IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA2/06
BETWEENEAN INNES BROWN AND FRANKLIN WAYNE BROWN
Appellants
ANDCARLTON GUSTAV PETERSON
First RespondentANDPACIFIC RIM ENTERPRISES LIMITED
Second Respondent
Hearing:6 April 2006
Court:William Young P, Gendall and Ronald Young JJ
Counsel:H Fulton for Appellants
W W Peters for Respondents
Judgment:12 April 2006
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
ALeave to appeal in respect of both judgments is granted and the time prescribed for appealing is extended until 24 April 2006.
BThe appellants are to pay costs of $3,000 to the respondents along with usual disbursements.
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REASONS
(Given by Gendall J)
[1] The proposed appellants seek special leave to appeal out of time pursuant to R 29(4) Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 from judgments of Baragwanath J delivered in the High Court at Whangarei on 24 March 2005 and 28 September 2005. Although the operation of the 2005 Rules commenced as from 1 May 2005 the time period within which an appeal must be brought, without special leave extending the time, remains the same at 20 working days.
[2] Accordingly the time for filing a Notice of Appeal in respect of the first judgment expired on 21 April 2005 and in respect of the second, on 26 October 2005.
Background
[3] The facts relevant to the High Court judgment are as follows. Mr Keeys owned a large section of rural land in Northland and entered into an agreement to sell part of it to Mr Peterson, the first respondent. The agreement contemplated that Mr Peterson was to construct (or to complete the construction of) a road upon the property which would be suitable for providing vehicular access from an existing public road. He was thereafter to grant to Mr Keeys, at the latter’s expense, an easement in the form of a right of way along the road. Mr Peterson disposed of his interest in the acquired property to Pacific Rim Enterprises Ltd the second respondent, and Mr Keeys settled his interest in trust upon trustees who are the present appellants. Mr Keeys has now died.
[4] In the first judgment Baragwanath J held that on a proper interpretation of the contract the vendor was required to wait indefinitely for the purchaser to complete the road, although he would be at liberty to do so himself, and thereafter receive the right of easement.
[5] The first judgment dealt with the rights of the parties but no specific relief was granted apart from what the Judge called “the substantive relief of a declaration of the rights recorded in paras [16]-[17]” of the judgment. The Keeys’ interests were also entitled to an order authorising the lodgement of a second caveat over the property. The rights recorded in paras [16]-[17] of the first judgment were as follows:
[16] ….Mr Peterson could not lawfully resile from his obligation, of indefinite duration, following the eventual establishment of a permanent road to grant Mr Keeys a permanent right of way over it. Given Mr Keeys’ insistence on…
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- Case
- [2006] NZCA 62
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether special leave should be granted to the appellants to appeal out of time from both judgments, in accordance with Rule 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005. The Court needed to determine if the justice of the case required such leave, considering the entire history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, and the implications of granting the leave. The Court also had to decide if there was a reasonable explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal against the first judgment.
The Court of Appeal, while acknowledging the appellants' failure to lodge the appeal against the first judgment within the stipulated time, found that the delay in appealing the second judgment was reasonably explained by the serious ill-health of Mr Keeys, who passed away before the appeal could be lodged. The Court considered that it was in the interest of justice to grant leave for both appeals, as the implications of the first judgment likely only became apparent with the second. The Court extended the time for bringing the appeal to 24 April 2006 and ordered the appellants to pay $3,000 in costs to the respondents.
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