Camelot Hotel Ltd v Square Holdings Ltd
[2016] NZHC 82
•4 February 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CIV-2013-409-001352 [2016] NZHC 82
BETWEEN CAMELOT HOTEL LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND
SQUARE HOLDINGS LIMITED First Defendant
AND
THE MINISTER FOR CANTERBURY EARTHQUAKE RECOVERY
Second Defendant
Hearing: 28 January 2016 Appearances:
S J Caradus for First Defendant (Applicant) L M Taylor for Plaintiff (Respondent)
S E Rowe for Second Defendant excused
Judgment:
4 February 2016
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE OSBORNE UPON SECURITY FOR COSTS
Introduction
[1] This judgment is upon a defendant’s application for security for costs
pursuant to r 5.45 High Court Rules.
[2] In particular, the first defendant applies for an order for security to be provided by the plaintiff.
[3] The plaintiff accepts that the threshold for the granting of an order for security for costs (under r 5.45(1)(b)) has been established.
CAMELOT HOTEL LIMITED v SQUARE HOLDINGS LIMITED [2016] NZHC 82 [4 February 2016]
The issues
[4] The Court is required to give judgment having regard to its conclusions on two issues, namely:
(a) what would represent an appropriate amount of security; and
(b) what form of security would be satisfactory.
The litigation background and context
[5] The plaintiff sues the first defendant for breaches of a 2007 lease by which the first defendant leased to the plaintiff a Cathedral Square building. The plaintiff operated a hotel and restaurant business from the property. The property was damaged during the Canterbury earthquake sequence and has not been occupied since February 2011. In November 2014, the Crown exercised its powers of compulsory acquisition of the property under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011.
[6] In summary, the plaintiff’s claims against the first defendant rely on the
following propositions:
(a) as at the date of the Crown’s acquisition, the lease had not been terminated;
(b)if the first defendant had acted with all reasonable speed, the building could have been repaired before the date of acquisition;
(c) the first defendant failed to undertake repairs which it was required, by the lease, to effect;
(d)the plaintiff was unable to re-enter its building and conduct its business, thereby suffering damage; and
(e) (alternatively), there was a failure by the first defendant to maintain a full replacement and reinstatement insurance for the building,
constituting a breach of the lease, as a result of which the plaintiff has suffered damage.
[7] The plaintiff has not adduced evidence to contradict that provided by the first defendant in order to establish the threshold test for security for costs. That evidence includes the following:
(a) the plaintiff has not traded since February 2011;
(b) the plaintiff does not appear to own any land or chattels;
(c) the plaintiff disposed of its chattels and furniture in May 2012;
(d)the plaintiff has, at least in part, relied on funding from its shareholder; and
(e) the solicitors who previously acted for the plaintiff commenced winding up proceedings against the plaintiff in March 2015 (subsequently settled).
[8] In these circumstances, the plaintiff accepted that some measure of security for costs should be offered.
Informal attempts to settle the amount and form of security
[9] The solicitors for the first defendant wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors in July
2015 in relation to security. This followed the public advertisement of the liquidation proceeding which had been commenced against the plaintiff.
[10] The first defendant’s solicitors, in their letter, provided a calculation of its costs in two stages. Before trial preparation they assessed a sum of $50,347. From trial preparation onwards, they assessed a sum of $30,845. Both calculations were stated to be on “Category 3”.
[11] The first defendant’s solicitors, by their letter, sought security for costs in two tranches being:
(a) an immediate payment of $80,000 (representing $50,000 for costs and
$30,000 for the fees of expert witnesses); and
(b)a second payment for trial preparation and trial costs to be settled later but expected to be “upwards of $50,000” (comprising $30,000 costs and $20,000 for expert witnesses’ fees). The plaintiff’s response was at two levels:
(i)the amount of security sought by the first defendant was unreasonable, a sum of $50,000 representing a reasonable sum; and
(ii)a personal undertaking of the plaintiff ’s director and shareholder, Rakesh Sharma, was offered, representing satisfactory security.
The appropriate amount of security
[12] Counsel referred me to a number of matters which they submit are relevant to the amount of security which the Court should or should not set. The Judge’s task in terms of r 5.45(3) is to direct security in a sum which the Judge considers sufficient. I have regard to the following matters raised by counsel.
Delay in bringing the application for security
[13] While the first defendant’s application was filed on 11 August 2015, its
solicitors had appropriately raised the issue of security by their July correspondence.
[14] This timing might suggest that the Court should focus on the costs and disbursements to be incurred from mid-2015.
[15] I adopt what I observed in Jo v Johnston:1
[18] Rule 5.45 does not expressly address the situation of a delayed application. Any aspect of delay is a factor to be brought into account in exercising the discretion. On their facts, applications for security for costs made at a very late stage in a proceeding are often unsuccessful: see Oceania Furniture Limited v Debonaire Products Limited.2 Cases where delay has been fatal to an application for security are often those where the application was made very close to the hearing date or where the applicant had stood by allowing the plaintiff to incur considerable expense without even an informal request in relation to security: see J Delaney, Security for Costs.3
[19] Drawing on Clifford J’s judgment in Oceania Furniture, relevant considerations as to delay include:
(a) Whether the application was made as soon as the defendant became aware, or could with reasonable inquiry have become aware, of the plaintiff’s likely inability to meet costs;
(b) Whether there has been needless delay in the application, particularly if it was designed to prejudice the plaintiff.
(c) Whether and if so to what extent the delay has prejudiced the plaintiff, such as where a plaintiff has expended substantial sums to bring a proceeding to the brink of trial.
[20] None of those considerations is decisive – Oceania Furniture is an example of a case where the Judge accepted that the relevant financial information had only very recently come to the knowledge of Oceania but the application for security was declined within the Court’s discretion.
[16] In the present case, the decisive evidence was obtained by the first defendant when it became aware (I infer about April 2015) that liquidation proceedings had been commenced against the plaintiff in March 2015.
[17] For the plaintiff, Ms Taylor submitted that the first defendant had already known sufficient to justify a security application from the time the plaintiff ceased trading as a result of the damage caused by the February 2011 earthquake. Her submission was that the likelihood of insolvency was obvious at that point. On the
other hand, Mr Caradus for the first defendant referred to the insurance covenants in
1 Jo v Johnston [2013] NZHC 552.
2 Oceania Furniture Limited v Debonaire Products Limited HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-1701,
24 April 2009.
3 Security for Costs J Delany (1989) at 124–127 and 174–175 (which provides examples from
Australian jurisdictions).
the lease and, in particular, to the obligation of the plaintiff as tenant to hold insurance for loss of profits. I accept Mr Caradus’s submission that the evidence in relation to the plaintiff’s financial position in the period 2011 to mid-2015 was relatively neutral.
[18] Assessing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that the first defendant pursued security promptly once it became aware of specific circumstances indicating that the plaintiff might be insolvent. There was no needless delay and certainly none designed or having the effect of prejudicing the plaintiff.
Estimated costs, disbursements and expert witnesses’ fees
[19] It was common ground between counsel that in assessing any security, the Court should assume that this proceeding is, in terms of r 14.3 High Court Rules, a Category 2 proceeding.
[20] Mr Caradus based his calculations of likely costs upon the basis that the reasonable time to be assessed for each step, in terms of r 14.5 High Court Rules, should be band B, representing “a comparatively large amount of time for [each] step”.
[21] Mr Caradus, at the hearing, helpfully provided a schedule (Schedule A to this judgment) which set out his calculations of the costs calculations which apply in the situations of both a band B and band C determination. (The Schedule replaced an earlier Schedule filed by Mr Caradus, removing some items of calculation.)
[22] Ms Taylor did not take any particular issue with Mr Caradus’s calculations. The thrust of her submissions was that the amount of security should have regard to a determination of band B and not a determination of band C.
[23] In general, I consider Ms Taylor’s promotion of band B as the more appropriate. It is clear in terms of r 14.5(1) itself that the determination of reasonable time involves a step-by-step consideration. None of the attendances of an interlocutory and case management nature suggest a band C determination. The single item highlighted by Mr Caradus which might reasonably call for a band C
determination is the defendant’s preparation of briefs for trial. It is clear that those will be extensive. There are likely to be at least three expert witnesses (dealing with engineering, quantity surveying, and insurance broking).
[24] Otherwise, I view Mr Caradus’s first column (in Schedule A), based on band
B, as the more appropriate approach to costs.
[25] For Mr Caradus’s stage 1 (attendances prior to security for costs application)
I find Mr Caradus’s first column figure of $37,611 to be a realistic assessment.
[26] For Mr Caradus’s stage 2 (attendances subsequent to security for costs application) there is a conceptual error in Mr Caradus’s calculations in that he has included matters relating to the present application for security for costs. As I will be awarding and fixing the costs of this interlocutory application to be immediately payable those are not matters for security. By deleting items 22, 24 and 26, Mr Caradus’s stage 2 calculation drops from $20,739 to $14,941.
[27] For Mr Caradus’s stage 3 (preparation for and attendance at trial) I consider realistic Mr Caradus’s first column (based on band B) with the exception of two items which are appropriately in band C. Item 30 (preparation of briefs) and item 33 (preparation for hearing) should each be allowed on a band C basis. This would increase Mr Caradus’s first column figure of $46,830 to $56,865.
[28] For present purposes, I regard the likely awarded costs to be $52,552 for stages 1 and 2 combined and $56,865 for stage 3.
[29] The disbursements recoverable by the first defendant will be those incurred on pleadings, totalling $1,680. I disregard Mr Caradus’s inclusion of the filing fee on the present interlocutory application as that, again, will be covered by an award of costs and disbursements now.
[30] That leaves the likely expenses of expert witnesses. Mr Caradus submitted that a conservative estimate for the three expert witnesses to be involved would be
$50,000 (if the experts prepare briefs and their evidence is agreed after conference between experts) or $100,000 if the experts are also required to give evidence at trial.
[31] In relation to sums of such significance it is somewhat unsatisfactory for the Court to be left with no estimate of fees made by the experts themselves. I therefore must proceed on a general impression and experience of past fees in comparable litigation. A range of $50,000 to $100,000 appears realistic. However, for the purposes of security for costs assessment, and in the absence of actual evidence of fees estimated by the experts themselves, I will adopt a base figure of $50,000.
[32] The figures which I will therefore take into account when setting the amount of security will be:
(a) Stage 1 & 2 costs – $52,552 (b) Stage 3 costs – $56,865 (c) Disbursements – $1,680
(d) Expert witnesses’ fees – $50,000
$161,097
Disposal of assets
[33] The (unchallenged) evidence of the first defendant is that the plaintiff disposed of its chattels and furniture in May 2012 at no cost. This was relied upon by the first defendant as part of its evidence of the plaintiff’s apparent insolvency. I do not regard the evidence provided as indicating that the plaintiff had been disposing of assets to make itself judgment-proof or costs-proof. The disposal of assets is explicable by the fact that the plaintiff had been unable to operate for over a year and needed to remove its contents from the leased premises.
Litigation funding
[34] Mr Caradus submitted that, in assessing security, the Court should take into account the fact that the plaintiff has a litigation funder in the person of Mr Sharma, its director and shareholder. Mr Caradus submitted, by reference to judgments of the Supreme Court in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd,4 that the plaintiff had failed in an obligation to promptly disclose the existence of a litigation funder.
[35] The Waterhouse case is distinguishable. This is not a case of a “litigation funder” in the sense used in Waterhouse, where the Courts recognised that control of litigation by a funder raises particular issues as to abuse of process and the like. All that is happening in the present case is that a plaintiff, unable to trade because of events affecting its leased premises, is for the time being supported in this litigation by its shareholder.
Mr Sharma’s financial support
[36] The greater relevance of Mr Sharma’s involvement relates to the plaintiff’s
access to justice.
[37] Mr Sharma has given evidence as to ownership of a property in Auckland; a significant taxable income in New Zealand in the year ended 31 March 2014; and a non-resident income from the United States in the year ended 31 March 2012. He also deposes to having valuable assets (of approximately USD$20 million) in the United States.
[38] On the plaintiff ’s own evidence (as provided by Mr Sharma), the plaintiff, in the person of Mr Sharma, has a person who has been sustaining this litigation and is prepared to continue to do so. Mr Sharma has not deposed that the plaintiff would be unable to continue with this litigation if substantial security is ordered.
[39] There is no reason to anticipate that the plaintiff will be unable to proceed with this litigation if there is an award of substantial security.
The form of security
[40] The first defendant seeks a traditional form of security, namely payment of
the secured sum into a solicitor’s trust account until further order of the Court.
[41] The plaintiff asks instead that the Court direct that security be provided in the form of an undertaking which Mr Sharma has deposed he would give, namely an undertaking to pay $50,000 costs should the plaintiff be ordered to pay such sum to the first defendant.
[42] The starting point for an appropriate form of security is r 5.45(3)(a)
whereunder a Judge may order security in a particular sum –
(a) by paying that sum into Court; or
(b)by giving to the satisfaction of the Judge or the Registrar security for that sum.
[43] Ms Taylor referred to two decisions which she submitted indicate acceptance by the Courts of the adequacy of an undertaking by a director or shareholder of a corporate plaintiff to meet any costs awarded, providing the undertaking is of substance.
[44] First, Ms Taylor referred to the judgment of Master Williams QC in Shalimar Supermarket Ltd v Toulis.5 In that case, Mrs Patel (a relation of the director/shareholder) provided by affidavit an undertaking to pay up to $25,000 in the event of damages being awarded against the plaintiff in the proceedings. Master Williams construed the undertaking as covering any order which might ultimately be made against the plaintiff if unsuccessful (including an order for costs up to
$25,000). The Master also found that the undertaken sum would sufficiently cover both damages and costs. As part of the Court’s conclusion (that the application for security for costs should be dismissed), the Master considered that security had already been given in the form of the undertaking.
[45] The Shalimar judgment does not disclose what the evidence was as to the certainty that Mrs Patel would be able to meet her undertaking. However, it appears, as Ms Taylor submitted, that the Judge and all parties must have regarded the undertaking as an undertaking “of substance”.
[46] I therefore do not regard Shalimar as authority for the proposition that an undertaking will generally suffice as a form of security. At most it indicates that an undertaking may be found to be satisfactory if there is no question as to the substance of the undertaking.
[47] Ms Taylor referred also to Combined Logging Co Ltd v Crown Forestry Management Ltd.6 That case involved a suggestion that a second plaintiff might provide an undertaking to meet the first plaintiff ’s costs in the event the proceeding failed. The second plaintiff was prepared to sign an undertaking. However, Master Thomson did not treat the offered undertaking as a form of security for costs under the then-r 60. Rather, counsel apparently canvassed with the Court during argument
the possibility that the Court might make an order pursuant to r 263 (which allowed the Court to make orders on interlocutory applications subject to such undertakings as the Court thinks just) expressly in lieu of an order for security for costs. The second plaintiff agreed to give a suitably worded personal undertaking. The defendant agreed to accept an order under r 263 (in lieu of an order for security under r 60).
[48] Combined Logging is therefore an unusual case in that the defendant as applicant expressly accepted an undertaking in lieu of an order for security. Implicitly the defendant accepted that the undertaking was of substance. In its own way, the Combined Logging decision reinforces my view that an undertaking would not generally be regarded as a form of security in that Master Thomson viewed the order he was making as not one of security but as one requiring an undertaking to be provided in terms of the then-rule 263 (which has no equivalent in the current
Rules).
6 Combined Logging Co Ltd v Crown Forestry Management Ltd HC Wanganui CP 40/91, 30
September 1996.
[49] Counsel might also have referred to the commentary in McGechan on Procedure7 where, under the heading “Manner of giving security”, the authors suggest:
The manner in which a plaintiff chooses to satisfy an order requiring security for costs is for the plaintiff: Geddes v Brebner HC Auckland CP 16-SD/99,
22 May 2003 (plaintiff proposing to secure his equity in his half-share of his
matrimonial home); Nikau Holdings Ltd v BNZ (1992) 5 PRNZ 430.
[50] In Geddes v Brebner,8 the plaintiff jointly owned, with his wife, their home. For the defendant it was submitted, and accepted by the Master who had heard the initial application, that it was relevant that the plaintiff was in a position to have his wife (as joint owner) agree to the property being used for security.
[51] On review, Potter J rejected the Master’s approach, holding:
[45] In Nikau Holdings Limited v BNZ (1992) 5 PRNZ 430 on an application for security for costs the Court stated that it is –
inherent in the whole concept of security for costs ... that the Court has the power to order a plaintiff to do what it is likely to find difficulty in doing, namely to provide security for costs which ex hypothesi it is unable to pay. The means by which the plaintiff satisfies such an order is a matter for it.
[46] The way the plaintiff, or for that matter any citizen, chooses to arrange his assets is a matter for him. As was noted in Nikau Holdings Limited, the manner in which he chooses to satisfy any Court order requiring security for costs is also a matter for him. It is clear that the plaintiff has an equity in a half share in the residential property he owns jointly with his wife, which is available to him to meet reasonable provision for security for costs. The means by which he chooses to do so is a matter for him. Observations by the Master as to the approach the plaintiff’s wife might take to a request by the plaintiff that she should join in making available the residential property as security, are not particularly relevant. They are simply aspects which may arise from any decision the plaintiff takes in relation to the arrangement of his assets.
[52] Master Williams QC was the Judge who decided Nikau Holdings Limited v BNZ.9 It is his judgment which Potter J was citing. The Master had referred to the judgment of Davison CJ in Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General.10 I do not find
anything in the judgment of the Chief Justice which recognises an autonomy of
7 McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR 5.45.08].
8 Above at [49].
9 Nikau Holdings Ltd v BNZ (1992) 5 PRNZ 430.
10 Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney-General (1986) 1 PRNZ 457.
plaintiff’s choice as to form of security which Master Williams’s decision (as adopted by Potter J) might suggest. The Bell-Booth Group decision did not result in an award of security. The Bell-Booth plaintiff was not left to make a decision as to the form in which to provide security. The applications for security were dismissed. Furthermore, as I read the judgments of both Potter J and Master Williams, the focus is not upon the type of security to be provided (e.g. stakeholding or mortgage) but rather on the means by which a plaintiff might assemble the funds required for security.
[53] I would respectfully decline to follow Geddes v Brebner and Nikau Holdings Limited v BNZ to the extent that those judgments might suggest there is plaintiff autonomy as to the type of security to be provided. As it is, I view the observations in both judgments as being in fact directed to how a plaintiff would raise its security rather than the type of security it would provide.
[54] My decision is reinforced if not required by the wording of r 5.45(3) of the High Court Rules. The Rule specifically provides that an order for security may require the plaintiff to give to the satisfaction of the Judge or the Registrar security for a particular sum (my emphasis). The previous rule, r 60, referred to the satisfaction of the Registrar (but not the Court). In short, whatever the preference of the plaintiff as to the form of security and the means by which it provides security, it is ultimately for the Judge or Registrar to be satisfied as to the security offered.
[55] I make this additional observation as to practice. It may be that, in some cases, the plaintiff will be able to provide compelling evidence that a personal undertaking will be of substance and would result in prompt payment of any costs award. The Judge or Registrar may find in such circumstances that a personal undertaking sufficiently protects the defendant’s position. There may also be other situations involving issues of access to justice arise by reason of the plaintiff’s limited access to financial support or where the defendant has contributed to the plaintiff’s financial predicament. In such cases it may be appropriate for the Court to regard an undertaking, in the particular circumstances, as satisfactory. But any earlier practice (dating from the 1980’s or thereabouts) whereby personal undertakings might more readily have been regarded as satisfactory security (and I
am not convinced that such a practice existed) should not be assumed to retain validity. The financial crises from the late-1980’s have involved the very abrupt elimination of some corporate and individual fortunes. Assets are readily moved internationally. Individuals can readily relocate. This Court will recognise, when a defendant today seeks to protect its legitimate interests by an order for security for costs, that there is a substantial difference in the “security” provided by a personal undertaking and that provided by more traditional forms of security such as stakeholdings.
[56] The plaintiff’s evidence in the present case falls well short of satisfying me either that a more traditional form of security cannot be offered or that the personal undertaking offered by Mr Sharma will inevitably result in prompt payment of any costs award. The evidence as to Mr Sharma’s New Zealand income is almost two years old, with the American income information still older. Mr Sharma refers to his ownership of an Auckland property but the evidence provided as to the bank loans on the property appears to indicate that there is a partnership involved in the ownership of that property. Mr Sharma has not provided evidence as to the registered title. Finally, although Mr Sharma is apparently resident at present in New Zealand, by far the bulk of his claimed assets are stated to be in the United States. Mr Sharma has not offered any undertaking as to not further charging his assets. These circumstances do not provide a sense of assurance that Mr Sharma will at the time of any judgment be in New Zealand to honour his personal undertaking.
[57] In fact, Mr Sharma’s evidence read as a whole suggests that there should be little or no difficulty for the plaintiff accessing sufficient cash to pay by way of security into an account a significant sum.
[58] On the evidence provided by the plaintiff, the form of security which I consider will be satisfactory is a payment into a solicitor’s trust account as requested by the first defendant.
The appropriate amount of security
[59] I find that it is just to order that the plaintiff provide by way of security a sum of $120,000 representing approximately 75 per cent of the incurred and anticipated costs and disbursements.
[60] In this case the pleadings are at the point of being closed. A trial will commence in June 2016. In my judgment, it is appropriate to allow the plaintiff to make payment by two tranches if it prefers tranches, but the dates for the two tranches will be relatively close.
Costs
[61] This has been a straightforward interlocutory application. Costs should follow the event. It is appropriate that costs be fixed on a 2B basis.
Orders
[62] I order:
(a) The plaintiff shall provide by way of security for the costs, disbursements and expert witnesses’ fees to be incurred by the first defendant, the sum of $120,000.
(b)The security of $120,000 is to be provided in two tranches of $60,000 each.
(c) Each tranche is to be paid into the plaintiff ’s solicitors’ trust account
as follows:
(i)First tranche by 26 February 2016 (being five working days after the close of pleadings date);
(ii) Second tranche by 2 May 2016 (being 15 working days after
the date for provision of the plaintiff’s briefs);
The security shall be held by the plaintiff ’s solicitors on an
interest-bearing deposit.
(iv)The plaintiff’s solicitors shall in writing notify the first defendant’s solicitors immediately that each tranche of security has been received into their trust account.
(v)In the event that the plaintiff fails to make payment on time of either the first tranche or the second tranche, the proceeding will be stayed, save to the extent that the plaintiff (but not the first defendant or second defendant) will in such event still be required to complete any of its outstanding timetable obligations;
(vi)The plaintiff is in any event to pay the first defendant’s costs and disbursements of this application which I fix in the sum of
$8,751.00.
Associate Judge Osborne
Solicitors:
Duncan Cotterill, Christchurch Anthony Harper, Christchurch Buddle Findlay, Christchurch
SCHEDULE A
SCHEDULE OF HIGH COURT COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
STAGE 1 (ATTENDANCES PRIOR TO SECURITY FOR COSTS APPLICATION)
Item Commencement, Case Management, Discovery and inspection Allocated
days
Allocated
days
Category B Category C
Commencement of defence by defendant 2 6
Counterclaim 1.6 4.8
Pleading in response to amended pleading (3) 1.8 6
Preparation for first or subsequent case management conference (10) 4 10
Filing memorandum for case management conference or mentions hearing (10)
10
Appearance at first or subsequent case management conference (10) 3 7
List of documents on discovery 2.5 7
Total 18.9 50.8
Cost recovery rate category 2 $1,990.00 (until 1 July 2015) $37,611 $101,092STAGE 2 (ATTENDANCES SUBSEQUENT TO SECURITY FOR COSTS APPLICATION)
Item Description Allocated
days (2B)
Allocated
days (2C)
Category B Category C
Application for security for costs on 11 August 2015 .6 2
Memorandum for case management conference on 12 August 2015 .4 1
Appearance at case management conference on 13 August 2015 .3 .7
Inspection of CERA’s documents received on 3 September 2015 2.5 7
Inspection of Camelot’s documents received on 7 September 2015 2.5 7
Memorandum for case management conference filed on 5 October
2015
Notice of opposition to application by Camelot for further discovery filed on 13 October 2015
.4 1
.6 2
Preparation of written submissions filed on 18 December 2015 1.5 3
Appearance at hearing on 28 January 2016 .5
9.3 24.2
Costs recovery rate category 2 - $2,230 (from 1 July 2015) $20,739 $53,966
STAGE 3 (TRIAL AND APPEARANCES)
Item Trial and appearances Allocated
days
Allocated
days
Memorandum for case management conference (there are presently no timetables orders)
Category B Category C
.4 1
Appearance at case management conference .3 .7
Preparation for and appearance at pre-trial conference .5 1
Preparation for and appearance at issues conference .5 1
Plaintiff’s or defendant’s preparation of briefs or affidavits 2.5 5
Defendant’s preparation of list of issues, authorities, and common
bundle
2.5 4
Preparation for hearing 3 5
Appearance at hearing for principal counsel 8 8
Second and subsequent counsel 4 4
Total 21 28
Cost recovery rate category 2 $2,230.00 (from 1 July 2015) $46,830 $62,4408
0
0