Bracey v Police
[2022] NZHC 476
•16 March 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE
CRI-2021-488-000060
[2022] NZHC 476
BETWEEN JACOB CARL BRACEY
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 9 March 2022 Appearances:
S J Ross for the Appellant S-L Litt for the Respondent
Judgment:
16 March 2022
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
This judgment is delivered by me on 16 March 2022 at 11am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
.....................................................
Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Counsel/Solicitors:
Stephen Ross, Barrister, Whangarei Crown Solicitor, Whangarei
BRACEY v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2022] NZHC 476 [16 March 2022]
Introduction
[1] The appellant Jacob Bracey pleaded guilty in the District Court at Whangarei to a range of property offences, the most serious being two burglary charges. Judge Orchard sentenced him to 10 months’ home detention, six-months’ suspension of his driver’s licence, and monetary reparations for the fuel he stole.1
[2]He appeals this sentence on the basis that:
(a)the starting point was too high;
(b)the discount for his youth was insufficient; and
(c)the sentencing Judge did not have full information regarding his background, particularly in relation to a Psychological Assessment previously undertaken when he appeared in the Youth Court.
Factual Background
[3]Mr Bracey’s offences were committed between February and August 2021.
[4] The first was a burglary of a residential property on 22 February 2021.2 The owner of the property and the appellant are known to each other. The appellant stole a BMW from the garage under the house and after visiting two premises in Whangarei, travelled south to Auckland. The car was later recovered. Mr Bracey had just turned 18 at this time.
[5] The second and third charges of theft were in relation to fuel drive-offs.3 Mr Bracey went to a petrol station, filled up his car, and left without paying on two occasions. The first fuel drive-off was committed on 6 May 2021 while he was driving when his licence was suspended.4 The second, on 27 June 2021, was while he was on bail.
1 New Zealand Police v Bracey [2021] NZDC 22504.
2 Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1)(a).
3 Crimes Act 1961, ss 219 and 223(d).
4 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(c) and 32(3).
[6] The fourth and fifth offences occurred in relation to one incident on 4 August 2021. Mr Bracey’s vehicle had been repaired by a vehicle mechanic and was on the mechanic’s premises. Mr Bracey broke in by cutting the fence and stole the vehicle. He was charged with being unlawfully in an enclosed yard5 and intentional damage,6 both of which carry a maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment.
[7] Two days later, on 6 August 2021, Mr Bracey committed the second burglary.7 He broke into a company’s premises in West Auckland and stole a boat, fishing gear and other equipment as well as some containers of petrol and diesel, which he had filled from pumps on the company’s property. The police stopped Mr Bracey near Whangarei as he was towing the boat and recovered all the property.
District Court decision
[8] At sentencing, the District Court Judge calculated the starting point by adding together:
(a)12 months for the first burglary,
(b)1 month for the two thefts of diesel and driving while suspended,
(c)1 month for the charges of being unlawfully in an enclosed yard and intentional damage, and
(d)18 months for the second burglary.
[9]This brought the Judge to a starting point of two years and eight months.
[10] She then gave two discounts: 20 per cent for Mr Bracey’s guilty pleas and 15 per cent for his youth and “a number of other factors”. The Judge took into account his youth offending, his appearances at the Youth Court, and his determination not to repeat his prison experience.
5 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29(1)(b).
6 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 11(1)(a).
7 Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1)(a).
[11] Applying the 35 per cent discount the resulting sentence was 20 months’ imprisonment. The Judge converted that to 10 months’ home detention.
[12]The Judge constructed the sentence as follows:
(a)four months’ home detention for the first burglary;
(b)reparation to the petrol station in the sum of $60.48 for the first petrol theft;
(c)disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for six months from the date of sentencing;
(d)reparation to the vehicle mechanic in the sum of $537.05 in relation to the offending on 4 August 2021; and
(e)10 months’ home detention for the second burglary.
[13] The Judge ordered that the two terms of home detention be served concurrently.
Approach on Appeal
[14] An appeal against sentence can be brought as of right.8 The appeal court can only allow the appeal if there is an error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should be imposed.9 However, the Court “will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.10 The sentence must be “manifestly excessive” for the appeal court to substitute its own views. Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive is to be assessed in terms of the sentence given, rather than the process by which it is reached.11
8 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 244.
9 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250.
10 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].
11 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
[15] The submission made by counsel for Mr Bracey in the District Court, was that the appropriate starting point was two years and seven months’ imprisonment. The Judge noted that was roughly similar to her starting point of two years and eight months’ imprisonment.12 Notwithstanding the submission made in the District Court, Mr Ross (who was not counsel in the District Court) submits on behalf of Mr Bracey, that the starting points for the two burglaries were too high.
[16] In relation to the first burglary which also involved the theft of the BMW, Mr Ross submits that there were no aggravating features. In the statement made by Mr Bracey’s brother to the Police, he says the BMW was in the garage in his house. Mr Bracey did not have permission to enter the house or take the BMW. However, he said Mr Bracey had previously stayed with him. He surmised (given there was no damage to any of the doors) that Mr Bracey must have used keys from when he had stayed there.
[17] Mr Ross submits rather than a starting point of 12 months adopted by the Judge, in a “family” situation the appropriate starting point is six months.
[18] Mr Ross describes the second burglary of the boat as “bizarre” and submits it indicates Mr Bracey “had some cognitive difficulties that should be explored”. Mr Ross’s instructions are that there was no plan for the boat other than to go fishing.
[19] Mr Ross submits the appropriate starting point for the second burglary is 12 months rather than the 18 months adopted by the Judge.
[20] Mr Ross further submits that the two uplifts of one month for theft, driving while his licence was suspended, unlawfully being in an enclosed space, and intentional damage were wrong in principle because a first offender would not ordinarily be sentenced to imprisonment on those charges. He submits that these offences should have been dealt with by way of concurrent sentences.
12 New Zealand Police v Bracey, above n 1, at [11].
[21] On the second ground of appeal, Mr Ross submits that there should have been a higher discount for youth. He refers to R v Slade which notes that adolescents do not possess the same level of mental development or psychological maturity as adults and, as a result, are often more impulsive and vulnerable to peer pressure.13 Churchward also highlights that neurological difference, as well as the effect of imprisonment on young people and young people’s greater capacity for rehabilitation are relevant to sentencing.14 Pouwhare v R and R v Chankau again make these points.15
[22] On the third, and main ground of appeal, Mr Ross refers to a psychological assessment dated February 2018 undertaken when Mr Bracey was 14 years old (he is now 19 years old). Its purpose was to identify his mental health needs and to inform a treatment care plan.
[23] The position on behalf of Mr Bracey is that the assessment sets out significant issues with Mr Bracey in his mother’s care up until July 2016 when he and his sister were taken into custody of Oranga Tamariki, after his mother was imprisoned. From there he went into the care of his father. His difficulties continued, including criminal offending, resulting in regular appearances in the Youth Court. Mr Ross says the assessment clearly refers to personal factors in terms of the treatment of Mr Bracey by his mother over a lengthy period of time.
[24] Mr Ross submits that a 20 to 25 per cent discount is warranted given the historical psychological issues and cultural factors identified in the report.
[25] Further, in relation to the report, Mr Ross submits that had the sentencing Judge seen the report, serious consideration would have been given to the sentence option of intensive supervision combined with community detention. Mr Ross refers to two cases where sentences of intensive supervision were imposed on appeal for what he submits was similar offending.16
13 R v Slade [2005] 2 NZLR 526 (CA) at [43].
14 Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531 at [77].
15 Pouwhare v R [2010] NZCA 268 at [69]; and R v Chankau [2007] NZCA 587 at [26].
16 Vaeau v New Zealand Police [2015] NZHC 1972; and Marsters v Police [2014] NZHC 3273.
[26] He says in this case a 12-month intensive supervision sentence coupled with community detention should be imposed, instead of the sentence of home detention, given Mr Bracey is a first offender in the District Court, his rehabilitative needs, and the time he has spent on home detention.
Respondent’s submissions
[27] Ms Litt for the respondent, submits that the starting point was appropriate and within range. The end sentence was not manifestly excessive, and it appropriately reflects the culpability of the offending. The appropriate discounts for mitigating features were properly applied.
[28] In relation to the burglary in which the boat was stolen, the Crown does not accept that there was no plan, or that it was an opportunistic attempt to go fishing. The District Court Judge had found it was premeditated. The burglary and accompanying theft occurred in West Auckland, and Mr Bracey was located the next day in the Whangārei area. The pre-sentence report had recorded that, “In regards to the burglary of the boat, fishing equipment and petrol/diesel [Mr Bracey] states it was planned and thought out”.
[29] Ms Litt submits that the District Court Judge considered Mr Bracey’s youth and appropriate deductions were made. The Judge allowed a significant reduction despite being well aware of the appellant’s Youth Court history.
[30] In relation to the psychological report that Mr Bracey now seeks to rely on, Ms Litt submits that the youth factors of impulsivity and rehabilitative needs are identified in the pre-sentence report and were applied in this case in any event.
Analysis
Starting point
[31] There is no tariff case for burglary. However, the following cases provide some assistance.
[32] In R v Columbus, the Court of Appeal, after referring to inconsistencies in approaches to starting points between burglary and other offending, offered guidance in relation to setting the starting point:17
… As a Full Court of this Court has emphasised, the starting point identifies the culpability inherent in the offending by reference to its circumstances: R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 at [42]-[44] (CA). The same principle applies in burglary sentencing, where “the intrinsic nature and gravity of the offence charged” is the primary consideration: R v Power [1973] 2 NZLR 617 at 618 (CA). The dual purposes of transparency and of providing a basis for assessing consistency between cases are served by this approach.
[33] In Columbus, the appellant appealed against a sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment imposed on him in the District Court following his pleas of guilty to one charge of burglary, two charges of theft, one charge of possession of cannabis and one charge of possession of a pipe. The appellant had forced open the vehicle access door of a garage of a residential property causing damage which cost
$672 to repair. He stole a mountain bike together with gardening tools and a tool box. He pawned the bike later that day but it was recovered by the police. The appellant then stole a lawnmower from the rear of a residential property a few days later. The cost of its replacement was $479.
[34] While on bail the appellant drove to a service station, put $68 worth of petrol into his vehicle but departed without paying. When his property was searched under warrant some days later, he acknowledged that a cannabis pipe and some loose cannabis leaf found there belonged to him.
[35] After initially pleading not guilty to all the charges the appellant later changed his pleas to guilty on the charges of burglary, theft of a lawnmower together with the theft of petrol and the cannabis offences. The sentencing Judge treated the burglary charge as the lead offence. He acknowledged that it was at the minor end of the scale but took into account the totality of the appellant’s offending and his history of dishonest offending in fixing a global starting point of three and a half years’ imprisonment.
17 R v Columbus [2008] NZCA 192 at [13].
[36] The Court of Appeal considered an adjusted starting point of one a half years’ imprisonment was appropriate and that the appellant’s previous history justified a further increase of one year. The appropriate end adjusted starting point for the sentence of burglary was thus two and a half years’ imprisonment. It followed that the starting point adopted by the Judge of three and a half years was excessive.18
[37] In Rarere v Police, after a defended hearing, the appellant was convicted on charges of burglary, unlawfully taking a motorcycle and dangerous driving.19 He had been sentenced in the District Court to two and a half years’ imprisonment on each of the burglary and unlawful taking charges with a cumulative sentence of three months’ imprisonment on the dangerous driving charge, resulting in a total effective sentence of two years and nine months’ imprisonment.
[38]The facts in Rarere were that the complainant had parked his brand new
$37,000 Harley Davidson motorcycle immediately outside his work premises in the parking area at the front of the property. It was parked close to the door of the property. The appellant and others manhandled the motorcycle onto a trailer attached to a car they were using and made off with the motorcycle. The alarm on the motorcycle activated. The appellant who was driving the car towing the trailer was later apprehended, but not before a collision which derailed the trailer causing the motorcycle to fly through the air. It was thus seriously damaged.
[39] In the High Court the appellant submitted that the totality of the offending justified a starting point of only eighteen months to two years’ imprisonment. In a helpful discussion Toogood J referred to previous cases as follows:
[25] Although dated, Bell v Police provides a good point of comparison with the current case. There, Gendall J upheld an appeal against sentence on charges of unlawful taking of motor vehicle, theft and reckless driving while disqualified. He replaced the end sentence of four years’ imprisonment with a starting point of four years less a 25 per cent discount to reflect a guilty plea and the age of the offender. The 18-year old offender in that case had a history of 40 dishonesty convictions.
[26] The approach in Bell was followed by Randerson J in Graham. In that case, there had been three unlawful conversions and a burglary together with a dangerous driving charge. A starting point of four years was presumed on
18 At [20].
19 Rarere v Police [2012] NZHC 779.
appeal by Randerson J and, allowing a 25 per cent discount for youth and guilty plea, the three-year end sentence was upheld.
[27] In Taki, Joseph Williams J held that the totality of the offending (which involved unlawful taking of motor vehicle, theft and being in an enclosed yard) had similar elements to Bell and Graham, both of which involved a combination of car conversion and theft. Nonetheless, the overall offending was less serious than that in Bell and Graham. He declined to interfere with the sentence imposed, holding that the difference in culpability was reflected in the starting point of three years (compared with four years in those cases).
[40] Having regard to the cases referred to above, Toogood J considered that there could be no complaint about the District Court’s two and a half year starting point.
[41] In Tito v Police the appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of burglary, driving with excess breath alcohol (third and subsequent), failing to stop when followed by red and blue flashing lights, being an unlicenced driver failed to comply and reckless driving. 20
[42] The facts of the burglary were that some time between 9 pm and 7 am the appellant went on to a residential property. He walked down the driveway, entered an open garage and stole a Ford Ranger Utility vehicle that had been left unlocked with the keys in it. The value of the vehicle, said to be fairly late-model, was uncertain.
[43] The sentencing Judge adopted a four year starting point for all the offending on a totality basis. He reduced the starting point by 25 per cent as credit for an early guilty plea and then imposed an end sentence of three years on the burglary charge with concurrent sentences on all the other charges. There is a helpful discussion in the judgment on appeal of previous cases as follows:
[22] Ms Chandra [for the appellant] submitted that this case was comparable to R v Columbus, which involved the forcible entry to a garage and the theft of property worth $672. The Court of Appeal accepted that the offending was opportunistic and spontaneous and reduced the original starting point to one year of imprisonment for the burglary charge (before uplifting for other offending). Ms Chandra noted that, although the value of the vehicle Mr Tito stole was higher than the value of the property taken in Columbus, he had not forced entry as the defendant in Columbus had; the garage was open and the vehicle unlocked with the keys inside it.
20 Tito v Police [2018] NZHC 3370.
[23] Ms Vaili [for the respondent] drew a different comparison. She pointed out that the offending in Columbus occurred during the day whereas the present offending occurred at night, with the inevitable risk of confrontation with occupants. She suggested that Poole v R21 and Knock v Police22 were more comparable to the present offending. I agree.
[24] In Poole, the appellant forced entry to a residential address, taking items to a value of about $2,500 before embarking on other driving-related offending. The initial starting point of three years for the burglary taken in the District Court was reduced to 18 months on appeal.
[25] In Knock, the appellant stole a vehicle parked in a driveway, reversing at speed and causing damage to a fence and letterbox before continuing to commit other driving offences. The sentencing Judge took a 20-month starting point and Ellis J declined to interfere with that on appeal.
[44] The Judge on appeal considered an appropriate starting point for the burglary would have been 18 months.
[45] In this case the second burglary was of commercial premises, not a residential address. There was therefore less of a risk that there would be people on the premises and consequential harm to them. On the other hand, it was a pre-meditated and planned offence, and property of significant value was stolen. The boat was valued at approximately $55,000 and the items loaded into the boat were valued at approximately $10,000. Mr Bracey was located with the stolen property some distance away. In all those circumstances a starting point of 18 months was not manifestly excessive.
[46] The 12 months’ imprisonment for the burglary of his brother’s home is also within range. Although the BMW was taken from a residential address, the unlawful access was during the daytime. Mr Bracey, having lived with his brother around 4-5 months earlier, might be taken to have known his brother would be at work at the time. There was no damage to the property as it appears Mr Bracey used keys in his possession from when he had lived with his brother. On the other hand, the BMW was not located until almost one month later. Taking into account the circumstances of the burglary and by reference to the cases discussed, the starting point of 12 months was not manifestly excessive.
21 Poole v R [2014] NZHC 1226.
22 Knock v Police [2017] NZHC 910.
[47] I accept Mr Ross’s submission that the additional two one-month uplifts for the more minor offences are unprincipled.
[48] As a result, the starting point would be two years and six months’ imprisonment (rather than two years and eight months).
Youth Discount
[49] The District Court did take the appellant’s young age into account at sentencing. She stated that:23
[12] … there should be an extra 15 per cent given to you for a number of factors, including that you are young (you are only 18). That is somewhat undercut by the fact that you have an offending history in the Youth Court and also came to attention of the authorities from the sound of things before that as well, but nonetheless you are still only 18 and a half years old. In addition to that, you have spent 14 days in prison and you have been on a 24-hour curfew for about three months.
[50]But she also added:
[14] I have to say, looking at the scale of your offending, the premeditation of some of it, the sense of entitlement you seem to have and the lack of conscience about stealing from other people, I am very concerned that your character is such that if you do not do some very serious work on yourself you are going to be back before the courts. The fact that you have been appearing in the Youth Court just increases my concern. You have the support of your grandparents and I hope that that will help you avoid a reappearance in this court.
[51] I am satisfied that the Judge appropriately considered Mr Bracey’s youth at sentencing. In particular, she took his capacity for rehabilitation into account. A discount of 15 per cent as given by the Judge was appropriate.
Psychological report
[52] Mr Ross makes it clear that there is no criticism levelled at counsel who appeared for Mr Bracey in the District Court in not putting the psychological report before that Court. Mr Ross explains that the report was on the Youth Court file; sentencing occurred when the country was operating under Covid Alert Levels
23 At [12].
towards the end of last year; and Mr Bracey would not have had the “wherewithal” to let counsel know of the existence of the report.
[53] Although the evidence was available and could have been put before the District Court Judge and is accordingly not fresh evidence, I admit the report on appeal in the interests of justice.24
[54] In 2010 when Mr Bracey was aged seven, a referral was made to Te Roopu Kimiora: Community Mental Health and Addiction Services. At that time Mr Bracey was said to be showing a considerable escalation in problematic behaviour and emotional distress. The psychiatrist involved at the time noted the diagnosis of ADHD. He reported on-going problems with attention, hyperactivity and impulsivity along with oppositional behaviour not amounting to ODD.25
[55] The 2018 report records the appellant did not have an easy childhood. His parents split up when he was young, and he often felt his mother placed his needs after hers and his sister’s. After his mother was imprisoned in 2016, he and his sister were placed in their father and stepmother’s care. They attempted to provide the appellant with boundaries but did not always have the time. He had been suspended from schools for stealing, lying, as well as some bullying behaviour.
[56]In formulating the findings, the report states:
There was instability in Jacob’s family life from an early age (e.g. parents splitting up, reported stress and well-being challenges for his single Mum). It appears that this may have combined with his Neurodevelopmental problems and caused escalated behaviour difficulties (e.g., hyperactivity, being seen as “uncontrollable”). This may have contributed further to escalated parenting stress and maladaptive responses. … Jacob’s emotional distress and behaviour difficulties at school and home (aged about 7 years) appear to have been partially mitigated with medication and support for managing his behaviour.
…
Jacob’s behaviour problems continued and further developed (e.g. stealing) in the context of his perception of poor family relationships. …
Jacob’s conduct behaviour has escalated more recently in the context of a serious event in his family life (the imprisonment of his mother) and other
24 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 335.
25 Oppositional Defiant Disorder.
significant changes including reduced emotional support (no contact with Mum). … In this context of stress and change Jacob’s externalising behaviour has been on-going and increased in seriousness.
[57] While the report is now out of date and for that reason cannot be said to be overly compelling, there is nevertheless a basis for reaching the view that personal factors in Mr Bracey’s early life have a causal connection to his offending. I give a five per cent discount for his personal factors.
Sentencing calculation
[58] In summary, my sentencing calculation is a starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment with deductions of 20 per cent (guilty plea), 15 per cent (youth) and five per cent (personal factors). This results in a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment or nine months’ home detention. While this is only one month less than the original sentence, I do not consider that to allow the appeal would be tinkering with the sentence. That is because the sentence is short, and the offender young. It is therefore significant enough to consider that the original sentence was manifestly excessive. Or, looked at it in another way, it could be said there was an error in sentencing as the Judge (through no fault of hers) did not consider the psychologist’s report.
Intensive supervision and community detention
[59] The above conclusion leads to a further consideration and that is whether instead of substituting a sentence of nine months’ home detention, the Court should consider a sentence of intensive supervision coupled with a sentence of community detention. Mr Ross urged the Court to do so.
[60] Mr Ross submits that such a sentence would ensure the sentence has more of a rehabilitative focus and would ensure that Mr Bracey is engaged in that process of rehabilitation. Mr Ross says that at present Mr Bracey is serving his home detention sentence at the home of his step-grandparents. While they are supportive, there is very little input from the Probation Service. Accordingly, there is little focus on Mr Bracey’s rehabilitation. Mr Ross submits that a sentence of intensive supervision
would give more of a focus on rehabilitation and community detention would mean a curfew at night.
[61] In Vaeau v Police, the offender was charged with similar but more serious offences: attempted burglary, seven charges of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle and one charge of possession instruments for conversion.26 However, prior to sentencing, he was in custody for over 10 months on remand and on 23-hour lockdown for significant periods so that he would not come into contact with the adult inmates. Therefore, Thomas J considered the punitive aspect of the sentence already served and sentenced him to 14 months’ intensive supervision.
[62] In Marsters v Police, the offender was sentenced on charges of receiving, being unlawfully in a closed yard, possession of an offensive weapon and burglary.27 His offending related largely to burglary of people’s homes. Whata J found that:
Turning then to the purposes and principles of sentencing, I consider that a proper balance of deterrence, accountability, public protection and rehabilitation can be achieved through the imposition of a 10 month period of intensive supervision for a first offence in the District Court jurisdiction by a 17 year old, for a daylight burglary with no particularly aggravating features.
[63] Having regard to the contents of the psychological report (although somewhat outdated), I consider a sentence of intensive supervision coupled with a sentence of community detention, would be more appropriate than a sentence of home detention. As it is Mr Bracey’s first offence in the District Court, and he is young, a better balance of the purposes and principles of sentencing would have more of a focus on rehabilitation.
[64] In the event that the Court was minded to allow the appeal, Mr Ross sought an order that the psychological report be provided to the Probation Service. The purpose of doing so would be to inform the relevant probation officer as to Mr Bracey’s background issues. It will assist the Probation Office in determining the appropriate further assistance. The Crown did not oppose such an order.
26 Vaeau v Police above n 16.
27 Marsters v Police above n 16.
Result
[65] I allow the appeal. The two concurrent sentences of home detention (10 months and four months) are quashed. I substitute a sentence of 12 months’ intensive supervision and six months’ community detention on the burglary charge involving the burglary of the commercial premises. I substitute a sentence of six months’ intensive supervision and six months’ community detention on the burglary of the residential premises, to be served concurrently. Community detention is to be served at the existing home detention address with a curfew period from 7 pm until 6 am seven days a week.
[66] I impose a special condition of intensive supervision pursuant to s 54G of the Sentencing Act 2002 that Mr Bracey attend any programme directed by a probation officer to reduce the likelihood of further offending through his rehabilitation and reintegration.
[67] I also direct that the psychological report referred to in this judgment be provided to the Probation Service to assist in formulating the appropriate rehabilitative programme for Mr Bracey.
Gordon J
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