Commissioner of New Zealand Police v Murray

Case

[2016] NZHC 2699

10 November 2016

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV-2014-409-000858 [2016] NZHC 2699

BETWEEN

COMMISSIONER OF NEW ZEALAND

POLICE Applicant

AND

MICHAEL SEAN MURRAY First Respondent

ESTATE OF THE LATE DONNA MARIE HOWSE (Deceased)

Second Respondent

Hearing: 2 November 2016

Appearances:

H F McKenzie for Applicant
P J Kaye for First Respondent

Judgment:

10 November 2016

JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

COMMISSIONER OF NEW ZEALAND POLICE v MURRAY [2016] NZHC 2699 [10 November 2016]

Introduction

[1]      On 23 October 2015 the first respondent, Michael Sean Murray (Mr Murray) following a guilty plea, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight years and four months for possession for supply of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine (a Class A controlled drug), possession of cannabis (a Class C controlled  drug),  and  possession  of  GHB  (a  Class  B  controlled  drug).    These offences occurred on 27 and 28 October 2014.

[2]      In the present proceeding the Commissioner of the New Zealand Police as applicant  seeks  a  profit  forfeiture  order  against  Mr  Murray  and  the  second respondent,  the  Estate  of  Donna  Marie  Howse  (the  Estate),  under  s  55  of  the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (the Act).   The original application was against Donna Marie Howse personally but as she died shortly before 9 June 2016, consent was given to amend the proceeding such that the Estate was substituted as second respondent in place of the late Ms Howse.

[3]      The Estate was not represented at the hearing before me.  It seems, however, that the present application is not opposed by the Estate.  It is opposed by Mr Murray however.  Essentially, in terms of s 55 of the Act the Commissioner contends that Mr Murray should be required to pay an amount equivalent to the financial benefit that he has potentially derived from his criminal activity in this case.

[4]      The profit forfeiture order is sought in the present application pursuant to ss 43, 44 and 52 of the Act.

The grounds advanced by the applicant on which the order is sought are as follows:

(a)      Mr Murray has, in the relevant period of criminal activity as defined in s 5(1) of the Act (namely 28 November 2007 up to the date of this present application being 27 April 2016), unlawfully benefitted to the value of at least $479,000 from the significant criminal activity noted above, namely various drug related offending, including possession for supply of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine.

(b)Mr Murray has the following interest in or effective control over the property sought to be realised:

(i)The 2008 Harley Davidson FXST Softail standard motorcycle registration number A2NSP is registered to Mr Murray.

(ii)The 2008 Ford Falcon BA XR8 4A motor vehicle registration number  DCS13  is  currently  registered  in  the  name  of  the Estate, but it is believed that Mr Murray had effective control over it.

(iii)The   1995   Chevrolet    Silverado   pickup    motor   vehicle registration number TM9664, although registered in the name of Terence Austin McFarland, it is believed Mr Murray purchased or acquired for his own use and control.   (This is based on an intercepted text message of 12 October 2014, and Mr McFarland advising the police at interview that he had sold the Chevrolet Silverado for cash to a “gang member”.)

[5] Before me, Mr Kaye counsel for Mr Murray conceded that for present purposes Mr Murray did have the pleaded interests in or control of the three vehicles noted at [4](b) above. In addition, he confirmed that it is not disputed Mr Murray was a senior patched member of the Head Hunters Motor Cycle Club gang.

[6]      Before me the applicant also formally applied here for an effective control order under s 58 of the Act to the effect that Mr Murray has effective control over the

2005 Ford Falcon BA XR8 4A motor vehicle.  Mr Kaye, counsel for Mr Murray, also indicated before me that there was no issue on this aspect.  Effectively he consented to that control order being made. Accordingly, I now make an order to this effect.

Background facts

[7]      In October 2014 it seems police in Christchurch began an operation targeting Mr Murray and others in relation to the alleged distribution of methamphetamine in the South Island of New Zealand.

[8]      Mr Murray was then arrested on Monday 27 October 2014 in the vicinity of Taupo after being stopped by police following a complaint about the manner of his driving.    He  was  stopped  on  State  Highway 1  driving  the  Chevrolet  Silverado vehicle noted above.

[9]      Initially, a small amount of methamphetamine was found in the cab of the Chevrolet Silverado vehicle and Mr Murray was arrested for possession of a Class A controlled drug.  He was bailed to appear in the Taupo District Court on 29 October

2014.  Mr Murray declined to make any comment regarding the methamphetamine, although police also recorded that he had in his possession at the time $1794.90 in cash and a cell phone.

[10]     A full search of the Chevrolet Silverado vehicle then revealed approximately

500 grams of methamphetamine which was concealed in four containers hidden under the lining of the truck deck. That methamphetamine was thought at the time to have a street value of between $300,000 and $500,000.

[11]     Following his arrest on 27 October 2014 and being bailed from the Taupo Police Station Mr Murray returned to his home at 158 Marshall Road, Levels Valley, Timaru.     He  was  then  arrested  and  charged  in  relation  to  the  500 grams (approximately)  of  methamphetamine  located  in  the  vehicle.    This  occurred  on

29 October 2014 and Mr Murray at that point again declined to make any comment.

[12]     A search warrant was then executed at Mr Murray’s residential address at

Marshall Road, Timaru.  At the time of Mr Murray’s arrest in Taupo on 27 October

2014  he  was  on  Court  imposed  bail,  having  been  arrested  on  9  July  2014  in

Auckland and charged with:

(a)       Unlawful possession of a pistol;

(b)      Unlawful possession of explosives (ammunition); and

(c)       Possession  of the Class  B controlled  drug Gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (Fantasy).

Mr  Murray  has  a  number  of  criminal  convictions  including  for  drug  related offending.

[13]     The issues before the Court with the applicant’s present application are now reasonably confined, given the position taken by Mr Murray as outlined before me by his counsel, Mr Kaye. This position is as follows:

(a)       Mr Murray accepts he was a patched member of the Head Hunters

Motor Cycle Club.

(b)Mr Murray, it is noted, has already accepted responsibility by his plea of guilty and subsequent sentencing for the drug related offending committed on 27 and 28 October 2014.

(c)      Mr Murray further accepts responsibility for earlier firearms related offending dated 9 July 2014 and for the methamphetamine found in the Ford Silverado motor vehicle which was established as an amount of 479 grams.

(d)Mr Murray’s position however is that, so far as the offending which resulted in his arrest at Taupo is concerned, he was simply the driver of the Ford Silverado vehicle and merely a courier of the methamphetamine drugs from Auckland such that he says he received no benefit from this incident.  Mr Murray claims that he was simply stopped with the methamphetamine in the vehicle and, as only the courier engaged in this activity, he got nothing for his troubles.

The Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009

[14]     At the outset it needs to be noted that the present application is one seeking only a profit forfeiture order in terms of s 53 of the Act.  The applicant is not seeking an assets forfeiture order here.

[15]     For such an application s 45 of the Act provides that service is required on

any person who, to the applicant’s knowledge has an interest in the property, the

Official Assignee, and anyone who the Court directs must be served.  The persons entitled to appear and to adduce evidence at the hearing are:

(a)       The applicant;

(b)      Any person on whom the application is served; and

(c)       Any other person who claims an interest in the property.

[16]     In this case, other than the applicant, the only other party who appeared at the hearing of this matter was Mr Murray through his counsel.  No other person claimed any interest in the property concerned.

[17]     A profit forfeiture order in terms of s 55 of the Act is mandatory where certain requirements are met.   In the present case, this Court must make a profit forfeiture order under that provision if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Murray has unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity within the relevant period of criminal activity, and has interests in the property in question. Importantly, property that is subject to a profit forfeiture order does not need to be tainted by the significant criminal activity (or any other criminal activity), as is required for an assets forfeiture order.

[18]     The Court derives its jurisdiction to make profit forfeiture orders from ss 53,

54, 55 and 56 of the Act.  Sections 53 and 55 are relevant to the present case.  They provide:

53       Value of benefit presumed to be value in application

(1)       If the Commissioner proves, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has, in the relevant period of criminal activity, unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity, the value of that benefit is presumed to be the value stated in—

(a)      the application under section 52(c); or

(b)      if the case requires, the amended application.

(2)       The presumption stated in subsection (1) may be rebutted by the respondent on the balance of probabilities.

55       Making profit forfeiture order

(1)       The High Court must make a profit forfeiture order if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that—

(a)      the respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity within the relevant period of criminal activity; and

(b)      the respondent has interests in property. (2)         The order must specify—

(a)       the  value  of  the  benefit  determined  in  accordance  with section 53; and

(b)       the maximum recoverable amount determined in accordance with section 54; and

(c)       the property that is to be disposed of in accordance with section 83(1), being property in which the respondent has, or is treated as having, interests.

(3)       Subsections (1) and (2) are subject to section 56.

(4)       A profit forfeiture order is enforceable as an order made as a result of civil proceedings instituted by the Crown against the person to recover a debt due to it, and the maximum recoverable amount is recoverable from the respondent by the Official Assignee on behalf of the Crown as a debt due to the Crown.

[19]     As Laing J noted in Pulman v Commissioner of Police:1

[10]     The  making  of  a  profit  forfeiture  order  under  s  55  potentially requires  the  Court  to  take  four  separate  steps.  First,  it  must  determine, whether the Commissioner has proved, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity during the relevant period.  If the court is so satisfied, the value of that benefit is presumed to be one of the values prescribed by s 53(1). The respondent may, however, rebut that presumption on the balance of probabilities.

[11] Second, the Court is required to determine the maximum recoverable amount. It does that by taking the value of the benefit and deducting from that figure the value of any property already forfeited to the Crown by virtue of any assets forfeiture order made in relation to the same criminal activity as that to which the profit forfeiture application relates.

[12] Third, the Court must determine whether any property should be excluded from the operation of the profit forfeiture order because undue

1      Pulman v Commissioner of Police (HC) Auckland CIV-2010-404-5666, 27 May 2011, Laing J.

hardship is likely to be caused to the respondent if such property were realised.

[13] Once the Court  has undertaken  such  of these exercises as  may be relevant, it must make a profit forfeiture order under s 55(1) if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has interests in property. Any such order must specify the value of the benefit, the maximum recoverable amount, and the property that is to be disposed of.

(Citations omitted)

[20]     In the present case Mr Kaye for Mr Murray confirmed that the only question at issue is whether the Commissioner has proved on the balance of probabilities that Mr Murray had unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity during the relevant period.

[21]     In this regard, s 7 of the Act states:

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, a person has unlawfully benefited from significant criminal activity if the person has knowingly, directly or

indirectly, derived a benefit from significant criminal activity (whether or not that person undertook or was involved in the significant criminal activity).

[22]     In terms of the Court’s requirement to determine the maximum recoverable amount, Mr Kaye confirmed that, if the Court is satisfied that the first requirement noted  at  para  [19]  above  is  satisfied,  then  the  maximum  recoverable  here  is

$479,000, being the agreed estimate of value of the methamphetamine located in the

Chevrolet Silverado vehicle.  No deductions are to be made

[23]     Next, Mr Kaye accepted that Mr Murray did have the required interests in the vehicles in question and he acknowledged also that no argument was being advanced on behalf of Mr Murray that undue hardship was likely to be caused to him in this case if those vehicles were to be realised.

[24]     The only matter at issue, therefore, I repeat, is whether the Commissioner has proved on the balance of probabilities that Mr Murray has unlawfully benefitted from  significant  criminal  activity during the relevant  period  here.    On this, Mr Kaye’s argument, as I have noted at para [13] above, is that Mr Murray was simply the courier of the drugs in question and he received no benefit from the activity in question.

[25]     I turn now to examine that aspect.

[26]     In doing so, it is useful to consider the decision of this Court given in Pulman v Commissioner of Police2  which made a number of useful comments, in a not dissimilar situation, albeit that decision related essentially to an application before the Court relating to non-party discovery.

[27]     In  Pulman,  at the time of the offending Mr Pulman was  employed at  a pharmacy in Pukekohe, having originally owned the pharmacy business and continued to work there as an employee after the new owners acquired it.   He pleaded guilty to a representative charge of manufacturing methamphetamine and was  sentenced  to  five  years,  eight  months’ imprisonment  on  that  charge.    His conviction stemmed from numerous sales of pseudoephedrine-based products sold from the pharmacy during a period between 2005 and 2007.  Mr Pulman had sold approximately 1290 packets of drugs containing pseudoephedrine to persons who called at the pharmacy outside usual trading hours at a price routinely of $100 per packet paid in cash.  There was no dispute that Mr Pulman received cash totalling approximately $129,000 for the drugs he sold in that way.  He maintained, however, that he deposited the cash that he received from the sale of the drugs into a cash box kept for that purpose, which his employers then used to pay staff wages and to meet other business outgoings.   Mr Pulman insists that he never received any personal benefit from the transactions that led to his convictions.

[28]     Addressing these arguments, Laing J made the following comments:

[21] If the definition in s 7 is applied literally, however, Mr Pulman undoubtedly received a benefit from his criminal offending. He did not gift the drugs to the persons who came to the pharmacy. Rather, he sold them to purchasers for $100 per packet. The receipt of cash in those circumstances must,  in  my  view,  amount  to  the  derivation  of  a  benefit  from criminal activity.

[25] Relevantly, the forfeiture regime proposes to eliminate not only the ability of persons to actually profit from undertaking or being associated with significant criminal activity, but also the “chance” that they may be able to  do  so.  In  addition,  the  regime  proposes  to  deter  significant  criminal

2      Above n 1.

activity. Finally, it proposes to reduce the ability of criminals and persons associated with crime or significant criminal activity to continue or expand criminal enterprise.

[26] When the purpose and objects of the Act are measured against the facts in  the  present  case,  a  clear  outcome  emerges.  First,  the  monies  that Mr Pulman received were derived directly from significant criminal activity as the proceeds of drugs that he had sold for cash. Second, the proceeds of sale amounted to income in his hands even if he subsequently handed the cash over to his employer. Third, Mr Pulman always had the chance to profit from his criminal activity because he always had the ability to keep the sale proceeds for his own benefit.

[27] In addition, the criminal activity in which Mr Pulman engaged was obviously of a type that the forfeiture regime seeks to deter. Finally, the provision of precursor drugs to persons involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine meant that Mr Pulman’s criminal activity had the effect of continuing or expanding criminal enterprises by others.

[28] These factors suggest that the forfeiture regime was clearly designed to apply to criminal activity of the type that Mr Pulman engaged in. The regime provides a strong deterrent to those who are minded to engage in such activity, because it will apply even in circumstances where the offender ultimately derives no personal benefit from his or her criminal activity. The Commissioner’s approach, therefore, accords with both the literal wording of s 7 and the purpose and objects of the Act.

[29]     In my view, these comments from Pulman apply directly in the present case and there is no salient difference here.  Despite Mr Murray’s contention first, that he was simply the courier of these drugs transporting them from Auckland to Christchurch and nothing more, and secondly, that  he received nothing nor any benefit for his troubles the fact remains that, like the situation that prevailed in Pulman, Mr Murray clearly had charge of the drugs when he was stopped in Taupo and he “always had the chance to profit from his criminal activity” because he always had the ability to keep or deal in these drugs for his own benefit.

[30]     This, in my view, is clearly in line with the regime proposed under the Act to deter significant criminal activity and major enterprises. The purposes and objects of the Act as I see it are designed to create a forfeiture regime which seeks to deter just the sort of criminal activity in which Mr Murray was engaged.

[31]     Ms McKenzie for the applicant contends that the evidence must suggest in this case that Mr Murray, as a senior patched Head Hunters gang member, was not simply  a  courier  of  the  drugs  but  was  to  play  a  major  part  in  their  sale  and

distribution.  She submitted this was a clear inference also from the evidence before the Court of the two sets of scales, the point bags and cash located at his home.  In my view, however, the Court does not, in this case, need to go this far (although these additional factors do provide some persuasive support here.)

[32]     Mr  Murray,  given  his  acknowledged  background  and  being  someone  in control of this large quantity of methamphetamine which he claims he was transporting to Christchurch, clearly had the “chance” at least to actually profit from this criminal activity undertaking.   This was because, like the situation which prevailed in Pulman, Mr Murray always had the ability to himself sell or divert the drugs onto the market to provide him with a personal benefit.

[33]     As I see the position, it does not matter in this case that ultimately Mr Murray may not have managed to keep the drugs (or indeed any monies from their possible sale) because he was first intercepted en route at Taupo.  The unlawful benefit in this case emanated, in my view, from Mr Murray’s being in possession of a large and valuable quantity of drugs and thereby being able to deal with or dispose of them as he thought fit.

[34]     And  finally,  for  completeness,  I  would  simply  note  that  none  of  the provisions in s 61 - 69 of the Act, providing relief from civil forfeiture orders in certain circumstances, apply here.

[35]     For all these reasons, I conclude that the Commissioner here has proved on the balance of probabilities that, under all the circumstances prevailing here, during the relevant period Mr Murray has unlawfully benefitted from significant criminal activity and in terms of ss 53 and 55 of the Act a profit forfeiture order should be made.

Result

[36]     Accordingly, the present application succeeds. [37]     The following orders are now made:

A profit forfeiture order is now made in terms of s 55 of the Act against the first respondent, Mr Murray, and on the following terms:

(a)       The value of the benefit determined in accordance with s 53 of the Act is at least $479,000.

(b)      The maximum recoverable amount is $479,000.

(c)       The following property in terms of this order is to be realised:

(i)2008  Harley  Davidson  FXST  Softail  standard  motor  cycle with the registration number A2NSP.

(ii)2005  Ford  Falcon  BA  XR8  4A motor  vehicle  registration number DCS13; and

(iii)     1995 Chevrolet Silverado pickup vehicle registration number

TM9664.

Costs

[38]     Given that these proceedings are described in the Act as civil proceedings, if costs are sought by the applicant here, and counsel are unable to agree, they may file memoranda sequentially which are to be referred to me and I will decide the issue on the material before Court.

...................................................

Gendall J

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor’s Office, Raymond Donnelly & Co, Christchurch

Copy to:

Peter Kaye, Barrister, Auckland

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