Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Dixon

Case

[2017] NZHC 1126

25 May 2017

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

CRI-2017-419-9 [2017] NZHC 1126

BETWEEN

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Applicant

AND

MICHAEL MORGAN DIXON Respondent

Hearing: 25 May 2017

Appearances:

G Kelly for the Applicant
G Boot for the Respondent

Judgment:

25 May 2017

ORAL JUDGMENT OF GORDON J

Solicitors:           Crown Solicitor, Hamilton

Boot Law, Hamilton

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v DIXON [2017] NZHC 1126 [25 May

2017]

Introduction

[1]      On  14  February  2017  the  Chief  Executive  applied  for  an  extended supervision order against Mr Dixon pursuant to s 107F of the Parole Act 2002.  An interim supervision order was made by Venning J on 12 April 2017.

[2]      Mr Dixon appeared before me on 24 May 2017.   He was represented by counsel, Mr Boot, who advised that Mr Dixon did not oppose the making of an extended supervision order.

[3]      I adjourned the hearing to today to enable me to read the application and supporting documents.

[4]      Ms Kelly appears in support of the application and Mr Boot appears again for

Mr Dixon who is also present.

[5]      I have read the application and supporting documents as follows: (a) Mr Dixon’s criminal record and traffic conviction history;

(b)      The summary of facts for the offending that occurred on 15 January

2009;

(c)       The summary of facts for the offending that occurred on 20 February

2009;

(d)      The High Court sentencing notes of Wylie J dated 14 August 2009; (e)         Mr Dixon’s release licence; and

(f)       A   health   assessor’s   report   of   registered   clinical   psychologist,

Kirsty Bell Hunter, dated 15 December 2016.

The test

[6]      Before a court can make an extended supervision order it must be satisfied of the matters set out in s 107I which relevantly provides as follows:

107I    Sentencing court may make extended supervision order

(2)       A sentencing  court  may  make  an  extended  supervision  order  if, following the hearing of an application made under section 107F, the court is satisfied, having considered the matters addressed in the health assessor’s report as set out in section 107F(2A), that—

(a)      the offender has, or has had, a pervasive pattern of serious sexual or violent offending; and

(b)      either or both of the following apply:

(i)       there is a high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant sexual offence:

(ii)      there is a very high risk that the offender will in future commit a relevant violent offence.

[7]      I must therefore be satisfied that Mr Dixon:

(a)       Has, or has had, a pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending; and

(b)There is a high risk that he will in future commit a relevant sexual offence.

[8]      “Satisfied” does not connote a burden or standard of proof.  It simply means

that the Court makes up its mind.1

1      McDonnell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2009] NZCA 352, (2009) 8

HRNZ 770 at [72], [74] and [75], adopting the approach taken in R v Leitch [1998] 1 NZLR 420 (CA) at 428, in relation to sentencing decisions involving preventive detention.

Pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending

[9]      The Parole Act does not define serious sexual offending.  In Holland v Chief

Executive of the Department of Corrections, the Court of Appeal held:2

We consider that the phrase “serious sexual offending” falls to be interpreted by reference to its ordinary meaning viewed against the purpose of this part of the Parole Act.  In ordinary language “serious” means “important, grave; having (potentially) important, esp. undesired, consequences; giving cause for concern; of significant degree or amount, worthy of consideration.”

[10]     I  am  satisfied  that  Mr  Dixon  has  a  pervasive  pattern  of  serious  sexual offending.   This can be seen from his offending for which he was sentenced on

14 May 2009 and the psychologist’s report which refers to Mr Dixon’s “ongoing undetected   pattern   of   coercive   sexual   interactions   and   inappropriate   sexual behaviours as an adolescent” and “self-reported multiple instances of rape, primarily against women that he has met through informal social situations.”3

Risk of committing a relevant sexual offence in the future

[11]     The risk that Mr Dixon will commit a relevant sexual offence in the future must be assessed by reference to the criteria in s 107IAA.  That section relevantly provides:

107IAA Matters court must be satisfied of when assessing risk

(1)       A court may determine that there is a high risk that an eligible offender will commit a relevant sexual offence only if it is satisfied that the offender—

(a)      displays  an  intense  drive,  desire,  or  urge  to  commit  a relevant sexual offence; and

(b)      has a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending;

and

(c)      has limited self-regulatory capacity; and

(d)      displays either or both of the following:

2      Holland v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2016] NZCA 504 at [44] (footnotes omitted).

3      Offender Management: In Confidence Health Assessment Report to National Commissioner

Corrections Services dated 15 December 2016 at [12].

(i)        a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending:

(ii)      an absence of understanding for or concern about the impact of his or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

[12]     Although Mr Dixon, by consenting to the order being made, has conceded that the statutory criteria are satisfied, the Court must make its own assessment whether the criteria in s 107IAA(1)(a)-(d) have been met.4

[13]     I now consider the four mandatory statutory criteria.

Does Mr Dixon display an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence?

[14]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

34       The offender’s display of an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit

a relevant sexual offence.

Mr Dixon has been convicted of three sexual offences against two females aged 16 and 19-years-old.   While unverified, he has also disclosed multiple undetected rapes against relatively unknown females, prior to being incarcerated for his index offending.  During assessment, Mr Dixon evidenced an ongoing high degree of sexual preoccupation and drive to engage in casual sexual activities at a high  frequency.    During  his  previous  recall  (February 2016),  he rapidly engaged in causal (sic) sexual encounters via access to online dating sites.   He reported to engage in rough sex with his alleged current partner and lacked insight into high-risk lifestyle choices. Mr Dixon reported no current intentions to sexually reoffend, given his learnings from the ASOTP and his desire to remain out of prison. He  articulated  cognitive  and  behavioural  strategies  to  remain focussed on healthy sexual thoughts and activities, with consensual sexual partners.   Conversely, Mr Dixon has recently become non- compliant with Probation, suggesting superficiality to his reported intentions to remain free of further relevant sexual offending.

In summary, it is the writer’s opinion that Mr Dixon has previously displayed  an  intense  drive,  desire  and  intentions  to  engage  in coercive sexual behaviour and, since offending, he has continued to seek out high-frequency sexual activities with relatively unknown sexual partners.   As such, he has and is likely to continue to deliberately place himself in high-risk situations for sexual reoffending.  Mr Dixon’s sexual offence history (both sanctioned and

4      R v Peta [2007] NZCA 28, [2007] 2 NZLR 627 at [56] - [57].

self-reported), indicated a pattern of sexual compulsivity, determination and effort.  While Mr Dixon reported his intentions to never  sexually reoffend  again,  the reliability of  his intentions to remain free of sexual reoffending have not yet been established, due to the insufficient time Mr Dixon has had in the community.

[15]     Having  regard  to  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  Mr  Dixon’s  previous offending and  Ms  Hunter’s  evidence,  I am  satisfied  that  Mr Dixon  displays  an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence.

Does Mr Dixon have a predilection or proclivity for serious sexual offending?

[16]     A person  has  a  predilection  for  serious  sexual  offending  if  they  have  a preference or particular liking for serious sexual offending.5    A person who has a proclivity has an inclination toward something considered morally wrong, such as serious sexual offending.6

[17]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

35       The   offender’s   predilection   or   proclivity   for   serious   sexual

offending.

Mr Dixon has been convicted of three sexual offences against two females aged 16 and 19-years-old and has disclosed having engaged in multiple undetected sexual offences (rapes), against relatively unknown females.  It is the writer’s opinion that Mr Dixon’s sexual offence history (both sanctioned and self-reported) evidenced a pattern of predilection and proclivity for serious sexual offending against known and unknown females, prior to his incarceration for the index offending.

[18]     Having  regard  to  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  Mr  Dixon’s  previous offending and Ms Hunter’s assessment of Mr Dixon, I am satisfied that Mr Dixon has both a predilection and proclivity for serious sexual offending.

Does Mr Dixon have limited self-regulatory capacity?

[19]     The expression “limited self-regulatory capacity” was considered by Heath J

in Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v B:7

5      Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v B [2016] NZHC 2816 at [66].

6 At [66].

7      Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v B, above n 5, (footnotes omitted).

[91]     I am not aware of any authority that has considered specifically the question of what is meant by the phrase “limited self-regulatory capacity”. Use of the word “limited” suggests that questions of degree are involved in this assessment.  The phrase is used in the context of a list of factors that must be established before an extended supervision order can be made.  The apparent nexus is between the existence of limited self-regulatory capacity (on the one hand) and high risk of committing a relevant sexual offence (on the other).

[92]     At one level, the inquiry is directed to whether an offender has a limited  capacity  to  self-regulate  his  or  her  desires  or  urges  to  commit relevant  sexual  offences.    Put  another  way,  the  question  is  whether  an offender has sufficient capacity to self-regulate those impulses.  Yet, to approach the issue in that way is over simplistic.  As a matter of common sense, the extent of any ability to self-regulate those impulses is dependent on the capacity to avoid circumstances in which the relevant drive, desire or urge are likely to manifest themselves.  …

[20]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

36       The offender’s self-regulatory capacity.

Mr Dixon’s documented offending, file information and self-report has demonstrated his limited ability or motivation to contain his sexual  urges.    He  has  engaged  in  sexualised  activity from early adolescence with high numbers of sexual partners, and self-reported and sanctioned coercive sexual interactions.  Mr Dixon reported to have  accessed  newly  met  females  as  sexual  partners  by  way  of dating sites on a daily basis when last paroled.  While Mr Dixon has not incurred prison misconducts since 2013 (for fighting), he was breached and recalled in March 2016 for breaching his sentence conditions (with drug paraphernalia).   Moreover, he has attended only  one  Probation  Service  report  in  since  his  release  in  22

November 2016 and his whereabouts are currently unknown.

In summary, it is the writer’s opinion that Mr Dixon has presents

(sic) with limited self-regulation.

[21]     I am satisfied that Mr Dixon has limited self-regulatory capacity.

Does Mr Dixon display a lack of acceptance of responsibility or remorse for past offending?

[22]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

37       The offender’s acceptance of responsibility and remorse  for  past

offending.

Mr Dixon verbalised acceptance of his offending for the most part. Through  psychological  treatment  it  seems  that  his acceptance  of personal responsibility for his offending has increased.   Mr Dixon

did  not,  however,  evidence  congruent  emotional  responses  often seen with genuine remorse.   When asked about his greatest risk, rather than indicate high-risk scenarios, Mr Dixon stated that his highest risk was to himself should his victims’ families inadvertently see him and seek vengeance.  Moreover, when previously paroled in the community Mr Dixon placed himself at an increased risk for potential sexual offending by meeting previously unknown women through the internet, with the intention of sexual interactions.  This indicated limited responsibility for minimising the risk of further sexual reoffending.

In summary, it seems that with education Mr Dixon has increased his self-responsibility for the index offending.   He has verbalised his remorse for the harm he inflicted to his victims.  However, Mr Dixon engaged in risk-aligned sexual behaviours in the community.   It is the writer’s opinion there is mixed evidence in this domain, and his responsibility taking remains at a somewhat superficial level.

[23]      I take into account both Mr Dixon’s verbal expression and his conduct. Given the mixed evidence referred to by Ms Hunter I am not satisfied that Mr Dixon has fully accepted responsibility and remorse for past offending.

Does Mr Dixon display a lack of understanding for or concern about the impact of his sexual offending on actual or potential victims?

[24]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

38       The offender’s understanding for or concern about the impact of his

or her sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

During interview Mr Dixon verbalised his understanding of the potential  short  and  long  term  impacts  of  his  offending.     He articulated multiple likely problems that his victims may experience due to his sexual assaults, albeit in a perfunctory manner.  Mr Dixon vehemently conveyed several times that he would not sexually reoffend in the future.   His primary reason for this was that he wished to live a normal life in the community and not return to prison.   As such, the depth of genuine concern evidenced by Mr Dixon for harm caused to his victims appears somewhat wanting.

[25]     I am  satisfied  that  Mr  Dixon  does  not  have  a  full  understanding  for  or concern about the impact of his sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

Does Mr Dixon pose a high risk of committing a relevant sexual offence?

[26]     The report of the health assessor addresses this issue as follows:

46In summary, based on a multi-method assessment, Mr Dixon is considered to be at very high risk of committing a further relevant sexual offence over the next ten years, while in the community.  Mr Dixon has been convicted for sexual offences against two female adult victims aged 16 and 19-years-old and has disclosed multiple occasions  of  undetected  sexual  offending  against  known  and unknown females similarly aged and older.   Mr Dixon’s estimated very high risk has in part been accounted for by his self-disclosed historical sexual offending.  While his disclosures remain unverified, his self-report has remained consistent in content across time and psychological contexts.   When previously released from prison 2

February 2016, Mr Dixon was convicted of two breaches of release conditions (for drug paraphernalia) and was re-incarcerated.

47Mr Dixon evidences a high number of dynamic risk factors, verbal motivation to remain offence-free (although this remains unconvincing), and unproven treatment gains (through completion of the STURP and the ASOTP).  He was exited from the DTU in 2013 prior to completing and as such, remains untreated for drug and alcohol  use.    Only  recently  released  from  prison  (22  November

2016), Mr Dixon has failed to attend his second Probation appointment and his current whereabouts are unknown.  Mr Dixon does not have a current safety plan that addresses his risk of sexual reoffending.    He is due to commence intervention with a Departmental Psychologist for safety planning and to support during his early reintegration.

48Mr Dixon has previously displayed an intense drive, desire, or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence, and his sexual offence history indicates a pattern of sexual compulsivity, opportunism, impulsivity, determination, and planning.  He is yet to display depth of remorse and pro-active risk management.  Mr Dixon will need to demonstrate sustained generalisation of his learnings to be considered as actively managing his risk.   Mitigation of his risk will likely be better (leastways in the short term), if assisted by external monitoring and management.  This may also enable Mr Dixon to engage in further safety planning and treatment, and his drug and alcohol programme alongside of the Probation Service.

[27]     I am satisfied that there is a high risk that Mr Dixon will in future commit a relevant sexual offence.

Determination under s 107I

[28]     I  am  satisfied  that  Mr  Dixon  has  a  pervasive  pattern  of  serious  sexual offending and that there is a high risk that he will in the future commit a relevant sexual offence.   I have made that determination on being satisfied that Mr Dixon displays an intense drive, desire or urge to commit a relevant sexual offence and has both a predilection and proclivity for serious sexual offending.  I am satisfied that he

has limited self-regulatory capacity, that he has not fully accepted responsibility or remorse for past offending, and that he does not have a full understanding for or concern about the impact of his sexual offending on actual or potential victims.

[29]     I  am  satisfied  that  this  is  an  appropriate  case  in  which  to  exercise  my discretion to make an ESO.

Appropriate length of extended supervision order

[30]     I now consider the term of the ESO, which must not exceed 10 years.8   The term of the order must be the minimum period required for the purposes of the safety of the community, in light of the level of risk posed by Mr Dixon, the seriousness of the harm that might be caused to victims, and the likely duration of the risk.9

[31]     The Chief Executive seeks a term of 10 years.  I am satisfied that 10 years is an appropriate term.  Mr Dixon has demonstrated that he has a pervasive pattern of serious sexual offending that began in adolescence.   I accept the health assessor’s opinion that:

45In  summary,  Mr  Dixon  currently requires  high  risk  management based on his current release circumstances and his high level of dynamic risk factors. …

46In summary, based on a multi-method assessment, Mr Dixon is considered to be at very high risk of committing a further relevant sexual offence over the next ten years, while in the community. …

Result

[32]     Mr Dixon is subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 10 years commencing today.

[33]     In addition to the standard extended supervision conditions set out in s 107JA of  the  Parole Act  2002,  I  impose  five  special  conditions  which  are  set  out  in Mr Dixon’s 1 March 2017 release license.  Those special conditions are to cease to

take effect after 17 September 2017, and are as follows:

8      Parole Act, s 107I(4).

9      Parole Act, s 107I(5).

(a)      If  meets  criteria  and  if  directed,  to  undertake  a  psychological assessment, and complete such psychological counselling/treatment as is then recommended, to the satisfaction of the probation officer and service provider.

(b)To  attend  and  complete  such  counselling/programme/treatment  to address  identified  offending  behaviour  as  may  be  directed  by the probation officer and to the satisfaction of the probation officer and programme provider.

(c)      Undertake alcohol and other drug assessment, and complete any recommended counselling or treatment for abuse of alcohol and other drugs, to the satisfaction of the probation officer and programme provider.

(d)To reside at an address approved by a probation officer and not move address without the prior written approval of a probation officer.

(e)      Not to purchase, possess or consume alcohol and/or illicit drugs, nor the consumption of illicit drugs.

Gordon J