Brooks v The Queen - [2019] NZSC 107

NOTE: ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF PROPENSITY WITNESSES R, S AND M PURSUANT TO S 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 REMAINS IN FORCE. SEE

NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE

NOTE: DISTRICT COURT ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF APPLICANT’S FATHER’S (A) NAME AND (B) NAME AND LOCATION OF BUSINESS REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

SC 74/2019
[2019] NZSC 107

BETWEEN	PETER JAMES BROOKS Applicant
AND	THE QUEEN Respondent

Court:	William Young, Glazebrook and O’Regan JJ
Counsel:	I M Brookie for Applicant J E L Carruthers for Respondent
Judgment:	8 October 2019

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

In 2018, Mr Brooks was convicted, after a jury trial in the District Court, on two charges of sexual violation of the complainant, J, by unlawful sexual connection. He applies for leave to appeal against two judgments of the Court of Appeal (one pre‑trial[1] and one post-trial).[2] Both concern the admissibility of prior acquittal propensity evidence given by two witnesses, R and S. In both judgments, the evidence was ruled admissible under s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006 (the Act).
[1]R v Brooks [2017] NZCA 503 (Winkelmann, Wylie and Whata JJ) [Pre-trial CA judgment].
[2]Brooks v R [2019] NZCA 280 (Miller, Simon France and Peters JJ) [Post-trial CA judgment].
In summary, Mr Brooks claims the Court of Appeal erred in finding:
(a)the probative value of the S complaint outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, despite the absence of much of the records relating to the prior acquittal and the effect of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; and
(b)the probative value of the R complaint outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice.

Background

At the trial in 2018, the Crown alleged Mr Brooks performed oral sex on J and that he had inserted J’s penis into his anus, both without J’s consent. Mr Brooks contended that the oral sex was consensual and denied the latter allegation. Three other men (R, S and M) had previously accused Mr Brooks of sexual assault in 1990, 1995 and 2012 respectively. Each complaint went to trial and each resulted in acquittal. At the 2018 trial, the Crown called R, S and M to give propensity evidence.
In the proposed appeal, Mr Brooks would challenge the admissibility of the R and S complaint evidence.[3] In summary:
(a)In 1990, R (then 16) and Mr Brooks (then 25) worked in a shearing gang. R became intoxicated at a party one night and went to bed. R alleged Mr Brooks came into his bed, groped and kissed R, and initiated anal intercourse. Mr Brooks attempted to stop R from moving and was told to keep quiet. R managed to push Mr Brooks off and left his bedroom. (Mr Brooks denied the events ever occurred.)
(b)In 1995, S (then…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Brooks v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Brooks v The Queen [2019] NZSC 107
Case: [2019] NZSC 107
Decision Date: 8 October 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Peter James Brooks sought leave to appeal against the admissibility of prior acquittal propensity evidence given by two witnesses, R and S, in his sexual violation trial. Brooks had been convicted by a jury in the District Court on two charges of sexual violation of a complainant, J, by unlawful sexual connection. The Court of Appeal had ruled the propensity evidence of R and S admissible under s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006. Brooks claimed the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the probative value of the S complaint outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, despite the absence of much of the records relating to the prior acquittal, and the probative value of the R complaint outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. The Supreme Court held that the application for leave to appeal did not meet the requirements of s 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, as it attempted to re-argue the application of settled law to the facts of the case. There was nothing of general or public importance raised, and nothing suggested any risk of a miscarriage of justice. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders