Craig v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections

[2025] NZHC 1512

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE

CIV-2025-425-54 [2025] NZHC 1512

BETWEEN  KYLE JAMES CRAIG

Applicant

ANDCHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Respondent

Hearing:                   On the papers

Appearances:           Applicant in person (by AVL)

W S Taffs for Respondent

Judgment:                10 June 2025

ORAL JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

[1]On 9 June 2025 Mr Craig filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

[2]        Mr Craig faces four charges of breaching a protection order and his current detention is pursuant to a decision on a bail application made by Judge Harvey on  30 May 2025.1 Judge Harvey declined bail noting:

[29] The best predictor of future behaviour is to look at the past. I am very far from satisfied that this defendant is able to satisfy me that if granted bail he will not commit any offence involving violence against or danger to the safety of any person. His history would suggest that granting bail would be an extreme risk.

[3]        That history included the fact that Mr Craig had 93 criminal convictions, has had four protection orders made against him in respect of four different partners, has

1      New Zealand Police v Craig [2025] NZDC 12212.

CRAIG v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2025] NZHC 1512 [10 June 2025]

13 previous convictions for contravening protection orders, two convictions for breaching home detention, four for breaching community work, and one for breach of release conditions.

[4]        The Judge concluded his decision by saying that whether he considered the application under s 12 or under s 8 of the Bail Act, he would have “no confidence that if granted bail the defendant would not further offend”.

The application

[5]        As best as I can discern from his written application, Mr Craig is arguing that his detention is unlawful because:

(a)he does not consider that what he has been charged with is a crime;

(b)he has complaints about the conduct of the proceedings in  the  Family Court, including the actions of Oranga Tamariki, which he appears to believe led to his current imprisonment;

(c)he has a complaint about the alleged impartiality of Judge Harvey who directed the remand in custody;

(d)he believes his incarceration is part of a plan by his ex-partner to separate him from his children; and

(e)he believes his home address is suitable for bail, saying he has not “accosted, approached, visited or harmed (his partner) at all” and that the “victim/complainant-centric justice system” is being “weaponised” against him.

[6]        Today, in oral submissions, he has also suggested that his arrest by police was unlawful. However, as I explained him I can only consider the lawfulness of his current detention. He also made a number of other submissions, including wishing me to “strike out” the Bail Act and the Family Courts Act, amongst other legislation, and to accept other interlocutory applications, such as to have his charges struck out.

As I explained to him, these could not be entertained in the context of an application for a writ of habeas corpus.2

[7]        He also raised challenges to the merits of the various legislation, which is affecting him, including legislation such as the Family Violence Act. Again, I explained to him that I simply could not entertain those challenges in the context of this application.

Jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus

[8]        An application for a writ under the Habeas Corpus Act allows a person to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.3 As I confirmed with Mr Craig today, there is no question that he is detained. Accordingly, the onus passes to the respondent to establish the lawfulness of the detention.

[9]        This can be achieved by producing the warrant of commitment remanding him in custody as the respondent has done here.

[10]      While Mr Craig also sought to challenge the lawfulness of his detention pursuant to the police arrest, that detention is now moot since the bail decision. I was not prepared to look into it.

[11]      Furthermore, as I explained to Mr Craig in the minute I issued on receipt of his application, under s 14(2)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act, a Judge is not entitled to call into question a ruling as to bail by a Court of competent jurisdiction. As his current detention is the outcome of the District Court’s decision as to whether Mr Craig should be granted bail, this section is clearly engaged.

[12]      While I understand Mr Craig has complaints about both the decision to charge him, and about the merits of the decision to remand him in custody rather than grant him bail, the first is an issue to be dealt with in the substantive criminal hearing and the second should be raised using Mr Craig’s rights of appeal.

2      He also sought an adjournment of his application so he could provide more documents to the Court, but as he could not explain what relevance they would have to his application I declined the adjournment sought.

3      Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 6.

[13]      In a summary hearing such as this, there is simply no scope or jurisdiction to examine the merits of the District Court’s bail decision. The proper  course is  for  Mr Craig to appeal that decision.

[14]      In conclusion, I am satisfied that Mr Craig’s detention is lawful, being pursuant to a bail decision made by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

Result

[15]Accordingly, the application for a writ of habeas corpus is declined.

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch

Copy to: Mr Craig