Chapman v Police HC Whangarei CRI-2010-488-000071

[2011] NZHC 502

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

CRI-2010-488-000071

LOUANA EMILY CHAPMAN

Appellant

v

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:         19 May 2011

Appearances: Appellant in person

D Stevens for the Respondent

Judgment:      19 May 2011

ORAL JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J

Solicitors / Parties:

Ms L E Chapman, Kamo

Mr D Stevens, Marsden Woods Inskip & Smith, Office of the Crown Solicitor, Whangarei

CHAPMAN V NEW ZEALAND POLICE HC WHA CRI-2010-488-000071 19 May 2011

[1]      Ms Chapman has appealed against her conviction on two charges of injuring with intent to injure.  The notice of appeal in its form also includes an appeal against the sentence, although the date of the notice of appeal is in fact before the date of sentence.  Nothing turns on that point.

[2]      Conviction was entered by Judge Harvey in the District Court at Whangarei on 13 October 2010.  Ms Chapman was sentenced on 21 December 2010 to a total of

5 months home detention with special conditions, including conditions applying for

6 months following the home detention.

[3]      The notice of appeal does not set out any grounds.   It is stated that the grounds will be identified in points of appeal to be filed.   Points of appeal in the conventional sense have not been filed.

[4]      On 17 May 2011 an affidavit of Ms Chapman was filed. At the hearing today Ms Chapman, who appeared on her own behalf with the assistance of a friend, said that all of her submissions in support of the appeal are fully set out in the affidavit.

[5]      The affidavit is in fact a submission.  In a broad sense the submission is that the District Court did not have jurisdiction in respect of the criminal charges.  Ms Chapman said that the relief she seeks today is set out in paragraph 9 of the affidavit. The relief set out in paragraph 9 is that this Court state a case for the Maori Appellate Court pursuant to s 61 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.

[6]      I advised Ms Chapman that the law is clear; the District Court did have jurisdiction and on matters of appeal it is this Court which has jurisdiction.  I invited Ms Chapman to expand on her submission if she wished but she did not wish to do so.  Rather she then referred me to paragraph 11, which is as follows:

Should the motion herein at paragraph 9 fall on deaf ears the applicant on appeal seek [sic] special leave to appeal to the court of appeal forthwith without prejudice.

[7]      There are no grounds for this Court to grant leave to appeal to the Court of

Appeal.  I have advised Ms Chapman that if she wishes to seek leave to appeal to the

Court of Appeal she may do so by application to that Court.  I am bound to record that my observation in that regard should not be taken as any indication that the Court of Appeal will grant leave.  The law in respect of the matters raised by Ms Chapman is clear.  And it is law binding on this Court.  I refer, in particular, to R v Miru[1] and R v Toia.[2]

[1] R v Miru CA65/01, 26 July 2011.

[2] R v Toia [2007] NZCA 331, CA310/06, 3 August 2077.

[8]      Following my discussion with Ms Chapman in respect of the matters just referred to I asked whether there were any further matters she wished to advance in support of her appeal against conviction.  Ms Chapman made it clear that there were not.

[9]      In fairness to her I do make the following observations.  With the greatest of respect to Ms Chapman, appeals against criminal convictions founded on the matters contained in her affidavit are misguided.  The law does give a right of appeal against conviction.  If convictions on criminal charges have been wrongly entered for some reason then citizens are entitled to bring an appeal.  But if they wish to exercise that right they need to exercise it in accordance with the law, which is clear.  If they go down another path, which the Court of Appeal has already made clear is not open to them, they are losing the opportunity to exercise the right of appeal.

[10]     The second point is that I have, of course, read the decision of the Judge as to his reasons for entering the conviction.  On the basis of his reasoning there does not appear to be any foundation upon which the convictions could have been overturned in any event.  That is not intended as a definitive conclusion because the matter has not been argued before me.

[11]     To the extent that there might have been an argued appeal against sentence I

also observe that on the face of it the sentence is well within the range open to the

Judge. There is no indication that it is manifestly excessive.

[12]     For these reasons the appeals against conviction and against sentence are

dismissed.

Peter Woodhouse J