Commons v Commons
[2019] NZHC 557
•27 March 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2018-404-000515
[2019] NZHC 557
BETWEEN ANDREW HAMILTON JOHN COMMONS
Plaintiff
AND
HAMISH JOHN COMMONS, PATRICIA ANNE COMMONS, and JONNE BRYDE WILLCOX
Defendants
CIV-201-404-001057 BETWEEN
HAMISH JOHN COMMONS and JONNE BRYDE WILLCOX
Applicants
AND
HAMISH JOHN COMMONS, JONNE BRYDE WILLCOX and PATRICIA ANNE COMMONS
Respondents
Hearing: 19 November 2018 Appearances:
Plaintiff in Person
R J Brown for Defendant Trustees in CIV-2018-404-1057
K Muir and C Chung for the Defendants (as beneficiaries), and for the Applicants in CIV-2018-404-1057
R Von Keisenberg and K Mortimer for Susan Axford (litigation guardian for Patricia Commons)
Judgment:
27 March 2019
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SARGISSON
This judgment was delivered by me on 27 March 2019 at 11.30 a.m. pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date.......................................
COMMONS v COMMONS & Ors [2019] NZHC 557 [27 March 2019]
Introduction
[1] These proceedings relate to the Will and estate of the deceased, Dr John Commons. They are brought by Andrew Commons, who is one of two sons of Dr Commons’ first marriage, against Dr Commons’ second family – his widow Patricia, and their children Hamish Commons and Jonne Willcox.
[2] The parties agree to tailored discovery, but have been unable to agree on the categories of documents to be discovered, with very limited exceptions. The plaintiff seeks orders.
[3] The principal issue in the proceedings is whether, in terms of Andrew’s first cause of action, Dr Commons breached the moral duty owed to Andrew pursuant to s 4 of the Family Protection Act 1955 when making provision for him in his Will. The second and third causes of action concern the actions of the trustees of the estate. The issues are, first, whether the trustees’ decisions are ultra vires on the basis that Dr Commons’ widow, as one of the trustees, has not properly participated in the decision making; and second, whether the distribution to the widow of the entire income earned on the estate’s investment fund is a perverse exercise of the trustees’ discretion, under the Will, to pay it to her or accumulate part of it as capital.
The dispute
[4] Andrew seeks discovery of ten categories of documents. They are wide-ranging and are set out in the schedule to this judgment. Most categories are disputed.
[5] At issue is whether the categories of discovery proposed by Andrew include documents of no relevance to the issues the Court must decide; or whether the discovery he seeks is disproportionate and unreasonable; or whether it is misdirected and ought be sought by non-party application.
Tailored discovery - the relevant principles
[6] The discovery regime in the High Court Rules is discussed by Asher J in Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific.1 There is a specific requirement on the parties to co-operate with each other at an early stage to seek to achieve a consent position as to the scope and method of discovery. The parties must ask whether it is appropriate that discovery should be standard discovery (which requires an “adverse documents” test) or tailored discovery, where specific discovery categories are ordered.
[7] Rule 8.8 provides that tailored discovery must be ordered when the interests of justice require “more or less” discovery than standard discovery will involve.2 Under r 8.9 there is a presumption of tailored discovery in specified cases including where, as in this case, the total of the sums in issue in the proceedings exceeds $2,500,000 or the parties agree to tailored discovery.
[8] Rule 8.9(a) also provides that where the cost of standard discovery would be disproportionately high in comparison to the matters at issue in the proceeding, there should be tailored discovery.
[9] It appears the parties accept that the cost of standard discovery would be disproportionate. They have acted in accordance with the spirit of the regime to the extent of agreeing on tailored discovery, and they make no suggestion that there should be more than standard discovery. They have also agreed on staged discovery relating to valuations of the assets that are indisputably part of the estate. But they have otherwise failed to settle the terms of the tailored discovery. The core of the dispute is primarily about what circumstances Dr Commons should have taken account of in making provision in his Will for Andrew, assuming he were looking through the lens of “a wise and just testator”.
1 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific [2012] NZHC 726.
2 High Court Rules 2016.
[10] Rule 8.12(1)(c) provides that an order for tailored discovery may set out categories (for example by subject headings and date periods) or another method of classification by which documents are to be identified. The discovery checklist, which must be considered by the parties in the process of co-operation and endeavouring to agree on an appropriate discovery orders, provides:3
3 Tailored discovery
…
(2) The parties must–
(a)endeavour to agree a proposal in relation to the discovery order that should be made, with respect to the following:
(i) categories: identify the categories of documents required to be discovered by the parties, and for each category seek to limit discovery to what is reasonable and proportionate. This may be done by, for example, specifying–
(A) subject matter:
(B) date range:
(C) types of documents:
(D) key individuals (for example, those who are company directors or are at a specified management level; and
….
Approach
[11] As Asher J noted, the concept of proportionality is central to tailored discovery.4 It is relevant in determining whether tailored discovery is appropriate.5 It is relevant in deciding whether the categories of tailored discovery are reasonable and proportionate.6 It is also fundamental in determining what is a reasonable search for documents within the scope of a discovery order,7 and the methods and strategies for locating documents.8
3 High Court Rules 2016, sch 9, cl 3.
4 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific [2012] NZHC 726 at [12].
5 High Court Rules 2016 r 8.9(a); and sch 9, cl 1.
6 Schedule 9, cl 3(2)(a)(i).
7 Rule 8.14(2)(e); and sch 9, cl 2(b).
8 Schedule 9, cl 3(2)(a)(ii).
[12] At issue in this application is whether the category orders sought by Andrew are reasonable and proportionate. In unpacking that, the first question is whether the categories are relevant to the issues in the proceeding. Justice Asher held that the starting point in such a consideration must be an analysis of the issues:9
Discovery categories will reflect the issues and will only be ordered for the discovery of documents that are relevant to those issues. Except in exceptional circumstances, these issues will be discernible from a review of the pleadings. Discovery orders that are essentially of a “fishing” nature are not part of tailored discovery. Orders will not be granted where the categories do not relate to a pleaded relevant issue, but rather a non-pleaded issue which might be pleaded should discovery reveal documents that support such a pleading.
[13] Inherent in the question whether the documents sought are relevant is the question of how important they will be.10 This has also been framed as “their degree of relevance”, which is to be weighed against the cost of carrying out discovery in determining whether it is proportionate.11
The Family Protection Act claim – breach of moral duty
[14] The disputed documents sought in relation to the first cause of action, the claim under s 4 of the Family Protection Act 1955, are those listed in the schedule under categories 2–4 and 7.
[15] In this cause of action, it is pleaded that Dr Commons did not live up to the standard of “a wise and just testator”, by failing to properly take account of various “relevant circumstances” when making provision for Andrew in his Will. The circumstances relied upon, as alleged in the pleading, include:
(a)the emotional and financial neglect of Andrew and his brother, especially during their childhood and young adulthood;
(b)Andrew’s condition as a paraplegic resulting from a tragic accident and its serious impact on his much reduced but still successful legal career;
9 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific [2012] NZHC 726 at [13].
10 Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760 at [14].
11 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific [2012] NZHC 726 at [18].
(c)the generous emotional and financial provision made for the two children of Dr Commons’ second marriage before his death – directly and via trusts – from which they have derived significant financial benefit and can reasonably anticipate significant ongoing financial benefit; and
(d)the probability those children, Hamish Commons and Jonne Willcox, will benefit significantly from the estate and trusts associated with their mother, Patricia Commons, who is Dr Commons’ widow.
[16] Andrew acknowledges that the Act’s remedial reach under s 4 of the Act is restricted to the edges of his father’s actual estate, as is made clear from the words of the section. It states:
4 Claims against estate of deceased person for maintenance
(1) If any person (referred to in this Act as the deceased) dies … and in terms of his … will … adequate provision is not available from his … estate for the proper maintenance and support of the persons by whom or on whose behalf application may be made under this Act, the court may, at its discretion on application so made, order that any provision the court thinks fit be made out of the deceased’s estate for all or any of those persons.
[17] But Andrew seeks to support his case for further provision out of the estate by reference to all of the above circumstances. For that purpose he refers to a pool of assets divested by his father to several trusts as part of a long-term estate planning exercise undertaken for the benefit of his second family to the exclusion of the first family. He pleads an “adequate” allocation from the estate would be a sum calculated at 20% of the combined value of the estate and the additional pool of assets. He estimates that combined value to be about $33 million, and the value of the estate itself to be about $13 million. He contends that had his father viewed the making of his Will from the lens of a wise and just testator, he ought to have taken account of:
(a)The combined pool of assets from which his half-siblings have already benefitted, and are likely to continue to benefit from;
(b)The likely benefits they have had (and reasonably anticipate receiving) from the mother and her estate.
[18] Had Dr Commons taken account of these aspects, Andrew maintains that his provision from the estate would have increased.
[19] The documents sought relate to the trusts settled as part of a long-term estate planning exercise, being the John and Patricia Commons Children’s Trust No. 1 which owns a property at Mt Maunganui; the Whare Kamana Trust which also has property at Mt Maunganui and a property known as the Relish Café in Rotorua; and the “Springwood Trusts”; which are in fact the Jonne Commons Trust and the Hamish Commons Trust, each of which owns a residential property in Balmoral.
[20] The documents sought in category 2 are those pertaining to benefaction Jonne and/or Hamish Commons received from Dr Commons during his life, including from trusts in relation to which he had any power of trustee or settlor. Category 3 contains documents identifying property (and its value) in Patricia Commons’ estate the subject of her will in favour of Jonne and/or Hamish Commons. Category 4 includes documents identifying property and its valuation of property in relation to which Patricia Commons is or was settlor, or has or had any trustee power, the beneficiaries of which are (without limitation) Jonne and/or Hamish Commons. Category 7 includes documents relating to the contents of the trusts, including their assets and the valuations of those assets, the sources and dates of injections of capital, any debts Dr Commons forgave, and each trust’s annual financial statements.
[21] Patricia, Hamish and Jonne do not accept the wholescale discoverability of the documents identified in categories 2–4, and 7 in their capacity as the executors and trustees of the Will and the estate or as beneficiaries under the Will. Their primary objection is lack of relevance. They also object on the basis that they are not sued in their capacity as trustees of these trusts, and observe that, in the case of the Whare Kamana Trust, there is another trustee who is not named as a party in these proceedings. They point out that the trusts were settled many years before Dr Commons died and cannot be regarded as testamentary trusts, as happened in Flathaug v Weaver, where the testator left his entire estate to a trust.12 They also point to Ashworth v Lambie where the Court reviewed the authorities at some length and
12 Flathaug v Weaver [2003] NZFLR 730 (CA) at [36].
concluded it could only deal with the estate as it is and not what it might have been if the testator had not disposed of some of his assets during his lifetime.13 Justice Gendall observed:
[41] The extent of the deceased’s moral duty is to be assessed at the time of his death. Clearly in this case, a duty was owed to the widow and children. The size of the estate and the existence of other moral claims on it, described as “the testator’s bounty” in Re Leonard are of course relevant. But the “testator’s bounty” may be different to “the family assets”. The Court can only deal with the estate as it is and not what it might have been if the testator had not disposed of some of his assets during his lifetime, whether to beneficiaries under the will or claimants. Naturally, the Court has to have regard to the size of the estate; provision, if any, made for claimants; competing claims and all the circumstances in deciding the initial question whether there was a breach of moral duty. Neither counsel have been able to refer the Court to any authority to support the proposition that because a beneficiary receives benefits during his/her lifetime, then that can be reflected in there being an increase in the moral duty to others who claim under the legislation. It may well be that if the testator’s assets have been substantially diminished and/or depleted by inter vivos provisions to another, and as a result the estate is insufficient to meet the moral claims of others, awards to those claimants should be increased.
(Citations omitted)
[22] His Honour went on to state he had unearthed only two High Court decisions where inter vivos gifts made to persons, also beneficiaries under a will, have been taken into account when evaluating the extent of a deceased’s moral duty to a claimant.14 Both involved small estates. In the first, gifts to the widow left a small estate, all of which was left to the widow with nothing to the claimant (and the parties had reached an agreement and only sought the Court’s approval to it).15 In the second “a small legacy to a claimant daughter – in necessitous circumstances – did not meet the testator’s moral duty where he had made significant inter vivos gifts to a housekeeper, who also was given a life interest in a modest estate.”16 In each of these cases “the breach of moral duty to the claimant arose because the estate was insufficient – if testamentary provisions remained unaffected – to remedy the breach of moral duty”.17
13 Ashworth v Lambie [2012] NZHC 1100.
14 Ashworth v Lambie [2012] NZHC 1100 at [43].
15 Re Fountain HC Auckland A101/87, 1 December 1989.
16 Ashworth v Lambie at [43]; describing Re Howse HC Auckland A1093/84, 26 September 1990.
17 At [43].
[23] The present case is different from those two exceptional cases. The estate in this case is a very substantial estate. If there is shown to be a breach of duty, the estate is more than sufficient to ensure such provision as the court thinks fit can be made out of the estate for Andrew, even at the level he is seeking. The defendants do not, in any capacity, seek to argue the contrary.
[24] I am mindful that the claim is pleaded in a way that seeks to put in issue the inter vivos benefits that Andrew’s half siblings have received from their father, and the benefits they are likely to derive from various trusts and through benefaction bestowed on them by their mother. But I do not read into the established authorities that Andrew relies upon the kind of approach that he is pursuing in relation to the assessment of the s 4 duty. That approach has the hallmarks of a “beneficiary comparison”, which the courts have consistently eschewed. The authorities are clear that a comparative approach is not what the s 4 is concerned with. In Williams v Aucutt Blanchard J said:18
[70] It is not for the Court to be generous with the testator's property beyond ordering such provision as is sufficient to repair any breach of moral duty. Beyond that point the testator's wishes should prevail even if the individual Judge might, sitting in the testator's armchair, have seen the matter differently. As I have said, the Court's power does not extend to rewriting a will because of a perception that it is unfair. Testators remain at liberty to do what they like with their assets and to treat their children differently or to benefit others once they have made such provisions as are necessary to discharge their moral duty to those entitled to bring claims under the Family Protection Act.
[25] Further, as the Court of Appeal observed in Auckland City Mission v Brown, the Court should avoid granular “category by category” assessments of dispositions to each beneficiary over history.19
[26] I accept that the question of breach requires a contextual assessment and that the financial circumstances of the other moral claimants (not just those of the plaintiff) are relevant. In Re Harrison, the Court of Appeal held:20
18 Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479 (CA).
19 Auckland City Mission v Brown [2002] NZCA 33, [2002] 2 NZLR 650 at [37].
20 Re Harrison [1962] NZLR 6 (SC) at 14.
In considering whether there is a moral obligation, regard is had not only to the needs of the applicant but also to the extent of the estate which the testator had to dispose of and to the claims which other persons had upon him.
[27]In Williams v Aucutt, Richardson J held:21
The first inquiry, whether there has been a breach of duty, obviously requires details of the estate and of the financial positions of the claimants and beneficiaries under the will, all as at the date of death.
[21] Relevantly, the Court of Appeal held in McKenzie v Thomas:22
[14] Although this is a modest estate, it is necessary to determine it on the “support” provision in s 4 of the Act. This is because neither the appellants nor the respondents provided the High Court with sufficient financial details to enable financial considerations to be taken into account. A party’s income and asset position, whether that party be an appellant or a beneficiary in the position of a respondent, should be provided in all family protection cases. These factors are relevant to whether or not the deceased has breached a moral duty.
[28] But that need for contextual assessment does not mean a wide-ranging enquiry into inter vivos benefits – and possible or probable future benefits and the extensive discovery that would entail – would be a helpful or proportionate means of informing the assessment and the determination the Court is required to make. Affidavit evidence from each of the principal beneficiaries, providing a proper statement of their financial positions as at the date of Dr Commons’ death, including any contingent and vested interests they acquired on his death, will sufficiently enable the Court to take financial considerations into account when deciding the extent of any breach. They should also enable the Court to determine what further provision, if any, ought to be made out of the estate.
[29] It may be that a second stage of tailored discovery will be appropriate once the defendants – and I include all three of them in their capacities as beneficiaries – provide this information. I include Patricia because, as the Court of Appeal stipulated in McKenzie v Thomas a party’s income and asset position, whether that party be an appellant or a beneficiary in the position of a respondent, should be provided.23 She is a beneficiary under the Will and her financial position may be material to any
21 Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479 (CA) at [8].
22 McKenzie v Thomas CA120/02 14 November 2002 (emphasis added).
23 At [14].
potential adjustment that the Court may see fit to make from the estate for Andrew from the investment fund (both as to amount and when it would be available to him).
[30] I turn then to the discovery sought in relation to the second and third causes of action.
The second and third causes of action
[31] Disputed documents sought in relation to the second and third causes of action are listed in category 5 (documents identifying decisions and directions relating to the estate); category 6 (documents showing the extent of Patricia’s input in the decisions made by the trustees); and categories 8, 9 and 10 (documents relating to Patricia’s standard of living at the date of Dr Commons’ death, income earned on the investment fund and her independent means).
[32] The second and third causes of action are brought on the basis that the trustee executors are said to have breached their obligations under the Will and as trustees of the estate’s assets. This is on the alleged bases that:
(a)Steps taken under the Will were taken by Jonne and/or Hamish, without proper input from Patricia (now represented by a litigation guardian) who has been unwilling or unable in fact to participate properly in the decision making.
(b)The entire income derived from the estate’s investment fund since Dr Commons’ death, being about $780,000, has been distributed to Patricia and involves so large a sum as to be:
(i)surplus to the requirement in the Will to support Patricia (who has independent means) to the standard of living she was accustomed to prior to Dr Commons’ death; and
(ii)a perverse and improper exercise of – or a complete failure to recognise – the discretion under cl 6 of the Will to pay out the income to Patricia or accumulate any part of it as capital.
[33]Orders are sought as follows:
Second cause of action – breach of trust
(a)An order that steps relating to the estate taken “from a date to be determined on discovery” are ultra vires and set aside.
(b)An order that distributions since that date be subject to a remedial constructive trust and returned to the estate.
Third cause of action – breach of trustees’ obligations
(c)An order that surplus estate income be accumulated within the estate for eventual distribution to beneficiaries pursuant to clause 6.1.c.iv of the Will.
(d)An order that surplus estate income accumulated outside the estate prior to the date of judgment, be subject to a remedial constructive trust and returned to the estate.
[34] There is no dispute about documents listed at 5.1 and 5.4 in category 5. These relate to the distribution of estate income to any beneficiary and to the mix of investments to be undertaken with estate funds. They are to be discovered.
[35]But the request for other documents is generally too broad:
(a)Discovery of documents sought to see whether – over the entire period since the date of Dr Commons’ death – steps by the trustees were taken by Jonne and/or Hamish without proper input from Patricia is simply fishing for a foundation for the second cause of action.
(b)However, documents in category 6 that relate to formal resolutions or related decisions commencing from the date of the appointment of the litigation guardian in September 2018 should be discovered.
(c)Documents in categories 8 to 10 sought in relation to estate income paid to Mrs Commons and to her standard of living prior to Dr Commons’ death may be relevant to whether the income that has been distributed to her was a perverse and improper exercise of – or a complete failure to recognise – the discretion under cl 6 of the Will to pay out the income to her or alternatively to accumulate any part of it as capital. But the trustees have already agreed to discover any records of trustees’ decisions in respect of income distributions from the estate to any beneficiary. They say, candidly, through counsel, that they did not consider Mrs Commons’ standard of living prior to Dr Commons’ death because they did not read the Will as imposing any obligation to do so. Whether they are right (and they may well be) is for the trial judge to decide. But as counsel submits, such documents cannot be fabricated and I accept her submission there is little point in ordering discovery of them. Further, I consider the affidavit evidence I have directed each of the principal beneficiaries to provide, so as to give a proper statement of their financial positions as at the date of Dr Commons’ death, including details of any contingent and vested interests they acquired on his death, will be a proportionate means of providing the plaintiff and the court with sufficient financial details as to Mrs Commons’ standard of living.
(d)The estate’s financial statements should also be discovered. They are relevant to the Family Protection claim. Additionally, the trustees acknowledge that capital has been paid out wrongly to Mrs Commons, but it has since been repaid. That gives rise to an issue about interest that could or should have been earned on that capital. I am satisfied that any issues about such interest can be identified by providing copies of the financial statements.
Result
[36]I direct that the defendants are to provide tailored discovery as follows:
(a)Discovery of the documents listed in category 1 of the schedule, but staged on the basis agreed by the parties (and as outlined in the submissions of counsel for the executor trustees).
(b)Discovery of the documents listed in 5.1 and 5.4 of category 5 of the schedule.
(c)Discovery of category 6 documents dating from the appointment of the litigation guardian.
(d)Discovery of the estate’s financial statements.
[37] I further direct that the defendants, in their capacity as beneficiaries of the estate, are to file and serve affidavit evidence setting out a proper statement of their financial positions as at the date of Dr Commons’ death, including details of any contingent and vested interests they acquired on his death.
[38] The parties are to agree on a timetable for these steps, with leave reserved if further directions are needed. A memorandum may be filed and served on 2 days’ notice for that purpose.
[39] I add a postscript in relation to the documents listed in Category 1 of the schedule. The disputed items in this category are the joint family home of Dr and Mrs Commons (or property acquired from the proceeds of its sale) and their chattels. I am satisfied that these items are not to be treated as assets of the estate as they have passed by survivorship to Mrs Commons. But they will need to be included in Mrs Commons’ affidavits as to her financial position.
[40] As I consider no party has been entirely successful, I make an order under r 14.7 that costs on the application are to lie where they fall.
[41] Leave is reserved to the parties to file and serve memoranda within 2 working days if further orders are required.
Associate Judge Sargisson
Schedule - the categories of documents sought by way of tailored discovery
1. Documents identifying property (and its value) in John’s Estate.
2. Documents identifying:
2.1.Benefaction Jonne and/or Hamish received from John while he was alive.
2.2.Benefaction Jonne and/or Hamish received from trusts in relation to which John had any power of trustee or settlor.
This includes, but is not necessarily limited to:
a)Identification of the source of funding to purchase the homes beneficially owned by Jonne and Hamish in Balmoral.
b)Income received from the properties identified in (a) above.
c)Funds raised against the properties identified in (a) above.
d)Financial assistance in relation to Jonne/Hamish’s tertiary studies.
e)Other financial assistance received from [John] (other than for daily living expenses while living in the family home).
f)Distributions from, assets and valuations of property in, the Whare Kamana Trust, the John and Patricia Commons Children’s Trust No. 1, and “the Springwood Place Trusts”24.
3. Documents identifying property (and its value) in Patricia’s estate the subject of her will in favour of Jonne and/or Hamish.
24 Alternatively, the Hamish Commons Trust and Jonne Commons Trust.
4. Other than in respect of the Trusts, documents identifying property (and its value) in relation to which Patricia is/was settlor, or has/had any trustee power, the beneficiary/ies of which are (without limitation) Jonne and/or Hamish.
5. In relation to all Trustee decisions and/or directions, documents identifying/relating to:
5.1.Distribution of income from the Estate to any beneficiary.
5.2.Distribution of capital from the Estate to any beneficiary.
5.3.Payment(s) to person(s) other than by way of distribution to beneficiaries.
5.4.Mix of investments to be undertaken with Estate funds.
5.5.Steps taken relating to repayment of capital distributed from the Estate.
6. Documents identifying the extent, if any, of Patricia’s exercise of her office as Trustee under the Will.
7. In relation to the Whare Kamana Trust, the John and Patricia Commons Children’s Trust No. 1, and “the Springwood Place Trusts”:
7.1.Documents identifying any property “paid for” by Patricia (as stated to be the case by the Trustees’ counsel) that was transferred to any of the Trusts and details of Patricia’s payment for the same.
7.2.To the extent not within the scope of 7.1, documents identifying the sources and dates of injection(s) of capital/funding into the Trusts.
7.3.To the extent not within the scope of 7.1, documents identifying the sources and dates of injection(s) of real and/or personal property (other than capital/funding) into the Trusts.
7.4.Records of John’s debt forgiveness.
7.5.Annual financial statements.
8. Documents identifying the quantum of income to support Patricia to a standard of living to which she was accustomed prior to John’s death.
9. Documents identifying the income Patricia received since John’s death other than from the Estate.
10. Documents identifying the use of the income from the Estate received by Patricia since John’s death.
Solicitors:
Tompkins Wake, Auckland Morgan Coakle, Auckland
A Commons, Auckland
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