| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 63/2016 [2023] NZSC 27 |
| BETWEEN | CAMILLE IRIANA THOMPSON |
| AND | ATTORNEY‑GENERAL |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ |
Counsel: | D A Ewen for Applicant |
Judgment: | 27 March 2023 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for recall of this Court’s judgment of 7 October 2016 (Thompson v The Attorney‑General [2016] NZSC 134) is dismissed.
BThere is no order as to costs.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
On 7 October 2016, this Court declined Ms Thompson’s application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal.[1] The Court of Appeal had dismissed Ms Thompson’s appeal against a High Court decision dismissing her claim for, among other things, a declaration of a breach of s 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights) and public law compensation.[2]
[1]Thompson v The Attorney‑General [2016] NZSC 134 (Arnold, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ) [SC judgment].
[2]Thompson v Attorney‑General [2016] NZCA 215, [2016] 3 NZLR 206 (Wild, French and Cooper JJ) [CA judgment]; and Thompson v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 2333, (2014) 10 HRNZ 51 (MacKenzie J).
The Court of Appeal applied the decision of this Court in Chapman v Attorney‑General in coming to its conclusion that no award of public law damages was available.[3] In her application for leave to appeal to this Court, Ms Thompson argued that Chapman could be distinguished in her case. Her claim related to a breach of s 22 of the Bill of Rights, whereas Chapman related to breaches of ss 25 and 27 of the Bill of Rights. This Court did not accept that argument. It said:[4]
We do not consider there is sufficient likelihood that the arguments for distinguishing Chapman would be accepted to justify the granting of leave. Nor do we see any proper basis for revisiting Chapman, a relatively recent decision of this Court.
The application for leave to appeal was therefore dismissed.
[3]CA judgment, above n 2, at [74], citing Attorney‑General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110, [2012] 1 NZLR 462.
[4]SC judgment, above n 1, at [10].
After this Court’s judgment was issued, Ms Thompson made a communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), under the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[5] She alleged breaches of arts 2(3), 9(1) and 9(5) of the ICCPR by New Zealand as a result of her being arbitrarily arrested and detained and being provided with no effective remedy. The UNHRC adopted Views upholding the communication on 2 July 2021.[6] The New Zealand Government formally responded to the Views, but did not make any commitment to provide compensation to Ms Thompson.
[5]Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976).
[6]Human Rights Committee Views adopted by the Committee under article 5…
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- Case
- [2023] NZSC 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the recall of the Supreme Court's judgment was warranted under the criteria set out in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), and whether the UNHRC's decision constituted a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority. The Court considered that the UNHRC's decision did not meet the first category of the Horowhenua County test, as it was not the decision of a judicial body and was in Thompson's own case. The Court also found that there was no very special reason justifying recall, particularly given the significant time that had passed since the original judgment was delivered.
The Supreme Court dismissed Thompson's application for recall of the judgment, finding that the Horowhenua County test for recall of a judgment was not met. The Court noted that the UNHRC's decision may be relevant to future cases but did not impact the outcome of this recall application. As Thompson was legally aided in relation to the application, no order was made as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from a decision of the High Court, which dismissed Ms Thompson's claim for, among other things, a declaration of a breach of s 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and public law compensation. Ms Thompson appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Ms Thompson then applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which declined the application on 7 October 2016. After the Supreme Court's judgment was issued, Ms Thompson made a communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) under the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UNHRC adopted Views upholding the communication on 2 July 2021. Ms Thompson subsequently applied for the Supreme Court to recall its judgment declining leave to appeal, arguing that the UNHRC's Views is a decision of unquestionable high authority that is of central relevance to her case and to wider human rights in New Zealand.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the UNHRC's Views constitute a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority that falls within the first category in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2)?
2. Is there a very special reason justifying the recall of the judgment declining leave to appeal?
Held
1. The application for recall of the Court's judgment declining leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered Ms Thompson's application for recall of the previous judgment that declined her application for leave to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal. Ms Thompson argued that the UNHRC's Views, adopted after the initial judgment, constituted a new judicial decision of high relevance and authority that fell within the first category outlined in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2). The Court did not accept this argument, concluding that the UNHRC's Views were not a judicial decision but rather a decision specific to Ms Thompson's case, and thus did not meet the criteria for recall. Additionally, the Court found no "very special reason" justifying the recall of the judgment. It noted that over six years had passed since the original judgment, and reopening the case would compromise the value of finality. Consequently, the application for recall was dismissed. The Court did not need to consider the respondent's argument that a stricter "exceptional circumstances" test applied due to the perfected nature of the judgment. The Court's decision was based on the principles established in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2), where the Court outlined criteria for recalling judgments. In this case, the Court distinguished the UNHRC's Views from a new judicial decision of high authority, as it was not an authoritative decision in another case that may have affected the reasoning of the original judgment. The Court also found no special circumstances warranting recall, particularly given the significant time elapsed since the original judgment. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the adoption of a UNHRC's Views after a domestic court judgment does not automatically constitute a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority for the purposes of recalling a domestic court judgment.