Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA180/00

BETWEENCARTER HOLT HARVEY BUILDING PRODUCTS GROUP LIMITED


Appellant

ANDTHE COMMERCE COMMISSION


Respondent

Hearing:17 February 2003

Coram:Gault  P
Keith J
McGrath J

Appearances:  R A Dobson QC for the Appellant


M T Scholtens QC  for the Respondent

Judgment:3 March 2003

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY KEITH J

[1]       The Court granted the appellant conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council on 7 December 2001 under rule 2(a) of the New Zealand (Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 1910.  Leave was granted by consent on the conditions that

(a)       The appellant was to seal the judgment of this Court within 28 days.

(b)The appellant was to take the necessary steps to prepare the record, secure the necessary certificate of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal as to the record, dispatch the record to London and lodge it in the Privy Council and secure registration of the appeal at the Privy Council by 31 May 2002.

(c)The appellant was to enter within 28 days into good and sufficient security in the sum of $2000 in accordance with r5(a).

[2]       The appellant complied with conditions (a) and (c).  It has not however complied with condition (b).

[3]       On 13 November 2002 the appellant applied for final leave to appeal to the Privy Council while the respondent, as well as opposing that application, applied for an order rescinding the conditional leave order.  That application we were told was filed out of caution in response to remarks made by this Court in E v E [1972] NZLR 932, 935-936. The application before us presents two questions. The first is whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant final leave where a condition has not been satisfied in time and the application for leave has been made after the final date fixed in the conditions. The second is whether, if the Court has jurisdiction, it should in its discretion grant final leave.

[4]       The respondent’s argument on the first point is that the appellant must have taken some steps before the expiry of conditional leave to keep that leave alive.  The conditional leave simply lapses.  While the New Zealand (Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 1910 and the Judicial Committee (General Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 1982 do not address the issue before us, rules 17 and 21 of the 1910 order (about delays in seeking a final order when conditions were satisfied and delays, after the final order, in despatching the record) do allow an inference, the respondent says, that conditional leave lapses where a condition is not met and no steps are taken to preserve the situation before the time expires.  The power of the Registrar of the Judicial Committee under the 1982 Rules to dismiss an appeal for non prosecution after the record is despatched is also cited as supporting that contention.  The respondent points as well to the ability of the appellant, in the present context too, to seek leave directly from the…

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Details
Case
[2003] NZCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal of New Zealand considered a case involving Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Limited, the appellant, and the Commerce Commission, the respondent. The dispute centred around the appellant's conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council, which was contingent upon certain conditions being met, including the timely preparation and dispatch of a record of the proceedings. The appellant failed to meet one of the conditions, specifically regarding the timely preparation and dispatch of the record. Consequently, the respondent applied for an order rescinding the conditional leave granted to the appellant, while the appellant applied for final leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The court was tasked with determining whether it had jurisdiction to grant final leave despite the appellant's non-compliance with the conditions, and if so, whether it should exercise its discretion to grant such leave.

The court found that it had jurisdiction to consider the application for final leave despite the non-compliance with the conditions. It based its reasoning on the Privy Council's decision in Roulstone v Panton, which established that a court could refix the period for compliance when granting final leave. The court in this case agreed with the approach taken in previous cases, where it was held that the court could consider an application for final leave even if the conditions had not been met in time. The court emphasized that while the initial application for conditional leave was valid, the appellant had the responsibility to comply with the conditions or seek amendments, and then apply for final leave. The court noted that there was no rule prohibiting it from considering the application for final leave despite the non-compliance.

Upon determining that it had jurisdiction, the court turned to the question of whether it should grant final leave. The primary argument from the respondent was the appellant's lengthy delay in complying with the conditions. The court found that the appellant's delay was unjustified, especially considering the significant period allowed for preparing the record. The appellant's explanation, that it had been waiting for the outcome of another case (Boral) which was not a valid reason for the delay, was not accepted. The court held that condoning the appellant's approach would undermine efforts to deter the practice of lodging but not prosecuting appeals. Therefore, the court refused to grant final leave and rescinded the conditional leave, ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of $1,500.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group Limited, sought conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council, which was granted on 7 December 2001. The conditional leave was granted under specific conditions, including that the appellant was to prepare and dispatch the record to the Privy Council by 31 May 2002. The appellant did not meet this condition. The appellant then applied for final leave to appeal, while the respondent, the Commerce Commission, opposed the application and sought to rescind the conditional leave order. The respondent argued that the appellant had failed to take necessary steps to preserve the conditional leave before the time expired. The appellant's primary reason for the delay was waiting for the outcome of the Boral case, which had no bearing on the conditions for the appeal.

The matter originated from a decision by the Court of Appeal on 5 November 2001, leading to the appellant's application for conditional leave to appeal on 20 November 2001. Conditional leave was granted on 7 December 2001. Despite the conditions, the appellant did not meet the deadline to prepare and dispatch the record to the Privy Council by 31 May 2002. On 13 November 2002, the appellant applied for final leave to appeal, and the respondent applied to rescind the conditional leave order. The Court of Appeal heard the matter on 17 February 2003, delivering its judgment on 3 March 2003.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to grant final leave where a condition has not been satisfied in time and the application for leave has been made after the final date fixed in the conditions?
2. Should the Court, if it has jurisdiction, in its discretion grant final leave?

Held
1. The Court has jurisdiction to grant final leave to appeal to the Privy Council where a condition has not been satisfied in time and the application for leave has been made after the final date fixed in the conditions. The Court decided that it can refix the period when granting final leave.
2. The Court refused to grant final leave to appeal. The Court decided that the lengthy delay by the appellant was not justified and was inconsistent with the purpose of imposing a time condition for preparation and despatch of the record. The Court rescinded the grant of conditional leave and ordered the appellant to pay costs to the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court examined whether it had jurisdiction to grant final leave to appeal to the Privy Council where a condition had not been satisfied in time and the application for leave had been made after the final date fixed in the conditions. The Court found that it had jurisdiction to consider the application, as there was nothing in the Rules to prevent it from doing so. The Court relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Roulstone v Panton, which held that the Court could "refix the period" when granting final leave. The Court then turned to the question of whether it should grant final leave. The Court considered the lengthy delay by the appellant, which it found to be unjustified, as the appellant had been aware of the impending Boral decision when it initially sought leave in November 2001. The Court found that condoning the appellant's approach would be inconsistent with recent efforts to deter the practice of lodging but not prosecuting appeals. The Court also noted that respondents are entitled to have litigation brought to finality with reasonable diligence. Therefore, the Court refused the grant of final leave to appeal and rescinded the grant of conditional leave, ordering the appellant to pay costs to the respondent. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant final leave to appeal even if a condition has not been satisfied in time, provided the application for leave is made before the final date fixed in the conditions, and the Court may refuse to grant final leave if the delay is unjustified and inconsistent with the purpose of imposing a time condition for preparation and despatch of the record.