Bridge v The King

[2025] NZHC 89

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2025-485-54

[2025] NZHC 89

UNDER

the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, and in accordance with r 5.28 and r 5.29 of the High Court Rules 2016

IN THE MATTER OF

a right of action in tort

BETWEEN

DEBORAH JANE BRIDGE

Plaintiff

AND

THE CROWN

Defendant

Hearing:	On the Papers
Applicant in Person
Judgment:	7 February 2025

JUDGMENT OF CHURCHMAN J

[1]                  On 24 January 2025 Deborah Jane Bridge (the  Applicant)  emailed  the  High Court at Wellington a document described as being ‘Self represented applicant filing to be heard in the High Court, Wellington NZ’. This document was accompanied by a notice described as a Notice of Proceedings.

[2]                  The Registrar has referred these documents to me  as duty Judge pursuant to  r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2026 (HCR).

[3]                  Rule 5.35A authorises a Registrar to refer proceedings which the Registrar believes to be plainly an abuse of the process of the Court, to a Judge for consideration under HCR r 5.35B.

BRIDGE v THE CROWN [2025] NZHC 89 [7 February 2025]

[4]                  HCR 5.35B authorises a Judge to whom the Registrar referred such proceedings to make various orders including an order that the proceeding be struck out. HCR 5.35B(3) provides that if a Judge makes an order pursuant HCR 5.35B(2) on his own initiative without giving the person who filed the proceeding an opportunity to be heard, the order must contain a statement of that person’s right to appeal against the decision.

Are the proceedings plainly abusive?

[5]                  The term ‘plainly abusive proceeding’ is not defined in HCR 5.35A but the Courts have held that this term encompasses proceedings which are an obvious misuse of the Court’s process’.1

[6]                  The Court of Appeal has articulated what are described as seven basic rules of civil justice against which a judge can assess the ‘reasonable limits to recourse to law’. These have been described as being:2

Proceedings must involve claims by persons with a legitimate interest in the subject of the dispute.

All persons likely to be affected directly by a judgment should be joined in the proceeding.

Claims cannot be undertaken by instalment: the claim must bring all his or her claims on a subject together in the one claim.

Claimants who fail usually must pay a substantial contribution to the other side’s costs.

The judgement is determinative of all issues in the proceeding and must be implemented unless stayed pending an appeal.

Generally there is only one right of appeal, but a right to seek leave to bring a second appeal.

Once those rights are exhausted, that is that and the final judicial determination is not to be subverted by collateral challenge through further proceedings on the same subject matter.

1      See Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Limited [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 at [89].

2      Faloon v Planning Tribunal at Wellington [2020] NZCA 170.

[7]                  Where proceedings do not set out an identifiable defendant or are commenced against the wrong defendant they maybe struck out under HCR 5.35B.3 An example of proceedings being struck out because they were commenced against the wrong defendant is Tomkinson v Countdown Supermarket Timaru.4 In that case the proceeding sought judicial review in relation to trespass notices issued by two supermarkets for failing to wear a mask. The Court held that the plaintiff’s application was, in substance, an attempt to judicially review the legality of the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Alert Level Requirements) Order (No 12) 2021, and that all the supermarkets appeared to be doing was enforcing the law as it then stood.

[8]                  The Courts have also established that if proceedings lack a valid cause of action or are incomprehensible, they can also be struck out.5

[9]                  The Courts have also indicated what will not justify the striking out of a proceeding. This includes that the fact that a self-represented litigant may have drafted the proceeding poorly or incompetently.6

[10]The Courts have adopted a two-limbed test for strike out purposes:7

(a)whether it will be manifestly unfair to the respondents that they be required to be respond; and

(b)whether ‘right thinking people’ would regard the Court as exercising very poor control of its processes if it were to allow the applicant’s document to be regarded as a proper document.

[11]              If a proceeding would, if properly drafted, set out a viable claim the appropriate option for the Court will be to direct a re-pleading rather than strike the proceeding out.

3      O’Neill v Judiciary of Auckland High Courts [2023] NZCA 153 at [12] and [14].

4      Tomkinson v Countdown Supermarket Timaru [2021] NZHC 2742.

5      Tranter v Manager Telstra Clear NZ Ltd [2022] NZHC 456 at [13] and Smyth–Davoren v Parker

[2018] NZHC 3034 at [7]–[8].

6      D v Auckland District Court [2022] NZCA 477 at [38]–[39].

7      Mathiesen v Slevin [2018] NZHC 1032.

Analysis of document

[12]              The respondent in Ms Bridge’s proceeding is simply described as ‘the NZ Crown’. Section 14 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 details the correct manner in which the Crown is to be sued. Such proceedings are to be instituted against the appropriate government department in its own name or the appropriate officer of the Crown in the name in which he or she may be sued on behalf of the Crown or any government department or the Attorney-General if there is no such appropriate department or officer.

[13]              No thought appears to have been given in drafting the proceedings as to exactly whose actions Ms Bridge wishes to challenge or in what respect the Crown could be liable for those actions. Neither does the document set out causes of action that give rise to recognised duties of care.

[14]              The first cause of action is identified as ‘Negligence’. It is pleaded that the Ministry of Health failed ‘to provide adequate evidence regarding the isolation of SARS-CoV-2 [and] has therefore acted negligently’. It is also claimed that the Ministry of Health ‘failed to investigate or respond substantively, claiming frivulous [sic] questions, neither did ESR, Ms Siousxie Wiles the lead epidemiologist, thus breaching their duty of care to the public in  ensuring  the  health  and  safety  of New Zealand citizens’. This seems to be a challenge to the legislative response of the government to the Covid epidemic similar to that struck out in Tomkinson.8

[15]              The proceedings also describe the actions that the applicant is concerned about as being a ‘crime’ for which she demands justice. There is a fundamental difference between civil and criminal proceedings. Proceedings in tort are not the appropriate way of addressing criminal behaviour.

[16]              The second cause of action is one titled ‘Medical Negligence’. Ms Bridge asserts that she was prescribed antibiotics that she claims ‘contained toxic magnetic graphene oxide’ which she says she believes is ‘harmful to health’. The proceeding does not identify who she says prescribed the antibiotics to her. It cannot have been

8      Above, n 4.

the Crown. Again, this would seem to be a challenge to the legislation governing regulation of medicines. That is not something capable of giving rise to a tort claim.

[17]              The third ground  pleaded  is  ‘Defamation  and  Damage  to  Reputation’.  Ms Bridge claims that she has ‘…been publicly branded a ‘conspiracy theorist’ by government agents, Siouxsie Wiles Auckland University, media outlets, and law enforcement, without substantiation of this claim.’ The pleading does not explain how the Crown could be liable in defamation. Neither are the parties said to have defamed Ms Bridge been joined as defendants to these proceedings. These are fundamental defects.

[18]              The next ground asserted is ‘Discrimination and Breach of Medical Rights’. Ms Bridge pleads:

I have been unlawfully de-registered from my medical care provider, denied dental services, and denied access to any healthcare facility in the entire Tararua District, I have to travel 164 kms to see a Dr, based on my beliefs, and my stance on vaccination mandates without proper evidence. The Medical centre also committed fraud by way of charting on records and removing information, blood tests and renal failure documents.

[19]              This is another instance where the entities said to have committed tortious actions have not been named as parties to the proceedings neither has the nature of the duty of care said to have been breached by the Crown been identified. Again, in substance, what Ms Bridge appears to be concerned about is the validity of regulations passed in relation to the covid epidemic that may have had some adverse effect on her. These are not matters that can be challenged by way of tort proceedings against the Crown.

[20]              The final cause of action is described as ‘Unlawful Police Actions and Forced Compliance’. The pleading is that Ms Bridge ‘…was unlawfully arrested for failing to wear a mask in a public space, despite the lack of any legal basis for such a mandate, this was in front of many people, I was cuffed and masked, taken to the station, made to have a psychological assessment, then I was released without charge, even though I asked to be charged so I can have my day in court, this was denied. Therefore, false arrest.’ In support of this cause of action, Ms Bridge pleads:

The NZ Police continued to harass me, turning up to my property, pulling me over, following me, escorting me home, drones flying over my home, phone calls telling me off for emails to the PM and other ministers, calling the SIS, I have used every single avenue to obtain the evidence I need to satisfy the beliefs [sic] of this Crown’s actions to be honest and trusting, but to no avail.

[21]              This claim does not plead a recognised cause of action in tort that the Crown could be liable for. The pleading talks about cases which Ms Bridge will use ‘in her defence’. It is difficult to understand what she is ‘defending’. She acknowledges that she was not charged with any offence.

[22]              This pleading is also jumbled up with a claim that Ms Bridge has ‘discovered legal aid fraud, in regard to a lawyer in Hastings.’ No detail is provided. Neither is it possible to discern how the Crown could be liable in tort for the actions of an unrelated third party.

Relief sought

[23]              The relief sought by the applicant is also not relief that the Court could award against the Crown even if there was a valid cause of action in tort. The first ground of relief seeks ‘a formal acknowledgement and apology by the NZ Crown and its agents, a full investigation into the failure of the Ministry of Health and associated agents to provide undisputable [sic] evidence for the existence of SARS-CoV-2, this must involve myself in the investigations and my team of experts, no stone will be unturned until resolution is apparent.’

[24]The same comments apply to the second ground of relief sought which is:

An investigation into the allegations of poisoning due to the presence of magnetic graphene  oxide  in  prescribed  medications,  the  failure  of Ayesha Verral to investigate, instead passing it onto MOH who then passed it onto Medsafe who replied with a short brief letter stating there is no GO in antibiotics without investigating or proving otherwise, an independent [sic] will be sought by my expert team of chemical engineers, Professors and all other relevant experts that I see fit, I do not trust the Government’s officials to investigate because clearly there is distrust in their choices of experts.

Relief of this nature is not something the Court can grant.

[25]              The next item of relief sought is a formal retraction and a public apology for what Ms Bridge says are defamatory statements. Other than a statement said to have been made by Ms Wiles [who is not a defendant named in these proceedings] whom Ms Bridge claims ‘…defamed her (in her recent university court case and documentary’, none of the makers of the defamatory claims are identified and there is no basis upon which the Crown could be said to be liable. The relief sought is clearly unavailable.

[26]              The next claim for relief is for ‘Compensation for the harm to my health, reputation, and ability to access essential services’. The document does not contain any details relating to the applicant’s health or how the Crown might be responsible for something to do with her health. The reputation claim would seem to be based on defamation which, for the reasons set out above, is untenable and the ‘ability to access essential services’ claim would appear to be a challenge to the lawfulness of regulations made by the government and thus inappropriate for tort proceedings.

[27]The final claim for relief is:

Appropriate legal action against those responsible for causing harm, especially Jacinda Ardern, the one responsible for pushing this agenda, knowing it was in fact a hoax for furthering agenda [sic], including compensation for emotional distress, imprisoned without reasonable cause, and lost opportunities of seeing my son, resulting from the unlawful actions of the Crown and its agents.’

[28]              It is simply not possible to make sense of this claim for relief or identify any cause of action in tort where the Court might be entitled to authorise the commencement of ‘legal action’ against people Ms Bridge thinks might have caused her harm.

Outcome

[29]              The proceedings are wholly misconceived. They raise a raft of allegations against various entities and individuals who have not been joined as defendants; they do not identify viable grounds for causes of action; the relief sought is not within the Courts ability to grant and, in a number of respects the proceedings are incomprehensible.

[30]              These are not matters which are capable of being rectified. The Court would be exercising poor control of its processes if it allowed the proceedings to continue and to require a response from the Crown through the court process.

[31]              Accordingly, I strike the proceedings out pursuant to HCR 5.35B(2)(a) on the grounds they are an abuse of the process of the Court.

[32]              Pursuant to HCR 5.35B(3) I advise Ms Bridge that she has a right to appeal this decision.

Churchman J