Chen v Tawa Trade Finance Limited

Case [2023] NZHC 3254


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-000492

[2023] NZHC 3254

BETWEEN

LIYUN CHEN

First Applicant

LC1521319 DEVELOPMENT CO LIMITED
Second Applicant

AND

TAWA TRADE FINANCE LIMITED

Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

Self-represented Applicants

D Chisholm and C Pendleton for the Respondent

Judgment:

17 November 2023


JUDGMENT OF GORDON J


This judgment was delivered by me

on 17 November 2023 at 10 am, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

Solicitors/Counsel:

Turner Hopkins, Auckland Copy to: the Applicants

CHEN v TAWA TRADE FINANCE LTD [2023] NZHC 3254 [17 November 2023]

[1]This is a decision on costs.

[2]        On 31 May 2023, I gave judgment in favour of the respondent, Tawa Trade Finance Ltd (Tawa), against the first and second applicants, Liyun Chen and LC1521319 Development Co Ltd (together, the applicants).1

[3]        The applicants sought permission to apply by originating application to set aside a letter of demand and a Property Law Act 2007 (PLA) notice issued by Tawa until their claim in a separate proceeding (CIV-2023-404-427) was determined. I concluded that it was not in the interests of justice for the applicants to commence their proceeding as an originating application and therefore refused the application.2 I also noted that even if permission had been given for the applicants to commence their proceeding by an originating application, any such application would fail on the merits.3

[4]        I reserved costs. In the absence of agreement between the parties Tawa filed a memorandum seeking costs dated 31 July 2023. Ms Chen did not respond within the time allowed for in my judgment.4 There was a delay in the Registry referring Tawa’s costs memorandum to me. Given that delay I afforded a further opportunity to the applicants to respond. No response has been received. Accordingly, I proceed to determine costs on the basis of Tawa’s memorandum.

Costs principles

[5]        The starting point for the assessment of costs is that all matters with regard to costs are at the discretion of the Court.5 However, this discretion is not an unfettered one and is to be guided by the general principles in rr 14.2 to 14.5 of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR). A fundamental costs principle is set out in r 14.2(1), which provides that the party who failed with respect to a proceeding should generally pay


1      Chen v Tawa Trade Finance Ltd [2023] NZHC 1333.

2 At [46].

3 At [47].

4 At [48].

5      High Court Rules 2016, r 14.1.

the costs of the successful party. The rules are intended to create a framework for determining costs in individual cases that is both “predictable and expeditious”.6

[6]        Ultimately, the overriding consideration when exercising a discretion to award costs is that any award ought to do justice between the parties.7

Respondent’s submissions

[7]        Tawa says that the applicants’ application for permission to commence the proceeding by originating application was misconceived and caused wasted expense. It says that if the applicants had bona fide considered they had grounds to challenge the PLA notice or otherwise restrain the mortgagee sale, they should have simply applied for an injunction in their substantive proceeding.

[8]        Instead of claiming costs in accordance with its loan and security documentation, Tawa has resolved to seek costs and disbursements on a 2B basis. Therefore, Tawa seeks costs of $9,918.50 as set out in the table annexed to this judgment.

[9]        Tawa also seeks disbursements of $95.65 (excluding GST) to recover the filing fee on its notice of opposition.

Assessment

[10]      The principle that costs follow the event is not displaced in this case. I do not consider there are exceptional reasons justifying departure from this principle. Therefore, Tawa is entitled to an award of costs against the applicants.

[11]      I am satisfied that: 2B is the appropriate basis for the costs claim; the steps for which Tawa seeks costs as set out in the annexed table were taken; and the time sought for each step accords with the scale in the HCR.

[12]The filing fee for the notice of opposition is also appropriately sought.


6      Rule 14.2(g).

7      Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 869 (CA) at [5].

Result

[13]      I make an order that the applicants are to pay to Tawa costs of $9,918.50 and disbursements of $95.65 totalling $10,014.15.


Gordon J

ANNEXURE

Costs sought by Tawa

Item

Description

Band/allocation

Amount

38

Filing notice of opposition

to originating application and supporting affidavits

B (2 days)

$4,780

39/12

Mention in duty judge list on 20 April 2023

B (0.2 days)

$478

40/241

Preparation     of     written submissions

B (1.5 days)

$3,585

26

Hearing on 25 May 2023 before Gordon J

B (0.25 days)

$597.50

29

Sealing Judgment or order

B (0.2 days)

$478

Total

4.15

$9,918.50


1      Counsel referred to both items 40 and 24. They are both provisions for the preparation of written submissions. Item 24 falls under interlocutory applications whereas item 40 falls under originating applications. They both have the same allocated number of days.

Details
AGLC
Chen v Tawa Trade Finance Limited [2023] NZHC 3254
Case
[2023] NZHC 3254
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Auckland Registry, the applicants, Liyun Chen and LC1521319 Development Co Ltd, sought permission to apply to set aside a letter of demand and a Property Law Act 2007 notice issued by the respondent, Tawa Trade Finance Ltd. The court had previously dismissed their application and reserved the issue of costs. The applicants did not respond to the respondent's costs memorandum, and the court proceeded to determine the matter on the basis of the respondent's submissions.

The primary legal issue was whether the applicants' application for permission to commence the proceeding by originating application was misconceived and caused wasted expense. The court noted that the applicants' application was misconceived and that they should have applied for an injunction in their substantive proceeding if they had grounds to challenge the notice or restrain the mortgagee sale. The court also had to determine whether the respondent's costs claim was reasonable and appropriate.

The court found that the principle that costs follow the event was not displaced in this case and that the respondent was entitled to an award of costs against the applicants. The court was satisfied that the 2B basis for the costs claim was appropriate, and that the steps for which the respondent sought costs were taken and the time sought for each step accorded with the scale in the High Court Rules. The court also found that the filing fee for the notice of opposition was appropriately sought.

The court ordered that the applicants pay the respondent costs of $9,918.50 and disbursements of $95.65, totalling $10,014.15. The court noted that the applicants did not respond to the respondent's costs memorandum, and that it proceeded to determine the matter on the basis of the respondent's submissions. The court found that the respondent's costs claim was reasonable and appropriate, and that the applicants' application for permission to commence the proceeding by originating application was misconceived and caused wasted expense.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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