C v Accident Compensation Corporation
[2022] NZHC 2923
•8 November 2022
INTERIM SUPPRESSION ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND SECOND DEFENDANT. IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGANUI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGANUI ROHE
CIV-2021-070-749
[2022] NZHC 2923
UNDER the Defamation Act 1992, the Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 171 and 172 of the Crown Entities Act 2004, and the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 BETWEEN
C
Plaintiff
AND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
First Defendant
N
Second DefendantTHE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Third Defendant
Hearing: 7 November 2022 Counsel:
R W Ord for Plaintiff
I G Hunt and M E Gall for First and Second Defendants
S Conway, K Stephens, and V Howell for Third DefendantJudgment:
8 November 2022
JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J
[Strike out application]
[1] Before the Court is an application by the first and second defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s fifth amended statement of claim.
C v ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION [2022] NZHC 2923 [8 November 2022]
[2] The plaintiff, who I will refer to as C, has filed proceedings against the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), N (an ACC staff member), and the Attorney-General. The plaintiff’s claim is made against the defendants in defamation, misfeasance in public office, negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty, and breaches of privacy.
[3] ACC and N (collectively ‘the applicants’) seek to strike out the fifth amended statement of claim on the basis that:
(a)it does not disclose any reasonably arguable cause of action against them;
(b)the causes of action pleaded are not founded on separate and distinct facts, nor are they stated separately or clearly, and their factual basis is difficult if not impossible to discern;
(c)the pleading is diffuse and prolix, with extensive irrelevant and evidential material pleaded, argumentative, and includes matters that are speculative and/or of submission.
[4] The applicants say that as the plaintiff has already filed five amended statements of claim, there is no realistic prospect that the pleadings are capable of being rehabilitated.
[5] The Attorney-General has also filed an application for strike out, in relation to the “alternative fourth cause of action…which alleges the Attorney-General is vicariously liable for the alleged misfeasance in public office by the ACC”. The Attorney-General submits that the allegations are clearly untenable and disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action.
[6]The plaintiff opposes the strike out applications.
[7] For the reasons below, I am of the view that the applications for strike out of the fifth amended statement of claim, should be allowed.
Factual background
[8] C is a 60-year-old ACC claimant. She has two claims with ACC dating from the 1980s. One of those claims is a claim relating to physical injuries arising from a motorcycle accident. The other is a sensitive claim as a result of serious sexual assaults. C’s interactions with ACC since the 1980s have been somewhat strained, with various disputes about cover and acceptance of claims. The fifth amended statement of claim records that as a result of these issues, C formed the belief that ACC and N were biased against her.
[9] C makes various allegations against ACC in respect of the way in which ACC has handled information relating to her two claims. She alleges that in October 2015, ACC sent her a package of documents which was opened by an unknown third party and scattered on the ground outside her house. She says that material contained incorrect and defamatory statements about her and her two claims, and that similar events had occurred in the early 2000s whereby ACC mixed the information relating to her two claims, wrongly accessed it, inadvertently deleted it, and/or provided it to external professionals. C says that in December 2020, ACC admitted liability in respect of her allegations as to the dealing with her information, and offered to settle, but that she decided instead to file proceedings.
Procedural background
[10] The original statement of claim was filed on 6 October 2021 in the Tauranga District Court. It included an additional defendant who has since been removed. A first amended statement of claim was filed on 8 December 2021. C sought the first amendment, so as to plead vicarious liability against the Attorney-General in respect of the fourth cause of action.
[11] A second amended statement of claim was also filed on 8 December 2021. It is unclear what distinctions the second amended statement of claim has to the first, other than being slightly longer. Mr Ord, counsel for C, submitted that this was a result of an amendment to a list of documents. By way of joint memorandum dated 8 April 2022, counsel for the defendants indicated their intention to make an application
for strike out, so as to allow the plaintiff the opportunity to further amend the statement of claim.
[12] Following further discussion between the parties, a third amended statement of claim was filed on 28 May 2022, which was again greater in length. On 2 June 2022, counsel for the defendants reiterated their position that the pleadings were non- compliant. By this time, the matter had been moved from the District Court into the High Court by consent of the parties.
[13] On 7 June 2022, Simon France J issued a minute removing one of the defendants, and directing that C file an amended pleading, removing commentary and argument from its contents. As such, a fourth amended statement of claim was filed on 14 July 2022. Contrary to Simon France J’s direction, the fourth amended statement of claim was again, greater in length and had not removed the commentary and argument. Defence counsel then requested directions for a strike out hearing by way of joint memorandum dated 3 August 2022.
[14]Then, in a minute issued on 24 August 2022, Johnston AJ noted:
There are some differences between counsel as to how the matter should be progressed. A feature of the case is an exceptionally lengthy and seemingly complicated statement of claim. The plaintiff was directed to file a fourth amended statement of claim with a view to stream-lining the claim. However, it is not immediately obvious that this has been achieved.
[15] His Honour then made directions for an application by the defendants to strike out the statement of claim, and timetabling towards the hearing of that application. On 25 August 2022, the application for strike out was filed by ACC and N, followed by the Attorney-General on 26 August 2022.
[16] Then, owing to errors made by the plaintiff in the fourth amended statement of claim, the plaintiff sought leave to file a fifth amended statement of claim in anticipation of the strike-out hearing. By way of a further minute dated 11 October 2022, Johnston AJ directed that the plaintiff do so. The plaintiff’s fifth amended statement of claim was then filed on 12 October 2022. It contains some 229 paragraphs and runs to some 56 pages. It is the version that is the subject of the present judgment.
[17] The plaintiff filed a memorandum dated Sunday 6 November which had yet another version of a further amended statement of claim which it was submitted addressed the defects conceded to be present in the fifth amended statement of claim. No leave was applied for to file this document and I declined to consider it.
[18] There remain some matters that it appears, are yet to be dealt with. These are, a proposed application by the plaintiff to make these proceedings into proceedings of a representative nature, and some form of collateral proceedings of a judicial review nature. The parties agreed that these issues were not matters for the Court to address in this hearing.
Positions of the parties
The applicants
[19] Counsel for the applicants, Mr Hunt, submits that the function of pleadings is to clarify and define the issues, as well as inform the Court and the parties as to the legal basis of the plaintiff’s claim, in the clearest terms possible.1 He relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Limited, in which that Court struck out a statement of claim comprising of
419 paragraphs, which included a large amount of factual material which was impossible to respond to.2
[20] Mr Hunt submits that the plaintiff’s claim is likely to cause prejudice and delay, as the pleadings are defective to the extent they are irreparable. He says that they contain evidential and irrelevant material, and that it is impossible to properly respond to them. He submits that the pleadings disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action in fact or in law. He says:
(a)the narrative of the claim is difficult to understand, as the facts and evidence are not pleaded consistently in a chronological or logical order;
1 Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998; and O’Neill v Bridgman
[2020] NZCA 460.
2 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53.
(b)large tracts of evidence are pleaded, without establishing why it is relevant;
(c)it is impossible to identify what the material facts are;
(d)parts of the pleadings do not make sense;
(e)the claim fails to identify and plead necessary elements for each cause of action; and
(f)the plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.
[21] Mr Hunt submits that the claim in defamation does not plead or otherwise particularise what defamatory statements were made by the applicants, or what the specific instances of publication were.
[22] In respect of the negligence claim, Mr Hunt says that the plaintiff has not sufficiently particularised the nature of any duty of care owed by ACC, how it was breached, and whether that breach caused loss that was not too remote. He says that there is no authority which establishes that ACC has a duty of care in terms of the handling of a claimant’s information, but that such a duty is already codified by way of the Privacy Act 2020. He says that there is no legal basis for an award of exemplary damages.
[23] In respect of the claim of misfeasance in public office, Mr Hunt submits similarly that it is insufficiently particularised, as the plaintiff has failed to identify the required mental state for a successful claim. He says that the plaintiff does not plead adequately the specific acts or omissions allegedly undertaken by N which were beyond the limits of her office.
[24] In respect of the claim of breach of the Privacy Act, Mr Hunt submits that it is insufficiently particularised and not reasonably arguable in law. He says that ACC was entitled to gather and share C’s information in the management of her claims, on reasonable grounds. He says also that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider complaints arising from alleged breaches of the Privacy Act – rather complaints must
be heard by the Privacy Commissioner and the Human Rights Review Tribunal. He says that the Privacy Commissioner refused to investigate C’s complaints and that therefore she has no recourse to the Tribunal.
[25] In relation to the plaintiff’s claim that ACC had acted unlawfully in failing to notify the Commissioner of a breach of the Privacy Act, Mr Hunt points out that the claimed breach occurred prior to 1 December 2020 which was the date that a legal obligation to notify first became operative.
[26] Finally, Mr Hunt submits that the fifth cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty by way of breach of the ACC Code of Claimant’s Rights (the Code), is unable to succeed, as the Code provides its own mechanisms for dispute resolution. He says further that the Code does not create obligations on ACC analogous to those created by a deed or contract. He says that ACC as a statutory body is not a fiduciary, and that the plaintiff’s pleadings do not disclose any basis on which such duties could be imposed.
The Attorney-General
[27] Crown counsel, Mr Conway, submits that the plaintiff’s alternative fourth cause of action against the Attorney-General should be struck out. He submits:
2.1The plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the requirements for a pleading of misfeasance in public office against [N] or any other ACC staff member.
2.2Even if the plaintiff’s pleading of misfeasance in public office could be cured, it is not reasonably arguable that the Attorney-General is vicariously liable for the actions of ACC staff members. Public misfeasance concerns the targeted or non-targeted unlawful conduct of a public officer. ACC is a Crown agent and is a separate legal entity from the Crown. The Crown’s powers in relation to ACC are prescribed by provisions in the Crown Entities Act 2004 and do not confer sufficient control over individual ACC staff members to establish vicarious liability. There is no employment relationship, or relationship akin to employment, between the Crown and ACC staff members.
2.3The plaintiff’s allegations against the Attorney-General are also time- barred.
[28] Mr Conway submits that an allegation of misfeasance in public office is analogous to a claim in fraud, in that it has the same requirements for particulars.3 He says that on an application for strike out, the plaintiff is required to discharge an onus of establishing an evidential foundation amounting to a prima facie case.4 As to the plaintiff’s case, he says:
The requisite mental state on the part of the second defendant is not identified. Nor are the acts or omissions of any other ACC staff member identified with sufficient particularity or linked to the requisite mental state. The plaintiff’s allegations are not therefore capable of sustaining a cause of action in public misfeasance. The plaintiff has also not identified a reasonably credible evidential foundation for her allegations of public misfeasance. It follows that the fifth amended statement of claim does not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action against the Attorney-General in relation to [N] or (un-named) ACC staff members.
[29] Mr Conway also submits that C’s extant application for representative status in relation to an entire cohort of unnamed ACC claimants lacks merit in the context of the identified difficulties with the misfeasance cause of action.
[30] Finally, Mr Conway submits that the plaintiff’s claim against the Attorney- General is time-barred, saying:
27.1to the extent the plaintiff relies on events alleged to have occurred before 1 January 2011 her claim against the Attorney-General is time- barred under s 4(1) of the Limitation Act 1950; and
27.2to the extent the plaintiff relies on events alleged to have occurred after 1 January 2011 her claim is barred by s 11 of the Limitation Act 2010.
The plaintiff
[31] Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Ord, concedes that the Court would be justified in ordering further particulars, but submits that the applications for strike out should be dismissed. He says that the lack of discovery has made preparation of the plaintiff’s case difficult, which he says has been complicated by ACC deleting part of the plaintiff’s file. He says also that he was on leave for family reasons between April and
3Rintoul Group Ltd v Robson [2019] NZAR 434 at [22]; Schmidt v Pepper New Zealand (Custodians) Ltd [2012] NZCA 565 at [15].
4Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Redcliffe Forestry Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 94, [2013] 1 NZLR 804 at [33].
October 2022, and that junior counsel were not prepared to take on the matter due to inexperience.
[32] Mr Ord alleges that the defendants should seek further particulars – despite their applications being solely addressed to striking out the plaintiff’s claims. He submits that the plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently particularised, as the defendants have interpreted most of those claims successfully in their submissions. He says that there is no irrelevant material in the statement of claim, as the factual matters are necessary to set out the basis for the causes of action. He says the same in respect of the submission that the statement of claim contains evidential material.
[33] Mr Ord submits that the plaintiff “has a number of viable options based on the facts alleged, and her difficulty has been distilling the specific pleadings most likely to succeed”. He says that the particulars are sufficiently clear from the statement of claim. He says that an order for the provision of further particulars would not place an unreasonable burden on the defendants. He submits that it is in the interests of justice that discovery occurs before any strike out.
[34] Much of Mr Ord’s written submissions adopted an approach where he simply denied or disputed the defendants’ submissions, without offering any real indication as to the basis for those denials or disputes. Ultimately, that has made it difficult for me to establish the legal basis on which he opposes the applications for strike out. Mr Ord’s approach to this proceeding demonstrates some misunderstanding of the purpose and relevance of both pleadings and submissions. Parts of his submissions appeared to be unfinished, and also seem to attempt to add a further cause of action described as ‘fraudulent concealment’.
Principles on an application for strike out
[35] The parties are in agreement as to the standard to be applied. Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides that the Court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, is likely to cause prejudice or
delay, is frivolous or vexatious, or is an abuse of process. The following principles are relevant:5
(a)pleaded facts whether or not admitted are assumed to be true;
(b)the cause of action or defence must be clearly untenable;
(c)the jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, and only in clear cases;
(d)the jurisdiction is not excluded by the need to decide difficult questions of law; and
(e)the Court is to be careful when striking out claims in any developing area of the law.
[36] Prejudice or delay is likely to be caused where a pleading is unnecessarily prolix, purely consisting of evidential material, unintelligible, and/or inclusive of irrelevant material. 6
[37] However, where a defect in the pleadings can be cured by amendments the party is willing to make, the Court will often permit amendment rather than striking out the pleadings.7 However, the proposed amendment must be adequately clear for the Court to consider when assessing the need for strike out.
Analysis
[38] In short, I accept the submissions made by the defendants. For the reasons I will now set out, I have concluded that the fifth amended iteration of the plaintiff’s statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action. It is defective in a number of ways, and ample opportunity has been provided to C to effect reasonable amendments. Nor has Mr Ord indicated that C would be willing to effect amendments of the nature that would be required to remedy her pleadings.
5 Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262, [1998] NZFLR 145 (CA) at 267, endorsed in
Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45 at [33].
6 Above n 2, at [90] and [95].
7 Marshall Futures Ltd v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 316, (1991) 3 PRNZ 200.
[39] Fundamentally, the purpose of pleadings is to inform opposing parties and the Court of the essential basis of a claim, and its necessary ingredients.8 Pleadings are to provide a basis upon which a fair consideration of the dispute between the parties can proceed. They are required to be precise.9 They have been described as a “road map for the Court and the parties”.10 Rule 5.25 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:
The statement of claim—
(a)must show the general nature of the plaintiff's claim to the relief sought; and
(b)must give sufficient particulars of time, place, amounts, names of persons, nature and dates of instruments, and other circumstances to inform the court and the party or parties against whom relief is sought of the plaintiff's cause of action; and
(c)must state specifically the basis of any claim for interest and the rate at which interest is claimed; and
(d)in a proceeding against the Crown that is instituted against the Attorney-General, must give particulars of the government department or officer or employee of the Crown concerned.
[40] Pleadings must be accurate and intelligible, and are not to include the evidence relied on.11 They are a “distillation of the facts essential to the claim emerging from the evidence”.12 While particulars are generally necessary, what is required is that the Court and the opposing parties are sufficiently informed of the alleged facts, in a manner that means they may meaningfully respond. As such, pleadings that are speculative, include irrelevant information, or that are unable to succeed, will be struck out.13
[41] Further, where a pleading alleges a particular state of mind of a person, the pleading party is required to give particulars of the facts relied on in alleging that state of mind, pursuant to r 5.17(2). This has been held to be of increased importance where a pleading alleges fraudulent conduct – such claims must be pleaded cogently, and
8Reay v Attorney-General [2016] NZCA 519, [2016] NZAR 1672 at [16], citing Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 18.
9 Low Volume Vehicle Technical Association Inc v Brett [2019] NZCA 67 at [62].
10 McGechan on Procedure (online loose-leaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.26.03].
11 Above n 2, at [84].
12 McGechan on Procedure (online loose-leaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.26.04].
13 Red Stag Timber Ltd v Juken New Zealand Ltd [2018] NZHC 2459 at [28].
show a proper basis for the allegation.14 A plaintiff cannot speculate that something may come to light either in discovery or cross-examination.15 As submitted by the Attorney-General, the same requirements that apply to a pleading of fraud, apply to a pleading of misfeasance in public office.16
[42] Clarity and accuracy are likewise required when pleadings allege negligence and/or defamation. Specific particulars must be given in a claim of negligence as to acts or omissions which amount to negligence.17 Where a novel duty is alleged, its basis and nature should be pleaded in greater detail than a duty which is accepted to be well established, and opposing parties must not be left in doubt as to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim.18 Section 37 of the Defamation Act 1992 provides:
37 Particulars of defamatory meaning
(1)In any proceedings for defamation, the plaintiff shall give particulars specifying every statement that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory and untrue in the matter that is the subject of the proceedings.
(2)Where the plaintiff alleges that the matter that is the subject of the proceedings is defamatory in its natural and ordinary meaning, the plaintiff shall give particulars of every meaning that the plaintiff alleges the matter bears, unless that meaning is evident from the matter itself.
(3)Where the plaintiff alleges that the matter that is the subject of the proceedings was used in a defamatory sense other than its natural and ordinary meaning, the plaintiff shall give particulars specifying—
(a)the persons or class of persons to whom the defamatory meaning is alleged to be known; and
(b)the other facts and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies in support of the plaintiff’s allegations.
[43] Therefore, pleadings in defamation require a heightened approach to pleadings, requiring the inclusion of further matters.
14Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Redcliffe Forestry Venture [2012] NZSC 94, [2013] 1 NZLR 804 at [33].
15Ng v Harkness Law Ltd [2014] NZHC 850 at [44]; Deep v Auckland Gold Line Co-operative Taxi- Society Ltd [2018] NZHC 2362 at [11].
16 Stockman v Health and Disability Commissioner [2020] NZCA 588 at [79].
17 McGechan on Procedure (online loose-leaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.26.08(2)].
18 Smith v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 836 at [20] and [24].
[44] The fifth amended statement of claim complies with none of these requirements. It is 56 pages in length, the first 50 of which appear to be dedicated to setting out matters that are more appropriately included in evidence. Despite the prolixity of the statement of claim, it still does not fully or properly inform the court and the defendants of fundamental aspects of the claim. I do not accept Mr Ord’s submission that the statement of claim can be considered compliant given that the defendants’ submissions have analysed it as best they can. Specifically, the statement of claim does not:
(a)give particulars specifying every statement that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory and untrue;
(b)give particulars of every meaning that the plaintiff alleges the alleged defamatory statements bear, if the material is alleged to be defamatory in its ordinary meaning;
(c)specify a class of people to whom the defamatory meaning is known, if that is applicable;
(d)provide a proper basis for a pleading of misfeasance in public office by giving particulars of the facts relied on in alleging the requisite state of mind;
(e)adequately specify what acts or omissions amount to negligence;
(f)plead novel duties with sufficient clarity to justify the Court enquiring into them;
(g)grapple with the fact that the appropriate forum for the consideration of privacy complaints is the Privacy Commissioner, or the fact that the Privacy Commissioner refused to enquire into the plaintiff’s privacy complaints; or
(h)addresses the basis upon which the plaintiff’s claim is said to be time barred by the defendants.
[45] Simon France J instructed the plaintiff to remedy the defects in her pleadings on 7 June 2022. That has not occurred. On the basis of those factors alone I am satisfied that the statement of claim should be struck out.
[46] I also note that, in relation to the claim of defamation, the plaintiff extensively mentions the fact that documents said by the plaintiff to contain defamatory statements about her were sent by ACC to her by way of a courier package which was said to have been intercepted and opened by a person or persons unknown. This claim ignores the principle that if a defamatory statement is sent in correspondence in an envelope addressed to a particular person, there is no publication of the defamation to an unauthorised person who opens the envelope and reads it.19 Many of the alleged defamatory statements would appear to have been made when the defence of qualified privilege would apply. The statement of claim does not address issues such as qualified privilege, or the absence of it, at all.
[47]I will now briefly address the defendants’ limitation arguments.
Limitation
[48] Appendix Two to the plaintiff’s submissions contains a chronology which describes the series of events leading to the filing of these proceedings beginning in 2004, and ending in October 2015. That appears to also accord with the facts as described in the fifth amended statement of claim, despite some indication that matters occurred between 2003 and 2019.
[49]The applicants submitted:
Under s 59 of the Limitation Act 2010, the Limitation Act 1950 continues to apply to causes of action which accrued prior to 1 January 2011
…
For causes of action accruing after 1 January 2011, the Limitation Act 2010 applies. Section 15 of that Act provides that a defendant [has] an affirmative defence to a claim for defamation [if they] can prove the date on which the claim is filed is at least two years after the date of the events giving rise to the claim of defamation.
19 Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 (CA).
The plaintiff has not pleaded with any specificity which statements it considers to be defamatory, or when the instances of purported publication occurred….but she is clearly out of time in either respect:
(a)to the extent that the alleged acts or omissions occurred between 2003 and 1 January 2011, the plaintiff’s action…is barred by s 4(6A) of the Limitation Act 1950 and s 59 of the Limitation Act 2010.
(b)to the extent that the alleged acts or omissions occurred between 1 January 2011 and 1 October 2019, the plaintiff’s action…is barred by s 15 of the Limitation Act 2010.
[50] I accept those submissions. The plaintiff’s cause of action in defamation is therefore clearly time-barred.
[51] As to the remaining causes of action, the defendants allege that the acts or omissions giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims occurred at the latest by October 2015, and would therefore be barred by either s 4(1) of the Limitation Act 1950 and s 59 of the Limitation Act 2010. The limitation period is one of six years. In response, Mr Ord alleges that the plaintiff’s claim was filed prior to this.
[52] The original statement of claim was filed on 6 October 2021. Six years prior to that was 6 October 2015. Therefore, in order to not be time barred, the acts or omissions giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims must have occurred after 6 October 2015. The fifth amended statement of claim alleges that the events which involved C discovering the courier package containing her file opened on the footpath outside her house occurred “on or about 12 October 2015”. C also relies on further matters alleged to have occurred following 6 October 2015.
[53] Accordingly, I consider that there is potentially some basis for a conclusion that aspects of the remaining causes of action are not time-barred. However, given my findings above I do not need to determine which ones. I am satisfied that the pleadings disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action, and that they should be struck out on that basis, with the additional finding that it is clear that the defamation cause of action was filed out of time.
Result
[54] I strike out the plaintiff’s fifth amended statement of claim in its entirety. Counsel for the plaintiff confirmed that the plaintiff is in receipt of legal aid for these proceedings. If, in those circumstances, the defendants still wish to pursue a costs application, the defendants may file memoranda within 10 working days of the date of this decision with the plaintiff to file a memorandum in reply within 10 days of receipt of the defendants’ memoranda in the usual fashion. The memoranda are to be no longer than five pages in length. On receipt of all the memoranda, costs will be dealt with on the papers. Interim suppression orders were made suppressing the names of the plaintiff and the second defendant. I invite the parties to make submissions within 14 days of the date of this decision as to whether those suppression orders should be made final.
Churchman J
Solicitors:
Rob Ord, Barrister and Solicitor, Nelson for Plaintiff
Young Hunter, Christchurch for First and Second Defendants Crown Law, Wellington for Third Defendant
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