Court v Police

[2013] NZHC 1466

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CRI-2012-409-126 [2013] NZHC 1466

JASON MICHAEL COURT Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:                   18 June 2013

Appearances:           Appellant in Person

D J Orchard for the Respondent

Judgment:                18 June 2013

ORAL JUDGMENT OF FOGARTY J

[1]      Mr Court appeals against a conviction that he failed to stop at a yellow traffic signal.   The law is that – this is not a precise definition of it – where lights turn yellow you must stop if you are able to do so before entering the intersection. Drivers typically have to make judgments about yellow lights, deciding whether they can stop or not.  It is a combination of speed, weather conditions and traffic.

[2]      This is the setting of the case.   Mr Court was travelling down Moorhouse Avenue, driving east towards the intersection with Madras Street, intending to go straight ahead, in a gray van at 50 kilometres an hour.   Constable Loh, the police officer, was in a police car on the other side of Moorhouse Avenue, facing west, behind a white vehicle which had already begun a right hand turn, and its back wheels apparently were on the white line, but was largely into the intersection, clearly awaiting an opportunity to complete a right hand turn when the light phases

changed.

COURT v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2013] NZHC 1466 [18 June 2013]

[3]      Constable  Loh  says  he  observed  Mr  Court’s  gray  van  travelling  on Moorhouse Avenue,  in  a straight  lane.    He observed  the  yellow signal,  and  he observed the gray van entering the intersection, and then the traffic light turning red just as or shortly after the gray van entered the intersection.  It was the constable’s opinion that Mr Court had had an opportunity to stop while the lights were yellow, so that he did not need to enter the intersection.  As it happened, Mr Court had to brake to avoid colliding with the white vehicle which had already been in the intersection, and which had initiated a U-turn with the lights changing.  There is some issue as to whether that vehicle initiated a U-turn while the lights were yellow, or waited until the lights were red.

[4]      This was not Mr Court’s view of the facts.  He was of the view that he did not have an opportunity to stop.  That he had entered the intersection on the yellow light, having judged he did not have the opportunity to stop.

[5]      The clash of evidence was examined by the Justices of the Peace.  I have read the evidence-in-chief of Mr Loh, and the evidence-in-chief of a traffic engineer who explained that the yellow lights go on a four second phase, then they turn red, and after they have turned red for two seconds the lights the other way go green.

[6]      I have heard this matter in two hearings because I originally did not have the notes of evidence.   I now have the notes of evidence.   I read them before this hearing, and again examined them during the hearing.  I respect Mr Court’s point of view.  I accept him as a man who was telling the truth, as he saw it, before the Court and before me.  This is one of those situations where the trial Judge, in this case the Justices of the Peace, had to make a decision on a conflict of evidence.  The critical finding of the Justices of the Peace was:

So having traversed all the evidence before us, we are of the opinion that you did have time or could have stopped before the intersection but did not, and entered the intersection on an orange or yellow light which changed, in the evidence of Mr Loh, within a fraction of a second after you entered.

[7]      On that finding of fact it was inevitable that there would be a breach, because the Court had before it evidence that that meant that the  yellow light had been showing for almost four seconds before you entered the intersection.

[8]      I sit here on appeal.  This is not a fresh trial.  It might have appeared to have been a fresh trial because I have stretched the rules as to what I can do on appeal. But, in the end, I have to be satisfied that there is an identifiable error.   I was examining whether or not  the evidence of the police constable was  sufficiently reliable, upon which the case could be regarded as proved beyond a reasonable doubt.   I had some doubts about that but, having examined his evidence-in-chief against the evidence he gave in cross-examination and re-examination, I have come to the view that it was open for the Justices of the Peace to decide to favour the constable’s evidence over yours, Mr Court.  Not because the Court thought you were in any way not telling the truth, but it would have been a judgment that Constable Loh’s evidence was more reliable as to what had actually happened.   For those reasons, I think the judgment cannot be attacked as unsound.  Therefore it stands, and therefore the appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:

Raymond Donnelly & Co, Christchurch

Copy to:

J M Court, Christchurch