Commissioner of Police v Li

Case

[2014] NZHC 479

14 March 2014

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2013-404-3228 [2014] NZHC 479

UNDER  Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009

BETWEEN  COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Applicant

ANDSTEVEN QUAN LI First Respondent

AND  FAN YANG

Second Respondent

ANDPENGJI CHEN Third Respondent

Hearing:                   30 October 2013

Counsel:                  M Harborow for Applicant

D P H Jones QC for Respondents

Judgment:                14 March 2014

Reissued:                 25 March 2014

JUDGMENT OF KATZ J

This judgment was delivered by me on 14 March 2014 at 4:45 pm

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:           Meredith Connell, Office of the Crown Solicitor, Auckland

Lorne Street Chambers, Auckland

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v LI  & Ors [2014] NZHC 479 [14 March 2014]

Introduction1

[1]      In  February  2013  the  New  Zealand  Qualifications  Authority  (“NZQA”) received information alleging that a website called Assignment4U.com, run by a company called Ateama  Limited,  was  making  money by selling  assignments  to Chinese students.   On 12 May 2013 the Sunday Star Times ran a story regarding these allegations.  Shortly afterwards, the NZQA received further information from an  informant  who  claimed  to  be  one  of  the  “ghost writers”  who  had  written assignments in exchange for payment.

[2]      Search warrants were executed by the police on premises associated with Ateama Limited and the first and third respondents (Mr Li and Mr Chen).  Police recovered substantial material, including several computers and extensive documentary records. No criminal charges have yet been laid against the respondents and the police investigations are ongoing.

[3]      On 20 June 2013 the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner) applied for restraining  orders  under  the  Criminal  Proceeds  (Recovery) Act  2009  (“Act”)  in respect of certain property in which it was said the first and second respondents, Mr Li and Ms Yang (who are husband and wife) had an interest.  Interim restraining orders were made (without prejudice) by consent on 27 June 2013, in order to protect the position until the Commissioner’s application could be fully heard and determined.

[4]      If those restraining orders are to continue, I must be satisfied the property sought to be restrained is property Mr Li and Ms Yang have effective control of, or an  interest  in.    I  must  also  be  satisfied  that  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for believing:

(a)       that significant criminal  activity has occurred and that Mr Li and

Ms Yang have unlawfully benefitted from it; and/or

1      This judgment is a reissued version. The original judgment was recalled and the orders amended in two respects, with the consent of the parties.

(b)      that the property  is “tainted property”, in that it has been wholly or in part acquired as a result of significant criminal activity (either directly or indirectly).

Legal principles – restraining orders

[5]      Restraining  orders  are  interim  in  nature.    They  have  a  statutory  life  of

12 months, but may be extended upon application.   Restraining orders do not in themselves  forfeit  property rights.   Their purpose is  to  maintain  the  status  quo pending determination of an application by the Commissioner for civil forfeiture orders (asset forfeiture orders and/or profit forfeiture orders).  They may relate to all or part  of a  respondent’s  property,  including  property over which  a person  has “effective control”.

[6]      The nature of restraining orders was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Vincent v Commissioner of Police.2    The Court made the following observations about the nature of restraining orders at [45]:

Restraining orders are effectively interim orders of limited duration and may be made without notice. The explanatory note to the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery] Bill identified the purpose of restraining orders as being “to preserve property while the Crown is gathering evidence to support an application for forfeiture”. They may subsequently lead to forfeiture orders, but that requires the completion of a further process ...

It is important to recall what the judge must be satisfied about before issuing a restraining order. He or she must be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the property is tainted property or that the relevant person unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity. The judge is not required to make a finding that the relevant property is tainted property or that the particular person did in fact unlawfully benefit from significant criminal activity ...

[Footnotes omitted]

[7]      Arnold J, delivering the judgment of the Court, continued at [47]:

... restraining orders will often need to be obtained in situations of urgency, as is illustrated by the provision for “without notice” applications. They are, as we have said, temporary orders, which give the police time to gather further evidence, and may lead to forfeiture but only on the completion of further processes.  Restraining orders are issued on the basis of reasonable

grounds to believe, rather than proof, that the target has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity.

[8]      The threshold required for making restraining orders is therefore relatively low, consistent with their role as a “holding” measure.

[9]      There are three main grounds on which restraining orders can be sought. These align with the three types of substantive forfeiture order that may be made.  In particular, the Court may make restraining orders where reasonable grounds for belief exist that the property sought to be restrained is:

(a)      tainted  property  (if  proved  at  trial,  this  would  justify  an  assets forfeiture order);

(b)      property   of   a   respondent   who   has   unlawfully   benefited   from significant criminal activity (if proved at trial, this would justify a profit forfeiture order); and/or

(c)      an instrument of crime where a respondent has been charged with a qualifying offence (if proved at trial, this would justify an instrument forfeiture order).

[10]     In this case the Commissioner relies on ss 24 and 25 of the Act, which correspond with (a) and (b) above.  To make a restraining order under s 24 I must have reasonable  grounds  to  believe that  the property sought  to  be  restrained  is “tainted” property.  Tainted property is any property that has, wholly or in part, been acquired as a result of significant criminal activity or derived directly or indirectly

derived from significant criminal activity.3

[11]     Alternatively, I can make a restraining order under s 25 over all or part of the property sought to be restrained if I have reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Li and Ms Yang have unlawfully benefited from  significant  criminal activity.   For present purposes, significant criminal activity is activity from which property, proceeds or benefits of a value of $30,000 or more have been acquired (directly or

indirectly).  Mr Li and Ms Yang will have “unlawfully benefited” from such activity if they have knowingly derived a benefit from it, either directly or indirectly.4

[12]     I will first consider whether grounds exist for a restraining order under s 25. If there are, it will not be necessary to consider whether grounds also exist under s 24.

Are there reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Li and Ms Yang have unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity?

[13]     In order to make a restraining order under s 25, on the particular facts of this case,  I must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for belief that:

(a)        cheating services were provided to students;

(b)      the provision of such services is a criminal offence;

(c)       proceeds  or  benefits  in  excess  of  $30,000  have  been  acquired  or derived (directly or indirectly) from such offending;

(d)      Mr Li and Ms Yang have unlawfully benefitted from this “significant criminal activity”; and

(e)       the property sought to be restrained is property which Mr Li and

Ms Yang either have an interest in, or effective control of.

Are there reasonable grounds for believing that cheating services were provided to students?

[14]     The Commissioner alleges that Mr Li and Ms Yang have been involved since at least 2006 in providing cheating services for Asian students.   Three companies allegedly controlled  by Mr Li  and  Ms Yang are said to have been  involved in providing these services.  It is alleged that those companies employed ghost writers and received fees from students for the completion of assignments.  The assignments

were then handed in to academic institutions by the students, who passed the work off as their own.

[15]     The first of the three companies alleged to have provided these services was Assignment  4U  Consultant  Limited,  later followed  by Atan  Limited  and  finally Ateama Limited.  At all relevant times, the services were allegedly provided through a website: assignment4U.com. The sole director and shareholder of Assignment 4U Consultant Limited was Mr Li.  The company was struck off on 3 November 2008 (it was first registered on 28 November 2003).

[16]     The second company, Atan Limited, was first registered on 14 June 2007. Ms Yang is a director and shareholder of Atan Limited.  In 2009 NZQA received a complaint that Atan Limited was providing services to students to the effect that if students paid money, an assignment would be completed for them.  The complaint indicated that the company was operating from unit 4, 88 Cook Street, Auckland City.

[17]     The third company, Ateama Limited, was first registered on 14 June 2010. Its  sole  director  is  Mr Pengji Chen.  Its  shareholder  is  listed  as  Xiaohu  Ren  of

10A/88 Cook Street, Auckland City.  Mr Ren left New Zealand in 2010 and has not returned.

[18]     In  early 2013,  NZQA received  documentation  alleging that  thousands  of Chinese students were being provided with assignments through the Assignment 4U website, then operated  by Ateama Limited.   One of the documents provided to NZQA by an informant was a draft “contract agreement” between Assignment 4U Consultant Limited and “Party B” who appears to have been an “academic consultant”.

[19]     On 12 May 2013, the Sunday Star Times ran a story “Chinese cheats rort NZ Universities with fakes”.  The article investigated Assignment4U.com, then run by Ateama  Limited. The  article  reported  that  a  student  had  corresponded  with Assignment 4U via email and received confirmation that for $270 the student would

obtain an essay written for them “ready to hand in”.  A copy of that email was in evidence before me.

[20]     In the two days after that media attention (on 13 and 14 May 2013), Mr Li submitted documents to the Companies Office removing himself as the sole director and shareholder of two companies: Quanli Property Ltd and Liwen Trustee Ltd.  In his place, Ms Yang was appointed sole director and shareholder.   Quanli Property Ltd owns units 2, 4 and 24 at 88 Cook Street and Liwen Trustee Ltd owns unit 32

88 Cook Street.

[21]     On 21 May 2013, the Chief Executive of NZQA received a signed and sworn declaration  from  a  United  States  citizen,  confirming  he  had  been  employed  by Ateama Ltd as a ghost writer.   He gave details of the jobs he had carried out, including essays and assignments he had written as a ghost writer.  He also provided email correspondence from 2007 between himself and an email address [email protected].  The emails received from that address had been signed “Steven”. The Commissioner alleges that “Steven” was Steven Li, the first respondent.    Although Mr Li denied having corresponded with the US informant, correspondence was found in Mr Li’s bedroom that appears to indicate that Mr Li did correspond with the United States informant on at least 22 May 2007, in relation to his application for the position of assignment writer.  The US informant stated in that  email  that  his  wife had  advised  him  “about  your service in Auckland  that provides assistance to Chinese students”.    He added “she met one of your senior ghost writers and he referred me to this email”.

[22]     The 22 May 2007 email was found when police executed search warrants at the units at 88 Cook Street, Auckland, on 24 May 2013.   Police also discovered during that search that computers and servers at the business address of Ateama Ltd (unit 4) had been removed prior to their arrival. They were later discovered at unit 9,

88 Cook Street, the premises of Mr Li’s accountancy business, Premium Accounting

Solutions Ltd.

[23]     A preliminary financial analysis of the bank accounts of the three companies, undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  Commissioner,  indicates  that  they  each  received

numerous deposits from third parties, with the relevant payments being accompanied by references to “assignment”, “essay fee” or similar descriptions.

[24]     Each of the companies also made various payments to third parties.  Within these third party transfers out, the preliminary financial analysis indicates that a number of people have received funds on multiple occasions.   The Commissioner submitted that such payments are consistent with payments to “ghost writers”.

[25]     Mr Li deposed that he stopped being involved with the assignment business in 2008 when he switched his focus to his accountancy business.  The Commissioner pointed to evidence, however, that indicated that Mr Li continued to be involved in the assignment business after 2008 and that he was involved with both Atan Ltd and Ateama Ltd.  For example, Mr Li referred to himself as the general manager of Atan Ltd in early 2010.    In April 2013, Mr Li advised the BNZ Bank that he had been employed by Ateama Ltd for five years.  Further, the contact details for Ateama Ltd held by ASB include Mr Li’s email address.  The ASB records their client contact as “Steven” and include a contact phone number which is apparently Mr Li’s cell phone number.   The Ateama Ltd bank account is also linked to Ms Yang’s father’s bank account.

[26]     Further evidence was provided which indicates that Mr Li logged into the Assignment 4U website and authorised payments of invoices for “academic consulting” work.   The invoices were addressed to Ateama ltd. Mr Li allegedly authorised these payments from a computer located at his accountancy business.

[27]    The Commissioner submitted that Mr Li’s involvement in the “cheating services” provided during the period of  2008 to 2013 is further confirmed by the following matters:

(a)      Following the publicity in May 2013, Mr Li took steps to change the directorship and shareholdings of two companies which owned units at 88 Cook Street from his name to Ms Yang’s name.

(b)      When  police  executed  search  warrants  on  24  May  2013,  police discovered the computers and server had been removed from the business premises of Ateama Ltd (unit 4).   They were later located during the search of the premises of Mr Li’s accountancy business, Premium Accounting  Solutions  (unit  9).  The  preliminary  forensic review of a hard drive located identified numerous references to assignments on the hard drives but references had been deleted and overwritten and cannot now be restored.

[28]     Mr Jones QC submitted, on behalf of Mr Li and Ms Yang, that the evidence provided by the Commissioner is inadequate and can only give rise to a “suspicion” at most.  The business conducted by Assignment 4U included second hand textbook trading, tutoring, assignment proofreading services and article translation services. Such  services  do  not  constitute  criminal  activity,  let  alone  significant  criminal activity.     Tutors  and  other  persons  necessary  to  provide  such  services  can legitimately be employed and provide invoices for academic consulting services. The evidence provided is not therefore sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for belief that cheating services were provided, as alleged by the Commissioner.

[29]     Mr Jones further noted that the police investigation was initiated in May

2013.   The police executed search warrants and seized a substantial amount of documentary material as well as computers.  Bank accounts have been identified and analysed.  By the time of the hearing the police had had this material for over five months and have therefore had ample opportunity to conduct enquiries to establish the so-called “cheating services” which the application is based upon.  However, not a  single  “bogus  assignment”  has  been  put  in  evidence.    Nor  have  any  alleged “ghost writers” provided affidavits.   Nor is there any evidence from students who allegedly used such services or relevant tertiary institutions.  Mr Jones submitted that although the Commissioner has alleged a large scale systemic operation, he has not produced any actual proof of one.

[30]     Mr Jones submitted that there is therefore a void in the material the Court has to consider.   He said that “this abject lack of evidence strikes at the heart of the applicant’s  case.”    Further,  he  submitted  that  the evidence provided  by the  US

informant  was  unreliable  and  that  its  content  “evidences  a  deponent  who  is extremely unusual to say the least”.

[31]     Mr Jones’ focus was, essentially, on evidence that was not before the Court but which, he says, could have been if the police investigation to date had been more thorough.  In essence he criticised the progress of the police inquiries and suggested that far more information should have been available to substantiate the claims, some five months after the search warrants were executed.  That may or may not be the case.   Ultimately, however, the Commissioner’s application for a restraining order must stand or fall on the evidence that is before the Court.

[32]     I have carefully considered all of that evidence and I am satisfied that it meets the threshold of establishing that there are reasonable grounds for belief that “cheating services” (the provision of assignments to students for monetary reward) were provided to students in the manner alleged by the Commissioner.  While there is evidence, from Mr Li, of legitimate business activities by the relevant companies, including the sale of second hand text books, the evidence before the Court does not appear to relate to such activities.  For example, most of the bank statement entries relied on by the Commissioner do not appear, on their face, to relate to the sale of second hand books.

[33]     Whether or not cheating services were in fact provided, on the balance of probabilities, is not in issue before me.  That is an issue for another day. No question of forfeiture  yet arises.   It would be unrealistic to expect the Commissioner to provide, at this preliminary restraining order stage, all or even most of the evidence likely to be adduced at trial.  Rather, the Commissioner is required to put sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to determine whether there are “reasonable grounds for belief” that Mr Li and Ms Yang have benefitted from significant criminal activity.  If there are reasonable grounds for such belief, then a restraining order will be appropriate to protect the position pending trial.

[34]     In  terms  of  the  first  stage  of  that  inquiry,  I  am  satisfied  that  there  are reasonable grounds for belief that “cheating services” were provided, based on the evidence the Commissioner has provided.

Is the provision of cheating services a criminal offence?

[35]     The second stage of the inquiry requires me to consider whether the cheating services alleged by the Commissioner, if proved at trial, would amount to a criminal offence.

[36]   The Commissioner alleged that the cheating services offered through Assignment 4U Consultant Limited, Atan Limited and Ateana Limited, if proved, would constitute the following offences:

(a)       providing cheating services: Education Act 1989, s 292E; (b) obtaining by deception: Crimes Act 1961, s 240;

(c)       forgery: Crimes Act 1961, s 256; and

(d)      using forged documents: Crimes Act 1961, s 257.

[37]     The first offence, that of providing cheating services, could only relate to any offending that occurred after 30 August 2011 when the Education Amendment Act

2011 came into force.   That Act created a number of new offences (s 292-292G Education Act 1989) and provided the NZQA with a broader range of enforcement powers and responsibilities.   In particular, s 292E states that it is an offence to provide or advertise cheating services.  Cheating services include completing or the provision  of  any assignment  or  any other  work  that  any student  is  required  to complete.  A person who commits an offence against s 292E is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000.

[38]     Mr Jones acknowledged that the incident described by the Sunday Star Times could (if proven) constitute an offence against the Education Act 1989, namely providing  or  advertising  cheating  services  pursuant  to  s  292E.    However,  he submitted that the alleged offending does not fall within the definition of “significant criminal activity” in the Act. (I address this issue further below).

[39]     The other offences relied on by the Commissioner are not time constrained in the same way as the alleged offence under the Education Act 1989.   Each of the other alleged offences could arguably relate to any or all of the period since 2006.

[40]     I am satisfied that, if the facts alleged by the Commissioner are proved, there are reasonable grounds for belief that one or more of the offences relied on by the Commissioner will have been committed.   In this context, I note that the Commissioner  has  foreshadowed  that  it  will  likely  be  asserted  that  Mr  Li  and Ms Yang are liable as parties to any offending committed by students, in addition to any principal liability they may have.

Have Mr Li and Ms Yang unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity, being criminal activity from which proceeds in excess of $30,000 have been derived?

[41]     The current interim restraining orders can only be continued if there are reasonable  grounds  for  belief  that  Mr  Li  and  Ms  Yang  have  benefitted  from significant criminal activity.  Section 6 of the Act defines significant criminal activity in the following way:

Meaning of significant criminal activity

(1)       In  this  Act,  unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,  significant criminal activity means an activity engaged in by a person that if proceeded   against   as   a   criminal   offence   would   amount   to offending—

(a)     that consists of, or includes, 1 or more offences punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years or more; or

(b)     from  which  property,  proceeds,  or  benefits  of  a  value  of

$30,000 or more have, directly or indirectly, been acquired or derived.

(2)       A  person  is  undertaking  an  activity  of  the  kind  described  in subsection (1) whether or not—

(a)     the person has been charged with or convicted of an offence in connection with the activity; or

(b)     the person has been acquitted of an offence in connection with the activity; or

(c)     the person’s conviction for an offence in connection with the activity has been quashed or set aside.

(3)       Any expenses or outgoings used in connection with an activity of the kind  described  in  subsection  (1)  must  be  disregarded  for  the purposes of calculating the value of any property, proceeds, or benefits under subsection (1)(b).

[42]     The Commissioner relied on the second limb of the definition, namely that the alleged cheating services constituted criminal offending “from which property, proceeds, or benefits of a value of $30,000 or more have, directly or indirectly, been acquired or derived.

[43]     Section 6(3) requires that any “expenses” (such as payments made to alleged ghost writers) be disregarded.  The sole focus is on the property, proceeds or benefits received.

[44]     As I have noted above, a preliminary financial analysis of the bank accounts of the three companies, undertaken on behalf of the Commissioner, indicates that they each received numerous deposits from third parties with the relevant payments being   accompanied   by   references   to   “assignment”,   “essay   fee”   or   similar descriptions.

[45]     The preliminary financial analysis also indicates that the bank accounts of Mr Li and Ms Yang have received large amounts of money from Assignment 4U Consultant Ltd, Atan Ltd and Ateama Ltd from 2006 to 2013. In particular:

(a)       from 22 July 2006 to 12 June 2008 there were 68 payments totalling

$198,400 made from the Assignment 4U Consultant Ltd bank account to Mr Li and Ms Yang’s bank accounts;

(b)      from 18 July 2007 to 8 July 2010 there were 293 payments totalling

$483,245 made from the Atan Limited bank account to Mr Li and Ms

Yang’s bank accounts;

(c)       from 28 July 2010 to 15 May 2013 there were 177 payments totalling

$443,681.76  made  from  the Ateama  bank  account  to  Mr  Li  and

Ms Yang’s bank accounts. Of those 177 payments, 141 were made to

Mr Li’s BNZ bank account (a total of $137,766.42) with the reference

“drawing”.

[46]     The Commissioner also provided evidence of financial inquiries with the Inland Revenue, which indicate that the declared earnings of Mr Li and Ms Yang are minimal.  Over the period 2002 to 2012, Ms Yang has spent funds at SkyCity casino well in excess of her returned income. Over the period April 2012 to April 2013, Ms Yang incurred an actual cost at the casino of $96,000, although her returned income in the two financial years prior to that was only $23,880.  The Commissioner submitted that this level of spending, above declared legitimate income, indicates funds coming from elsewhere.

[47]     Mr Jones accepted that the overall financial benefit Mr Li and Ms Yang had received from Assignment 4U Consultant Ltd, Atan Ltd and Ateama Ltd clearly exceeded the $30,000 level in the Act.  He pointed to Mr Li’s evidence, however, that those companies were involved in legitimate business activities, including tutoring the sale of second hand text books.

[48]     I have found, however, that there are reasonable grounds for belief that those companies, in addition to any legitimate services they provided, were also involved in the provision of cheating services.   The precise apportionment of any income received by the relevant companies between legitimate business activities and cheating services will likely be a matter of some contention at trial (on which the respondents will carry the burden of proof in the event that profit forfeiture orders are sought). At this preliminary stage, however, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for belief that the proceeds derived from the cheating services during the relevant period exceeded $30,000.  Further, I am satisfied, based on the preliminary financial analysis, that there are reasonable grounds for belief that Mr Li and Ms Yang benefitted from the relevant activity.

Is the property sought to be restrained Mr Li and Ms Yang’s property?

[49]     The final issue is whether there are reasonable grounds for belief that the property sought to be restrained is Mr Li and Ms Yang’s property.

[50]     Section 25(2) of the Act allows a restraining order to be made under s 25(1) in respect of parts of a respondent’s property.   The Commissioner submitted that the property sought to be restrained is in part the property of Mr Li and Ms Yang, in that they have interests in the property5 or effective control over it.

[51]     Units 2, 4 and 24, 88 Cook Street are registered in the name of Quanli Property Limited.   Ms Yang is the sole director and shareholder of that company. Prior  to  the  Sunday  Star  Times  publicity,  Mr  Li  was  the  sole  director  and shareholder.   I am satisfied, for present purposes, that Mr Li and Ms Yang have interests in these properties and/or effective control over them.

[52]     Unit 2A, 88 Cook Street is registered in the name of SQL Trust Limited. Mr Li is the sole director and shareholder.  I am satisfied, for present purposes, that Mr Li has interests in the property and effective control over it.

[53]     Unit 8A, 88 Cook Street is registered in the name of Mr Li.

[54]     Unit 32, 88 Cook Street is registered in the name of Liwen Trustee Limited. Ms Yang is the sole director and shareholder of this company.   Again, before the publicity generated by the Sunday Star Times article, Mr Li was the sole director and shareholder of that company.   I am satisfied, for present purposes, that Mr Li and Ms Yang have interests in this property and/or effective control over it.

[55]     Units 6 and 6A, 88 Cook Street are properties that are registered in the name of FY & TC Limited. Ms Yang is a joint director and joint shareholder of FY & TC Limited.   The other director and shareholder is a Tianjun Chen, unit 4, 88 Cook Street.   Ms Yang clearly has interests in these units. FY & TC Limited has not elected to be represented in this proceeding.

Summary and conclusion

[56]     I have found that sufficient grounds exist to make restraining orders under s 25 of the Act.   In particular, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for

belief that:

5      As defined in s 5.

(a)       cheating services were provided to students;

(b)      the provision of such services is a criminal offence;

(c)      proceeds  or  benefits  in  excess  of  $30,000  have  been  acquired  or derived (directly or indirectly) from such offending;

(d)      Mr Li and Ms Yang have unlawfully benefitted from this “significant criminal activity”; and

(e)       the property sought to be restrained is property which Mr Li and

Ms Yang either have an interest in, or effective control of.

[57]     I emphasise that these proceedings are at a preliminary stage and the sole purpose of the restraining orders I am granting is to protect the position until the final hearing of any application(s) by the Commissioner for forfeiture orders.  Only at that stage will it be determined whether any criminal activity has actually occurred and, if it has, whether Mr Li and Ms Yang have benefitted from it.

[58]     As sufficient grounds exist for restraining orders under s 25, it has not been necessary to consider whether such orders could also be justified under s 24. Therefore, I have not considered whether there are reasonable grounds for belief that the property sought to be restrained is “tainted property,” in that it has, wholly or in part, been acquired as a result of significant criminal activity or derived directly or indirectly derived from significant criminal activity.

Result

[59]     I make the following orders:

(a)      Restraining orders pursuant to s 25 of the Act are made in respect of the property identified in paragraphs 1(a)(iv) to 1(a)(xii) of the Commissioner’s application dated 20 June 2013.

(b)      Such  property  is  to  be  under  custody  and  control  of  the  Official

Assignee.

(c)      Such property is not to be disposed of, or dealt with, other than in accordance with these orders.

(d)      In  the event  that  repayments  on  any of the loans  secured  by the mortgages referred to in paragraphs 1(a)(iv) to 1(a)(xii) of the Commissioner’s application dated 20 June 2013 fall into more than two months arrears, the Official Assignee may, on 7 days notice to Mr Li and Ms Yang, sell sufficient of the properties to remedy the default, provided the sale is at fair market value, and provided the default is not  remedied  (in  full)  within  7  days  from  the  time  the  Official Assignee gives notice to Mr Li and Ms Yang.  If any such sale or sales take place, following the repayment of the mortgagee and payment of the Official Assignee’s reasonable costs in effecting the sale(s), the Official Assignee shall hold the proceeds of the sale(s) as restrained property pending further order of this Court.

(e)       In  respect  of  the  mortgages  referred  to  in  paragraphs  1(a)(iv)  to

1(a)(xii) of the Commissioner’s application dated 20 June 2013, no further draw downs or lending may be made so as to increase amounts currently outstanding under the loans secured by the mortgages.

(f)      The Commissioner is entitled to costs and disbursements, as fixed by the Registrar, on a 2B scale basis.

Katz J

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