Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Husman Limited

[2021] NZHC 2812

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2020-404-2494

[2021] NZHC 2812

IN THE MATTER

of the Companies Act 1993

BETWEEN

THE COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE

Plaintiff

AND

HUSMAN LIMITED

Defendant

Hearing:	13 October 2021
Appearances:	C Van Der Merwe for the Plaintiff T Bowler for the Defendant
Judgment:	20 October 2021

JUDGMENT OF ROBINSON J

This judgment was delivered by me on 20 October 2021 at 3:00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

…………………………………………………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors/Counsel:

C Van Der Merwe, Solicitor, Inland Revenue, Manukau Neilsons Lawyers, Auckland

COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE v HUSMAN LTD [2021] NZHC 2812 [20 October 2021]

Introduction

[1]    On 11 November 2020 the plaintiff (“Commissioner”) served the defendant with a statutory demand for payment of $348,213.08 (“statutory demand”). The statutory demand was for unpaid GST for periods dating back to 31 January 2019; and unpaid PAYE, Kiwisaver contributions and other employee related deductions due for periods dating back to 31 December 2018. The amount demanded included penalties and interest.

[2]The statutory demand expired unremedied.

[3]    On 18 December 2020 the Commissioner issued these proceedings. She seeks an order pursuant to s 241(4)(a) of the Companies Act 1993 (“Act”) appointing liquidators to the defendant on the basis that the defendant is unable to pay its debts. Pursuant to s 287(a) of the Act the defendant is presumed to be unable to pay its debts because it did not comply with the statutory demand.

[4]    The matter was first called on 26 February 2021. It was adjourned then, and on subsequent occasions, essentially to enable the defendant to try to reach an agreement with the Commissioner, and to demonstrate solvency.

[5]    The matter was eventually due to be heard on 24 August 2021. On 23 August 2021 the defendant filed an application for leave to file a statement of defence out of time. It also applied for leave for its director, Ms Karlsson, to file a notice of appearance out of time. I made timetable directions leading up to a hearing of the defendant’s applications. I did so notwithstanding the defendant’s non-compliance with timetable orders for the filing of these applications, and the Court’s earlier indications and that there would be no further adjournments.

Intended Defences

[6]    The defendant accepts that when it was served with the statutory demand on 11 November 2020 the amount demanded was due and owing. It also accepts that the amount demanded has not been paid. However, the defendant seeks leave to pursue three affirmative defences:

(a)Solvency: the defendant says that it is solvent. It says that it has made a proposal to pay off the outstanding debt in full over 36 months and that it would be a miscarriage of justice to place the defendant into liquidation.

(b)Breach of Obligation: the defendant says the Commissioner has breached her obligations to accept proposals to pay some of the amount due by instalment, and/or otherwise to grant the defendant relief. The defendant says the Commissioner’s obligations to accept those proposals derive from the Tax Administration Act 1994 (“TAA”) and also the Inland Revenue’s Standard Practice Statement SPS 18/04 (“SPS 18/04”).

(c)Emergency Event: the defendant says that the tax could not be paid due to the occurrence of an emergency event as defined by s 4 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (“CDEMA”). The defendant pleads that the COVID-19 pandemic is an emergency event for the purposes of that Act and as such the defendant “is not required and/or obliged to pay the amount outstanding”.

[7]    Counsel for the defendant, Mr Bowler, submits that these are arguable defences which rebut the presumption of insolvency and demonstrate that the defendant does not owe the tax debt that was otherwise due. He places most emphasis on the allegation that the Commissioner breached her obligations by not accepting the defendant’s proposals.

[8]    The Commissioner opposes the defendant’s applications and seeks an order placing it into liquidation. Her counsel, Mr Van Der Merwe, says that by virtue of ss 109 (core tax), 120I (interest), and 138L (penalties) of the TAA the defendant cannot challenge the amounts the amounts owing. He submits that the Commissioner had no statutory or other obligation to accept the defendant’s settlement offers, or otherwise to offer the defendant relief. He says the defendant is presumed to be insolvent, and in fact is insolvent.

Legal principles

Applications for leave to file a statement of defence

[9]    The defendant’s application for leave to file a statement of defence out of time is made pursuant to rr 31.22 and 1.19 of the High Court Rules 2016 (“HCR”). There is no dispute as to the relevant legal principles. The defendant must:

(a)provide an explanation for the delay in filing a statement of defence;

(b)show that it has a defence to the claim; and

(c)demonstrate that any prejudice it might suffer if leave were not granted would outweigh any prejudice that other parties might suffer were the Court to grant and extension of time.

Test – does defendant have a defence?

[10]   In Fresh Cut Flower Wholesalers Ltd v Living and Giving Gift Co Ltd Paterson J held that:1

… leave should not be granted [to file a statement of defence out of time] unless the applicant can show on the papers an arguable basis upon which it is not liable for the amount claimed. Further, in my view, even if there is an arguable defence, leave should not be granted if the applicant is insolvent.

[11]   Mr Bowler also referred me to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Yan v Mainzeal Property & Construction Ltd (in rec and in liq) in which the Court of Appeal held that:2

[61]    It has long been established that, as a general rule, an order to put a company into liquidation will not be made where the application is founded upon a debt that is genuinely disputed. To apply to wind up a company in such circumstances is regarded as an abuse of the court’s process…In such cases, at court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent such an abuse of process. But the court also has power to consider disputed debts in the context of an opposed application for liquidation or upon applications for orders restraining

1      Fresh Cut Flower Wholesalers Limited v Living and Giving Gift Co Limited (2001) 16 PRNZ 173, at [9].

2      Yan v Mainzeal Property & Construction Ltd (in rec and in liq) [2014] NZCA 190; citing South Waikato Precision Engineering Ltd v Ahu Developments Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-970, 10 December 2008, at [22].

advertising and staying proceedings. The relevant principles were recently summarised by Associate Judge Faire (now Faire J) in South Waikato Precision Engineering Ltd v Ahu Developments Ltd in these terms:

(a)A winding up order will not be made where there is a genuine and substantial dispute as to the existence of a debt such that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to order a winding up;

(b)In such circumstances, the dispute, if genuine and substantially disputed, should be resolved through action commenced in the ordinary way, and not in the Companies Court;

(c)The assessment of whether there is a genuine and substantial dispute is made on the material before the Court at the time and not on the hypothesis that some other material, which has not been produced might, nonetheless be available;

(d)The governing consideration is whether proceeding with an application savours of unfairness or undue pressure.

(footnotes omitted)

[12]The Court of Appeal went on to state that:3

[t]he mere assertion of a dispute is not sufficient to rebut the presumption [of insolvency]. Cogent evidence short of actual proof that the debt is not payable, is required.

Solvency

[13]   Section 241(4)(a) of the Act provides that the court may appoint a liquidator if it is satisfied that the company is unable to pay its debts. As noted above, that inability is presumed in the cases such as this one where the company has failed to comply with a statutory demand.4

[14]   In assessing the solvency of a company for the purposes of determining whether it should be placed into liquidation, the focus is on the “cash flow” test of insolvency, rather than the “balance sheet” test. Once the presumption of insolvency has been established, as is the case here, the defendant must demonstrate that it is able to pay its debts as they fall due.5

3 At [63].

4      Above n 2.

5      Insolvency Law and Practice (online ed, Thomson Reuters), at [241.03(1)]; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v F B Duvall Ltd (2009) 10 NZCLC 264,455 (HC).

Factual Background

[15]   The defendant owns and operates a restaurant and café business in lower Queen Street, Auckland. It started trading in November 2018. The defendant had cashflow difficulties during its first year of trading. It filed its GST and PAYE returns, but did not make the payments. However, Ms Karlsson says that by December 2019 the defendant was starting to show a profit. It traded positively in January and February 2020.

[16]   On 25 March 2020 New Zealand was placed into COVID-19 Alert Level 4. Unsurprisingly, these restrictions and those that followed were detrimental to the defendant’s business. Ms Karlsson says there were 141 days of restricted trade in a 12-month period. Most of the defendant’s customers came from local CBD businesses, many of which implemented work-from-home policies even after the COVID-19 restrictions were lifted. The defendant also lost all its tourist trade, including from cruise ship passengers.

[17]   Ms Karlsson says the business traded profitably in November and December 2020; suffered again from the lockdowns in February 2021; but made a trading profit of almost $60,000 in the period from 1 March 2021 – 30 June 2021.

[18]On 17 August 2021 New Zealand was placed back into COVID-19 Alert Level

4. The defendant has been unable to trade since then. As matters stand it is unclear when the defendant will be able to trade again.

The debt

[19]   In her affidavit of 23 August 2021 Ms Karlsson says that the defendant’s cashflow difficulties and its inability to meet its tax obligations during 2020 were “solely due” to COVID-19.

[20]   However, the Commissioner has filed evidence to show that at the time of the first lockdown on 25 March 2020 the defendant owed PAYE of approximately

$111,300  and  GST  of  $49,500  for  periods  going  back  to December 2018.    The

defendant had made no GST or PAYE payments in the year to 31 March 2020, apart from a single payment on 30 March 2020.

[21]   I do not accept that the defendant’s financial difficulties and its inability to meet its tax obligations during 2020 were “solely due to COVID-19”. By the time of the first lockdown in March 2020 the defendant was already significantly in arrears.

[22]   Throughout the remainder of 2020 and into 2021 the defendant’s core GST and PAYE debt continued to accumulate, and penalties and interest continued to accrue. Since March 2020 the defendant has filed a further six GST returns showing amounts payable to the Commissioner, but it only made one of these payments. The GST return for the period ending 31 May 2021 showed an amount payable of $17,990.31, but this has not been paid.

[23]   Similarly, the defendant filed PAYE deduction returns for 16 monthly periods since March 2020. Five of these have been fully paid, five partly paid, and 6 remain unpaid. The return for the period ending 31 July 2021 was for $11,552.36 but it remains unpaid.

[24]   The Commissioner also points out that the defendant has received gross wage subsidies of approximately $222,000, but that it has not properly returned the PAYE that should have been deducted on those amounts.

[25]   The upshot is that the Commissioner assesses the total indebtedness as at 26 August 2021 to be $520,944.46. This comprises $310,006.49 of core PAYE Deductions and GST together with $210,968.37 of penalties and interest which continues to accrue. The defendant does not dispute the Commissioner’s calculations.

The defendant’s proposals

[26]   The defendant has made various proposals to pay part of the amount owing by instalment. An essential part of the defendant’s intended defence is that the Commissioner has rejected these proposals.

[27]   The defendant made its first proposal on 19 February 2021, the week before this matter was first called. The defendant proposed to pay $2,000 per week. At that time the defendant owed core tax of approximately $267,000. The Commissioner rejected that offer.

[28]   The defendant subsequently proposed to make 36 monthly payments of $3,900 per  month.  It  offered  to  forgo  losses   carried  forward  from  previous  years.   Ms Karlsson offered to try to withdraw $20,000 from her KiwiSaver account on hardship grounds which she would pay as an additional lump sum. The defendant asked IRD to waive the penalties and interest that had accrued.

[29]   IRD rejected that proposal. It considered there was a high risk the defendant would not pay the proposed instalment payments or the taxes becoming due in the future. It expressed concern the defendant was trading while insolvent.

[30]   On 23 August 2021 the defendant put another proposal to the Commissioner.6 The defendant offered to pay $10,000 per month over the next 36 months. It indicated that it would make these monthly payments for longer if the Commissioner required. The defendant provided its Profit and Loss Reports in support of the proposal.

[31]   The Commissioner rejected this  proposal  by  letter  from  the  IRD  dated  24 August 2021. IRD noted that the defendant’s Profit and Loss Reports showed average net profit of less than $10,000 per month over the past 6 months, which was insufficient to support the proposal. It also noted that the defendant had not paid its GST for the period to 30 June 2021, which was due on 28 July 2021. It expressed concerns that the company was trading while insolvent.

[32]   On the same day the defendant (via its solicitor) asked the IRD to review its decision. The defendant explained that the six-month period referred to by IRD included a period of lockdown. It explained that it relied on the performance for the period from 1 March 2021 – 30 June 2021 which showed profit of just under $60,000.

6      This was the same day the defendant filed this application, and the day before the Commissioner’s liquidation application was due to be heard.

[33]   Later that day IRD advised it had reviewed the decision which was to be upheld. IRD explained that the Commissioner was not satisfied that the defendant could make the proposed payments and meet its future tax obligations.

[34]   It is against this background that I must consider whether to grant the defendant leave to file a statement of defence out of time.

Delay

[35]   The Commissioner filed this proceeding on 18 December 2020. The statement of defence was due 10 working days later.7 On 25 June 2021 the matter came before Associate Judge Gardiner for a fourth time. Her Honour was not prepared to grant a further adjournment. She made timetabling orders for the defendant to file this application. These orders were varied by consent, but the defendant did not comply with the varied orders. The defendant filed this application the day before the matter was set down to be heard.

[36]   Mr Bowler for the defendant did not seriously contend that there was a good explanation for the delay. His submissions focussed instead on the intended defences. Ms Karlsson explains that she has not previously defended the proceedings because she was focussed on trying to reach an agreement with the Commissioner. I do not consider that to be an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the defence. Parties routinely engage in settlement discussions while the proceedings between them remain on foot. That is not an excuse for defendants to ignore the rules requiring them to take steps within a certain time. This is particularly so in liquidation proceedings where the rights and interests of third parties will also be affected.

Defences

Commissioner’s rejection of defendant’s proposals

[37]   The defendant submits that by not accepting the defendant’s proposals the Commissioner has breached her obligations to collect the highest net revenue that is practicable within the law having regard to its available resources. That is because the

7      High Court Rules 2016, r. 31.17

Commissioner would collect a much greater amount of tax out of the defendant’s proposal than it will if the defendant is placed into liquidation.

[38]For the reasons set out below I do not consider this to be an arguable defence.

Statutory Provisions

[39]Section 6A of the TAA provides:

6A      Commissioner’s duty of care and management

Care and management

(1)The Commissioner is charged with the care and management of the taxes covered by the Inland Revenue Acts and with such other functions as may be conferred on the Commissioner.

Highest net revenue practicable within the law

(2)In collecting the taxes committed to the Commissioner’s charge, and despite anything in the Inland Revenue Acts, it is the duty of the Commissioner to collect over time the highest net revenue that is practicable within the law having regard to—

(a)the resources available to the Commissioner; and

(b)the importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary compliance, by all persons with the Inland Revenue Acts; and

(c)the compliance costs incurred by persons.

(Emphasis added)

[40]Section 6 provides:

6Responsibility of Ministers and officials to protect integrity of tax system

Best endeavours to protect integrity of tax system

(1)Every Minister and every officer of any government agency having responsibilities under this Act or any other Act in relation to the collection of tax and for the other functions under the Inland Revenue Acts must at all times use their best endeavours to protect the integrity of the tax system.

Meaning of integrity of tax system

(2)Without limiting its meaning, the integrity of the tax system includes—

(a)the public perception of that integrity; and

(b)the rights of persons to have their liability determined fairly, impartially, and according to law; and

…

(d)      the responsibilities of persons to comply with the law; and

…

[41]Section 176 provides:

176     Recovery of Tax by Commissioner

(1)The Commissioner must maximise the recovery of outstanding tax from a taxpayer.

(2)Despite subsection (1), the Commissioner may not recover outstanding tax to the extent that—

(a)recovery is an inefficient use of the Commissioner’s resources; or

(b)recovery would place a taxpayer, being a natural person, in serious hardship.

(3)Despite subsection (2)(b), the Commissioner may take steps preparatory to, or necessary to, bankrupt the taxpayer, including debt proceedings in the District Court or the High Court.

[42]   Section 6A imposes an “overarching duty” on the Commissioner to collect over time the highest net revenue practicable.8 That duty prevails over other provisions in the Inland Revenue Acts, including s 176 of the TAA.9 Section 176 is to be read along with s 6 of the Act and subject to s 6A(2).10

[43]   The s 6A(2) duty relates to taxpayers generally and is not specific to a particular taxpayer. It overrides consideration of a taxpayer’s particular circumstances and requires the Commissioner to have regard to, amongst other things, the importance of promoting voluntary compliance over time.

[44]In Raynel v CIR Paterson J observed:11

8      Russell v CIR [2015] NZCA 351 at [21] – [22].

9      Raynel & Anor v CIR (2004) 21 NZTC 18,583, at [49].

10 At [64].

11     At [55]; cited with approval in Russell, above n 8, at [27].

[55] Ordinarily, where a higher net recovery will be achieved through a proposed compromise than by winding up or bankrupting a taxpayer and there are no countervailing considerations, the Commissioner’s duty will be to accept the compromise. But there may be circumstances where, in order to preserve the integrity of the tax system and promote compliance by other taxpayers, the Commissioner will be justified in refusing an offer and, instead, taking enforcement proceedings. Where, for example, there has been a flagrant and on-going failure to comply with the taxpayer’s obligations and where recovery is dubious or is likely to result only in a relatively minor proportion of the overall debt being recovered, the Commissioner may be justified in initiating or continuing enforcement proceedings to secure the wider interests identified by the legislation.

(emphasis added)

[45]   Paterson J’s explanatory example applies here. The defendant has failed to pay GST or PAYE voluntarily since 2018. Recovery is dubious. In my view there is no basis for the defendant to argue that the Commissioner is obliged to compromise the debt owing and to agree to a long-term payment arrangement that the defendant may well be unable to maintain. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the Commissioner’s overriding duty in s 6A of the TAA requiring her to have regard to the importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary compliance, by all taxpayers. That is particularly so in relation to PAYE and other earner-related payments that the defendant is required to have been holding on trust for the Crown.12

Standard Practise Statement 18/04

[46]   Nor do I consider that SPS 18/04 provides the defendant with an arguable defence. Standard Practice statements generally describe how the Commissioner will exercise a statutory discretion, or otherwise deal with practical issues arising out of the administration of relevant legislation. SPS 18/04 “sets out the Commissioner’s practice when considering the options for removing or deferring the obligation to pay tax, interest and/or penalties under the Tax Administration Act 1994”.13

[47]   There is nothing in SPS 18/04 to suggest that the Commissioner is obliged to accept the proposals put forward by the defendant. Nor is there anything in SPS18/04 that required the Commissioner more generally to grant the defendant relief. The Commissioner has a discretion to grant a taxpayer relief; it is not available as of right.

12     Tax Administration Act 1994, Section 167(1).

13     Inland Revenue, Standard Practice Statement 18/04, at 1.

The defendant’s history of non-compliance and its financial performance provide ample grounds for the Commissioner’s “significant concerns” that the defendant would be unable to service the proposed instalment arrangement while continuing to meet its ongoing tax obligations.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002

[48]The defendant also proposes to defend the application on the basis that:

(a)it has been unable to meet its obligations to the Commissioner due to an emergency event as defined by s 4 of the CDEMA; and

(b)due to the occurrence of the emergency event the defendant is not required and/or obliged to pay the amount outstanding.

[49]   Mr Bowler says the Commissioner has acknowledged that there has been an emergency event for the purposes of the CDEMA. He refers me to the Memorandum of Counsel dated 31 August 2021 that Mr Van Der Merwe filed for the purposes of r 9.73(5)(b)(i) of the HCR14 in relation to the unsworn affidavit which the Commissioner has filed. In his Memorandum Mr Van Der Merwe confirms, in accordance with rule 9.73(5), that he has spoken to the intending deponent who confirmed that “she would have sworn or affirmed the affidavit had an emergency not existed (i.e. if the COVID-19 restrictions were not in place)” and that she “will do so as soon as circumstances reasonably permit”.

[50]   However, the emergency to which Mr Van Der Merwe refers in his Memorandum is not an emergency for the purposes of the CDEMA. Mr Bowler’s argument overlooks rule 3.4(3) of the HCR which provides that:

“…for the purposes of these rules, an emergency exists in a place in respect of which-

an epidemic notice has been given pursuant to section 5(1) of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006; or

a state of national emergency has been declared pursuant to section 66(1) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002; or

14     As introduced by rule 17 of the High Court (COVID-19 Preparedness) Amendment Rules 2020.

a state of local emergency has been declared pursuant to section 68(1) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

[51]   Rule 3.4(3)(a) applies in relation to the COVID-19 epidemic. An epidemic notice has been given pursuant to section 5(1) of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006.15 That is the emergency to which Mr Van Der Merwe’s Memorandum refers. Rules 3.4(3)(b) and (c) do not apply. Neither a state of national emergency nor a local emergency has been declared pursuant to the relevant sections of the CDEMA.

[52]   In any event, even if a state of emergency had been declared, so that the CDEMA was in force, it would not relieve the defendant or any other taxpayer of their statutory obligations to pay tax. Section 6 of the CDEMA provides:

6Act not to affect functions, duties, and powers under other Acts or general law

Unless the Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties or powers of any person under the provisions on any enactment or any rule of law.

[53]   For these reasons I do not consider that the defendant has an arguable defence that it has been unable to meet its obligations to the Commissioner and/or is relieved of those obligations by virtue of an emergency as defined under the CDEMA.

Solvency

[54]   The defendant also intends to defend the Commissioner’s application on the basis that it is solvent. I do not accept that is an arguable defence. For the reasons set out above I do not consider that the defendant has rebutted the presumption of insolvency that arises by virtue of its failure to comply with the statutory demand. On the contrary, the evidence tends to confirm that the defendant is unable to pay its debts as they fall due.

[55]   The defendant owes the Commissioner over $520,000 of unpaid PAYE, employee deductions, GST, penalties and interest. That debt is due and owing. During the hearing Ms Karlsson told me that she believes the defendant would be able to

15     The Epidemic Preparedness (COVID-19) Notice 2020 Renewal Notice (No3) 2021 (8 September 2021) New Zealand Gazette No 2021-go3885.

comply with a payment arrangement once it is able to trade in a “post-COVID environment.” However, as matters stand, the defendant is unable to pay.

Application for leave for director to file notice of appearance out of time

[56]   The defendant has also applied for leave for Ms Karlsson to file a notice of appearance out of time.

[57]   Pursuant to r 31.19, Ms Karlsson’s appearance should have been filed not later than two working days  before the date of the hearing, i.e. by 23 February  2021.   Ms Karlsson did not file a notice of appearance until 3 June 2021.

[58]   For the same reasons set out at paragraph [36] above, I do not consider there is an acceptable explanation for this delay. Moreover, having read Ms Karlsson’s affidavits and written submissions, and heard from her during the hearing, it is apparent that she does not wish to pursue any defences other than those proposed by the defendant.

[59]   For these reasons I decline to grant Ms Karlsson leave to file her notice of appearance out of time.

Conclusion

[60]   The Commissioner’s proceeding against the defendant has been underway for 10 months. The proceeding has been adjourned on numerous occasions to enable the defendant to try to: reach an agreement with the Commissioner; arrange payment of the core tax; demonstrate solvency; and obtain leave to defend the proceedings. It has not been able to do so.

[61]   In the meantime, the defendant’s GST and PAYE liability has increased, and penalties and interest have continued to accrue.

[62]   The Commissioner seeks an order placing the defendant company into liquidation and appointing Vivian Judith Fatupaito and Elizabeth Helen Keene as joint and several liquidators. They have consented in writing to the appointment and

certified the matters referred to in s 282(1)(b) of the Act. I consider it is appropriate to grant the Commissioner the orders she seeks.

Result

[63]   The defendant company’s applications to file a statement of defence and for Ms Karlsson to file a notice of appearance out of time is declined.

[64]The defendant company is put into liquidation.

[65]   Vivian Judith Fatupaito and Elizabeth Helen Keene, accredited insolvency practitioners are appointed as joint and several liquidators of the defendant company.

[66]   The plaintiff is entitled to costs together with disbursements as fixed by the Registrar. The plaintiff is to file a memorandum as to its costs and disbursements within 5 working days of the date of this judgment.

[67]   The rates of remuneration of the liquidators and staff working under their supervision and control are fixed at the rates set out in the liquidator’s consent dated 22 February 2021. The liquidators are to apply at the conclusion of the liquidation for approval of their overall remuneration.

[68]These orders are timed at 3:00 pm on 20 October 2022.

Robinson J