Commerce Commission v International Racehorse Transport NZ

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2019-404-2118

[2020] NZHC 1716

UNDER the Commerce Act 1986

BETWEEN

COMMERCE COMMISSION

Plaintiff

AND

INTERNATIONAL RACEHORSE TRANSPORT NZ

Defendant

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

D A Laurenson QC, F J Cuncannon, K R Muirhead and P I C Comrie-Thomson for Plaintiff

J C L Dixon QC, A D Matthews and A M W Stewart for Defendant

Judgment:

16 July 2020


JUDGMENT OF PETERS J


This judgment was delivered by Justice Peters on 16 July 2020 at 10.30 am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ...................................

Solicitors:           Meredith Connell, Wellington

Matthews Law, Auckland

Counsel:            D A Laurenson QC, Wellington

J C L Dixon QC, Auckland

COMMERCE COMMISSION v INTERNATIONAL RACEHORSE TRANSPORT NZ [2020] NZHC 1716 [16

July 2020]

Introduction

[1]    International Racehorse Transport NZ is a  firm  trading  in  partnership  (“IRT Partnership”). The Commerce Commission alleges, IRT Partnership admits, and the parties seek declarations to the effect  that between 2 October 2009 and     28 October 2018 (“relevant period”) the partnership breached ss 27 and 30 of the Commerce Act 1986 (“Act”).

Sections 27 and 30 Commerce Act 1986

[2]    Section 27 prohibits a person, the definition of which is sufficient to include a partnership, from entering into a contract, arrangement or understanding containing a provision which has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. IRT Partnership’s breach of s 27 was by virtue of s 30 which, until August 2017, deemed a provision of a contract etc to have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition if it had, amongst other things, the effect of controlling the price at which parties to the contract etc, otherwise in competition with each other, would supply services (“price fixing”).

[3]    In August 2017, and subject to specific transitional provisions, s 30 was amended to prohibit, amongst other things, a party giving effect to a “cartel” provision, such provision being defined to include price fixing. Very broadly, the effect of the amendment was to prohibit price fixing directly, rather than via s 27. Hence IRT Partnership’s breach of s 30.

Background

[4]    What follows is a summary of the parties’ agreed statement of facts. I record the only parties who have participated in compiling the agreed statement are the Commission and the partners of IRT Partnership as of 28 October 2018. Accordingly, other parties said to have been involved have not been heard, and any reference to what they may or may not have done is essentially an allegation, derives solely from the understanding of the Commission and the said partners, and must be read in that light.

Partners/Services

[5]    In the period with which I am concerned, the partners of IRT Partnership comprised International Racehorse Transport (N.Z.) Ltd as to a two-third share, and Bloodstock 2000 Ltd until 31 May 2016 and thereafter Cole IRT Ltd, each as to the remaining…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZHC 1716
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand heard a case between the Commerce Commission and International Racehorse Transport NZ (IRT), a firm trading in partnership, concerning allegations that IRT breached sections 27 and 30 of the Commerce Act 1986 by engaging in anti-competitive practices through a joint venture with another competitor, ABC. The court was required to determine whether the joint venture's agreements, which controlled the prices of equine airfreight services, violated the Act by substantially lessening competition. Additionally, the court had to decide whether to impose a pecuniary penalty on IRT, despite the parties' agreement to seek only declaratory relief.

The court found that the agreements between IRT and ABC, which controlled prices and discounts for equine airfreight services, had the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening competition, thereby breaching sections 27 and 30 of the Act. The court acknowledged the joint venture had benefits, such as providing regular and scheduled services, but concluded that the anti-competitive effects outweighed these benefits. The court accepted that IRT's reliance on ABC's legal advice, which deemed the agreements lawful, did not necessarily indicate an intent to breach the Act. However, IRT admitted it should have sought its own legal advice and been more vigilant about compliance. The court also noted the severe financial impact of COVID-19 on IRT's business, which made it unlikely that IRT could pay a penalty. The court concluded that while IRT's conduct was serious, it was not egregious enough to warrant a pecuniary penalty. Instead, the court opted for declaratory relief to serve the purposes of deterrence and to assist the Commission in its educative function.

The court issued declarations confirming IRT's breaches of sections 27 and 30 of the Commerce Act 1986 through its joint venture agreements with ABC. The declarations specified the periods during which IRT gave effect to the agreements in contravention of the Act, both before and after the legislative amendments in August 2017. The court refrained from imposing a pecuniary penalty, considering the financial hardship faced by IRT and its employees, and the potential monopoly in the equine airfreight service market if IRT ceased trading. The court also noted that the declarations themselves would serve the public interest by confirming the Commission's enforcement of the Act and deterring future breaches. The court made no order as to costs, as the parties had agreed to bear their own costs.

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