Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Aral Property Ltd

Case [2010] NZSC 131


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 82/2010
[2010] NZSC 131

BETWEENCHURCHILL GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED AND ORS


Applicants

ANDARAL PROPERTY HOLDINGS LIMITED AND DAVID LEUNG


Respondents

Court:Blanchard, McGrath and William Young JJ

Counsel:Applicant Mr Fava in person


J D McBride for Respondents

Judgment:3 November 2010 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs of $2500 to the respondents.

REASONS

[1]        The applicants were ordered by the High Court to pay a very substantial sum in costs to the respondents after a proceeding brought by the applicants resulted in a default judgment against them.  Mr Fava sought to have that judgment stayed pending an appeal.  Venning J, who appears to have had no previous involvement in the litigation, refused to grant a stay.[1]  The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against that refusal.[2]  A Judge of this Court refused to grant interim relief and the application for leave was then discontinued.

[1]Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Aral Property Holdings Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2001-404-2302, 27 January 2010.

[2]        Now the applicants have sought to make a collateral attack on Venning J's decision despite the fact that the basis for their stay application has been considered twice on appeal and found wanting.  They have contended that Venning J should have recused himself because his daughter is a solicitor in the employ of the respondents' solicitors.  This argument was advanced in an application to the Court of Appeal seeking recall of its stay decision.  Not surprisingly, in view of the fact that the Judge's daughter had nothing to do with the litigation and the applicants' arguments depended on wild speculation without any grounding in fact, the Court of Appeal dismissed the recall application.[3]

[3]        The reasons given by the Court of Appeal are entirely convincing.  The proposed appeal to this Court against its refusal to recall its stay judgment is so unmeritorious that it has no prospect of succeeding.

[4]        We add that, given we are unpersuaded by the substantive merits of the applicants’ argument, there is no point in proceeding to consider their submissions concerning the conduct of counsel who appeared for the respondents at the High Court hearing, on which we make no comment.

Solicitors:

Bell Gully, Auckland for Respondents


Details
AGLC
Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Aral Property Ltd [2010] NZSC 131
Case
[2010] NZSC 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Churchill Group Holdings Ltd and Ors filed an application for leave to appeal against Aral Property Ltd and David Leung. The applicants sought to challenge a decision made by Venning J, who refused a stay of execution of a default judgment awarded to the respondents. The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed an appeal against the refusal of the stay, and an interim application for relief was also dismissed. The applicants now sought to make a collateral attack on Venning J's decision, arguing that he should have recused himself due to a perceived conflict of interest, as his daughter is a solicitor employed by the respondents' solicitors. This argument was also dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

The legal issues in this case centred around the applicants' attempt to collaterally attack the decision of Venning J, despite the fact that the basis for their stay application had already been considered and dismissed on two separate occasions. The applicants argued that Venning J should have recused himself due to the perceived conflict of interest, but this argument was found to be speculative and without any factual basis. The Court of Appeal found the reasons given for dismissing the recall application to be entirely convincing.

The Supreme Court found that the proposed appeal against the Court of Appeal's refusal to recall its stay judgment was so unmeritorious that it had no prospect of success. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the substantive merits of the applicants' argument and found no point in proceeding to consider their submissions concerning the conduct of counsel for the respondents at the High Court hearing. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, with costs of $2500 awarded to the respondents.

The final orders of the Supreme Court were that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs of $2500 to be paid by the applicants to the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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