Brown v Police

Case

[2017] NZHC 2079

29 August 2017

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CRI-2017-404-000190 [2017] NZHC 2079

BETWEEN

MORGAN BROWN

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 28 August 2017

Appearances:

D G A Reece for the Appellant
M L Clarke-Parker for the Respondent

Judgment:

29 August 2017

JUDGMENT OF PALMER J

This judgment is delivered by me on 29 August 2017 at 12.30 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:

D G A Reece, Barrister, Auckland

Crown Solicitor, Auckland

BROWN v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2017] NZHC 2079 [29 August 2017]

Summary

[1]      Mr Morgan Brown made a false statement in applying for a New Zealand passport.   He used the passport to leave Spain where he faced serious criminal charges.   He is not willing to return to Spain.   He was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment and appealed on the basis he should have had home detention.  I agree with  Judge  Pidwell  that  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  serves  the  purposes  and principles of sentencing.  I decline his appeal.

Facts

[2]      On 20 March 2017 Mr Morgan Brown, aged 25, pleaded guilty under s 32 of the Passports Act 1992, to making a statement he knew to be false in an application for a replacement passport.  That offence is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine up to $15,000 or both.

[3]      The offences were committed in September 2016.  His account of events was set out in an affidavit for the District Court.  The Crown does not have information that either contradicts or supports the information in the affidavit.  Mr Brown had left New Zealand with a friend on 14 June 2015.  He arrived in Spain in June 2015. Mr Brown says, one evening, he and his friend met a young woman on the street outside a nightclub in Barcelona.  She came home with them, had a few drinks and left.  Two days later he and his friend and another flatmate of theirs were arrested and jointly charged with rape.  They were remanded in custody for three weeks.  The flatmate was released without charge. Mr Brown and his friend were released on bail with a condition of surrender of their passports.   Mr Brown said that  financial pressures led to him living on the streets of Barcelona and occasionally begging.

[4]      In New Zealand, he says his father was struggling with severe alcoholism and his brother mental illness.   Mr Brown says his father asked him to come home because he was having trouble looking after his brother.  Mr Brown applied, through New Zealand, for a replacement New Zealand passport, saying that he had lost his passport  in Albert  Park  when  he  was  out  for  a  few  drinks  in Auckland  on  1

November 2016.  This is confirmed by the Crown.  Next to the declaration he signed

was a warning that it is an offence knowingly or recklessly to make a false statement to obtain a passport.  Nevertheless, this is what he did.

[5]      Mr  Brown’s  new  passport  was  sent  to  his  home  address  in  Henderson, Auckland and forwarded to him in Spain by an associate.   On 8 January 2017 Mr Brown returned to New Zealand using the new passport.  Mr Brown says the charges against  his  co-accused  friend  in  Spain  were  dropped  in  February  for  lack  of evidence.  Mr Brown also says his Spanish lawyer expects the charges against him will also be dropped.

[6]      The next hearing of Mr Brown’s case in Spain is set for late October 2017. Having talked to his Spanish lawyer, Mr Reece, his New Zealand counsel, understands Mr Brown’s presence is required.  At the hearing on 28 August 2017 I asked Mr Reece whether Mr Brown would commit to returning to Spain to face the legal processes there, if he is able to do so.  Without prejudging the outcome of the appeal, I raised the possibility that a sentence of home detention could be subject to conditions allowing Mr Brown to return to Spain to face the charges there.  After taking instructions Mr Reece advised that Mr Brown will not commit to doing so. He said Mr Brown is very sceptical as to whether he will get a fair hearing.  He is not sure whether the charge against him will be withdrawn.  Mr Brown is not willing to take that chance.  While the complainant did not appear in relation to the charges against the other defendants she may do in relation to the charge against him.   In addition, he is concerned he may be charged with breach of bail in Spain.  Of course, if Spain seeks his extradition, Mr Brown may not have an option as to whether he returns.

Department of Corrections report

[7]      The Department of Corrections assessed Mr Brown as being at low risk of reoffending or causing harm to others.   It says Mr Brown told them he has been suffering  from  depression  and  anxiety  issues  and  has  seen  a  counsellor  for assistance.   It assessed his home address as being suitable for the purposes of an electronically  monitored  sentence.    The  Department  recommended  sentences  of

community work and community detention.   There is no issue as to whether the address is technically suitable for home detention.

District Court Decision

[8]      Mr Brown filed an application for a discharge without conviction.  On 2 June

2017 Judge Pidwell in the District Court dismissed that application.1   She considered Mr  Brown’s  offending  to  be  at  the  medium  to  high  level  since  he  abused  his privileges as a New Zealander in order to evade the Spanish authorities.   She considered such offending affects New Zealand’s international reputation.   She accepted the consequences of conviction were that he would lose his job but considered that was not out of proportion to the gravity of the offending.

[9]      Judge Pidwell considered the Corrections pre-sentence report. She considered this was serious  offending which justified a prison term, with reference to two broadly similar cases, adopted a starting point of 24 months imprisonment.2    She considered Mr Brown’s status as an international fugitive from justice in Spain was an aggravating factor which had an element of perverting the course of justice in both jurisdictions.  She reduced the sentence to 18 months for his guilty plea and by

another three months for his expressions of remorse, the hardship he faced in Spain, his youth and his previous good character.  She considered home detention for the resulting 15 month sentence was not appropriate because it is important there be a clear message that anyone trying to evade the jurisdiction of any country must face up to the consequences of their action.

[10]     Mr Brown appeals.

Arguments

[11]     Mr Reece, for Mr Brown, submits the judge failed adequately to consider and

assess  Mr Brown’s  suitability for home detention  or community detention.    He submits that was inconsistent with ss 7, 8, 15A and 16 of the Sentencing Act 2002

1      New Zealand Police v Brown [2017] NZDC 11846.

2      Farley v R [2017] NZCA 97; and Burns v Police HC Wellington CRI-2005-485-125, 25 October

2005.

(the Act), and particularly the requirement to impose the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances under s 8(g).   Mr Reece submits that the Judge failed to give adequate weight to Mr Brown’s personal mitigating factors, placed excessive weight on his  previous non-compliance and that the end sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment is excessive.   He submits the sentence is not appropriate because it is not the least restrictive option.

[12]     Mr Reece points to new evidence, which I agree is fresh and cogent, of Mr

Brown’s offer of employment as a Market Research Agent, commencing September

2017, which appears not to be inconsistent with any conditions of home detention.  I

accept I should consider that evidence.

[13]     Mr Clarke-Parker for the Crown submits the judge made no error.  While the Judge did not expressly refer to ss 7, 8, 15A and 16 of the Act, and the decision was a quick one, her decision reflected the requirements of those sections. In any event, he submits, imprisonment is the appropriate option in terms of ss 7 and 8 of the Act. Mr Clarke-Parker submits the offending was serious, and requires an appropriate level   of   denouncement   and   deterrence   which   does   require   a   sentence   of imprisonment.  Home detention, he says, would not be enough.  Mr Clarke-Parker submits  the  fact  Mr  Hunter  evaded,  and  continues  to  evade,  the  Spanish  court process strongly supports the need for a sentence of imprisonment, in that he must not be given the opportunity to evade the consequences of his offending. The Crown acknowledges this is not a rehabilitation-focused sentence and that Mr Brown is still relatively young and has been in employment. But, it says, these factors do not outweigh the need for a sentence of imprisonment.

Law

[14]     Under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 I am required to allow appeal if I am satisfied that, for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed; and a different sentence should be imposed.  Otherwise, I must dismiss the appeal. The High Court does not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly  be  justified  by  accepted  sentencing  principles.    I  have  regard  to  the purposes of sentencing in s 7 of the Act and the principles of sentencing in s 8.

[15]     Home detention is neither a custodial nor a community-based sentence.  It is the second most restrictive sentence, after imprisonment.  It should be treated as a real alternative to imprisonment.3   In deciding whether home detention is warranted, s 16 of the Act requires the judge to have regard to the desirability of keeping offenders  in  the  community,  not  to  impose  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  unless satisfied that it is being imposed for particular sentencing purposes under s 7(1)(a) to (c) and (e) to (g), and that those purposes cannot be achieved by a sentence other than imprisonment.  In addition the court must be satisfied no other sentence would

be consistent with the application of the principles of sentencing in s 8.  The relative weight to be given to the principles and purposes of the Act is left to be determined by the sentencing judge in all the circumstances of the case.

Decision

[16]     I have considered all of Mr Brown’s, and the Crown’s, submissions.  I do not consider Judge Pidwell erred in not citing the relevant sections of the Act.   The requirement on judges is to make intelligible decisions. That does not always require reiteration of the numbers of sections.  The meaning of each of the relevant sections can easily be seen in the Judge’s decision.

[17]     Mr Reece suggests Judge Pidwell’s reference to previous non-compliance was a reference to Mr Brown’s two previous convictions for dangerous driving and excess breath alcohol, which was inappropriate.  But I consider it is more likely to be a reference to Mr Brown’s non-compliance with his conditions of bail in Spain. In fact, since Judge Pidwell’s three month discount was given for factors that included Mr  Brown’s  good  character,  it  could  be  argued  that  she  did  not  take  those convictions into account enough.  The sequence in which Judge Pidwell applied the discounts also favoured Mr Brown.

[18]     The offending, in lying when applying for a new New Zealand passport was serious.  Mr Brown obtained a privilege for the government of New Zealand, in the form of a passport, by providing false information.  The effect of doing so was to evade the processes of justice in Spain.  It is an affront to the system of justice in

both countries.  Mr Brown is entitled to the presumption of innocence from this court in relation to the charges he faces in Spain.  But his continuing refusal to return to Spain to face those charges, or to face the consequences there of his offending in returning to New Zealand, continues his affront to both justice systems.

[19]     Mr   Brown’s   youth,   his   employment,   his   remorse   and   the   difficult circumstances he faced in Spain all weigh in his favour.  Judge Pidwell took them into account in giving a discount on his sentence.   But she did not consider they justified a sentence of home detention.  She stated:4

That is below two years so I must turn my mind to whether a home detention sentence is appropriate.  In my view it is not.  That is because you have not complied with the authorities before and it is important that there be a clear message of anyone trying to evade the jurisdiction of any country that they must face up to the consequences of their actions and go through the appropriate process.  Those matters in Spain remain unresolved and I cannot make any assumptions either way in relation to the outcome of that but this sentence is purely focussed on your action of defying due process at that time.

[20]     I agree with Judge Pidwell that many of the purposes of s 7(1) of the Act are served by a sentence of imprisonment.  Imprisonment, rather than home detention, would hold him accountable to the community for his offending.  It may promote in him a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of that harm, which his attitude to returning to Spain indicates he currently lacks.   It would also serve to denounce his conduct and deter him and others from committing the same or similar offence.    I  consider  the  purposes  of  denunciation  and  deterrence  in  sentencing Mr Brown are capable of attracting a high weighting here.

[21]     I do not consider Judge Pidwell erred.  I agree with the sentence she imposed. I decline the appeal.   Mr Brown has been on bail pending the disposition of the appeal.  He must present himself at the Waitakere Police Station, 7 Buscomb Ave, Henderson, Auckland by 12 noon, Wednesday 30 August 2017 to begin his sentence.

..................................................................

Palmer J

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