Burrows v Police

Case [2018] NZHC 2088


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE

CIV-2018-454-000027

[2018] NZHC 2088

BETWEEN

WAYNE JOHN BURROWS

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

First Respondent

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Second Respondent

Hearing: 1 August 2018

Counsel:

Appellant in person

B D Vanderkolk for First and Second Respondents

Judgment:

15 August 2018


JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J

[Appeal against refusal to grant a restraining order against the Ministry of Justice and the New Zealand Police]


PART I INTRODUCTION

The issues

[1]                 The issues raised by this appeal from a decision of Judge D G Smith1 may be distilled to the following question:


1      Burrows v New Zealand Police [2018] NZDC 2951.

BURROWS v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2018] NZHC 2088 [15 August 2018]

Did the Judge err when he ruled that there was no jurisdiction under the Harassment Act 1997 (the Act) to issue restraining orders against the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) and the New Zealand Police (the Police)?

[2]The answer to that question requires consideration of two sub-questions:

(1)Does the term “person” in the Act mean that restraining orders can only be obtained against natural persons? If not;

(2)Does the term “person” in the Act encompass the Ministry and/or the Police?

[3] The term “person” is not defined in the Act. The issues raised by this appeal therefore engage the generic definition of “person” in s 30 of the Interpretation Act 1999. The relevant part of that section states that in any enactment passed or made before the commencement of the Interpretation Act, “person includes a corporation sole, and also a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate”.

[4]                 I have concluded that the jurisdiction to issue restraining orders under the Act is not confined to issuing such orders against natural persons. Thus, for example, it may be possible to issue a restraining order against a company. I have also concluded, however, that restraining orders cannot be issued against the Crown or entities that are part of the Crown, such as the Ministry and the Police. The answer to the question posed at [1] is, therefore, that Judge Smith was correct.

[5] To assist in understanding this judgment, I shall briefly explain the background. I shall then set out the relevant provisions of the Act and the Interpretation Act. I shall then examine the legal status of the Ministry and the Police before explaining the key features of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. In the final part of this judgment I shall analyse the issues before summarising my conclusion.

Background

[6]                 Mr Burrows’ proceeding stems from his concerns that he has been systematically threatened, assaulted and intimidated by employees of the Ministry in

the District Court at Wellington and Palmerston North and by police officers. These concerns arise in the context of Mr Burrows having become embroiled in a series of disputes, initially with a Ms  Thomson  who  obtained  restraining  orders  against  Mr Burrows under the Act,2 and then with court officials…

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Burrows v Police [2018] NZHC 2088
Case
[2018] NZHC 2088
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Burrows v Police, the Court was asked to decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant a restraining order under the Harassment Act 1997 against the Ministry of Justice and the New Zealand Police. The appellant, Mr Burrows, argued that he had been systematically harassed by employees of the Ministry and the Police. The appeal was brought against a decision of Judge Smith who concluded that the Act did not permit the issuing of restraining orders against those entities. The High Court found that the District Court was correct. Although restraining orders could be obtained against entities other than natural persons, they could not be obtained against the Crown or entities that are part of the Crown, such as the Ministry and the Police. The Court accepted that Parliament's intention in passing the Act was to provide adequate legal protection for all victims of harassment, but that this did not mean that the Crown, or entities that form part of the Crown, could be subject to restraining orders. The Court also found that the Act's reference to the Crown being bound by the Act was not intended to override the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 and allow restraining orders against the Crown or entities that form part of the Crown. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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