IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CRI 2014-485-58 [2014] NZHC 1830
NEIL MARTIN CLARKE Appellant
v
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Respondent
Hearing: 5 August 2014 Counsel:
Appellant in Person
E M Light for RespondentJudgment:
5 August 2014
JUDGMENT OF RONALD YOUNG J
[1] Mr Clarke faces five charges of using a document for pecuniary advantage and one of using a forge document. Prior to the trial Mr Clarke made a pre-trial application under s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 for a discharge of all charges. Although a number of grounds for the application were identified, as I understand it, only discharge based on delay was pursued.
[2] Mr Steven Tunley, an investigator with the Ministry of Social Development, gave evidence and was cross-examined at the pre-trial application. Mr Clarke who had filed an affidavit in support of the s 147 application was also cross-examined. Counsel for Mr Clarke and the Ministry of Social Development filed and made submissions although the application itself, as I have noted, was filed personally by
Mr Clarke.
CLARKE v MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT [2014] NZHC 1830 [5 August 2014]
[3] The Judge in the District Court identified what he thought was a six month delay between the identification of the offending and filing of the information. He did not consider such a delay would be sufficient for a discharge and accordingly refused the application.
[4] Mr Clarke filed written submissions in support of the appeal.
[5] There appear to be procedural impediments to Mr Clarke’s “appeal”. There is no right to appeal a pre-trial refusal to discharge a defendant under s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. Leave to appeal may however be given on a question of law which is properly identified.1
[6] In his notice of appeal Mr Clarke identified what seems to be his grounds seeking leave.2 All are fact based. First, Mr Clarke says that the delay in charging him which he says is from February 2013 to December 2013 was in breach of s 25(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. He says there was undue delay. This is a factual matter in the circumstances and does not raise any point of law. His complaint is not that the Judge misinterpreted the law in rejecting the claim of undue delay.
[7] Secondly, Mr Clarke says that s 32(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 was breached. He says that the prosecution did not take all reasonably practical steps to notify him that he had been summoned to appear before Court. As to this claim, this was not an issue dealt with by the Judge in the District Court and cannot therefore be the subject of an appeal. Further, it is plainly a question of fact. Finally, it is difficult to see how even if a breach of s 32(2) could be established that it could result in a s 147 discharge unless there could no longer be a fair trial.…
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- Case
- [2014] NZHC 1830
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues revolved around whether the delay in charging Mr Clarke constituted undue delay in breach of s 25(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and whether there was a breach of s 32(2) and s 30(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The appellant argued that the delay in charging him from February 2013 to December 2013 was undue, and that the prosecution failed to take all reasonably practical steps to notify him of the summons. However, the Court found these arguments to be factual in nature and not raising any question of law. Furthermore, the issue of s 32(2) was not considered by the District Court and did not warrant appeal. The third issue regarding s 30(1) was also deemed irrelevant to the outcome of the trial.
The Court ruled that there was no identified question of law in the appeal and thus refused leave to appeal. Ronald Young J held that the factual matters raised by Mr Clarke did not warrant an appeal as they did not involve any misinterpretation of the law by the District Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without leave being granted.
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