Cooper v Police

[2025] NZHC 2333

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE

CRI-2025-412-51

[2025] NZHC 2333

BETWEEN

AMY COOPER

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:	14 August 2025
Appearances:	B P Stephenson for Appellant (via VMR) J C Collins for Respondent (via VMR)
Judgment:	18 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

This judgment was delivered by me on 18 August 2025 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date……………

COOPER v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 2333 [18 August 2025]

Introduction

[1]    On 9 May 2025, Amy Cooper was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment on a raft of dishonesty, driving and drug related offending as well as a conviction for breaching community work, by Judge Flatley in the Dunedin District Court.1

[2]She appeals that sentence, on the grounds:

(a)the starting point for the lead charge of receiving; and

(b)uplifts imposed for the drug related offences and breach of community work were too high.

Charges

[3]Ms Cooper was sentenced on the following charges:

(a)theft (under $500) (x11);2

(b)       theft (over $1,000) (x2);3

(c)receiving property valued (over $1,000);4

(d)driving whilst disqualified 3rd or subsequent (x3);5

(e)possession of a Class A controlled drug (methamphetamine);6

(f)possession of a utensil (methamphetamine pipe);7

1      Police v Cooper [2025] NZDC 13559.

2      Crimes Act 1961, ss 219 and 223(d); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.

3      Section 219 and 223(b); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

4      Sections 246 and 247(a); maximum penalty seven years’ imprisonment.

5      Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(a) and s 32(4); maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment, or $6,000 fine and six month disqualification from driving.

6      Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 7(1)(a) and (2); maximum penalty six months’ imprisonment or

$1000 fine.

7      Sections 13(1)(a) and (3); maximum penalty one year imprisonment.

(g)possession of a Class A controlled drug (LSD);8

(h)breach of community work; and9

(i)providing false or misleading information (x2).10

Facts

[4]    Ms Cooper’s offending can be separated into three distinct categories: driving offending; theft and receiving offending; and drug offending.

Driving offending

[5]    On 19 February 2024 Ms Cooper was disqualified from driving for a period of six months.

[6]    On 25 May 2024, Ms Cooper drove to a service station in Oamaru. On that occasion she also left the service station without paying for an item, leading to one of the charges of shoplifting.

[7]    On 6 June 2024, Ms Cooper was pulled over in the early hours of the morning after police observed Ms Cooper driving at 118km/h in a 100km/h area. However, her vehicle was fitted with a space saver tyre limiting it to a speed of 80km/h, so the vehicle was travelling 38km/h in excess of the speed limit. Ms Cooper provided identification details and after a non-operation order (pink sticker) was issued in respect of the vehicle she was allowed to proceed to get the vehicle off the road. Police subsequently became aware that the name and address she supplied were false. When spoken to, Ms Cooper acknowledged being disqualified but said she did not recall being stopped by police.

[8]    Five days later, on 11 June 2024, just after 9pm, Ms Cooper was stopped at a police checkpoint. She produced no identification but gave a name and date of birth of an associate of hers. Police found a match equal to the information supplied but

8      Section 7(1)(a) and (2); maximum penalty six months’ imprisonment or $1000 fine.

9      Sentencing Act 2002, s 71(1)(a); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $1,000 fine.

10     Land Transport Act, ss 52A(1)(c), 52A (2) and 114; maximum penalty $10,000 fine.

were sceptical of the information given. The defendant agreed to allow the police to take a photo of her and she was able to proceed. The following day police established the Ms Cooper’s true identity, and that she was disqualified from driving at the time. Her vehicle was located and impounded. She later acknowledged her period of disqualification.

Theft and receiving offending

[9]    The 11 theft (under $500) charges relate to offending that occurred between March 2024 and October 2024. Ms Cooper would typically walk into retail stores and select items such as snack  foods,  dog  treats/food,  make-up,  groceries  and  on  one occasion a power-tool, before leaving the store without paying. The items ranged in value from $24.98–$59.90, although the power tool was valued at $299. Three of the charges relate to theft of petrol from a service station, the lowest amount stolen being $40, and the highest amount $106.05.

[10]   Finally, one of the theft (under $500) charges relates to an incident in September 2024, when Ms Cooper removed the front and rear registration plates from a victim’s vehicle and attached them to her own vehicle. They were recovered during a bail curfew check.

[11]   On 10 August, Ms Cooper entered Rebel Sport Dunedin and selected approximately eight baseball caps, concealing them in her backpack. She selected various other items before leaving the store. Items to the value of $939.86 were recovered and items to the value of $369.95 were not recovered. Those events gave rise to one of the charges of theft (over $1000).

[12]   Five days later, Ms Cooper entered a pharmacy with two associates. She selected various items and left the store without paying. Items valued at $1,011.93 were not recovered giving rise to the second charge of theft (over $1000).

[13]   In August 2024, a victim stored a large amount of personal property in the garage of his Dunedin property while he carried out renovations. Between 11  and  14 August 2024, an unknown person(s) gained entry into the victim's garage and stole property to the value of $30,374.08. Included in the stolen property was an iPad,

two e-bikes and a red bike helmet valued in total at $11,098. On 30 August 2024, police conducted a search at another address and located the stolen iPad. Upon speaking to the occupant, she stated the iPad had been given to her by Ms Cooper for it to be unlocked and returned to her for her children to use. On 12 September 2024, police conducted a subsequent search warrant at Ms Cooper’s address and located the two stolen e-bikes and the red bike helmet.

Drug offending

[14]   Just after midnight on 25 September 2024, police conducted a bail check at Ms Cooper’s address and entered a breach as she was not present. A few minutes later, police observed Ms Cooper driving and conducted a vehicle stop. Ms Cooper was arrested for breach of bail, and police observed a meth pipe on the driver’s seat. Following a search of the vehicle, police located a wallet containing three small clear snap lock bags, two of which contained methamphetamine weighing 0.27 grams and one which contained two tabs of LSD.

District Court decision

[15]   The Judge began by taking note of Ms Cooper’s nine prior convictions, all of which related to either dishonesty, drug or driving offending, or breaches of community work.

[16]   The Judge then summarised the facts giving rise to the convictions and took the charge of receiving as the lead charge. After summarising the relevant reports, the Judge set out relevant authorities, and observed an appropriate starting range for the lead charge was between 18–20 months’ imprisonment. The Judge adopted a starting point of 20 months for the lead charge, noting that even if that was reduced further, home detention would not be an available sentence.

[17]   The Judge undertook a similar analysis of relevant authorities in relation to the charge of theft offending which he considered amounted to a “spree” and adopted an uplift of 13 months’ imprisonment. An uplift of 10 months’ imprisonment was applied for the three driving while disqualified charges. For the drug offending, an uplift of two months was applied, and for the breach of community work, one month.

[18]   On the charges of giving false details, Ms Cooper was convicted and discharged.

[19]   The Judge reached an adjusted starting point of 46 months. The Judge applied an uplift of five per cent for previous convictions and offending on bail. A credit of 25 per cent was allowed for guilty plea, five per cent for remorse and insight and    10 per cent for addiction history. The uplift and credits combined resulted in a net credit of 35 per cent.

[20]The Judge reached an end sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment.

[21]   The Judge reiterated that home detention was not an available sentence for consideration and further, that it is not an automatic sentence upon reaching below 24 months’ imprisonment. The Judge observed that even if the end sentence was below two years, he was not persuaded a sentence of home detention would meet the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act 2002, as there was “lots of offending”, multiple victims and “a lot of loss”.

[22]   The end sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment on the lead offence, with concurrent sentences on the other charges. The Judge did not impose release conditions, declined to make reparation orders and cancelled Ms Cooper’s sentence of community work. Ms Cooper was disqualified from driving for 18 months. The Judge made an order for the destruction of the drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Principles on appeal

[23]   Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.11 As the Court of Appeal observed in Tutakangahau v R, citing the lower court’s decision, a “court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.12 It is appropriate for this

11     Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).

12     Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].

Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.13

Analysis of the grounds of appeal

Starting point for lead charge

[24]   Mr Stephenson contends the Judge erred in reaching the lead charge starting point by focusing “almost exclusively” on the valuation of the property received. It is submitted that although the decision in Andrews v Police14 relied on by the Judge observed that the value of stolen items is relevant in reaching an appropriate starting point for the charge of receiving, the High Court was not attempting to create a guideline judgment where reference to the valuation of the goods is the sole consideration for setting a starting point. The case observes there are other relevant factors that go to the overall seriousness of the offending, and, by implication, he says these were not given enough weight.

[25]   Further, Mr Stephenson seeks to distinguish the comparator cases relied on by the Judge.15 He submits the overall theme of the cases relied on is that higher starting points for receiving are warranted where there is a close connection between the burglar and the receiver. The rationale for that close connection being an aggravating factor is because the harm caused by receiving lies in the fact receivers provide a market  for  stolen  property  and  an  incentive  for  others  to  steal.  He  submits  Ms Cooper’s offending was less serious, because no inference of a close connection between the thief or burglar in this matter is available. He submits there is no evidence of Ms Cooper attempting to sell the goods, and they had been left out in the rain deteriorating, indicating she was not “readily available to take possession of stolen property.”

[26]   Mr Stephenson submits a starting point of 12 months’ imprisonment would have appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offending, where there was no close connection between Ms Cooper and the thief and there was no commercial element.

13     Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].

14     Andrews v Police [2015] NZHC 2496.

15     Sinclair v Police [2014] NZHC 1332 and Kennett v Police [2019] NZHC 1945.

He submits that starting point would be consistent with Drake v Police, where a motor vehicle valued at $11,000 was received and no connection between the receiver and thief could be inferred.16 A starting point of 15 months’ imprisonment was upheld on appeal, although the Court noted it may have been slightly harsh but nonetheless clearly available. Mr Stephenson submits a motor vehicle is an important household asset, and therefore possession of stolen e-bikes and an iPad is slightly less serious than the offending in Drake.

[27]   Mr Collins, on the other hand, submits the District Court decision does not reflect that the value of the received property was treated as a determinative factor and that several aspects of the offending were considered, as set out at [17] of the judgment.17 He also noted, in oral submissions, that the fact the goods taken were not in a fit state to be returned to the owner aggravates, rather than mitigates the seriousness of the offending.

Discussion

[28]   I accept the appellant’s submission that Andrews v Police was not intended to be a tariff decision, nor to be treated as such. However, it does not follow that the Judge erred by referring to the starting point range set out in that judgment. It is appropriate that the District Court applies judgments of the High Court when sentencing, where the High Court judgments deal with relevant offending.

[29]   Further, it is clear from the Judge’s reasoning, that factors beyond the value of the items were taken into account, as set out in the following extract:18

I have considered relevant decisions and authorities, including Andrews v Police, where the High Court noted that there is no tariff case, but noted a number of factors for the Court to take into account including:

(a)The value of items received. Here it was over $11,000, which is not insignificant.

(b)The duration of the offending. Where the burglaries occurred between 11 and 14 August and the items were found in your possession between 30 August and 12 September. I think that

16     Drake v Police [2015] NZHC 2252.

17     Paragraph [17] of the District Court judgment set out in full at [29] of this judgment.

18     Police v Cooper, above n 1, at [17]. Footnotes omitted.

is when the searches occurred on warrants. So not a long period of time. That is probably the result of the policing availability at that time and nothing else.

(c)There is only one charge. The number of charges is something to be taken into account but there is only one here.

(d)I have to consider whether there was any commercial element. There does not appear to be any commercial element here.

(e)I need to consider the closeness of the relationship between the burglar and receiver. It is unknown whether or not there was any relationship between you and the burglar.

[18]     They are the main factors to take into account.

[30]   Evidently, the value of the items taken was the most pertinent factor within these facts. The appellant, in seeking to distinguish the authorities relied on by the Judge, has emphasised the absence of the aggravating feature of a close connection between Ms Cooper and the thief. But the absence of an aggravating feature is not a mitigating feature. The most aggravating feature of the offending was the value of the items, and there was no error disclosed in comparing that value with other cases.

[31]   The appellant considers that only the valuation of the items in the cases Sinclair v Police and Kennett v Police were considered by the Judge.19 In both cases the value of the property was around $10,000. The appellant submits that it is clear from the decision in Sinclair that the main aggravating factor in that case was the close connection to the burglar and the actual burglary, meaning the seriousness of that offending is of a significantly higher category than the seriousness of Ms Cooper’s offending. However, Judge Flatley appropriately reflected that in the sentencing; in Sinclair, a starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment was adopted, and in this case, 20 months’ imprisonment was adopted.

[32]   Similarly, Kennet involved more serious offending, given the appellant was pawning the property at a cash converter the very next day. The starting point in that case was 28 months’ imprisonment. In Ms Cooper’s case the starting point was appropriately lower.

19     Sinclair v Police, Kennett v Police, above n 15.

[33]   I have also considered Drake v Police, which the appellant contends involves more serious offending, but where a starting point of 15 months' imprisonment was imposed for receiving a vehicle worth $11,000. While Drake is an analogous case with a lower starting point, I agree with Mr Collins that the overall picture of the previous decisions show sentences for convictions for receiving are varied, as would be expected where there is no tariff case and each matter is determined on the facts. Indeed, the cases summarised in Drake illustrate that very point.20 More importantly, for the purposes of this  appeal,  the  cases  cited  show  that  the  starting  point  of 20 months’ imprisonment was not out range, although perhaps was at the higher end.

Uplift for drug offences and breach of community work

[34]   Mr Stephenson submits the combined uplift of three months’ imprisonment for Ms Cooper’s drug offending and breach of community work was excessive. As noted, Ms Cooper’s drug offending comprised of possessing 0.27 grams of methamphetamine, a glass methamphetamine pipe, and two tabs of LSD. The community sentence was breached through failure to complete community work hours. Mr Stephenson submits the underlying cause of the drug and dishonest offending is Ms Cooper’s abuse of methamphetamine and the destabilising effect this has had on her life. He submits that given a community-based sentence or fine would have been available if sentenced on those charges alone combined with the totality principle, an uplift of one month would have been sufficient.

[35]   The respondent submits this aspect has already been taken into account as part of the five per cent reduction which was applied for remorse and insight and a separate 10 per cent reduction for addiction history. Mr Collins submits that anything further is essentially a double discount on the same factual basis.

Discussion

[36]   The appellant is essentially inviting the Court to impose a two-week uplift for all of the drug offending, and a two-week uplift for failing to complete community work, but to retain the percentage deductions on the sentence to reflect remorse, insight

20     Drake v Police, above n 16, at [14]–[21].

and addiction history. It is not relevant what sentence would have been imposed had the drug related charges and community work charge been sentenced in isolation.  Ms Cooper was to be sentenced on all matters and, as Judge Flatley observed, a sentence of imprisonment was clearly required. Three months’ imprisonment was again perhaps on the high side but the adjustment sought makes minimal difference to the end sentence and does not render the current sentence manifestly excessive.

[37]   Given the sentence remains undisturbed on appeal, and is a sentence of imprisonment greater than 24 months, it is unnecessary to consider Mr Stephenson’s submissions on commuting the sentence to home detention.

Result

[38]The appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:

Public Defence Service, Dunedin Crown Solicitor, Dunedin