Commissioner of Police v Marshall

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2020-404-377

[2021] NZHC 2316

UNDER The Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009

BETWEEN

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Applicant

AND

EVELYN DAWN MARSHALL

First Respondent

DAVID SIMON MARSHALL
Second Respondent

ZACH MARSHALL

Third Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances:

N Walker / J Pridgeon for Applicant N T C Batts for First Respondent

M J Taylor-Cyphers for Second Respondent S Wimsett for Third Respondent

Judgment:

6 September 2021


JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[on application for leave to appeal to Court of Appeal]


This judgment was delivered by me on 6 September 2021 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date……………

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v MARSHALL [2021] NZHC 2316 [6 September 2021]

[1]    In this proceeding the Commissioner seeks asset and profit forfeiture orders against the respondents under the Criminal Procedure (Recovery) Act 2009 (CPRA). At trial the Commissioner seeks to rely in part on statements made during examinations of the three respondents undertaken after the Commissioner had obtained orders under s 107 of the CPRA.

[2]    The respondents acknowledge they made self-incriminating statements during the examinations. They contend these are rendered inadmissible by both the Evidence Act 2006 and the CPRA. They therefore sought an order requiring the Commissioner to provide redacted transcripts of the interviews that excluded their incriminating statements.

[3]    In a judgment delivered on 19 July 2021 I dismissed the respondents’ application.1 The respondents now seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against this decision.

Relevant principles

[4]    Leave is required under s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 because the proposed appeal relates to an interlocutory decision. In Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council the Court of Appeal confirmed that considerations similar to the principles applicable to applications under the former 24G of the Judicature Act 1908 remain relevant to applications for leave under s 56(3).2 The Court observed:3

We agree that leave to appeal should only be granted where the significance or implications of an arguable error of fact or law, either for the particular case or for the applicant or as a matter of precedent, warrants the further delay which the appeal process would involve.

[5]    The principles governing interlocutory appeals were also very recently reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Tomar v Tomar.4 In that case the Court approved the approach taken by Fitzgerald in Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan.5 This recognises that the requirement for leave to appeal serves as a filtering mechanism to


1      Commissioner of Police v Marshall [2021] NZHC 1819.

2      Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2018] NZCA 291 at [17].

3 At [17].

4      Timar v Tomar [2021] NZCA 419.

5      At [6], citing Finewood Holstery Ltd v Vaughan [2017] NZHC 1679 at [13].

ensure that unmeritorious appeals against interlocutory orders do not necessarily delay the proceedings in which…

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Details
Case
[2021] NZHC 2316
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commissioner of Police sought asset and profit forfeiture orders against the respondents under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. The respondents sought an order that required the Commissioner to provide redacted transcripts of their interviews that excluded their incriminating statements, which they made during examinations undertaken after the Commissioner obtained orders under s 107 of the Act. The respondents argued these statements were rendered inadmissible by both the Evidence Act 2006 and the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. The respondents sought leave to appeal the High Court's decision dismissing their application. The central issue for which the respondents sought leave to appeal arose out of the wording used in ss 164 and 165 of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. These sections provide that evidence obtained under certain sections of the Act is not inadmissible and that self-incriminating statements made in the course of answering questions or producing documents may be used in evidence against a person in a prosecution for an offence under section 108 of the Crimes Act 1961 or under the Act in relation to any evidence given by the person that is inconsistent with the statement. The respondents argued that s 165 prescribed the only circumstances in which the Commissioner may use self-incriminating statements obtained in examinations under s 107 of the Act, and these did not include forfeiture proceedings under the Act. However, the court held that the wording of s 165(1), and in particular the use of the word “only”, meant that the respondents' submission was capable of argument. The court also held that the issue was likely to have importance for proceedings other than the present, and that it was novel, with counsel being unable to find any other case in which it had been raised. However, the court found that the interpretation for which the respondents argued would result in an outcome that was wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. The court considered that it was better at this stage for the proceeding to be determined at trial. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

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