Brogden v Police
[2025] NZHC 3480
•17 November 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE PAPAIOEA ROHE
CRI-2025-454-24
[2025] NZHC 3480
BETWEEN KERRE ANNE BROGDEN AKA KERRE ANNE
AppellantAND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 12 November 2025 (via VMR) Appearances:
Appellant in Person
G L Duncan for Respondent
Judgment:
17 November 2025
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[1] The appellant in this matter wishes to be known simply as Kerre Anne. I refer to her as Kerre Anne in this judgment.
[2] This is a second appeal against conviction and accordingly leave to appeal from this Court is required.1 In accordance with earlier directions of the Court, the hearing before me was set down to deal with the leave application and substantive appeal against conviction.2
The convictions and subsequent appeals
[3] The Police alleged that Kerre Anne committed infringement offences on 9 July 2024 of:
1 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 237(2).
2 Brogden v Police HC Palmerston North CIV-2025-454-24, 28 August 2025 (Minute of Grice J).
BROGDEN AKA KERRE ANNE v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 3480 [17 November 2025]
(a)failing to stop at a stop sign;3
(b)operating a private vehicle on a road when the vehicle was not displaying current evidence of vehicle inspection;4 and
(c)operating a motor vehicle by driving it on a road while an exemption from continuous licensing while reg 20 of the Land Transport (Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2011 was in force.5
[4] Kerre Anne denied these offences and requested a hearing under s 21(8) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. The matter was heard before two Justices of the Peace in the Palmerston North District Court on 13 December 2024. The Justices found the charges proved and ordered Kerre Anne to pay:
(a)for failing to stop—$1000 fine and $55 court costs;
(b)for driving without a warrant of fitness—$2000 and $55 court costs; and
(c)for driving while vehicle exempt from continuous licensing—$1000 and $55 court costs.
[5] Kerre Anne appealed against her convictions to the District Court. In a judgment dated 7 July 2025, the Court:6
(a)allowed the appeal in relation to the charge of failing to stop at a stop sign, set aside Kerre Anne’s conviction on that charge and directed that a new trial be held pursuant to s 233(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011; and
3 Land Transport Act 1998, s 40; Land Transport (Offences and Penalties) Regulations 1999, reg 4; and Road User Rule 2004, r 4.1(1)(a).
4 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 6, 34(1)(b); and Land Transport Rule, Vehicle Standards Compliance 2002, (r 35001/1).
5 Land Transport (Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2011, regs 88(a) and 92.
6 Brogden v Police [2025] NZDC 14188.
(b)dismissed the appeal in relation to the charges of operating a vehicle that was not displaying current evidence of vehicle inspection and operating a motor vehicle by driving it on a road while an exemption from continuous licensing was in force.
[6]Kerre Anne appeals against the District Court decision.
Procedural matters
[7] As recorded in the Minute of Grice J dated 28 August 2025, this appeal requires leave to proceed as it is a second appeal, the first appeal from the decisions of the Justices of the Peace having been heard and determined by a District Court Judge.7
[8] Following the determination of the District Court, the charge in respect of failing to stop for a stop sign was remitted to the District Court for retrial. The Police indicated that they would not be proceeding on that charge, and it has been dismissed. Grice J therefore dismissed the appeal to this Court in so far as it relates to that charge.
[9] Justice Grice also recorded that as the District Court appeal did not extend to sentence, the appeal against sentence cannot proceed in this Court but must be dealt with in the District Court. Therefore, Grice J dismissed the two appeals against sentence.
[10] Justice Grice recorded that the leave application for the balance of the conviction decisions on appeal (relating to warrant of fitness and registration) were to be dealt together with the substantive appeal.
First appeal to the District Court
[11] The District Court Judge dealt with the jurisdiction of the court to hear the appeal. The Police had argued that because these were infringement offences for which no convictions were entered when the Justices found the infringements proved, the
7 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 229 and 237.
appeal was a nullity as s 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows appeals against “conviction”.8 The Judge concluded that Kerre Anne had brought a valid appeal.9
[12] Kerre Anne also argued that the Court had not convened a proper hearing because the notice of hearing of the appeal purported to be issued under r 2.16 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2011, when the rules are dated 2012 and do not contain a r 2.16. The Judge concluded that these errors did not invalidate the appeal hearing or the notice of hearing given that the notice of hearing of appeal complied with r 8.15 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012.
[13] The Judge concluded that he was required to determine the appeal in accordance with s 232 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[14] The Judge records that Kerre Anne’s points on appeal, submissions on appeal and the way she approached the hearing with the Justices were characterised by Kerre Anne’s frequent references to pseudolaw, most often associated with sovereign citizens. The Judge records that Kerre Anne frequently referred to legal sources and principles that had no relevance to the proceedings or her obligations. This included legal principles that are common to pseudolaw adherence around the world and recognised as “an eclectic and archaic amalgam of genuine legal sources to support a broad range of self-serving ‘legal’ interpretations”.10
[15] Kerre Anne complained that the Justices of the Peace altered her plea without her consent. The Judge did not accept this, finding rather that the Justices followed the procedure set out under ss 39(2) and 41 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In doing so, the Justices did not undermine Kerre Anne’s right to be treated as innocent until proven guilty, rather they observed this principle by holding a defended hearing and not making a decision until the Police had supplied proof of the charges.
8 All of the offence provisions which brought Kerre Anne’s charges to the Court for determination provide for penalties to be imposed only if a person is “convicted” of the applicable offence.
9 Although not available to the Judge, see also the discussion of appeals in the context of infringement notices in France v Police [2024] NZHC 2827 at [21].
10 Harry Hobbs, Stephen Young and Joe McIntyre Pseudolaw and Sovereign Citizens (Hart Publishing, 2025) at p 4.
[16] The Judge also concluded that no miscarriage of justice occurred due to the Justices not acknowledging Kerre Anne’s legal name during the hearing, given no issue was taken that Kerre Anne was the person charged with these offences and was the driver of the car stopped by Sergeant Hall.
[17] Kerre Anne filed two affidavits prior to the hearing before the Justices of the Peace and said that the Justices excluded the affidavits from the proceedings in breach of r 9.62 of the District Court Rules 2014, thus preventing her from being heard. The Judge records that Kerre Anne’s argument in this respect exposes her misunderstanding of the nature of the proceedings. The rules of civil litigation do not apply given this is a criminal proceeding. The Judge records that the Justices explained that Kerre Anne needed to present any evidence she wanted to rely on in person at the hearing so that the evidence could be subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. Kerre Anne continued to insist that the affidavits be read and relied on by the Justices without otherwise presenting them in evidence.
[18] The Judge records that for completeness, he reviewed Kerre Anne’s affidavits and that they do not raise any point that could give rise to a miscarriage of justice. In particular, to the extent Kerre Anne’s affidavits traverse her factual dispute with Sergeant Hall (the Police officer who stopped Kerre Anne), this was squarely placed before the Justices for their consideration.
[19] Kerre Anne argued that during the hearing before the Justices she was told the Court was “not here to talk about the law” and “this Court is not a political Court”. The Judge accepted that the Justices said to Kerre Anne during the hearing that issues she was raising were political or constitutional issues which she could raise through other avenues and that their role was to apply the laws of Parliament which applied to everyone and whether any of the charges were proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Judge stated that the arguments made by Kerre Anne to the Justices (for example insisting on seeing the Justices’ warrants of appointment and that she was not a “person”) are familiar pseudolaw arguments offered by its adherents to avoid their legal obligations. The Judge found that they have no bearing on the case for or against Kerre Anne or the appeal.
[20] The Judge records that Kerre Anne had complained that the Justices did not produce their warrants when she requested them to show they were authorised to conduct the hearing and that she similarly requested that the Judge produce his appointment warrant. The Judge stated that neither he nor the Justices were under any obligation to do so and had declined to provide warrants to her. The Judge records that appointments to carry out the respective roles of Justices of the Peace and Judge are conferred by the Governor-General under warrant where the Secretary for Justice is required to publish appointments in the Gazette. The Judge noted that if Kerre Anne wishes to question whether anyone hearing her case is appropriately appointed, she need only consult this publicly available source.
[21] Kerre Anne argued she was intimidated by the presence of three prosecutors who were overbearing, manipulative, enforced “yes” or “no” answers and refused to allow explanations. The Judge concluded that Kerre Anne was asked relevant questions and given a fair opportunity to explain her answers and that the record does not suggest that the number of police personnel involved, whether as prosecutors or witnesses, overwhelmed Kerre Anne or prevented her from presenting her defence. The Judge found that it did not lead to a miscarriage of justice.
[22] Kerre Anne argued that the short time the Justices took to reach a verdict suggests they had pre-determined the outcome. The Judge concluded that the Justices took ample time to consider uncomplicated charges and an appropriate verdict. The Judge stated that the time a court takes to deliver verdict will seldom justify a suggestion the court has pre-determined the outcome in any event and in this case there was no such indication of pre-determination.
[23] The Judge then addressed the sufficiency of the evidence. In relation to the failing to stop charge, the Judge found that the evidence presented in Court provides a basis on which the Justices could have been justified in finding the charge of failing to stop proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Judge found that the Justices did not give any reasons for their finding that this charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Judge found there had been a miscarriage of justice and remitted this charge back to the District Court for rehearing.
[24] The Judge found that the Justices’ conclusion that the charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt for driving a vehicle that did not display a current warrant of fitness and driving a vehicle that was exempt from continuous licensing were the only feasible verdicts available to them on the evidence.
[25] Kerre Anne accepted that her car did not have a current warrant of fitness. Kerre Anne relied on certain consumer information that indicated that the issue of a warrant of fitness does not represent an assurance that the vehicle is fit for any particular purpose or will remain in warrantable condition for any period after any examination for the issue of a warrant of fitness. On this basis, Kerre Anne decided a warrant of fitness was of no effect and chose to neither obtain nor display one. The Judge held that this information did not alter the legal requirement to display a warrant of fitness. Rather it simply reinforces that a warrant of fitness does not absolve a road user from their obligation to not operate an unsafe motor vehicle on a road.
[26] Kerre Anne also explained that she had not registered her car because one cannot register it without a warrant of fitness, so she just kept it on hold. The Judge said that the defence available under reg 88(2) of the Land Transport (Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2011 did not apply to Kerre Anne as she was driving the vehicle to get groceries and was not taking it directly to a place of repair, inspection or to obtain evidence of vehicle inspection.
[27] The Judge did not accept Kerre Anne’s challenge to Sergeant Hall’s qualifications and appointment as a police officer, raised at the appeal. Nor did the Judge accept Kerre Anne’s submission that because Sergeant Hall was wrong that she had failed to stop at a stop sign, he had no lawful authority to stop her and ascertain whether her vehicle had a current warrant of fitness or was licensed. The Judge recorded that Sergeant Hall’s uncontradicted evidence was that he was in uniform, driving a marked patrol car and signalled Kerre Anne to stop using blue and red lights. Thus, he was entitled under s 114(1) and subs (2) of the Land Transport Act 1998 to signal Kerre Anne to stop in this way. Whether he was correct about having observed Kerre Anne failing to stop is immaterial.
[28] The Judge concluded that accordingly there was no miscarriage of justice arising from the Justices’ conclusion that these two charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Judge said that the evidence Kerre Anne had committed these offences was overwhelming and uncontroverted.
[29] Finally, the Judge recorded that Kerre Anne did not in the appeal ask the Court to review the penalties imposed by the Justices.
Leave to bring a second appeal
[30] As already noted, a second appeal against an infringement offence finding may only be brought with the leave of this Court. The Criminal Procedure Act provisions relating to second appeals apply. Under s 237(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the Court must not give leave for a second appeal unless satisfied that the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance, or a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, or may occur unless the appeal is heard.
[31] Counsel for the Police, Ms Duncan, submits that neither of these grounds is made out.
[32] Kerre Anne did not address leave to appeal in the affidavit she filed, which, with her agreement, I am treating as her submissions on appeal, together with her oral submissions. At the hearing before me, Kerre Anne’s focus was on the errors she alleges as discussed below.
[33] Kerre Anne believes that the proceedings before both Justices of the Peace and the District Court Judge, by proceeding under non-existent legislation, were conducted without proper jurisdiction, contained procedural defects, and failed to address several substantive legal issues raised at the hearing. Her essential point is that her convictions are invalid because of these errors. Kerre Anne says that all infringements issued by Police are invalid because of the issues she identifies. She suggests the cause is that an incorrect legal process was followed at the time the separate road traffic enforcement officers were integrated into Police, some decades ago.
Hearing
[34] At the hearing before me, Kerre Anne sought to read out her affidavits so they would go into the court record, so she could then obtain a transcript of them. I explained that while court proceedings are recorded, there is no automatic preparation of a transcript. I also explained that the appeal hearing was not an opportunity for Kerre Anne to “ask questions and seek evidence” as she proposed, rather, if she was successful in obtaining leave to appeal and in the substantive appeal, and a retrial was ordered, at that point evidential matters could be considered further. For these reasons, Kerre Anne did not read out the affidavits.
Discussion
Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace
[35] Kerre Anne argues that the initial hearing was presided over by Justices of the Peace who are not lawfully constituted as a District Court Judge under the District Court Act 2016. She says that ss 7 and 11 of that Act set out that judicial authority may only be exercised by a District Court Judge duly appointed and warranted. As a result, Kerre Anne says the hearing was conducted ultra vires and is void for want of lawful constitution. She further says that the District Court Judge did not address this jurisdictional defect.
[36] I accept Ms Duncan’s submission that this is incorrect. Section 355 of the Criminal Procedure Act and s 135 of the Land Transport Act clearly provide that Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction over category one offences, as apply in this case. Kerre Anne is incorrect in her suggestion that Justices may only carry out administrative work such as witnessing documents.
Police authority
[37] Kerre Anne argues that Sergeant Hall, who initiated the traffic stop and issued the infringement notice, did not produce a valid warrant of appointment as required under the Policing Act 2008, sch 1 pt 4.
[38] Kerre Anne misunderstands the provision she cites. It does not require Police to show that they are warranted, rather it outlines Police powers if warranted as a Police transport officer. As the District Court Judge identified, s 114 of the Land Transport Act states that an enforcement officer who is in uniform with a badge of authority may signal or request the driver of a vehicle to stop as soon as practicable, including by displaying flashing blue and red lights. An enforcement officer is defined in the Land Transport Act as a constable.11 The Policing Act defines a constable as a Police employee who holds the office of constable and includes a constable who holds any level of position within the Police.12
[39] The transcript of the District Court hearing shows the Judge explained to Kerre Anne that under the Policing Act, all Police officers, whatever their rank, are deemed to be constables. The uncontradicted evidence of Sergeant Hall is that he is a constable of the Police, he was in uniform and driving a marked patrol car. Kerre Anne’s own evidence is that he showed her his detective badge when requested by her to do so.
[40] Kerre Anne also submits that she has a right under equity to request and read a warrant of appointment. She was, however, not in a position to provide me with any authority in support of this submission.
Procedural injustice and denial of fair hearing
[41] Kerre Anne repeats the argument she made before the District Court Judge that she was prevented from speaking, was interrupted or was directed not to cite legislation in her own defence before the Justices of the Peace, in breach of s 25(a) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Kerre Anne suggests that the District Court Judge did not address these procedural concerns, but I do not accept this is the case. The Judge addressed the fact that the Justices of the Peace held a defended hearing and did not make a decision until the Police had supplied proof of the charges. The Judge addressed Kerre Anne’s misunderstanding that in a criminal proceeding she could file affidavits. His Honour went on to review the affidavits in any event,
11 Land Transport Act 1998, s 2.
12 Policing Act 2008, s 4.
concluding that they do not raise any point that could give rise to a miscarriage of justice.
Referral to legislation
[42] As noted above, Kerre Anne says she was denied the right to refer to certain legislation. Kerre Anne submits that her interpretation of “person”, “individual” and “people” affects her liability, pointing specifically to s 133 of the Land Transport Act as only imposing liability on the owner, who she says must be registered to the vehicle (which she was not—rather she was just the user of the vehicle.).
[43] I do not accept this argument. Section 133 of the Land Transport Act outlines the different people against whom charges can be brought against. This includes the person who committed the offence, the person registered to the vehicle, or the person who was lawfully entitled to possession of the vehicle. As Ms Duncan submits, Kerre Anne fits both the first and last of these categories. Section 133 is not inconsistent with the meaning of owner in s 2(1) of the Land Transport Act. That section defines owner as meaning the person who is “lawfully entitled to possession of the vehicle”. It does not specify that only the person registered to the vehicle can be an owner.
[44] Kerre Anne also refers to s 381(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act as referring to “people” as a distinct category entitled to protection from criminal liability, but this an incorrect reading of the statute that does not assist her argument.
Further infringement notices
[45] Kerre Anne says that she originally received infringement notices with modest fines, but further infringement notices were issued, escalating into additional alleged offences relating to vehicle compliance. Kerre Anne believes these successive actions demonstrate a pattern of targeted enforcement against her by the Police. Kerre Anne argues that she was not offered a reasonable opportunity to rectify the alleged non- compliance relating to the vehicle’s warrant of fitness or registration. She argues that enforcement proceeded immediately to penalty notices and fines without any attempt at equitable resolution and that such conduct undermines the rehabilitative and
corrective purpose of enforcement and indicates that revenue collection rather than compliance with the primary objectives is prioritised. Kerre Anne argues that the escalation of penalties after she exercised her right to challenge the notices in court is inconsistent with ss 25(c) and 27(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
[46] Ms Duncan submits that the further infringements Kerre Anne received related to other separate offences and in no way impacted her ability or right to defend the first charges. Ms Duncan says that while Kerre Anne may not have been given an opportunity to seek a warrant of fitness prior to the first infringement notice being issued, she does not point to any legal requirement obliging the enforcement agency to give her that opportunity, and it would be impractical for enforcement officers to do so in every case.
Treatment of legislative defects in the notice of hearing
[47] Kerre Anne contends that while the District Court Judge confirmed that the legislation referred to in the notice of hearing of appeal was incorrect the Judge nonetheless allowed the hearing to proceed. She says that such a judicial acknowledgment of a defective jurisdictional instrument, without taking corrective action, undermines the validity of all subsequent proceedings and raises serious questions as to procedural fairness and lawful authority.
[48] The Judge carefully considered this point, issuing a ruling on 14 May 2025 at the hearing of Kerre Anne’s appeal and addressing again the question of jurisdiction in his reserved judgment. As the Judge found, the Registrar gave notice of hearing of the appeal in accordance with r 8.15 of the Criminal Procedure Rules.
Transcript omission and procedural irregularity
[49] Kerre Anne acknowledges that she has received a transcript from the District Court but suggests that the portions relating to her jurisdictional challenge are missing, including the Judge’s acknowledgement that the notice of hearing of the appeal referred to inaccurate legislative provisions. Kerre Anne seeks production of “the certified, unedited audio recording or a complete verified transcript” to ensure that the
right to a full and fair appeal is preserved and no material exchanges are excluded from judicial consideration.
[50] As noted earlier, a transcript of a court hearing is not commonly prepared. Nonetheless, it appears a transcript of the District Court hearing was provided to Kerre Anne. It is apparent from the transcript that after hearing from Kerre Anne in relation to this issue, the Judge issued an oral ruling in relation to the jurisdictional challenge. The Judge subsequently issued the ruling in writing, dated 14 May 2025. When I asked Kerre Anne to explain what discussion she says was not included in the transcript, she said it related to her point that the Justice of the Peace did not accept that she was innocent. On my reading of the transcript, the discussion of this point is included in the transcript.
[51] In the circumstances, I do not accept there is any basis for Kerre Anne’s concerns in this regard.
Miscarriage of justice
[52] As to miscarriage of justice, I agree with Ms Duncan’s submission that despite the nature of the arguments raised by Kerre Anne, the District Court Judge was careful to avoid unfairness or disadvantage which could result from the fact she is a self- represented litigant.13 Kerre Anne’s appeal was allowed in respect of the failing to stop charge, which indicates that careful consideration was given to the matter despite Kerre Anne not being represented by counsel at the hearing. It is apparent from both the transcript and the judgment that the Judge thoroughly traversed Kerre Anne’s arguments and addressed each in turn.
[53] In addition, in relation to the remaining two charges where Kerre Anne’s appeal in the District Court was unsuccessful, I agree that the verdicts were clearly justified. In relation to the charge of failing to present a warrant of fitness, Kerre Anne accepts that she did not have a warrant of fitness displayed. In relation to driving the vehicle contrary to its exemption from continuous licensing, Kerre Anne accepts that
13 As was similarly the case in France v Police, above, n 9 at [25].
she was driving in such circumstances. Kerre Anne reiterated these admissions at the hearing before me.
[54] I consider the District Court Judge showed commendable patience and made every attempt to do justice to Kerre Anne.
Conclusion
[55] I conclude that none of the matters raised by Kerre Anne constitute a matter of general or public importance such that leave for a second appeal should be granted. Nor has Kerre Anne demonstrated that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, or would occur, if the appeal is not heard.
Result
[56] The application for leave to bring a second appeal in respect of the convictions for failing to present a warrant of fitness and driving the vehicle contrary to its exemption from continuous licensing is declined.
[57]The conviction appeals are dismissed.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
BVA, Palmerston North for Respondent
0
1
0