IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV 2017-404-3091
[2021] NZHC 2240
UNDER The Defamation Act 1992 BETWEEN
KRISTIN PIA CATO
Plaintiff
AND
MANAIA MEDIA LIMITED
First Defendant
ROWAN DIXON
Second DefendantJANE THOMPSON
Third Defendant
Hearing: 27 August 2021 (Via VMR) Appearances:
S J Mills QC and E D Nilsson for the Plaintiff S A McKenna and R G Scott for the Defendants
Judgment:
27 August 2021
JUDGMENT OF CAMPBELL J
(Mode of trial)
This judgment was delivered by me on 27 August 2021 at 4:00pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
CATO v MANAIA MEDIA LIMITED [2021] NZHC 2240 [27 August 2021]
[1] This is a defamation proceeding. The defendants elected, under s 16 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, a jury trial. The defendants were late in making their election, but Hinton J granted their application for an extension of time.1 Her Honour’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 3 June 2021.2
[2] A three-week trial is scheduled to begin on 6 September 2021. That is just over a week away. Auckland is currently at COVID-19 Alert Level 4. It is almost certain to be at that alert level or at Alert Level 3 in the week commencing 6 September 2021. Jury trials will not begin under Alert Levels 3 or 4.3 It is thus almost certain that, if the proceeding is to be tried with a jury, the trial will have to be vacated. This eventuality will cause considerable delay – perhaps 12 months – before a rescheduled jury trial could get underway.
[3] In these circumstances the plaintiff applies for an order for a judge-alone trial so that a trial can proceed on the currently scheduled timetable.4 Mr Mills QC, counsel for the plaintiff, submits the Court has inherent power to change the mode of a defamation trial where it is in the interests of justice to do so. He says the interests of justice favour such a change here. Defamation proceedings should be heard promptly. This proceeding has already suffered delays. A judge-alone trial would be quicker and less costly.
[4] The defendants oppose the application. Mr McKenna, for the defendants, submits the Court does not have any inherent power to change the mode of a defamation trial. Even if it did, he says it is not in the interests of justice to make a change here. The defendants exercised a right to have a jury trial and that must carry considerable weight. Mr McKenna says there will be delays whether the trial is before a judge sitting alone or before a jury. Both parties have prepared on the basis the trial will be before a jury.
1 Cato v Manaia Media Ltd [2020] NZHC 1240.
2 Cato v Manaia Media Ltd [2021] NZCA 226.
3 Chief High Court Judge Protocol: COVID-19 Alert Level 3 and 4 23 August 2021.
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- Case
- [2021] NZHC 2240
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether it had the inherent power to change the mode of a defamation trial and, if so, whether it was in the interests of justice to do so in this case. The court considered section 16 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, which provides for the right to a jury trial in defamation cases but also allows for a judge-alone trial under specific conditions. The court examined whether the statutory provisions precluded the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to change the mode of trial, referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Siemer v Solicitor-General, which emphasized the need for clear legislative intent to remove inherent powers. The court concluded that the statutory language and legislative history of section 16 clearly intended to limit the court's power to order a judge-alone trial to the circumstances specified in section 16(4). The court found no basis to exercise inherent jurisdiction beyond what was provided for in the statute.
Even if the court had found it had the inherent power to change the mode of trial, it would not have exercised that power in this case. The court gave considerable weight to the defendants' right to a jury trial, as mandated by section 16(3). The court also noted the uncertainties regarding the feasibility of a judge-alone trial within the scheduled timeframe, potential additional delays, and the extensive preparation both parties had undertaken for a jury trial. Considering these factors, the court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to change the mode of trial.
The plaintiff's application to change the mode of trial was dismissed, and the defendants were awarded costs on the application.
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