Chesterfields Preschools Limited (in liquidation) v Sisson

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

CIV-2016-409-000040 [2017] NZHC 859

BETWEEN

CHESTERFIELDS PRESCHOOLS

LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) Plaintiff

AND

THERESE ANNE SISSON Defendant

THE COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE

Intervener

Hearing: 1 May 2017

Appearances:

B M Russell and K M Kendrick for Plaintiff
Defendant Appears In Person
S M Kinsler and C L Russell for Intervener - Commissioner of
Inland Revenue

Judgment:

2 May 2017

JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J

Introduction

[1]      The defendant  in  this  proceeding  CIV-2016-409-40 Therese Anne  Sisson (Ms Sisson) has applied to set aside a judgment dated 16 February 2017 granting by consent orders sought by the plaintiff Chesterfields Preschools Limited (In Liquidation) (Chesterfields). The judgment has since been sealed.

[2]      Both Chesterfields and the intervener in this proceeding, the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the Commissioner), oppose the present application on the basis that Ms Sisson’s case does not fall within the limited circumstances in which such a sealed judgment can be overturned, given that as the judgment has been sealed,

recall under r 11.9 of the High Court Rules is not available.

CHESTERFIELDS PRESCHOOLS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) v SISSON [2017] NZHC 859 [2 May 2017]

[3]      Reopening of a judgment obtained by consent such as the one issued here is one of the few recognised exceptions to the principle that once a judgment is sealed it must stand for better or worse, subject of course to any further rights of appeal.

[4]      Generally the starting point must be the finality of litigation.  This endorses the public interest in there being an end to litigation as well as the private interests of affected parties in not being subject to vexatious litigation.

[5]      It is clear from the authorities, however, that absolute finality is unsafe and there are circumstances in which the Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment.   The issue here is whether this is one of those cases where the circumstances are such that the judgment in question should be set aside.

Background facts

[6]     The hearing of this proceeding CIV-2016-409-40, together with related proceedings (being CIV-2016-409-185, CIV-2016-409-304 and CIV-2016-409-637) commenced in this Court on 13 February 2017.  It continued to the fourth day of the hearing when, on that date, 16 February 2017, all matters were concluded with Ms Sisson first, choosing as the plaintiff to discontinue proceedings CIV-2016-409-

185 and CIV-2016-409-304 she had brought, and secondly, signing a consent memorandum agreeing to the orders sought by the plaintiff in the present proceeding CIV-2016-409-40.  In addition, Ms Sisson’s review of a judgment of Associate Judge Osborne in this Court striking out CIV-2016-409-637 was dismissed.

[7]      So  far  as  the  present  proceeding  CIV-2016-409-40  was  concerned,  on

16 February 2017 I issued an oral judgment in favour of the plaintiff Chesterfields against Ms Sisson in terms of Chesterfields’ second statement of claim and made a number of orders by consent.

[8]      It is useful here to set out fully those consent orders made at para [3] of the

16 February 2017…

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Details
Case
[2017] NZHC 859
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the Court was an application by Therese Anne Sisson (Ms Sisson) to set aside a judgment by consent that had been granted to Chesterfields Preschools Limited (In Liquidation) (Chesterfields) on 16 February 2017. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue was also a party to the proceedings, having intervened. Ms Sisson argued that there was a lack of informed consent in signing the consent memorandum and that she was suffering from a disability at the time the consent memorandum was signed. Chesterfields and the Commissioner opposed the application, arguing that Ms Sisson's case did not fall within the limited circumstances in which a sealed judgment could be overturned.

The Court found that reopening a judgment obtained by consent is one of the few recognised exceptions to the principle that once a judgment is sealed it must stand for better or worse. The Court found that absolute finality is unsafe and there are circumstances in which the Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment. However, the Court found that there was no genuine need for the orders sought by Ms Sisson to be granted, and that reopening the consent judgment would not be in the interests of justice in this case. The Court found that Ms Sisson had been quite unable to make out in any of the grounds she had endeavoured to advance the necessity for or the appropriateness of recalling or reopening that judgment. The Court dismissed Ms Sisson's application to set aside the consent judgment and awarded costs to Chesterfields and the Commissioner.

The Court found that Ms Sisson had acknowledged that she had agreed to the vesting orders, and that there was no mistake, misunderstanding or lack of informed consent on her part in agreeing to the consent judgment which made these vesting orders. The Court also found that there was no evidence before the Court that the consent agreement had resulted from undue influence through improper pressure, or that the agreement itself was unreasonable for Ms Sisson. The Court found that Ms Sisson's allegation that there was a lack of informed consent on her part in signing the consent memorandum was not supported by cogent evidence, and that her claim to be suffering under a disability at the time such that she did not properly read or understand the terms of the consent orders was not supported by compelling evidence of her impairment. The Court found that there was no evidence before the Court of any improper threat, duress or other conduct which might have affected Ms Sisson, nor was she able to establish unconscionability through Chesterfields seeking to take advantage of weakness on her part. The Court found that there was nothing before the Court to indicate that agreement was reached here by the parties by reason of mutual mistake.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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