Butcher v Independent Police Complaints Authority

[2025] NZHC 1361

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-2001

[2025] NZHC 1361

BETWEEN

CARL DAVID GEORGE BUTCHER

Applicant

AND

INDEPENDENT POLICE CONDUCT AUTHORITY

First Respondent

AUCKLAND HARBOURMASTER
Second Respondent (discontinued)

AUCKLAND POLICE DISTRICT COMMANDER

Third Respondent (discontinued)

CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION

Fourth Respondent  cont/…

Hearing:

11 February 2025

Appearances:

Mr Butcher, self-represented

SB McCusker for First Respondent

Judgment:

28 May 2025

JUDGMENT OF BECROFT J

This judgment was delivered by me on 28 May 2025 at 4pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

BUTCHER v INDEPENDENT POLICE CONDUCT AUTHORITY [2025] NZHC 1361 [28 May 2025]

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Fifth Respondent (discontinued)

NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY
Sixth Respondent (discontinued)

This application and the result

[1]    The Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) applies to strike out Mr Butcher’s judicial review proceeding against it.

[2]    The IPCA maintains the statement of claim, the third Mr Butcher has filed, is first, unintelligible, discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action and is effectively doomed, and second, is an abuse of process or likely to cause prejudice and delay.

[3]The IPCA is the first respondent in Mr Butcher’s judicial review claim.

[4]    The fourth respondent is the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC). That Commission has also filed a parallel application to strike out Mr Butcher’s quite different proceedings against it.

[5]    This decision could be read together with this Court’s separate judgment in respect of the CCRC’s application, as to a small degree they overlap.

[6]    In short, in both this application and that filed by the CCRC, I conclude in the circumstances of each case the proceeding must be struck out. What follows are my reasons.

Independent Police Conduct Authority

[7]    The IPCA is constituted under the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988 (the Act).

[8]The Court has previously summarised this statutory framework as follows:1

IPCA is an independent Crown entity. Its core functions are to receive complaints and to investigate incidents involving death or serious bodily harm of its own motion. Where it investigates, it forms an opinion which is conveyed to the Commissioner of Police and it may make recommendations. Its recommendations are not enforceable but if no action is taken which seems to IPCA to be adequate and appropriate, it must send its opinion and recommendations to the Commissioner of Police and it may make recommendations. It has no power to provide complainants with a legal remedy nor to deprive complainants of any legal remedy they may have. In that sense, the Act is concerned with the public interest of police oversight rather than private legal remedies.

[9]    Section 17 of the Act sets out the actions the Authority can take on receipt of a complaint. This includes investigating the complaint, referring it to police for investigation or, most relevantly here, deciding “in accordance with s 18, to take no action.” The Court has recently held that, in respect of the discretion to take no further action, it “should be reluctant to interfere with the IPCA’s specialist jurisdiction in exercising this discretion.”2

Procedural background

[10]   Mr Butcher commenced this proceeding by statement of claim dated 21 July 2021. It alleged the IPCA’s investigative procedures were “completely unable to handle the task” and that “they allow Police corruption to continue”. No specific statutory power or grounds of review were identified.

[11]   In a minute dated 11 October 2023, Jagose J struck out this pleading. In giving Mr Butcher an opportunity to replead, the minute explained the matters Mr Butcher had to “clearly and concisely identify” for the purposes of the High Court Rules 2016 (Rules):

1      Catalin v Independent Police Conduct Authority [2022] NZHC 413, [2022] NZAR 229 at [14].

2      Deliu v Independent Police Conduct Authority [2024] NZHC 2334 at [37].

(a)what specific right, obligation or interest had by him is affected by the

IPCA’s conduct of its investigations;

(b)by reference to the 1988 Act’s provisions, what particular statutory power the IPCA is said to have exercised;

(c)which specific actions of the IPCA are at issue as exercises of that statutory power;

(d)in relation to each, what of them is alleged not to be exercised in accordance with law, or to be unfair or unreasonable in a judicial review sense, and how; and

(e)with reference to s 16 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, what relief he seeks the Court to grant.

[12]   An amended statement of claim was filed on 31 October 2024. It alleged in relation to the IPCA that:

The IPCA process is such they ask for all information to be passed to them about a complaint about Police. They are then in possession of evidence to a crime at that point. To not themselves investigate when a crime is passed to them when a crime is passed to them is a failure of the decision-making process. The current method is to send the information to the (in this case) “dodgy cop” and ask for an explanation, granting opportunity to cover up, response was essentially nothing to see here, its a civil matter. Attempted murder to cover up fraud and theft with a starting point establishing in October 2003 is not a civil matter. A warrant to seize my life insurance policies was executed by police when they arrested my ex-wife, the financial director of the company writing the cheques.

…

Given these few examples I feel it is justified to ask the [IPCA] for an explanation into there (sic) decision-making process to why there is no investigation into “dodgy Dargaville Police” because they are by way of gathering the information as they do, then passing on that information the to offenders in the way that they do, are essentially aiding as (sic) abetting the ongoing corruption when instead they have a responsibility to remedy the situation.

[13]   In a minute of 15 November 2023, Jagose J determined this second pleading to be “more discursive and less focused than its predecessors” and struck it out also. The Minute recorded:

The respondents seek I also dismiss the proceeding. I remain reluctant to do so to the extent any of these observably statutorily-empowered respondents may be said to have exercised a particular statutory power affecting Mr Butcher’s interests. I consider Mr Butcher should be given a final opportunity to do so, desirably with close attention to my prior minute’s [4] – [6].

However — to prevent Mr Butcher’s continued filing and service of plainly non-compliant pleadings, if he remains unrepresented, putting respondents to needless further time and expense in seeking to address them either procedurally or substantively — he is first to obtain the certification of a barrister or solicitor of this Court the intended pleading is in a form meeting the requirements of the High Court Rules 2016.

[14]   A second amended statement of claim was filed by a lawyer on behalf of Mr Butcher on 14 May 2024 accompanied by a certification that it had been drafted and filed by a barrister and solicitor and complied with the Rules. Mr Butcher’s lawyer sought to be excused from future appearances as he had been instructed on an interim legal aid grant and he was “not willing” to provide Legal Aid Services with an “assessment of Mr Butcher’s prospects of success.” Subsequently, the lawyer applied and was granted a declaration that he was no longer the solicitor on the record for Mr Butcher.

[15]   In a minute dated 3 July 2024, van Bohemen J declined to strike out this pleading for non-compliance with Jagose J’s earlier direction. However, he agreed that it was “still deficient in particularising the statutory power of decision that the IPCA is alleged to have failed to exercise and the nature of that failure.” The Court “did not consider it useful” to require a further repleading given Mr Butcher’s absence from the list call and “the previous history of the proceeding.”

[16]   The IPCA was directed that it could file an application for strike out if it wished to. It subsequently did so, leading to this judgment.

The current proceeding

[17]   Mr Butcher’s most recent statement of claim alleges the following as the factual basis for his claims.

[18]   In October 2003, Mr Butcher entered into an agreement to purchase a dairy farm and runoff comprising two separate titles at 588 and 590 Trounson Road, Dargaville.

[19]   Mr Butcher paid the deposit of $85,000 to his then lawyer, Mr King. The deposit was paid to the real estate agent.

[20]   Mr Butcher’s parents-in-law then approached an Auckland lawyer, Mr Clark, to uplift the conveyancing file for the Trounson Road transactions. His parents-in-law had no authority from Mr Butcher to have the file uplifted.

[21]   Mr Clark then cancelled part of the purchase—for the runoff at 590 Trounson Road and obtained a refund of the deposit, from which the lawyer deducted his fee before paying the balance to Mr Butcher’s parents-in-law.

[22]   When Mr Butcher became aware of what had happened, he contacted Mr Clark and requested that Mr Clark reimburse him. The lawyer did not disclose he had already received and disbursed the deposit. Indeed, Mr Clark told Mr Butcher that the deposit was still held by the vendors towards the purchase of the other property and that, as the purchase was unconditional, he would lose his deposit if he did not complete the purchase.

[23]   Mr Butcher complained to the Auckland police that he was a victim of theft by deception by Mr Clark. He alleges that in 2022, the Auckland police opened a file to investigate the alleged theft by deception. The file was closed by a Dargaville policeman, Detective Sergeant Jonathan Tier. The Auckland police, on multiple occasions, have reopened the file only for it to be closed by Detective Sergeant Tier.

[24]   Mr Butcher alleges that he complained to the IPCA about the Dargaville policeman “meddling” in an investigation by the Auckland police.

[25]   Mr Butcher then alleges that the IPCA referred the complaint to Detective Sergeant Tier for his response, did not follow up about that response and closed the file without resolving it.

[26]   He alleges the IPCA’s processes are inadequate to investigate and resolve his complaint.

[27]   On the basis of that alleged factual basis, Mr Butcher claims that the IPCA has exercised or purported to exercise a statutory power of decision by effectively failing to investigate and resolve his complaint. He claims that the failure to investigate the alleged interference by the Dargaville policeman was, in all the circumstances,

unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable decision maker would make it and it is thereby flawed.

[28]   Mr Butcher seeks that the first respondent properly investigate and resolve his complaint against Detective Sergeant Tier and costs.

The IPCA’s strike out application

[29]   The IPCA has filed a strike out application. It relies on several grounds. The first is that the statement of claim, as pleaded, discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action against it. Second, it also says Mr Butcher’s claim amounts to an abuse of process or is likely to cause prejudice or delay.

The law

[30]Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 states:

15.1 Dismissing or staying all or part of proceeding

(1)The Court may strike out all of part of a pleading if it –

(a)discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or

(b)is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or

(c)is frivolous or vexatious; or

(d)is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

[31]Relevant principles in this case include:

(a)A pleading which discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action must be “clearly untenable”3 or “so certainly or clearly bad” that it should be precluded from going forward.4 This jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases.5

(b)A pleading “likely to cause prejudice or delay” includes those which are prolix, contain scandalous and irrelevant material, plead purely evidential matters or are unintelligible. A “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the courts

3      Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267.

4      Couch v Attorney General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33].

5      Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner, above n 3, at 267.

processes, while a “vexatious” one contains an element of impropriety.6 Verbose, ill-drafted pleadings “may defeat the purpose of a statement of claim to such an extent it is an abuse of process.”7

[32]   The Court is typically reluctant to strike out a pleading capable of amendment.8 However, there are limits to this, particularly where multiple opportunities have been given to replead and they remain unintelligible.9 Further, while the Court will assist lay litigants within reasonable bounds, they remain subject to the rules of court “and should not expect that latitude will be extended to any greater degree” than represented parties.10

[33]   Strike out applications generally proceed on the assumption that pleaded facts are true. However, this does not extend to speculative or unfounded allegations. As the Court of Appeal held in McVeagh v Attorney-General:11

The court is entitled to receive affidavit evidence on a striking-out application and will do so in a proper case… Normally it will not consider evidence inconsistent with the pleading, for a striking-out application is dealt with on the footing that the pleaded facts can be proved. But there may be a case where an essential factual allegation is so demonstrably contrary to indisputable fact that the matter ought not be allowed to proceed further.

Does Mr Butcher’s statement of claim disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action?

[34]   The essence of the IPCA’s position under its first ground is that no complaint was ever made or conveyed to it by Mr Butcher regarding the activities of Detective Sergeant Tier. It simply has no record of any complaint having been made or received. Therefore, no investigation was ever carried out. The IPCA also emphasises that it has no file in respect of the complaint.

6      Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 at [89].

7 At [87].

8      Marshall Futures Ltd (in liquidation) v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 316 (HC) at 316.

9      See for example Quilter v Roman Catholic Diocese of Christchurch HC Christchurch CIV-2003- 409-2512, 18 August 2004, where the Court struck out a statement of claim and the proceeding following three unsuccessful attempts to replead.

10 Nottingham v Otahuhu District Court HC Auckland M760/00, 7 December 2000 at [49].

11 McVeagh v Attorney-General [1995] 1 NZLR 558 (CA) at 566.

[35]   The IPCA’s position is therefore that the claim must be doomed because there is nothing for this Court to review. No complaint was ever received and, therefore, no reviewable decision was ever made by the IPCA in respect of it.

[36]   During the hearing, Mr Butcher was not able to provide any evidence that he had made a complaint. The most he could say was that he felt sure that he had. In the interests of fairness, I gave him until 5 pm on Thursday, 13 February 2025, to produce such documentation. That deadline has now passed, and Mr Butcher has filed no further documentation.

[37]   To properly assess the IPCA’s claim that the statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, I need to determine whether it is demonstrably or unarguably clear that no complaint was ever made to the IPCA.

Did Mr Butcher ever complain to the IPCA about Detective Sergeant Tier meddling in an investigation?

[38]   A detailed affidavit in support of the IPCA’s application was provided by Ms Catherine Anyan, the manager of the Resolutions Team at the IPCA. She provides significant detail about Mr Butcher’s dealings with the IPCA.

[39]   Ms Anyan sets out the many and various complaints made by Mr Butcher, none of which refer to the complaint set out in Mr Butcher’s statement of claim about Detective Sergeant Tier “meddling” in an investigation by the Auckland police.

[40]   For the sake of the record, I set out the full details of Mr Butcher’s recorded interactions with the IPCA. First, Ms Anyan’s affidavit records:

[6] On 29 February 2004 and 31 October 2005, Mr Butcher made  complaints to the Authority. These related to the Police’s alleged failure to investigate an assault by an employer, and an alleged breach of privacy, respectively.

[41]   Ms Anyan deposes that, due to the time that has lapsed since these complaints, the relevant records are no longer readily available. They are in hard copy only, held at the storage management facility in the Wellington region. However, it is self- evident that they could not relate to his alleged complaint about Detective Sergeant Tier because, even on Mr Butcher’s own case, the investigation Detective Sergeant

Tier is alleged to have meddled in had not been opened. This response applies equally to all of the other complaints Mr Butcher made to the IPCA prior to 2022. However, I still set them out in full for completeness.

[42]   Since 2012, Mr Butcher’s complaints to the IPCA have related to a number of issues, but Ms Anyan deposes they broadly fell into the following five general categories:

(a)an alleged failure by police to investigate allegations of fraud and dishonesty relating to Mr Butcher's parents-in-law, liquidators and lawyers who were involved in an ongoing dispute relating to the company “Dragon Flyte Farm Limited” and a jointly owned property;

(b)an alleged failure by police to act on criminal offences such as theft and threats to his and his family's safety;

(c)a refusal by police to investigate an alleged conspiracy to end his life;

(d)allegations that police were involved in the "abduction" of his children; and

(e)an alleged failure by police to ask Interpol to do a welfare check on his children living overseas.

[43]I detail the specifics of these complaints further, below.

[44]   On 13 April 2012, Mr Butcher made a complaint to the IPCA which contained multiple allegations against the police. Various allegations were made about the conduct of the Dargaville police but there was no complaint that could be construed as referring to Detective Sergeant Tier “meddling” in the investigation of the alleged fraudulent activity by the Auckland lawyer.

[45]   The IPCA completed a review and referred the matter back to police as it considered Mr Butcher’s complaint could be resolved by conciliation. Mr Butcher was advised of this by letter on 2 May 2012. The letter also advised him that an officer would contact him to investigate his complaint. Subsequently, the police completed

their final report concerning their investigation into Mr Butcher’s above 2012 IPCA complaint. They concluded that no further action would be taken on the matter.

[46]   Mr Butcher made further complaints to the IPCA throughout October 2012 largely repeating his allegations of fraud and the lack of police action in respect of this. On 2 November 2012, the IPCA advised Mr Butcher that the complaint of fraud was being investigated by a Detective of the Kerikeri police and that the Authority was not able to assist him further.

[47]   Mr Butcher made no further complaints about the alleged fraud between late 2012 and March 2019. In fact, the only complaint he made to the IPCA in that period related to the police’s handling of a child custody dispute.

[48]   On 2 March 2019, Mr Butcher wrote to the IPCA reiterating his allegations of fraud. He also made allegations that attempts on his life had been made which the police were refusing to investigate. The IPCA indicated a willingness to investigate given the serious nature of the allegations.12 It requested further information from Mr Butcher. In response to this, Mr Butcher provided another letter with further information.

[49]   In June 2019, the IPCA wrote to Mr Butcher responding to his complaint of 2 March 2019. It advised that the IPCA would not be able to revisit some of the historical issues that he raised given the passage of time. Furthermore, the IPCA had reviewed the additional information Mr Butcher had provided and was not satisfied that it provided reasonable grounds for a credible suspicion that anyone was contracted to kill Mr Butcher. The IPCA advised that the complaint would now be closed.

[50]   Intermingled with the fraud complaints were various further complaints about child custody and child abduction matters. None are relevant to the current proceeding.

12 By virtue of s 18(1)(a) of the Act, the IPCA may in its discretion decide not to take action, or to  take no further action, if an aggrieved person has had knowledge of the matter for more than 12 months.

[51]   Mr Butcher sent further correspondence to the IPCA on 1 and 3 October 2021 stating his allegations that the police were posing as Serious Fraud Office staff, failed to investigate his fraud allegation and failed to act on criminal offences committed against him.

[52]   On 14 May 2022, the IPCA wrote to Mr Butcher advising him that they had carefully considered all the information from his previous complaints, reviewed relevant police records and found no basis to reopen Mr Butcher’s 2012 complaint or open a new complaint. The IPCA emphasised:

As we have reviewed this matter a number of times, this is our final decision on these matters. Should you provide further correspondence on any part of the issues you have already raised, we will review the material, but will not respond further unless we think it is necessary.

[53] On 24 November 2022, Mr Butcher wrote to the IPCA restating his allegations about the alleged fraud and police inaction. He also referred to a One News report entitled “ ‘Major deficiencies’ in how police respond to fraud – IPCA”. Crucially, Mr Butcher alleged that he had attended a police station in Auckland and refused to leave until he was given a file number. As I can best understand it, this must be what Mr Butcher is referring to in his statement of claim where he notes that the police opened a file to investigate the alleged theft by deception. It is unclear whether Mr Butcher’s complaint was in fact given a file number, however as recorded at [59] below “the fact that a file number has been allocated does not mean that Police have opened an investigation.”

[54]   On 14 December 2022, Mr Butcher sent another email to the IPCA repeating his allegations of fraud and a lack of police action over it.

[55]   Finally, on 9 January 2023, Mr Butcher wrote again in respect of the fraud allegation and threats to his life. As I understand it, it essentially repeated the allegations. However, for the first time, it indirectly referred to Detective Sergeant Tier by including what purported to be an email from him to Mr Butcher.

[56]   It is without any date or other details and, on its face, simply records the following:

Mr BUTCHER

I was forward your complaint by my supervisor to assess.

I note that you have previously reported this same matter 6 times at various Police Stations.
The matter is not criminal. I also doubt that there is a civil case however you may wish to seek legal advice.

We will not take further complaints in regard to this matter. This matter will be filed.

Thank you Jonathan Tier

[Police identification details and personal cell phone number redacted for privacy reasons].

[57]   On 26 January 2023, the IPCA responded to Mr Butcher outlining that, as set out in its earlier letter of 14 May 2022, the matter had been reviewed multiple times and the IPCA would not be taking any further action on the historical complaint. Mr Butcher was advised that his case would remain closed.

[58]    I have set all of that out in some detail because it shows the persistence of Mr Butcher in bringing his various complaints to the attention of the IPCA. However, it is clear, and I accept, that there was simply no complaint made about the actions of the Detective Sergeant Tier.

[59]   Ms Anyan observes that, in respect to the allegations in Mr Butcher’s statement of claim:

The Authority has not been able to identify correspondence from Mr Butcher that specifically relates to a decision by police to “open a file to investigate the alleged theft by deception” in 2022 and the closure of that investigation by Detective Sergeant Tier on “multiple occasions”.

…

The only record the Authority has about a police investigation opened into Mr Butcher’s allegations is the one referred to in the 2 November 2012 correspondence conducted by Detective Johnson at Kerikeri police.

…

In his correspondence of 24 November 2022 and 9 January 2023, Mr Butcher refers to refusing to leave a Police station until it had assigned his report a file number. The 9 January 2023 correspondence also in includes in the body of the email an undated email from Detective Sergeant Tier advising that he was forwarded Mr Butcher’s report “by a supervisor to assess” and that Police “will not take further complaints in regard to this matter.” As the email is undated, it is not clear whether it relates to the Police complaint Mr Butcher refers to in his November and January correspondence. It also does not appear from his correspondence that the officer “closed” or “meddled: in an investigation by Auckland Police – rather he was provided the complaint to assess by his supervisor and determined that it was not a criminal matter. All

Police reports are given a file number in the event they need to be retrieved at a later date, and the fact that a file number has been allocated does not mean that Police have opened an investigation.

[60]   Ms Anyan further deposes that the IPCA has no record of it referring any of Mr Butcher’s correspondence since 2012 to Detective Sergeant Tier “for his response”, as is alleged in the statement of claim.

[61]   Ms Anyan also comments that if the Authority receives a complaint about a particular police officer, it does not refer such complaints directly to the officer involved. Instead, if the IPCA seeks further information, it would have invariably, as a matter of standard practice, send the relevant request to the Professional Conduct Manager for the police.

[62]   Ms Anyan deposes that is not the practice of the IPCA to provide any response to a complainant such as Mr Butcher. And neither does the IPCA ask a complainant for his or her comment on what is being advised by the police.

[63]   The Authority only sought information from the police in relation to Mr Butcher’s fraud complaint on three occasions, all of which took place in 2012. None of these align with the alleged referral of the complaint to Detective Tier for a response in Mr Butcher’s statement of claim. The three occasions were:

(a)16 April 2012 when the IPCA asked the police for sufficient information to enable it to categorise Mr Butcher’s initial fraud complaint;

(b)16 July 2012 when it asked the police for an update on progress with conciliating the matter; and

(c)10 October 2012 when, in response to Mr Butcher’s “expression of dissatisfaction” with the IPCA’s decision on his complaint, the IPCA asked the police to provide it with all documents associated with the file.

[64]   Finally, Mr Butcher alleges in his statement of claim that after the alleged referral to Detective Sergeant Tier, the Authority “closes the complaint without resolving the complaint”.

[65]   As already set out, the IPCA letter of 14 May 2022 gave a final decision on Mr Butcher’s fraud allegations. That letter was clear that his complaint would remain closed, and the IPCA would not respond to any further correspondence from him unless it thought it was necessary. There is nothing in the evidence to show the IPCA ever opened a new complaint that it could have closed.

Conclusion as to reasonably arguable cause of action

[66]   Having set all of this out, and in the absence of any contrary information from Mr Butcher, it seems abundantly clear on the evidence that:

(a)no complaint was ever made about Detective Sergeant Tier; and

(b)there was no investigation about Detective Sergeant Tier’s conduct nor a refusal to open one.

[67]   Therefore, I am satisfied that Mr Butcher’s statement of claim discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action. This case is one of those very rare situations referred to in McVeagh, where not only is it appropriate to receive affidavit evidence as I have done from Ms Anyan of the IPCA, but also where the essential factual allegations in Mr Butcher’s claim “are so demonstrably contrary to indisputable fact that the matter ought not to be allowed to proceed further”. I will strike out Mr Butcher’s claim against the IPCA accordingly.

Conclusion

[68]   There is no need to consider the other two grounds advanced by the IPCA. However, I observe that in respect of the second ground the submission that the proceedings are likely to cause prejudice seems strong. While Mr Butcher’s alleged complaint about Detective Sergeant Tier only dates back to 2022 at the earliest, the underlying complaint that Mr Butcher claims was being investigated dates all the way back to 2003. The passage of time makes sensible investigation of the meddling claim much more difficult in this way.

[69]   In any case, the first ground advanced by the IPCA must succeed: Mr Butcher’s claim is so factually untenable that it does not, and cannot, reveal any reasonably arguable cause of action. To allow further amendments, and encourage what would be a fourth statement of claim, would cause significant prejudice to the IPCA and further delay. Its resources have been tied up in this claim for some time and the IPCA has clearly expended considerable effort in applying to the Court to have Mr Butcher’s claim clarified. Therefore, under r 15.1(2), I take the additional step of dismissing Mr Butcher’s proceeding. In my view, the claim should now be, and is, brought to an end. I so order.

[70]   As to costs, if sought by the IPCA, I see no reason in principle why the ordinary rule that costs follow the event should not apply. My preliminary view is that costs at a 2B scale should be awarded if sought by the IPCA. The parties are encouraged to agree costs matters between themselves. However, if agreement cannot be reached, the IPCA should file a memorandum as to the costs it seeks within 14 days from the date of receipt of this judgement. If Mr Butcher disagrees, he should file a memorandum in reply 14 days after his receipt of the IPCA’s memorandum. Memoranda are limited to three pages.

Becroft J

Solicitors/Counsel:

Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington Copy to: C Butcher