Cavanagh v Jackson - [2025] NZHC 1491

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2024-409-623

[2025] NZHC 1491

UNDER Residential Tenancies Act 1986

BETWEEN

MARIA ELENA JEAN CAVANAGH

Appellant

AND

MARGARET CATHERINE JACKSON

Respondent

Hearing: 4 June 2025

Appearances:

Appellant in Person

No appearance by or for the Respondent

Judgment:

9 June 2025

JUDGMENT OF MANDER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 9 June 2025 at 4 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: .

CAVANAGH v JACKSON [2025] NZHC 1491 [9 June 2025]

Introduction

[1] Ms Cavanagh seeks to appeal a decision of the Christchurch District Court1 declining her appeal from the Tenancy Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) determination that it had no jurisdiction to hear her application.2 The Tribunal held the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (the Act) did not apply because the premises, a residential dwelling situated in Woolston (the property), was used as Mrs Jackson’s, the landlord’s, place of residence during Ms Cavanagh’s tenancy. This precluded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.3

Factual background

[2] Before turning to consider the parties’ positions, it is necessary to set out some background.

[3] Mrs Jackson, who is now in her 80s, had owned and lived in the property for many years with her husband. On his death, the premises were transferred to a family trust. The trust subsequently sold the property to one of Mrs Jackson’s sons, who subsequently transferred it to some family friends. The premises were transferred on the basis that Mrs Jackson would be permitted to continue to occupy the premises during her life.

[4] The premises included three bedrooms. Mrs Jackson used one of the bedrooms which had an ensuite. She had let one of the other bedrooms to a male who was seldom at the property. She advertised the third bedroom on TradeMe as “Woolston 1 bedroom $110 pw.” On 21 November 2019, Ms Cavanagh responded to the advertisement stating: “I could be interested in the room. I am a full-time mature (in my 40s) student at UC”.

[5] There was email correspondence in early December 2019, arranging for Ms Cavanagh to view the room. On 12 December 2019, Mrs Jackson sent an email to Ms Cavanagh stating she had decided to let “just the big room.” This was a reference

1      Cavanagh v Jackson [2024] NZDC 26207.
2      Cavanagh v Jackson [2024] NZTT 4701869.
3      Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 5(1)(n).

to the fact the room Mrs Jackson originally intended to let was the smaller of the bedrooms. Mrs Jackson also stated: “Do know if U get [in] a pickle re finding accommodation you are welcome to stay as U get sorted.”

[6] Ms Cavanagh and the other tenant shared a bathroom and they, together with Mrs Jackson, shared the kitchen and laundry facilities. Ms Cavanagh and the other tenant could use the living room as well, although Ms Cavanagh seldom did so. That said, the District Court accepted that Ms Cavanagh sometimes ate dinner in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Cavanagh v Jackson

Details

AGLC: Cavanagh v Jackson [2025] NZHC 1491
Case: [2025] NZHC 1491
Decision Date: 9 June 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cavanagh v Jackson concerns an appeal by Ms Cavanagh against the Christchurch District Court’s decision to decline her appeal from a Tenancy Tribunal determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear her application. The Tribunal held that the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 did not apply because the property, which was used as the landlord’s residence during the tenancy, precluded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Ms Cavanagh’s appeal to the High Court hinges on whether the District Court erred in finding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction by misapplying section 5(1)(n) of the Act, which excludes the Act’s application where the premises are principally used as the landlord’s residence.

The central issue in this case is whether the term "premises" in section 5(1)(n) of the Act should be interpreted to mean only Ms Cavanagh’s bedroom or the entire property. Ms Cavanagh argues that her tenancy was confined to her bedroom, while the District Court found that the Act did not apply because the premises were principally used as Mrs Jackson’s place of residence. The court must determine whether the District Court’s interpretation of "premises" and its application of section 5(1)(n) was correct.

The court analysed the definition of "premises" in the Act and noted that it includes any part of any premises, any land and appurtenances, and any mobile home, caravan, or other shelter. The court considered the accepted factual findings that Ms Cavanagh and the other tenant had free and unimpeded access to the common areas of the property, and that they shared living facilities. The court concluded that Ms Cavanagh’s bedroom could not be described as self-contained and that the tenancy arrangement was akin to a flatting situation. Therefore, the court held that the term "premises" should not be construed as being limited to Ms Cavanagh’s bedroom alone. The court found no error in the District Court’s analysis and upheld the conclusion that section 5(1)(n) applied, excluding the application of the Act.

The appeal is dismissed, and the District Court’s decision stands.

Orders