Bujak v Republic of Poland

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA287/07 [2007] NZCA 392

BETWEEN  SLAWOMIR RYSZARD BUJAK Appellant

ANDTHE REPUBLIC OF POLAND Respondent

Hearing:         9 August 2007

Court:            William Young P, O’Regan and Robertson JJ Counsel:         G M Illingworth QC for Appellant

C J Lange for Respondent

Judgment:      6 September 2007         at 2 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        We  answer  the  questions  on  which  leave  to  appeal  was  granted  as follows:

(i)       Is undue delay amounting to abuse of process made a justiciable issue in an extradition context by virtue of s 22 of the Extradition Act 1999 and the decision of the Court in Police v D [1993] 2

NZLR 526? Answer:   Yes

(ii)If so, were the circumstances said to constitute undue delay in this case capable of founding an abuse of process in terms of the test

framed in Police v D?

SLAWOMIR RYSZARD BUJAK V THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND CA CA287/07  6 September 2007

Answer:    It is not possible to  rule out  that  possibility  on  the evidence before the Court.

BWe  therefore  allow  the  appeal  in  part  and  remit  the  matter  to  the District Court for consideration of the appellant’s abuse of process argument.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by O’Regan J)

Extradition to Poland

[1]      The Republic of Poland seeks the extradition of Mr Bujak so that he can be tried on a number of fraud-related charges arising in the context of the failure of a transport business which he operated in Poland.   The offences are alleged to have occurred in 1988 – 1989.  Mr Bujak left Poland in 1999 and has not returned.  He has resided in New Zealand since 1999 and has been granted permanent residence. Poland began moves to have Mr Bujak extradited at the end of 2000, but its formal request for his extradition was not made until March 2004.

[2]      Mr Bujak was brought before the District Court under s 24 of the Extradition Act 1999 to determine his eligibility for surrender to Poland.   Under s 22 of the Extradition Act, such proceedings must be conducted in the same manner as if they were the preliminary hearing of an information for an indictable offence committed in New Zealand.

[3]      Mr Bujak argues that there has been delay of such gravity in the process to extradite him that the Court should rule Mr Bujak ineligible for surrender to Poland or should stay the s 24 proceedings.

Issues

[4]      The essential issue for this Court is whether a District Court conducting a s 24 hearing has jurisdiction to stay the proceeding in the event that it concludes the proceeding is an abuse of process.  Put another way, is delay a justiciable issue in s 24 proceedings, in the context of a request for extradition to Poland?  If the answer to that questions is “yes”, a subsidiary question arises as to whether the matter should be remitted to the District Court for…

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Details
Case
[2007] NZCA 392
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bujak v Republic of Poland, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand was tasked with determining whether undue delay in extradition proceedings could amount to abuse of process, and if so, whether the delay in this case warranted a stay of the proceedings. The respondent, Poland, sought the extradition of the appellant, Mr Bujak, to stand trial for fraud-related charges arising from a failed transport business in Poland. Mr Bujak argued that the lengthy delay in extradition proceedings amounted to an abuse of process, rendering him ineligible for surrender.

The Court began by addressing whether delay could be considered a justiciable issue in extradition proceedings under the Extradition Act 1999. The Court found that delay could indeed be a justiciable issue, as the District Court had the same powers as it would in a preliminary hearing, including the power to stay proceedings to prevent an abuse of process. This conclusion aligned with the Court's decision in Police v D, which held that a court could stay proceedings in exceptional cases where the procedure was so flawed that it would be an abuse of process to continue.

Next, the Court examined whether the delay in Mr Bujak’s case constituted an abuse of process warranting a stay of the proceedings. The Court concluded that while delay could be a justiciable issue, the delay in this case did not amount to an abuse of process that would justify staying the proceedings. The Court noted that any issues related to the fairness of Mr Bujak's trial or his ability to conduct his defense were matters for the trial court in Poland, not the District Court conducting the extradition hearing.

The Court also addressed the argument that Mr Bujak, as a permanent resident, was a “subject” under Article 4 of the Poland/New Zealand Treaty, entitling him to protection from extradition. The Court found that the term “subject” did not have any special significance in New Zealand law and that Mr Bujak was not a “subject” for the purposes of the Treaty. Therefore, Article 4 did not apply to him, and the District Court’s role was limited to determining eligibility for surrender.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, remitting the matter to the District Court for consideration of Mr Bujak’s abuse of process argument. The Court emphasized that the sufficiency of the delay arguments was not strictly before the previous court, and Mr Bujak should have the opportunity to pursue such arguments if he had a basis for doing so. The Court did not rule out the possibility that Mr Bujak could successfully argue for a stay of proceedings if he could demonstrate that the delays amounted to an abuse of process under the Police v D test.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

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