Connolly v Keung
[2025] NZHC 1689
•24 June 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2024-409-510 [2025] NZHC 1689
IN THE MATTER of the Insolvency Act 2006 AND
IN THE MATTER of the bankruptcy of SENG BOU (PAUL)
KEUNG
BETWEEN LEISHA MAUD CONNOLLY
Judgment Creditor
AND SENG BOU (PAUL) KEUNG
Judgment Debtor
Hearing: 16 May 2025
Appearances: L C Elliott for Judgment Creditor
Judgment Debtor appears in person
Judgment: 24 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on 24 June 2025 at 4.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
CONNOLLY v KEUNG [2025] NZHC 1689 [24 June 2025]
[1] Mr Keung applies to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued in respect to several cost judgments obtained against him by Ms Connolly in proceedings before the High Court and Court of Appeal. The proceedings were, in essence, challenges by Mr Keung to the entry of summary judgment in favour of Ms Connolly in the District Court, where Judge Zohrab held that advances made by Ms Connolly to Mr Keung were unrepaid loans and not, as Mr Keung argued, contributions by Ms Connolly to a joint venture or partnership between the parties.
[2]Mr Keung applies to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the grounds that:
(a)he has counterclaims or cross-claims against Ms Connolly which equal or exceed the amount owing to Ms Connolly in the bankruptcy notice;1
(b)he could not advance his counterclaims by way of defence of Ms Connolly’s claim because she proceeded by way of summary judgment and he did not have available to him all relevant evidence or documents that were yet to be obtained by way of discovery; and
(c)his counterclaims are now pursued in a civil proceeding filed against Ms Connolly in the High Court under CIV-2023-409-574 (the 574 proceeding).
[3]Ms Connolly opposes the application. She says the alleged counterclaims:
(a)were as a matter of law and fact able to be set up in defence of her claim;
(b)lack sufficient mutuality of subject matter and parties;
(c)do not exceed the amount owed to her under the bankruptcy notice; and
(d)are not genuinely triable.
1 For present purposes it is not necessary to address the difference between counterclaims and cross- claims.
[4]I consider the issues I must decide are:
(a)Does Mr Keung have counterclaims against Ms Connolly which equal or exceed the amount owing under the bankruptcy notice?
(b)Could Mr Keung have advanced his counterclaims by way of defence of Ms Connolly’s claim in the proceedings in which her judgment was obtained?
(c)Should the Court exercise its discretion to set aside the bankruptcy notice?
Principles
[5]Section 17(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 2006 (the Act) provides:
17 Failure to comply with bankruptcy notice
(1)A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if—
...
(d)the debtor has not, within the time limit specified in subsection (4), —
(i)complied with the requirements of the notice; or
(ii)satisfied the court that he or she has a cross claim against the creditor.
...
(7)In subsection (1)(d)(ii), cross claim means a counterclaim, set-off, or cross demand that—
(a)is equal to, or greater than, the judgment debt or the amount that the debtor has been ordered to pay; and
(b)the debtor could not use as a defence in the action or proceedings in which the judgment or the order, as the case may be, was obtained.
[6] Under s 17(1)(d)(ii) a debtor will not commit an act of bankruptcy if they satisfy the Court they have a cross-claim (which includes a counterclaim) against the creditor that satisfies the requirements of s 17(7) of the Act.
[7] The relevant principles in determining whether the requirements of s 17(1)(d)(ii) of the Act are satisfied are as follows:
(a)The debtor must show they have a genuine, triable cross-claim against the creditor.2
(b)The debtor’s inability to use the cross-claim as a defence is primarily a legal inability. Factual inability is also available but requires some cogent circumstance.3 Notwithstanding that the creditor’s original claim was pursued through a summary proceeding, it is open to the defendant in such a proceeding to set up a cross-claim.4
(c)To establish the required value under s 17(7)(a), the debtor must establish (including where a claim may be for unliquidated damages) a genuine, triable claim at least to a sufficient extent in monetary terms to bring it somewhere near the equality or excess required under the subsection.5
Background
[8] Mr Keung and Ms Connolly were in a personal relationship for periods during 2020 and 2021. Much litigation has resulted from the breakdown of the relationship. One such matter involved Ms Connolly applying for summary judgment against Mr Keung in the District Court to recover advances she had made to him as loans to assist him obtain an annulment of his bankruptcy.
[9] Mr Keung maintained the advances were not loans but contributions to a joint venture or partnership involving the purchase and development of a property at Frankleigh Street, Christchurch. After a defended hearing before Judge Zohrab, it was
2 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd (1992) 6 PRNZ 386 (CA) at 389, approving Clark v UDC Finance Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 636 (HC) at 637.
3 Clark v UDC Finance Ltd, above n 2, applied in Hardie v Booth [1992] 1 NZLR 356 (HC) at 362.
4 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Ltd, above n 2, at 389.
5 At 390.
held the advances were loans and Ms Connolly obtained summary judgment against Mr Keung in an amount of $49,000 along with interest and costs.6
[10] Mr Keung appealed that decision to the High Court. On 29 August 2023, Gendall J dismissed his appeal.7 On 11 October 2023, Osborne J awarded Ms Connolly costs on the appeal of $55,250.8
[11] Mr Keung made an application for an extension of time to appeal Gendall J’s judgment, but that application was declined by Osborne J on 20 November 2023.9 Costs were awarded against Mr Keung on that application of $6,374.
[12] Mr Keung then filed an application for leave to bring his appeal with the Court of Appeal. That application was struck out for want of jurisdiction.10 Mr Keung had costs awarded against him before the Court of Appeal of $6,201.11
[13] Mr Keung has paid the amount awarded by the District Court including costs. However, he did not pay the other costs orders and Ms Connolly obtained the issue of the bankruptcy notice in respect to:
(a)the amount of the costs and disbursements from the appeal to the High Court against summary judgment
$55,250
(b)the amount of costs and disbursements in respect to the application for an extension of time to appeal in the High Court
$6,374
(c)the amount of costs in respect of the application for leave to bring appeal in the Court of Appeal
$6,201
Total $67,825
6 Connolly v Keung [2022] NZDC 8108.
7 Keung v Connolly [2023] NZHC 2381.
8 Keung v Connolly [2023] NZHC 2858.
9 Keung v Connolly [2023] NZHC 3286.
10 Keung v Connolly [2024] NZCA 411.
11 At [37].
[14] The bankruptcy notice was served on Mr Keung under an order for substituted service. Mr Keung took issue with the manner of service. He has again raised that complaint on the hearing of this application, but it was previously resolved between counsel with consent orders made by the Court.12 I need not refer to this further.
[15] Since the bankruptcy notice was issued Mr Keung has paid two of the costs orders in issue. What remains outstanding is the award from dismissal of Mr Keung’s appeal to the High Court against summary judgment being entered against him in the amount of $55,250.
[16] Mr Keung’s application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was prepared with the assistance of senior counsel. He is now self-represented. The kernel of Mr Keung’s case, as he has chosen to advance it, is that the entry of summary judgment in the District Court and the High Court’s rejection of his appeal were wrong because, as he had argued, Ms Connolly’s advances were not loans but contributions to a partnership or joint venture. In this regard, Mr Keung’s approach misconstrues the grounds upon which the Court can set aside a bankruptcy notice under s 17(1)(d). This application is not a further opportunity for Mr Keung to challenge the judgments of the District Court and High Court, which must now be regarded as beyond challenge.
[17] As he did previously, Mr Keung has flooded the Court with documents, affidavits and memoranda running to many hundreds of pages, the great majority of which are not relevant to the issues I must decide.13 For this hearing alone, Mr Keung submitted five large bound volumes of documents. Since then he has filed more documents, including a series of memoranda and affidavits, which I have considered. The failure to refer to such material simply reflects that it does not assist me.
[18] In his first affidavit Mr Keung deposed that he was able to pay the amount outstanding into his solicitors’ trust account so that the Court could be satisfied of his ability to meet the outstanding costs award. He has not done so, and at the hearing he advised me he will not pay the amount owing as, I understand, a matter of principle.
12 Connolly v Keung HC Christchurch CIV 2024-409-510, 28 November 2024 (Minute).
13 See in this regard the comments of Judge Zohrab in the District Court Connolly v Keung, above n 6, at [62]; Gendall J in Keung v Connolly, above n 7, at [43]; and Osborne J in Keung v Connolly, above n 8, at [33].
[19] After the hearing, transcripts of conversations between Ms Connolly and her banks have been put into evidence. These were only recently obtained, after Mr Keung obtained an order for non-party discovery.14 Both parties have had an opportunity to make submissions upon them. Mr Keung considers these transcripts, along with emails recovered after a forensic search of his computers, are important new evidence supporting his case.
Does Mr Keung have a genuine counterclaim?
[20] Mr Keung says he has genuine counterclaims against Ms Connolly which he (along with a company with which he is associated, Keung Investments Ltd) has filed in the 574 proceeding. Mr Keung recently filed an amended statement of claim with four causes of action. I will summarise what is alleged in each of them.
[21] The first cause of action is that in late 2018 Ms Connolly and Mr Keung entered a partnership or joint venture arrangement in property development with Keung Investments Ltd, and that on 2 October 2020 Ms Connolly repudiated the partnership and failed to pay balances owing as seed money and her capital contribution. It is said that Mr Keung has lost $265,000 because of Ms Connolly’s breach of the terms of the partnership, representing the deposit on the property at Frankleigh Street of $140,000, the unpaid seed money of $25,000, and her capital contribution of $100,000. He seeks judgment for the $265,000.
[22] The second cause of action alleges that in February 2020 Ms Connolly agreed to pay Mr Keung $30,000 for personal advances in respect to living costs, payment of debts, holiday accommodation and transportation but has not done so. Mr Keung seeks judgment for the $30,000.
[23] The third cause of action is that Ms Connolly has failed to account to Mr Keung in certain respects, namely:
(a)in mid-2021 she converted a vehicle worth $7,500;
14 That order was obtained in the 574 proceeding. There was no objection to the use of the transcripts in this proceeding.
(b)between February 2019 and September 2020, she removed $10,000 in cash from his home at Christchurch;
(c)she removed further funds from his safe at Kaikoura “among other places” with an estimated value of $5,000; and
(d)on 11 November 2020 she withdrew $2,000 cash using his credit card.
In respect to this cause of action Mr Keung claims $24,500.
[24] The fourth cause of action alleges that between October 2020 and February 2021 Ms Connolly converted chattels and jewellery totalling an estimated
$30,000. He seeks judgment in that sum.
[25] Mr Keung also pleads that between October and December 2022 Ms Connolly entered Mr Keung’s home, accessed his computer files and deleted emails, pictures, and files. He foreshadows a further claim in respect to this.
[26] On the face of Mr Keung’s pleading in the 574 proceeding, he has claims against Ms Connolly that exceed the amount owing to her in the bankruptcy notice. Ms Connolly argues that the claims are not genuinely triable and refers to the judgments of both the District Court and High Court where Mr Keung’s contentions were variously described as “bordering on farcical”,15 “totally implausible”,16 and “baseless and riddled with inconsistencies and inherently lacking in credibility”.17 I do not need to make such findings as, even accepting that the claims are genuinely triable, they are all claims that Mr Keung could have raised in defence of Ms Connolly’s claim in both the District Court and the appeal to the High Court in which the outstanding costs judgment was obtained.
15 Connolly v Keung, above n 6, at [137].
16 At [138].
17 Keung v Connolly, above n 7, at [50].
Could Mr Keung have advanced his counterclaims by way of defence of Ms Connolly’s claim?
[27] Mr Keung’s claims all arose out of the breakdown of the parties’ relationship which occurred in around October 2020. Ms Connolly’s summary judgment application was not heard until June 2022. Mr Keung was aware of all the claims he is now making well before then. Mr Keung acknowledges this in his first affidavit and says:
In the summary judgment application and subsequently on appeal, I maintained that the amount that was sought by Ms Connolly related to a joint venture arrangement between Ms Connolly and I in respect of the purchase of a property located at Frankleigh Street, Christchurch. I also made it clear that I had other claims against Ms Connolly for other other [sic] amounts.
[28] Mr Keung’s claims are all, in one form or other, referenced in the District Court and High Court judgments. It was part of Mr Keung’s case that Ms Connolly was not entitled to summary judgment because there were disputes that needed to be determined following discovery and a full trial and a need to determine his counterclaims.18 However, Mr Keung did not file a counterclaim.
[29] Judge Zohrab referred to Mr Keung’s contention he had a counterclaim against Ms Connolly when he said:
[149] Mr Keung suggests that there are various other advances that he has made to Ms Connolly and has on a number of occasions spoken of filing a counterclaim. No counterclaim was ever filed. Mr Keung did seek to file a further affidavit at the commencement of this hearing, and which included a draft statement of defence and counterclaim, together with a substantial amount of new evidence. However, given this is a summary judgment application, and that the pleadings effectively closed in October last year, I refused leave to file such a document as it was seven months too late.
[150] During the course of the hearing Mr Keung continued to allude to other witnesses and evidence he wished to put before the Court at a substantive hearing, and I noted on several occasions that a summary judgment hearing was not a “dress rehearsal”, and that he should have put his best evidence before the Court in his affidavit.
[151] However, I am content to conclude that if, as Mr Keung strenuously contends, there are monies owed by Ms Connolly to Mr Keung, then there is no prejudice to Mr Keung as they are quite separate to the loan advance made by Ms Connolly and can be pursued by Mr Keung in separate legal proceedings.
18 Connolly v Keung, above n 6, at [4] and [7].
[30] In his appeal to the High Court Mr Keung again raised his counterclaims, arguing that Judge Zohrab had failed to identify circumstances which would have justified the exercise of the Court’s discretion to decline summary judgment.
Gendall J noted:19
[45] If, as Mr Keung has endeavoured to claim here, Ms Connolly may genuinely owe monies to him or to his associated entities for other matters, then of course he can exercise his proper remedies to seek to recover these from her outside the present claim for repayment of the loan. To date, he has not done so. No proceedings of any kind, as I understand it, have been brought by Mr Keung against Ms Connolly to recover monies allegedly owing to him or his interests.
...
[48] ... Further, Judge Zohrab directly considered Mr Keung’s contention that he had a counter-claim against Ms Connolly, and in doing so he noted that no counter-claim had been filed. He concluded no prejudice of any kind arose here for Mr Keung.
[31] Mr Keung argues he could not advance a counterclaim because, first, Ms Connolly had applied for summary judgment and a counterclaim is not a defence to a summary judgment application and, second, because he did not have all relevant evidence or documents which he needed to obtain upon discovery.
[32] In respect to the first matter, that issue has been authoritatively determined by the Court of Appeal in Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.20 There the ANZ Bank had obtained summary judgment against Mr Sharma pursuant to his guarantee of loans made to companies he was associated with. The bank obtained summary judgment, and then the issue of a bankruptcy notice in respect to its judgment. Mr Sharma applied to set the bankruptcy notice aside, claiming that he had a counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand which he could not have raised in response to the Bank’s summary judgment application. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention, disagreeing with a view previously expressed by the High Court to the contrary.21 The Court of Appeal said as follows:22
A further point debated before us with regard to the meaning of the paragraph relates to the words “which he could not set up in the action”. In the judgment
19 Keung v Connolly, above n 7.
20 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd, above n 2.
21 McKenzie v Leisure Ventures Christchurch Ltd HC Auckland B215/90, 7 June 1990.
22 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd, above n 2, at 389.
under appeal and also in McKenzie v Leisure Ventures Christchurch Ltd ... the view appears to have been taken by the learned Judge that a counterclaim cannot be “set up” in a summary judgment proceeding, within the meaning of para (d). With respect, we take a different view. An application for a summary judgment is in terms of r 138 an interlocutory application which may be made in proceedings within the purview of rr 135 to 144. It is not in itself a separate substantive proceeding. In the proceeding in which summary judgment is sought, it is competent for the defendant to file a counterclaim pursuant to r 145, and that is one step that could be taken as part of the process of attempting to satisfy the Court under r 142(2) that the defendant has a counterclaim that ought to be tried. An affidavit in support of the counterclaim would be necessary as well. But the more usual practice is probably to endeavour to satisfy the Court to that effect by affidavit evidence and a draft counterclaim. It seems reasonably clear, however, that in one way or another the counterclaim may certainly be set up. It may or may not persuade the Court to refrain from entering summary judgment. The same applies whether the claim of the defendant is accurately to be described as a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand, the precise connotations of which terms do not require discussion now.
[33] Insofar as Mr Keung submits he could not raise a counterclaim because he did not have relevant evidence and documents, he identifies the recovered emails and the transcripts of conversations between Ms Connolly and her banks as new evidence that establishes there was a joint venture between him and Ms Connolly.
[34] In Clark v UDC Finance Ltd a debtor applied to set aside a bankruptcy notice, arguing that at the time judgment had been obtained he had not fully appreciated the implications of the transactions that were in issue and only did so after the issue of the bankruptcy notice when he took advice.23 The High Court did not set aside the bankruptcy notice, stating that “simple neglect to take even the elementary step of seeking further information ... cannot avail the debtor”.24
[35] Here, it was open to Mr Keung from at least May 2021, when Ms Connolly’s action in the District Court was commenced, to take steps to obtain the emails and transcripts upon which he now relies. His laptops could have been searched at any time. He took no formal steps to obtain the transcripts of bank recordings until over a year after commencing the 574 proceeding.25 There was also, of course, nothing to stop Mr Keung applying for discovery before the summary judgment application was
23 Clark v UDC Finance Ltd, above n 2.
24 At 640.
25 Mr Keung advised me on several occasion that he had heard one of the conversations but he only obtained an order for non-party discovery in the 574 proceeding on 1 May 2025.
heard, but he made no such application. In any event, if Mr Keung had put the emails and transcripts before the District Court (or the High Court on appeal) I do not consider they would have assisted him.
[36] As far as the emails are concerned, in February 2024 Mr Keung had a computer expert, Mr Brent Whale, examine his laptops to locate deleted emails. I have considered those emails. They do no more than confirm that there were discussions between Mr Keung and Ms Connolly about a possible joint venture. That such discussions occurred was recognised in both the District Court judgment granting Ms Connolly summary judgment and the High Court judgment dismissing Mr Keung’s appeal. The emails do not establish a commitment by Ms Connolly to a partnership or joint venture. I do not propose to go through each of the emails but shall provide some examples.
[37] Ms Connolly made her advances to Mr Keung on 27 September 2020 and 28 September 2020.26 The emails Judge Zohrab relied upon to conclude that the advances were loans were ones sent at the time of the advances, particularly 24 September 2020 and 28 September 2020.27 The email from Mr Keung to Ms Connolly of 28 September 2020 at 12.47 pm confirms not only that the advances were loans but also that Ms Connolly had not committed to a joint venture or partnership in respect to Frankleigh Street.
[38] The recovered email closest in date to the advances was dated 24 August 2020 and sent by Mr Keung to Ms Connolly. There was clearly no joint venture agreed as it reads:
Leisha,
My bank are not happy. They gave approval to us early this month and now want to know yes or no if it’s me or us buying this unit at Frankleigh and they want to know today.
Can you please simply put your fears aside and say yes I’m keen or no I’m not. The indecision is actually coming from you and if you could see the damage it’s doing to you, you would understand it has to go.
26 Connolly v Keung, above n 6, at [14].
27 At [14]–[16].
I don’t mind what you decide but seriously you need to get this right in your heart.
Regards,
Paul
[39] There is an email postdating the advances of 12 October 2020, but that has no content other than to have attached to it an email from Mr Keung to Ms Connolly of 15 June 2020, which again establishes that there was no commitment from Ms Connolly to a joint venture. It reads:
You have committed to nothing. We have no property together.
All your promises made financially and otherwise have been broken or never followed through with;
1) frankleigh st deposit
2) half counseling [sic]
3) your income given to me for living costs
There is no one thing you are bound to or contractually committed to.
[40] Mr Keung believes the bank transcripts are conclusive evidence of a joint venture. Mr Keung considers this is because Ms Connolly said in her call to Kiwibank on 27 September 2020 that the amount she wished to withdraw was for a house deposit and, in her call to ANZ that same day, that the money was required for a business.
[41] Mr Keung considerably overstates the relevance of the transcripts. They are a record of calls made by Ms Connolly to her banks to withdraw deposits. The conversations did not involve Mr Keung. The explanations Ms Connolly gave her bankers when asking to break deposits do not detract from Mr Keung’s acknowledgment that the advances were loans.
[42] Mr Keung has also raised that he has acute medical issues associated with severe concussions. He relies upon a judgment of Harland J, in a proceeding not involving Ms Connolly, where she granted an adjournment of a trial due in part to
Mr Keung’s medical condition.28 However, Harland J’s judgment is dated 7 September 2023 and refers to three accidents that had occurred over the “last 12 months”.29 The hearing before the District Court was in May 2022. Until the date of the hearing before the District Court Mr Keung had lawyers acting for him, and he was represented by senior counsel for his appeal to the High Court. His failure to advance his claims earlier is not explained by his medical condition.
[43] I am satisfied that to the extent that Mr Keung has genuine counterclaims against Ms Connolly there was no reason, factual or legal, why they could not have been set up by him in defence of Ms Connolly’s claim.
[44] It is not necessary for me to deal with Ms Connolly’s further submission that the counterclaims lack sufficient mutuality of subject matter and parties.
Exercise of discretion
[45] This is not a matter that was directly raised by Mr Keung. However, as he is self-represented, I have considered whether there are any grounds for me to exercise the Court’s discretion and set aside the bankruptcy notice.
[46] The Court has the power to set aside a bankruptcy notice to control abuse of its processes. In Re Wise, ex parte Benecke Master Kennedy-Grant identified that the Court might intervene where, for instance, there was a procedural defect in the obtaining of the judgment or arguable grounds of defence existed at the time the judgment was given.30
[47] The grounds upon which the Court might exercise its discretion were also discussed in Re Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd, where Associate Judge Abbott quoted from Re Wise, ex parte Benecke and stated:31
[29] The first two circumstances identified by Master Kennedy-Grant in Re Wise call into question the judgment itself. A procedural defect suggests an element of unfairness in letting the judgment stand. The “arguable grounds
28 Ballantyne Trustees Ltd v HFK Ltd [2023] NZHC 2512.
29 At [11].
30 Re Wise, ex parte Benecke HC Auckland B227/95, 21 June 1995.
31 Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-2896, 12 August 2008.
of defence” suggests a substantive reason for questioning the soundness of the judgment (hence the case law built up around stay pending an appeal, but perhaps also a defence that had not been identified at the time of the underlying judgment or which has emerged since). In all of these cases there is an issue as to the safety of the underlying judgment. The Court will intervene in those cases on the grounds that it would be an abuse to allow a bankruptcy proceeding to be pursued if there is good reason to doubt the judgment on which it is based. There is no suggestion in the present case of a procedural defect, a legitimate defence being overlooked, or (now that the appeal has been determined) that there was any error in the judgment.
[30] I turn then to consider the third possible grounds contemplated in Re Wise, namely that there are some circumstances in the case which lead the Court to the view that it is necessary to intervene to prevent injustice. This was not considered further in Re Wise because the grounds relied on in that case amounted to a direct attack on the judgment.
[48] I note that Associate Judge Osborne in Izard Weston v Ayers said the observations in Re Wise should be seen in the context of the facts of that case in which judgment against the defendant was obtained by default.32 That is not the case here.
[49] Nothing advanced by Mr Keung suggests to me that the judgment obtained by Ms Connolly that is the subject of the bankruptcy notice was irregularly or unfairly obtained, or can be impugned on any basis. There is nothing to suggest a miscarriage of justice has occurred. The evidence Mr Keung says is new and has introduced does nothing to alter my view of the matter.
[50] It follows the bankruptcy notice will not be set aside. That does not mean that Mr Keung has no options. He can pay Ms Connolly and bring an end to this proceeding. His right to pursue his claims in the 574 proceeding would be unaffected. Alternatively, he could oppose the making of an adjudication order in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, but it should not be thought I am encouraging that approach or indicating a view on the merits or chances of success.
Result
[51]The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice is dismissed.
32 Izard Weston v Ayers [2017] NZHC 3000 at [10].
[52] Ms Connolly is entitled to costs. Any application for costs should be filed by memorandum within 10 working days of the date of this judgment. Mr Keung will have five working days to respond. I will determine costs on the papers.
O G Paulsen Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Christchurch
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