Clark v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections

[2025] NZHC 880

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2025-409-000155

[2025] NZHC 880

IN THE MATTER

of an application for a writ of habeas corpus

BETWEEN

JESSIE DYLAN CLARK

Applicant

AND

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Respondent

Hearing:	On the papers
Appearances:	Applicant in person
Judgment:	10 April 2025

JUDGMENT OF EATON J

This judgment was delivered by me on …….. at ……… pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

CLARK v CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2025] NZHC 880 [10 April 2025]

Introduction

[1]        By application dated 9 April 2025, Jessie Dylan Clark has filed for a writ of habeas corpus.

[2]        Mr Clark faces a number of charges in the District Court that include driving charges, a charge of unlawfully possessing a firearm, a charge of contravening a protection order and charges of failing to answer bail and escaping police custody. He has been found guilty in two judge alone trials. He is presently remanded in custody pending sentencing, which is set down for 14 May 2025.

[3]        He challenges the legality of his detention. The current application seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of “detention and restraint on [his] liberty” and he seeks the determination of whether this is lawful.

[4]        Mr Taffs has filed submissions on behalf of the respondent. Essentially, he submits the application is vexatious and an abuse of process, that Mr Clark is lawfully detained by a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and should be dismissed absent a formal hearing. He gives notice that the respondent may seek to recover costs from Mr Clark.

Prior applications

[5]Mr Clark has filed six previous applications for habeas corpus.

[6]        In a decision dated 14 July 2022, Mander J dismissed the application and declined to issue the writ, having sighted the warrant of detention issued pursuant to s 168(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.1 That warrant provided a lawful basis for Mr Clark’s ongoing detention. In that judgment it was made clear to Mr Clark that an application for habeas corpus was not the appropriate procedure to call into question a refusal to grant bail and that Mr Clark’s option was to appeal a bail ruling.

[7]        On  2  August  2022,  Mr  Clark   filed   a  second   application   for  a   writ of habeas corpus. Again, he complained of being unlawfully detained at

1      Clark v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZHC 1674.

Christchurch Men's Prison. Doogue J determined Mr Clark sought to challenge bail decisions.2 The respondent produced warrants of detention authorising Mr Clark’s detention pending further appearances in the District Court. The application was found to be ill-conceived, and the warrants produced a complete answer to the application.

[8]        On 21 September 2022, I considered Mr Clark’s  third  application  for  habeas corpus, and found Mr Clark sought to re-litigate the same question resolved in the prior applications.3   For those reasons and having sighted a valid warrant  for   Mr Clark’s detention, the application was dismissed.

[9]        On 29 July 2024, Dunningham J presided over another application for a writ of habeas corpus.4 Again, Mr Clark claimed he was unlawfully detained because he was subject to electronically monitored bail. Dunningham J had been satisfied the detention was lawful as the District Court had remanded Mr Clark on bail following the issue of Judge Elkin’s decision on conviction, and this was a decision as to bail of a competent jurisdiction.

[10]      Dunningham J observed a further reason for declining the application. Pursuant to s 14(1A)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001, an application for a writ of habeas corpus may be refused if it is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant. The underlying challenge was to the merits of the conviction, and to the conduct of the subsequent bail variation hearing. Dunningham J confirmed that a fully argued conviction or bail variation appeal, or both, was the most appropriate procedure for determining the issues which Mr Clark raises in this application.

[11]      Mr Clark sought leave to appeal this decision, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.5

2      Clark v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZHC 1929.

3      Clark v Christchurch Men’s Prison [2022] NZHC 2417.

4      Clark v Police [2024] NZHC 2078.

5      Clark v Police [2024] NZSC 106.

[12]      In September 2024 Mr  Clark  brought  yet  another  application  for  a  writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention on the current charges. This application focussed on the conditions of electronically monitored (EM) bail. The only new issue raised on this application was that Mr Clark said he never saw a full copy of the bail order and there was no signed bail bond. This was comprehensively rebutted by opposing counsel and Dunningham J agreed that even if the bail bond had not been signed, the bail was not unlawful as Mr Clark plainly understood the terms of his bail.6 The balance of the issues raised by Mr Clark repeated the arguments raised in the 29 July 2024 hearing. Dunningham J found that under s 15(1) of the Habeas Corpus Act, Mr Clark was precluded from advancing these arguments as they raised “substantially the same questions as those considered by the Court when the earlier application was refused.”7 To the extent Mr Clark challenged the lawfulness of his conviction, he was clearly advised that a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate procedure and he had rights of appeal he could pursue.

Current circumstances

[13]      Mr Clark was found guilty in a reserved decision of Judge Kellar following a trial on 10 June 2024. He was then found guilty in a second  trial  heard before  Judge Elkin on 17 June 2024. He was remanded in custody following his arrest in relation to other matters on 12 September 2024 and refused EM bail on  appeal on  16 December 2024.   He is due to be sentenced  on the District  Court charges  on   14 May 2025. I have sighted the warrant for his detention.

Analysis

[14]      The only difference in circumstance between the first six applications and the present application is that Mr Clark is presently detained awaiting sentence rather than electronically bailed awaiting conviction and/or sentence.

[15]      In support of the current application, Mr Clark says “I am currently detained unlawfully due to judicial impropriety and a criminal breach of trust by the

6      Clark v Police [2024] NZHC 2644.

7 At [29].

Resident Magistrate of Peace P Kellar and the [Sherriff] of Christchurch District Court”.

[16]      His application then refers to the Admiralty Act and to both estoppels and injunctions that he contends order the dismissal of all charges and release of Mr Clark from detention. These estoppel and injunction “orders” are produced by Mr Clark. They are not Court orders and have no legal authority. The reference to the Admiralty Act is a mystery.

[17]      In the circumstances, as in my decision dated 21 September 2022,8 it is appropriate to consider whether the High Court should dispose of the application without a hearing on the grounds the proceeding appears to be an abuse of process. That issue was considered by Mander J in Greer v Smith9 who observed:

[13]      The question arises as to whether there are any circumstances in which no hearing is necessary. In my view, there are two situations where that may arise. The first is where the narrow exceptions provided by s 14(1A) apply. Thus, where the application is an attempt to relitigate the same, or substantially the same questions as were raised in a previous application, the matter will not be heard by combination of ss 14(1A)(a) and 15(1). The other s 14(1A) ground is where an application for a writ is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant.

[14]      A second situation where, arguably, no hearing would be necessary is where the application represents an abuse of process warranting invocation of inherent jurisdiction to strike the application out. It may, however, be that having regard to the solemnity and importance of habeas corpus and the statutory framework that now governs such applications, the statute supersedes any such jurisdiction. If that is the case, applications that would otherwise   have   constituted   an   abuse   are   now   dealt   with    under    ss 14(1A) and 15(1).

[18]      The current application falls fouls of both situations referred to by Mander J. Mr Clark seeks to re-litigate the same question resolved in the prior applications. Further, an application for a writ is not the proper procedure to challenge a bail ruling.

[19]      This application is an abuse of process. Yet again he is using the habeas corpus route to challenge a bail decision. Mr Clark’s detention is not unlawful.

8      Clark v Christchurch Men’s Prison, above n 3.

9      Greer v Smith [2015] NZHC 326, [2017] NZAR 141.

Result

[20]      For those reasons the application is dismissed without a hearing. Any further application challenging the current detention is likely to be struck out as an abuse of process under rule 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016.

...................................................

Eaton J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors, Christchurch

Copy to: J D Clark