Bowman v Police

Case

[2017] NZHC 884

4 May 2017

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY

CRI 2017-443-5 [2017] NZHC 884

BETWEEN

HURA BOWMAN

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 2 May 2017

Counsel:

N Bourke for Appellant
G N Milne for Respondent

Judgment:

4 May 2017

JUDGMENT OF ELLIS J

[1]      On 15 March 2017, Mr Bowman was sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment

for:1

(a)       three charges of burglary; and

(b)      one charge of receiving.2

[2]      He now appeals against that sentence on a number of grounds.

1      Police v Bowman [2017] NZDC 5389.

2      He was also convicted and discharged on one charge of possession of cannabis, one charge of breach of community work and one charge of breach of supervision.

BOWMAN v POLICE [2017] NZHC 884 [3 May 2017]

The relevant offending

[3]      On 3 September 2016, an associate of Mr Bowman’s, Mr Boyle, went to a house in Hawera and stole two televisions, a tablet and a playstation, valued at around $2,220.  He took these things to Mr Bowman’s home and together they sold them to persons unknown. Those events gave rise to the receiving charge.

[4]      The following day, Messrs Boyle and Bowman were driving around Hawera. They parked their car outside a house there and knocked on the door.  They were seen by someone across the road.  They went around the back where they found the back door was unlocked.  Both men went inside.  Mr Bowman took one television to the back door.  He told Mr Boyle there was another one.  Mr Boyle then took both televisions and put them in the back of their car.  The men also took some jewellery. The total value of the things taken was around $1,550.

[5]      Early in the morning of 9 September 2016, the two men drove to a house in Normanby.   Mr Boyle stayed in the car while Mr Bowman knocked, first on the front, and then the back door.   Again, the back door was unlocked and both men entered the house. They took property from inside valued at approximately $1,050.

[6]      Later that same morning, they parked in a driveway in Egmont Street in Hawera.  Mr Bowman told Mr Boyle to check out the house.  A neighbour saw them both and called Police.   In the meantime, Mr Boyle forced open a door and went inside.  Mr Bowman checked out the garage.  Mr Boyle picked up something from the lounge but when he saw a Police car pull into the drive he ran from the address empty-handed.

[7]      Mr Boyle went to a house on Reid Avenue and changed his jersey.  Then he went to the Hawera Police station and made a complaint that his car had been stolen. He was later arrested, as was Mr Bowman.  The car they had been driving, which belonged to Mr Boyle’s father, was found at the Egmont Street address, with the keys still in the ignition.  Stolen property was found in the car.

[8]      A search conducted at the Police Station revealed that Mr Bowman was in possession of a small usable quantity of cannabis.

Subsequent events and sentencing

[9]      Mr Bowman  first appeared  on  10  September  2016  and  was  bailed  on  a

24 hour curfew to his parents’ address.  At that point both he and Mr Boyle were facing three other burglary charges.  Mr Bowman was at that point represented by the same lawyer as Mr Boyle.

[10]     Following the instruction of new counsel, Mr Bourke, the Police accepted Mr Bourke’s contention that Mr Bowman’s role in the offending had been secondary to Mr Boyle’s and that he was not involved in the other three burglaries.  Those three charges  against  Mr  Bowman  were  then  withdrawn,  and  he  pleaded  guilty  on

13 December 2016.

[11]     Both  Mr  Bowman  and  Mr  Boyle  appeared  before  Judge  Sygrove  for sentencing on 15 February 2016.

Mr Boyle

[12]     Mr Boyle had pleaded guilty to all the original six charges of burglary and one  of  theft  (relating  to  the  property  said  to  have  then  been  received  by Mr Bowman).  On 15 February Judge Sygrove:3

(a)       adopted a starting point of 30 months;

(b)uplifted by four months for the number of offences, their seriousness, and previous convictions;

(c)       discounted by 10 months for reparation and restorative justice; (d)     reduced by six months for guilty pleas; and

(e)       converted  the  end  sentence  of  18  months  to  nine  months’ home

detention.

3      Police v Boyle [2017] NZDC 5567.

Mr Bowman

[13]     Because Mr Bowman’s proposed home detention address (which was the same as that to which he had been bailed) had not yet been checked for electronic monitoring suitability he was not sentenced on 15 February but remanded to enable an updated PAC report to be prepared.  He was advised by the Judge that he would do well to present on the next occasion with a reparation payment.

[14]     Mr Bowman was sentenced by Judge Sygrove on 15 March 2017.  The Judge began by noting that he had two burglary convictions in 2014.   He recorded the distress expressed by the victims in their statements. Then, he said:

[5]       The pre-sentence report recommends a sentence of imprisonment. The address that you have given as a home detention address they do not regard as suitable.  The police certainly do not regard it as suitable because there  have  been  callouts  to  that  address  on  two  occasions  already,

17 November and 7 August.  The probation officer who wrote the report and is in Court today, she does not regard the address as appropriate.  You are unable to offer reparation unlike your co-offender and your type of offending is described in Senior v Police as a spree burglar.  You can expect a sentence of  around  four  years’ imprisonment.    Spree  burglars  appear  for  a  large number of burglaries committed within a short space of time.  They tend to be  candid  with  the  police  usually  in  the  form  of  admissions  to  some burglaries  that  result  in  those  burglaries  and  potentially  other  burglaries being solved.  Their co-operation is a significant sentencing factor that must be balanced with the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation. The factors in Nguyen that need to be considered are the degree of planning and sophistication, that was minimal, the nature of the premises entered, private home, the kind and value of property stolen substantial, high, extent of offending three burglaries.   You fit within those categories quite well Mr Bowman.  And based on that I regard the starting point for you taking into account the applicable authorities and statutory factors as one of three years’ imprisonment.  The offences were committed while you were on bail subject to a sentence and the number, seriousness, date and relevance of previous convictions justify an uplift of eight months’ imprisonment.  There are not mitigating factors so far as you are concerned.  You have breached community work.  You have breached intensive supervision and I am sorry to say that your lawyer’s submissions to me to impose home detention all on deaf ears.  Do not commit the crime if you cannot do the time Mr Bowman. You are sentenced to 33 months’ imprisonment.

The appeal

[15]     Mr Bowman’s sentence appeal was brought on the following grounds: (a)     the three year starting point was excessive;

(b)      the eight month uplift was excessive;

(c)      the sentence was inconsistent with Mr Boyle’s;

(d)      no discount was given for the six months he spent on 24 hour curfew; (e)     no credit was given for his youth (he is 20 years old); and

(f)       the  end  sentence  was  outside  the  available  range,  and  manifestly excessive.

Discussion

[16]     I agree with Mr Bourke that the three year starting point cannot be justified when compared with the 30 month starting point adopted for Mr Boyle.  Ms Milne for the Crown did not disagree.  In R v Lawson the Court of Appeal said:4

The disparity argument is not infrequently raised in this Court. For that reason we reiterate that differences in the length, and sometimes the type of sentence imposed on co-offenders, unfair although they may sometimes appear  to  be  in  the  view  of  co-offenders  who  think  they  suffer  by comparison,  are  not  of  themselves  enough  to  found  an  appeal  against sentence on a disparity argument. Sentencing is not an exact science and the circumstances of one offender can rarely be closely compared with those of another. The sentencing Judge must not only consider the relative involvement of the individuals in the offence but also the mitigating factors affecting each. But a marked difference in the sentences imposed on co- offenders,  and  for  which  no  justification  can  be  shown,  may  be  of importance to the administration of justice generally in that such a marked and unjustified difference will tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Courts must bear in mind that public confidence in the administration   of  justice  is   best   preserved   if  justice   appears  to   be administered evenhandedly. It is for this reason that a disparity in sentences imposed on co-offenders may justify a reduction in a sentence imposed on one which would otherwise be appropriate. But the test of intervention by an appellate Court is not merely whether an offender feels a sense of grievance

4      R v Lawson [1982] 2 NZLR 219 (CA) at 223 (citations omitted).

over the sentence imposed on him compared with that imposed on his fellow offender but whether the disparity is such as not to be consonant with the appearance of justice. A number of expressions have been used to capture this concept, namely “the disparity is so gross that a justifiable sense of injustice would persist”, that right-thinking members of the public are likely to say “there is something wrong here”.   But the test is objective; not subjective. It is not merely whether the offender thinks that he has been unfairly treated but whether there is a real justification for that grievance; whether a reasonably minded independent observer aware of all the circumstances  of  the  offence  and  of  the  offenders  would  think  that something had gone wrong with the administration of justice.

[17]     Here, the signal point here is that Mr Boyle was sentenced for twice as many burglaries (including those three in which Mr Bowman was involved).  While it was open to the Judge not to accept that Mr Boyle was the ring-leader (notwithstanding the Police position) he did not express that view.  Nor does the Summary of Facts disclose any obvious basis for such.  Accordingly the reasons for adopting a higher starting point  for Mr  Bowman  is  neither made  explicit  and  nor is  it  obviously implicit.   Those matters which might legitimately form the basis of a distinction between the two men and the two sentences (in particular Mr Boyle’s payment of reparation and his participation in the restorative justice process) were separately dealt with by the Judge.   In my view the disparity between the starting points here is such that it meets the thresholds referred to in Lawson.

[18]     Secondly, there is the matter of the eight month uplift.

[19]     The  Judge  was  right  to  note  that  the  offending  was  committed  while Mr Bowman remained subject to another sentence, although it seems relevant that he had, in fact, completed 162 out of his 180 hours’ community work sentence.5    The Judge’s statement that he was also on bail at the time of his offending was, however, mistaken.6     And in terms of the “the number, seriousness, date and relevance of previous convictions” Mr Bowman had only four dishonesty convictions7  and had

never before received a custodial sentence.

5      He was precluded from completing the remaining 18 hours before sentencing by his 24 hour curfew.

6      He  did  have active charges for  breach of supervision and  community work but  had  been remanded at large.

7      Two for burglary, one for theft (under $500) and one for unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.

[20]     And thirdly there is the question of the six months spent on 24 hour curfew, more or less without incident.8     While I accept that a sentencing Court is only obliged  by  law  to  take  into  account  the  fact  of  time  spent  on  EM  bail,  it  is nonetheless commonplace to recognise other cases where an offender has already had a very real restriction placed on his liberty.   I accept Mr Bourke’s submission that such a restriction is particularly acute where a 20 year old man has been required

to live for some considerable time in very close quarters with his parents and three younger siblings with no opportunity for relief or escape.  Theirs is a modest house. Mr Bowman was required to share a bedroom with his younger brother.

[21]     The combined effect of the above three matters is, I think, that Mr Bowman’s

end sentence is inevitably manifestly excessive.  For myself, I would adopt:

(a)       a starting point on the burglary charges of no more than 24 months, given Mr Bowman’s secondary role;9

(b)an  uplift  of  no  more  than  four  months  for  relevant  previous convictions and offending while subject to a sentence;10

(c)       a discount of two months for time spent on 24 hour curfew; and

(d)      a 25 percent discount for guilty plea (as did the Judge).

[22]     That  would  yield  an  end  sentence  of  20  months’ imprisonment.    Home detention therefore becomes a sentencing option and in my view it is the least restrictive one here.  It is trite that home detention carries a considerable measure of deterrence and denunciation.  Mr Bowman’s relative youth and the fact he has never

previously been subject to an EM sentence are also relevant factors.

8      There was one recorded breach, where Mr Bowman went to the dairy to buy cigarettes.   No charge resulted.

9      In relation to the third burglary charge, for example, he did not even go inside the house or take anything.

10     Compare for example Newton v Police [2012] NZHC 2829 (three month uplift for 20 previous convictions (three for dishonesty) and offending on bail) and Kati v Police HC Napier CRI 2011-

441-19, 11 July 2011 (four month uplift for over 20 previous convictions in the District Court, including theft, wilful damage and unlawful taking).

[23]     The PAC report deemed Mr Bowman’s bail address technically feasible for home detention but not suitable due to the two call-outs that had occurred during his time on bail. Those call-outs were the result of friction between Mr Bowman and his brothers where his mother had called Police to help de-escalate the situation.   No charges were laid.

[24]     The PAC report also raised Mr Bowman’s parents’ criminal past but makes it quite clear that those days are behind them.  Both the Police and the District Court regarded  their  address  suitable  for  strict  bail  purposes.     I  also  record  that Mr Bowman’s parents have attended a number of his court appearances and continue to be supportive of him.

[25]     As Mr Bourke submitted, it is unusual to have a case where the suitability of a home detention address has been tested by a “dry run” of the kind that has occurred here.   Although not completely without incident the six months already spent by Mr Bowman at the address under 24 hour curfew is as good an indicator as any that the address is appropriate.  I note that if trouble nonetheless arises there is another address in Wellington that may be a suitable alternative.

Result

[26]   The appeal against sentence is allowed and the sentence of 33 months imprisonment is quashed.  A sentence of nine months’ home detention is substituted (which is intended to take account of the time Mr Bowman has already spent in custody) on standard and the following conditions:

(a)      the  sentence  will  commence  on  the  day  after  the  date  of  this judgment;

(b)upon his release from prison Mr Bowman is to travel directly to the home detention address, (his parents’ home in Hawera) where he is to await the attendance of a Probation Officer;

(c)       he  is  to  attend  alcohol  and  drug  counselling  as  directed  by  his

Probation Officer;

(d)he is to attend an assessment for Short Rehabilitative Programmes as directed by his Probation Officer and is to attend any counselling, treatment or programme recommended as a result of that assessment as directed by and to the satisfaction of his Probation Officer; and

(e)      he is to attend an assessment for a Tikanga Programme as directed by his Probation Officer and to attend and complete any counselling, treatment  or  programme  recommended  by  the  assessment  and  as

directed by and to the satisfaction of his Probation Officer.

Rebecca Ellis J

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