Commissioner of Police v Woodhouse

[2024] NZHC 655

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND DUNEDIN REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTEPOTI ROHE

CIV-2024-412-26

[2024] NZHC 655

BETWEEN

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Applicant

AND

ADAM JAMES WOODHOUSE

First Respondent

AND

SAMANTHA RAYLENE HAWEA

Second Respondent

AND

ANZ BANK NEW ZEALAND

Interested Party

AND

BRANDED FINANCIAL SERVICES NEW ZEALAND

Interested Party

Hearing:	On the papers
Judgment:	22 March 2024

JUDGMENT OF HARLAND J

[1]        On 15 March 2024, Preston J made a restraining order over certain property owned by the respondents. The order was made without notice to the respondents or interested parties.

[2]        On 19 March 2024, the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner) applied to vary that order insofar as it relates to two vehicles. This application has been made on notice. However, the subject matter tends to suggest that the application has been prompted by the respondents’ need to have access to the motor vehicle covered by the order and the Commissioner’s acceptance that this is reasonable pending any applications for civil forfeiture that might be made.

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v WOODHOUSE [2024] NZHC 655 [22 March 2024]

The application

[3]        The Commissioner seeks to vary the restraining order insofar as it relates to the 2012 Toyota Hilux (registration PKR295) registered to the first respondent, and the Yamaha Wave Runner VXR jet ski and trailer.

[4]        The application refers to the Commissioner having become aware that the Toyota Hilux vehicle is required by the respondents for work and family purposes and that the cost of removal and storage of the Yamaha Wave Runner jet ski is likely to exceed the value that could be realised from the sale of it.

[5]        The Commissioner is agreeable to the respondents having the ongoing use of both the Toyota Hilux vehicle and the jet ski pending any applications for civil forfeiture that might be made. I am advised that the Official Assignee is agreeable to the vehicles being released from his custody and control on the conditions outlined in the order I now propose to make.

[6]        Accordingly, and although the application is made on notice, I am prepared to deal with it effectively on a without notice basis given that the orders assist and do not prejudice the respondents. However, to preserve the prospect that some or any of the orders might need to be further varied, I grant leave to the respondents to apply to the Court at short notice for a variation of them.

[7]        I grant the Commissioner’s application for further orders varying the restraining order as follows:

(a)        The vehicles shall not be disposed of or dealt with by any person other than provided for in this order, and may be in the possession of the respondents throughout the duration of the restraining order on the basis that the respondents:

(i)undertake not to dispose of, sell or otherwise deal with the vehicles;

(ii)do not encumber or otherwise borrow against the vehicles;

(iii)ensure that the vehicles are insured at all times;

(iv)agree to engage with the Official Assignee to provide any information relating to the vehicles as requested by the Official Assignee on a quarterly basis;

(v)ensure that the vehicles are kept in a good state of repair;

(vi)ensure that the vehicles are fully serviced at least annually;

(vii)ensure that, where applicable, the vehicles have a current vehicle licence (registration) at all times;

(viii)ensure that, where applicable, the vehicles have a current warrant of fitness at all times;

(ix)in the event that the respondents are unable or unwilling to register or obtain a warrant of fitness for the jet ski trailer, then arrangements must be undertaken with NZTA and the Official Assignee for the appropriate registration exemptions to be obtained, and secure storage of the jet ski trailer must be provided at 80 Forbury Road,

Dunedin for the duration of the restraining order; and

(x)meet repayments, including principal and interest, on existing finance (if any) in respect of the vehicles. For the avoidance of doubt, this refers to any pre-existing finance secured against the vehicles prior to the making of the restraining order.

(b)       If the Official Assignee has reasonable grounds to believe that the respondents have failed to meet any of the obligations in respect of the conditions above, the Official Assignee may take possession of either or both of the vehicles and retain the vehicles within its custody and control for a period of 14 days. At the expiry of the 14 days, unless the Commissioner has applied for a variation of these orders, the vehicles are to be returned to the respondents on the same conditions as set out above.

(c)        For the avoidance of doubt:

(i)the vehicles remain the subject of the restraining order; and

(ii)nothing in this order prevents the Commissioner from applying for the vehicles to be the subject of any civil forfeiture order.

Harland J