anxiety, decision-making and welfare. Furthermore, Mr Harvey says a separate discrete reduction should have been made for the impact on the appellant’s partner and children. This is so because they have their own challenges, he has sole custody of one of his children, and he takes his children to school. Accordingly, Mr Harvey says an overall reduction of 20 per cent for mitigating factors was available.
[27] Mr Harvey suggests a starting point of two and a half years, with a nine-month uplift for the cannabis and firearms charges, a 25 per cent guilty plea reduction, a 20 per cent reduction for personal factors, and five per cent reduction for previous good character. This results in an end sentence of approximately 19 months. He says a sentence of home detention should be imposed, and notes this is a deterrent sentence in its own right. If the Court was willing to grant home detention, Mr Harvey notes that, as the appellant has spent three months in prison, a reduction of three months would be appropriate, resulting in six and a half months’ home detention.
Respondent’s submissions
[28] Ms Barham, for the New Zealand Police, submits that the Judge did not err in imposing a 12-month uplift for the possession of a firearm charge. She says the Court of Appeal has consistently upheld uplifts of between 12 and 18 months’ imprisonment where those involved in drug dealing are found with firearms in their possession. She says that while this case does not have aggravating factors of carrying a firearm in public or gang connections, the firearms offending cannot be divorced entirely from the appellant’s cannabis charges. Additionally, she says this is not a case of a single bolt action firearm that was forgotten after a licence was revoked. Rather, the appellant knew the semi-automatic firearm and ammunition remained in his possession and was aware he needed to hand it in. Instead, he retained it and went on to manufacture further firearms.
[29] With respect to the uplift for the cannabis charge, Ms Barham says without expert evidence to support the argument that cannabis leaf has little use, the Court cannot ignore the fact that the 624 grams of leaf was included in the total useable quantity of 886 grams stated in the agreed summary of facts to which the appellant
pleaded guilty. She says the fact the appellant was found with scales, ziplock bags and a large quantity of cannabis, alongside his admission of actual sales, means a starting point within the lower end of band two of Terewi is justified. She submits that a stand- alone starting point of at least 18 months would have been appropriate, even if only the 262 grams of cannabis head was considered. Therefore, a six-month uplift was entirely within range and not manifestly excessive. To support this submission, Ms Barham refers to Gray v R, in which the Court of Appeal held that one charge of possession of cannabis for supply involving 286 grams of cannabis would attract a starting point of 18 months’ to three years’ imprisonment.16
[30] Ms Barham does not agree that a reduction for lack of convictions or previous good character is available. She notes the rationale for previous good character reductions is to recognise that a fall from grace is punishment itself, and the greater potential for rehabilitation where good character indicates a reduced possibility of re- offending. While she agrees the appellant likely would not receive a conviction for his prior cannabis offending if it had occurred more recently, the reality is he does have a prior conviction and so the fall from grace is different from someone with an unblemished criminal record. His prior conviction also suggests illegal cannabis use continues to be an issue for him, so the assessment of likelihood of reoffending is different from that applicable to a first time offender. Ms Barham says that while the appellant has undertaken some counselling, it does not seem to be targeted towards addiction issues. She submits that, rather than a good character reduction, the better argument might be around mitigation that proven addiction factors can have when a causative link to offending is established.
[31] Ms Barham takes no issue with a further reduction being available for the appellant for the impact on his children and partner, even though this was not raised at the sentencing. However, she does not consider a further reduction for background factors, to recognise the appellant’s interest in firearms, is available. She says the Judge did not err in finding the appellant’s comments around hunting and his attachment to firearms showed a degree of unfounded entitlement, particularly when
16 Gray v R [2015] NZCA 297 at [12].
his licence had been revoked. Moreover, the pistols the appellant has manufactured do not appear to be designed primarily for hunting.
[32] Ms Barham acknowledges that if further reductions of 15 per cent or more are found to be warranted for impacts to the appellant’s family and potentially addiction factors, this would bring the end sentence in range for home detention. She says no issue can be taken that the firearms offending is serious, and notes Judge Krebs’ comment that the 2020 amendments to the Arms Act signalled Parliament’s intention that a stern approach is to be taken to those who manufacture firearms.17 However, she also says no issue is taken with the appellant’s submissions that home detention is still a punitive sentence. She notes, however, the appellant would remain unable to transport his children or help his partner in the same way as before if his sentence is converted to home detention.
My assessment
[33] I agree with Ms Barham that the starting point arrived at by the sentencing Judge was neither manifestly excessive nor outside of the range available. No issue is taken with the starting point for the lead charges of intentionally manufacturing a firearm. I also agree the initial starting point of two and a half years’ imprisonment was well within range, given the decision in McLaren. In that decision, Eaton J noted the 2020 amendments to the Arms Act followed the mosque terrorist attacks in Christchurch. The amendments introduced a number of new offences including, relevant to that case and the present appeal, offences relating to the illegal manufacturing of certain arms items.18 Eaton J also referred to the explanatory note for the Bill, which states:
(a)it reflected a single broad policy, being to improve public safety by imposing tighter controls on the use and possession of firearms;19
17 Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [12], referring to McLaren v Police, above n 6.
18 Arms Act, s 55D.
19 McLaren v Police, above n 6, at [36].
(b)one of the policy goals of the Bill was to allow New Zealand to accede to the UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking of Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition.
[34] Eaton J considered that the purpose of s 55D of the Arms Act goes beyond targeting gangs:20
Firearms manufactured whether using a 3D printer or otherwise will not be recorded in a firearms register and cannot be traced by police. Unlawfully manufactured firearms defeat the core objective of the firearms register, undermining the fundamental purpose of the legislation being to deter any unauthorised persons from engaging in the manufacture of a firearm and to ensure all firearms are registered and traceable by police. Manufacturing firearms with a 3D printer or otherwise undermines this purpose as the weapons are difficult to detect, impossible to trace, and subvert the usual regulatory measures intended to reduce harm from firearms in New Zealand.
[35] With regard to the uplift for the possession of the Magtech semi-automatic rifle, I accept that there is no tariff decision for possession of firearms. However, I note the comment of the Court of Appeal in the recent decision of Campbell, that possession of a single firearm with no mitigating circumstances generally calls for a starting point in the vicinity of two to three years’ imprisonment.21
[36] I do not consider the cases of Burns v Police22 and Long v Police,23 referred to by Mr Harvey, assist here. Burns v Police concerned a modified firearm, namely a sawn-off shotgun, and Long v Police involved only one operational firearm, with no connection to other offending. Long was also decided prior to the 2020 amendments to the Arms Act to which I have referred.
[37] I reject Mr Harvey’s submission that the retention of the Magtech firearm can be described as careless. Although the appellant did not purchase the firearm after his licence was revoked, he was aware he needed to hand it in, but failed to do so. I do not accept the appellant’s explanation that he was too busy to drop the rifle off to his uncle. This ignores the circumstances in which the rifle was found, unsecured under the appellant’s bed, with ammunition nearby, in a house in which at least one child
20 At [38].
21 Campbell v R [2022] NZCA 579 at [18].
22 Burns v Police [2021] NZHC 1589.
23 Long v Police HC Palmerston North CRI-2009-454-39, 8 October 2009.
lived, and from where drugs were being sold. Bearing in mind these aggravating features, I consider the 12-month uplift was well within the range available to the Judge and indeed was lenient.
[38] In respect of the uplift for the appellant’s cannabis offending, again the Judge sentenced on the basis of the agreed summary of facts, which states that the useable quantity of cannabis was 886 grams. I am not persuaded that what the Judge did was incorrect. In Paul v R the Court of Appeal noted cannabis leaf was used to manufacture cannabis oil and hashish.24 And in Hassall v Police, production of approximately 140 grams of cannabis oil by cooking about one pound (454 grams) of cannabis leaf attracted a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment.25 While there is no evidence the appellant intended to use the cannabis leaf for this purpose, I am unwilling to accept the leaf should not be included in the amount of cannabis in the appellant’s possession. The agreed summary of facts were the facts of the offending to which the appellant pleaded guilty, and no application was made to admit new evidence on appeal as to the amount of cannabis found. Accordingly, I do not intend to undermine this previously accepted aspect of the factual matrix of the offending.
[39]Nor do I consider the cases relied on by Mr Harvey, namely Devereux26 and
Rauhihi,27 are helpful here. The defendant Mr Drake in Devereux only possessed
110.74 grams of cannabis and also possessed methamphetamine. Rauhihi concerned a number of mature cannabis plants along with 326 grams of cannabis material, with much less evidence of commerciality than in the present case. Given the quantity involved, I consider that the sentencing Judge correctly assessed that the cannabis offending fell into the lower end of band two of Terewi. Thus an uplift of six months was well within range.
[40] Therefore, I do not consider the adjusted starting point was outside of the range available. Indeed, it could have been higher, but still within range.
24 Paul v R [2011] NZCA 589 at [22].
25 Hassall v Police [2018] NZHC 487.
26 Devereux v Police [2017] NZHC 167.
27 R v Rauhihi HC Palmerston North CRI-2008-031-1438, 1 May 2009.
[41] I agree that the reduction for the appellant’s personal mitigating factors (outside of the guilty plea reduction) was on the low side. However, I do not agree that a reduction for previous good character is available. As noted by the Court of Appeal recently in Hore v R:28
A good character discount reflects two purposes. A defendant without prior convictions and otherwise of good character deserves leniency for an offence that represents an isolated fall from grace and because that fall may itself provide a degree of punishment; and a greater capacity for rehabilitation and reduced probabilities of reoffending may be inferred from previous good character.
(footnotes omitted)
[42] I do not consider this was an isolated fall from grace. The appellant has previously been convicted and sentenced for possession of cannabis, despite the penalty being a relatively minor fine. It is irrelevant that he would not have received a conviction for this conduct if it had occurred recently. The fact remains that he has a criminal record for offending that remains a crime. Accordingly, the additional impact of a fall from grace or impact on his reputation by this offending is less pronounced, bearing in mind that the offending and penalty here is much more serious than the prior offence. Additionally, it is hard to say the appellant has a greater capacity for rehabilitation and reduced probability of reoffending, when both his prior and current offending involved possession of cannabis.
[43] I also do not consider a reduction for the appellant’s attachment to firearms can be made. I consider this is an aggravating rather than mitigating factor, as it shows the appellant considers firearms a part of his identity justifying or at least rationalising his keeping firearms and 3D-printing new ones. I agree that the sentencing Judge was correct to find this displayed a sense of unjustified entitlement around firearms, rather than the desperation suggested by Mr Harvey. The appellant’s stated rationale of wanting to continue hunting to provide for his family does not explain why he decided to 3D-print firearms that appear to have limited use for hunting, namely pistols. Accordingly, I do not consider this attachment to firearms can be considered a
28 Hore v R [2024] NZCA 216 at [24] citing R v Findlay [2007] NZCA 533 at [89]–[91] and Taylor v R [2017] NZCA 574 at [24].
causative background factor that warrants a reduction, of the kind applied by the Supreme Court in Berkland.29
[44] While Ms Barham has suggested that a reduction could instead be available for proven addiction factors, there is no clear evidence to support the appellant being addicted to cannabis or other substances. He says the cannabis he possesses is primarily for personal use, and rationalises his use on the basis that it helps him self- medicate for the pain he experiences from his gout. However, the Alcohol, Smoking and Substance Involvement Screen Test (ASSIST), which uses self-reported information, resulted in the appellant scoring as a low risk for health and other problems from use of cannabis and a moderate risk of experiencing health and other problems from use of tobacco. Accordingly, I do not consider there is a sufficient evidential basis of a causative link between addiction and the appellant’s offending.
[45] However, I agree the 10 per cent reduction for the appellant’s health issues and the impact on his children and partner is too low. Were I sentencing him afresh, I would agree that a separate reduction for the impact on the appellant’s children and partner would be warranted, particularly when he has sole custody of one child aged 14, drives his children to school, and has a partner who is vision impaired and requires significant assistance from him. As noted in R v Harlen, the family situation of a convicted person, including where applicable the wellbeing of their children, will always be among the personal circumstances to which a sentencing judge is to have regard to.30 Furthermore, as observed by the Supreme Court in Philip, a consideration of all the relevant circumstances must include the child’s interests.31 Therefore, I would have given a further five to 10 per cent reduction for the impact on the appellant’s family, alongside the existing 10 per cent reduction for his health issues.
[46] However, standing back and assessing the overall sentence, I do not consider Judge Krebs’ sentence was manifestly excessive. As I have already explained, the Judge was lenient in setting the adjusted starting point, particularly in relation to the uplift for the semi-automatic rifle under the appellant’s bed.
29 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509.
30 R v Harlen (2001) 18 CRNZ 582 (CA) at [22].
31 Philip v R [2022] NZSC 149, [2022] 1 NZLR 571 at [56].
[47] As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Kumar v R, “the appellate court will intervene only where the trial court has exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible”.32 Overall, the sentence is appropriate and there is no material error. Mr Crowley’s final sentence is not manifestly excessive.
[48] Moreover, I note the Judge’s comment that, given what he viewed to be the seriousness of the charges, he would not have considered home detention to be the least restrictive option that was appropriate in the circumstances. By that, I take the Judge to have concluded that the purposes of denunciation, deterrence and community protection would not be met by a sentence other than imprisonment. On my assessment of Mr Crowley’s offending, this conclusion was open to the Judge.
Result
[49]I dismiss the appeal.
McHerron J
Solicitors:
BVA Law, Palmerston North for Respondent
32 Kumar v R [2015] NZCA 460 at [79], citing G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 (HL) at 651–652, quoting
Bellenden (formerly Satterthwaite) v Satterthwaite [1948] All ER 343 at 345.
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