Buxton v Xero Limited

Case [2022] NZCA 100


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA140/2021
 [2022] NZCA 100

BETWEEN

KRISTINA LOUISE BUXTON
First Appellant

AFB TREASURY LIMITED
Second Appellant

SPINACH DESIGN LIMITED
Third Appellant

AND

XERO LIMITED
Respondent

Hearing:

30 September 2021 (further materials received on 1 November 2021)

Court:

Goddard, Woolford and Mander JJ

Counsel:

J Moss and S L Austin for Appellants
S J Leslie for Respondent

Judgment:

31 March 2022 at 11.00 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is allowed. 

B The cross-appeal is allowed.

CThe order made in the High Court striking out the appellants’ proceedings is set aside, and replaced with an order entering summary judgment for the defendant, Xero Ltd, in those proceedings.

DThe appellants must pay costs to the respondent for a standard appeal on a band A basis, with usual disbursements.

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Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction

Background

Section 171 requests to Xero seeking access to records of AFB and Spinach
Examination of Mr Henderson and pre-examination ruling
Ms Buxton complains to Xero about the disclosures

The appellants’ breach of privacy proceedings

The appellants file proceedings for breach of privacy
Xero applies for strike out/summary judgment
The appellants oppose Xero’s applications

High Court judgment

The issues before this Court

Appellants’ submissions on appeal

Xero’s arguments on appeal

Discussion

The elements of the tort of invasion of privacy
Are the proceedings an abuse of process?
Should summary judgment be entered for Xero?

Result

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Goddard J)

Introduction

  1. Mr Henderson was a prominent property developer.  His businesses encountered difficulties, and between November 2010 and January 2017 he was bankrupt.  The Official Assignee undertook investigations into Mr Henderson’s affairs.  She formed the view that while he was a bankrupt Mr Henderson was exercising control over, and conducting dealings through, a number of companies including AFB Treasury Limited (AFB), the second appellant, and Spinach Design Limited (Spinach), the third appellant.  The sole director of both these companies at the relevant time was Ms Buxton, the first appellant, who is married to Mr Henderson.

  2. Xero Ltd, the respondent, is a cloud-based accounting software company that provides online services to small business customers. 

  3. Section 171 of the Insolvency Act 2006 provides that the Official Assignee may, by notice in writing, require any person to deliver to her “any document relating to the bankrupt’s property, conduct, or dealings in that person’s possession or under that person’s control”.  The Official Assignee issued three s 171 notices to Xero seeking access to financial information held on Xero’s system concerning AFB and Spinach, which the Official Assignee believed were Xero customers.  AFB was a Xero customer.  Spinach was not.  In response to those notices, Xero provided electronic files to the Official Assignee which contained extensive information about transactions recorded by its customer AFB using Xero’s accounting software (the information). 

  4. The appellants accept that some of the information provided by Xero to the Official Assignee arguably related to Mr Henderson’s conduct or dealings.  But they…

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AGLC
Buxton v Xero Limited [2022] NZCA 100
Case
[2022] NZCA 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Buxton v Xero Limited, the Associate Judge of the High Court was asked to determine whether Xero Limited could be granted summary judgment in a case brought by Buxton against Xero Limited. The dispute primarily centred around whether Xero Limited could be held liable for the failure to provide adequate financial information to an Official Assignee during Buxton's bankruptcy proceedings. Buxton sought to establish that Xero Limited had a duty to provide accurate financial information and that the failure to do so constituted a breach of fiduciary duty or a breach of statutory obligation under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

The key legal issues for the court to decide included whether Xero Limited had a duty to provide accurate financial information to the Official Assignee and whether the doctrine of res judicata precluded Buxton from bringing the current claim. The Associate Judge had to consider whether there were any real issues to be tried that would prevent the granting of summary judgment to Xero Limited. This involved assessing the evidence presented by both parties and determining whether Buxton's claims were legally tenable.

The Associate Judge concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact that needed to be resolved at trial. The court noted that it was at least arguable that some of the information provided by Xero Limited to the Official Assignee was of a confidential nature, and that this could potentially affect the scope of Xero Limited's duty to provide accurate financial information. Additionally, the court examined whether the doctrine of res judicata applied, preventing Buxton from re-litigating issues that had already been determined in previous proceedings. However, the court found that there were sufficient distinctions between the prior proceedings and the current case to allow Buxton to pursue the matter further. As a result, the Associate Judge denied Xero Limited's application for summary judgment, finding that the case should proceed to a full trial to resolve the disputed issues.

The Associate Judge's decision was that Xero Limited's application for summary judgment was dismissed, and the case would proceed to trial. The court held that the evidence presented raised genuine issues of material fact that warranted a full hearing. The court also determined that the doctrine of res judicata did not entirely preclude Buxton from pursuing the current claims, as there were sufficient differences between the prior proceedings and the present case.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The application for summary judgment was made under r 12.2 of the High Court Rules, which provides:12.2Judgment when there is no defence or when no cause of action can succeed(1)The court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff satisfies the court that the defendant has no defence to a cause of action in the statement of claim or to a particular part of any such cause of action.(2)The court may give judgment against a plaintiff if the defendant satisfies the court that none of the causes of action in the plaintiff's statement of claim can succeed. The Associate Judge set out the following passage from Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd in which this Court described the approach to be taken to summary judgment applications by plaintiffs:[13][26] The principles are well settled. The question on a summary judgment application is whether the defendant has no defence to the claim; that is, that there is no real question to be tried: Pemberton v Chappell [1987] 1 NZLR 1 at 3 (CA). The Court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty. The onus is on the plaintiff, but where its evidence is sufficient to show there is no defence, the defendant will have to respond if the application is to be defeated: MacLean v Stewart (1997) 11 PRNZ 66 (CA). The Court will not normally resolve material conflicts of evidence or assess the credibility of deponents. But it need not accept uncritically evidence that is inherently lacking in credibility, as for example where the evidence is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable: Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 at 341 (PC). In the end the Court’s assessment of the evidence is a matter of judgment. The Court may take a robust and realistic approach where the facts warrant it: Bilbie Dymock Corp Ltd v Patel (1987) 1 PRNZ 84 (CA). [27] Under r 141A the defendant need not file a statement of defence. The onus remains on the plaintiff, and summary judgment will be denied if on the hearing of the application it appears that there is an issue worthy of trial.[13]Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187, (2008) 19 PRNZ 162. In this case, the application for summary judgment was made by the defendant. The same principles apply: in order to succeed the defendant must be able to establish that the plaintiff cannot succeed on any pleaded cause of action.[14][14]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [10]. The Associate Judge set out the background to the claim, and to Xero’s application. He accepted the appellants’ submission that it is at least arguable that some of the information provided by Xero to the Official Assignee was of a confidential nature.[15][15]At [34]. The Associate Judge set out the following passage from this Court’s recent decision in Craig v Stringer summarising the principle of res judicata:[16]Access to the courts will be denied where a litigant seeks to reopen a dispute that has already been determined. This is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata which serves the public interest in finality in litigation and upholds the principle that a party should not be vexed twice in the same matter. Res judicata applies where a cause of action has been determined in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies — cause of action estoppel. The doctrine prevents re-litigation of the same cause of action in any subsequent proceedings. Res judicata can also apply where there has been a determination in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies of an issue that was essential to the determination of the claim such that the judgment could not stand without it — issue estoppel. Issue estoppel is narrower, and less absolute in its application than cause of action estoppel.(Footnotes omitted).[16]At [41], quoting from Craig v Stringer [2020] NZCA 260, (2020) 25 PRNZ 367 at [16].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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