Bosson v Police
[2025] NZHC 1913
•14 July 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA NGĀMOTU ROHE
CRI-2025-443-22
[2025] NZHC 1913
BETWEEN ALISON JANE BOSSON
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 10 July 2025 Appearances:
S J Parry for Appellant
P M Lange for Respondent
Judgment:
14 July 2025
Reissued:
21 July 2025
JUDGMENT OF McQUEEN J
[1] Ms Bosson was sentenced on 30 April 2025 at the Hawera District Court, following the entry of guilty pleas, in relation to the following charges:1
(a)possession for supply of cannabis plants;2
(b)two charges of selling, giving, supplying, dealing cannabis plant;3 and
(c)permitting premises to be used for cannabis offending, namely cultivating cannabis.4
1 Police v Bosson [2025] NZDC 9564.
2 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(f): maximum penalty eight years’ imprisonment.
3 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(1)(d): maximum penalty eight years’ imprisonment.
4 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 12: maximum penalty three years’ imprisonment.
BOSSON v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 1913 [14 July 2025]
[2] Ms Bosson was sentenced to two years and five months’ imprisonment. She now appeals against the sentence on the basis it is manifestly excessive because the sentencing Judge erred in assessing the quantity of cannabis possessed for supply, the starting point was too high and insufficient credit was given for her personal circumstances.
[3] The Police oppose the appeal, submitting that the end sentence is not manifestly excessive.
[4]For the reasons that follow, the appeal is allowed.
The offending
Offers cannabis
[5] Between 30 July 2024 and 27 August 2024 Ms Bosson offered cannabis plant on 12 different occasions via text messages.
Supply cannabis
[6] Between 1 August 2024 and 29 August 2024 Ms Bosson supplied cannabis plant on five different occasions via text messages.
Possession for supply of cannabis
[7] On 12 October 2024, during a search warrant at Ms Bosson’s address, Police located a large plastic container with six zip lock bags, one paper bag and a smaller plastic container. The total cannabis located in the container was 432 grams, with on average 57 grams contained in each of the zip lock bags. The Police also located two sets of scales and snap lock bags in the kitchen.
Permitting premises
[8] During the same search, Police located 96 cannabis plants in various stages of growth potted individually in a spare bedroom. In the wardrobe, a cannabis plant was hanging to dry, and another 886 grams of dried cannabis was located in a bag.
[9] In the garage, Police located a large double room grow tent for hydroponics with three old plants that had been cultivated. There was also equipment such as fans, heat lamps and lights.
[10] The total amount of dried cannabis located at Ms Bosson’s address was 1318 grams of cannabis with a total street value of approximately $7,000.
Decision under appeal
[11] The District Court Judge set out the charges as alleged in the summary of facts. The Judge had the benefit of written and oral submissions from the Police and Ms Bosson’s counsel, a letter from Ms Bosson and a Provision of Advice to Courts (PAC) report.
[12] The Judge considered the PAC report. First, the report noted Ms Bosson’s criminal history, which spans 31 years and includes 10 convictions for drug-related offending. In relation to the most recent drug-related conviction, Ms Bosson was sentenced in 2021 for virtually identical offending. Next, the report recorded that there is a slight increase in the frequency and seriousness of Ms Bosson’s offending. Ms Bosson was assessed as having a high risk of reoffending unless she addressed her alcohol, drug and gambling issues and left her current circle of friends. The report also noted that Ms Bosson explained she was offending to keep her head above water to pay bills. The report writer infers that Ms Bosson possibly uses the money from drugs to sustain her addictions of gambling and alcohol use. The report records Ms Bosson experienced mental health issues on being released from prison in February 2022. The report recommended imprisonment given the seriousness of the charges, and the fact that her most recent sentence of imprisonment did not deter her from reoffending.
[13] The Judge acknowledged the aspects of the PAC report that discussed Ms Bosson’s personal circumstances. However, the Judge said that Ms Bosson was a 51-year-old mother and grandmother who had been ensconced in drug offending without any kind of deterrence.
[14] Possession for supply was taken as the lead charge, as agreed by counsel, to fix the starting point. The guideline case of R v Terewi was adopted.5 The Judge placed Ms Bosson’s offending in category 2 as it involved small-scale offending for commercial purposes. Category 2 generally has a range from two to four years’ imprisonment. Ms Bosson’s counsel proposed two years and two months as the starting point, while the Police said three years and three months to three years and six months was more appropriate.
[15] Taking into account the submissions and cases referred to, the Judge adopted a starting point of two years and eight months’ imprisonment for possession for supply of 1312 grams, and uplifts of four months for the other charges and a further four months for previous convictions for similar offending. The Judge gave Ms Bosson a 25 per cent guilty plea credit and five per cent for personal factors. The Judge calculated that to be 29.2 months or rounded to two years and five months’ imprisonment. As that was out of range for home detention (as it was not a short-term sentence of imprisonment) that was the final sentence.
Approach on appeal against sentence
[16] Under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, an appeal against sentence must only be allowed if the Court is satisfied that, for any reason, there was a material error in the sentence imposed and a different sentence should have been imposed.6 The focus is on the final sentence reached, rather than the process by which it is reached.7
[17] The Court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles. Although s 250 does not use the expression “manifestly excessive”, it is a principle that is well-established in the Court’s approach to determining the extent of the error in sentencing appeals.8
5 R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA).
6 Section 250(2); and Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [30].
7 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
8 Tutakangahau v R, above n 6, at [32]–[35]; and R v Shipton [2007] 2 NZLR 218 (CA) at [138]– [140].
The appeal
[18]Ms Bosson pursues her appeal against sentence on the following grounds:
(a)the sentencing Judge erred in the treatment of the quantity of cannabis possessed by Ms Bosson (specifically) for supply;
(b)the sentencing starting point was too high; and
(c)there was insufficient credit given for her personal circumstances.
[19] On behalf of Ms Bosson, Mr Parry submits that these errors individually and collectively gave rise to a sentence that is manifestly excessive. The appropriate sentence is one of an electronically monitored sentence.
Treatment of quantity of cannabis for supply
[20] Mr Parry submits that there was a material error as the Judge arrived at a starting point for the lead charge of possession for supply with reference to the total quantity of cannabis found at Ms Bosson’s address (1312 grams) rather than the amount which was attributed to that charge in the summary of facts (432 grams). Mr Parry says that only 432 grams of cannabis is attributed as belonging to Ms Bosson and being possessed by her for supply. There is nothing in the summary of facts to support the position taken by the Judge as regards to the relevancy of the additional 882 grams to the start point on the lead charge. Rather the 882 grams coincides with the charge of permitting to use premises for cultivating cannabis. Mr Parry says this approach was an unwarranted inferential gloss on the summary of facts.
[21] Mr Parry submits as a subsidiary point that, in any event, the additional 882 grams has little or no commercial value because it is low-quality cannabis (referred to as cabbage).9 He notes that while this distinction is not made explicitly in the summary of facts, it is nonetheless implicit in the fact that the figure was adjusted in the amended summary of facts. The essence of this argument appears to be that this cannabis would never have been used for supply and therefore could not be counted
9 R v Coe [2021] NZHC 3242 at [6]; and Commissioner of Police v Heron [2024] NZHC 2497.
towards the possession for supply charge. Mr Parry also maintains that the $7,000 figure is itself problematic in the sense that it would appear to unduly inflate the value of the “cabbage” material. However, he accepts that on appeal he cannot revisit the summary of facts.
[22] While counsel for the Police, Ms Lange, acknowledged that the Judge may have incorrectly attributed the amount of cannabis for the lead charge, at the hearing Ms Lange submitted that the actual amount was 432 grams plus 57 grams according to her reading of the summary facts.
[23] Given this dispute as to the amount of cannabis that was possessed by Ms Bosson for supply, I permitted the parties to file a joint memorandum clarifying the issue following the hearing and they did so. It is accepted by the parties that the correct amount attributed to the possession for supply charge is 432 grams as indicated in the summary of facts. I proceed on that basis.
[24] There is clearly a material error by the sentencing Judge in the treatment of the quantity of cannabis attributed to the possession for supply charge. The Judge arrived at a starting point using the total amount of cannabis found at the address being 1312 grams rather than the amount which was attributed to possession for supply charge being 432 grams. I also agree with Ms Lange, as was accepted by Mr Parry, that Ms Bosson cannot challenge the commercial value of the cannabis as stated in the summary of facts. Those are facts to which Ms Bosson pleaded guilty to prior to sentencing. I turn to consider whether the starting point adopted for that charge was therefore too high.
Starting point for the possession for supply charge
[25] Mr Parry’s position is that the error led the Judge to impose a starting point that was too high for the possession for supply charge. Mr Parry suggests that the common
law has come a long way since R v Terewi, which sets out the sentencing bands for the cultivation of cannabis and the possession of cannabis for supply.10 In addition, Mr Parry submits that it is difficult to reconcile how Ms Bosson’s offending could have warranted a higher starting point than the cases the Judge relied on in setting Ms Bosson’s starting point. Having regard to the later negative treatment of Terewi and to sentencing decisions for comparable offending, Ms Bosson’s starting point ought not to have exceeded two years’ imprisonment.
[26] Ms Lange submits that the overall sentence imposed reflects the full scope of the offending and properly accounts for Ms Bosson’s criminal conduct and culpability. The summary of facts illustrates that Ms Bosson had a significant level of involvement in permitting the use of her premises, which resulted in the discovery of 886 grams of cannabis and 99 cannabis plants. Ms Lange says this context is relevant to the assessment of Ms Bosson’s overall culpability. The adjusted starting point appropriately reflected the totality of the offending and cannot properly be characterised as manifestly excessive.
[27] As mentioned, the Judge adopted a starting point of two years and eight months’ imprisonment for possession for supply of 1312 grams of cannabis. I have concluded that the correct quantity of cannabis to be attributed to the lead charge— possession for supply—–is 432 grams. The cases relied on by the Judge to set the starting point were:
(a)Crouch v Police: this involved possession of 334 grams of cannabis for supply and the Judge adopted a starting point of two years’ imprisonment.11 That was category 2 of Terewi, and the context was inferred to be a small commercial operation from the amount of cannabis and cash found.
10 R v Terewi, above n 5, at [4]; and R v Keefe CA275/02, 28 November 2002 at [11]. The caselaw referred to by Mr Parry is R v Merton HC Auckland CRI-2009-044-2520, 7 May 2010 at [13]; R v Smyth [2017] NZCA 530 at [17]; Batchelor v R [2018] NZHC 3279 at [19]; Newton v Police [2019] NZHC 1245; and Teraki v R [2022] NZHC 2658.
11 Crouch v Police [2025] NZHC 739.
(b)Haeta v R: this relevantly involved possession of 487 grams of cannabis and $2,000 cash, and fell into the lower end of category 2 of Terewi which justified an uplift of one year imprisonment to a lead charge of possession of firearms.12 The sentencing Judge for Ms Bosson considered this meant it would have been a two-year starting point had it been the lead charge.
(c)Whaanga v R: this involved possession of 441.7 grams of cannabis,
339.7 grams of synthetics and $31,760 of cash located in one address.13 In a second address an additional 249.1 grams of cannabis, 131.7 grams of synthetics and $13,848.30 cash was located. This offending fell into category 2 of Terewi and attracted a starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment.
[28] I find the cases of Crouch and Thomas v R to be of assistance in setting a range for a starting point for Ms Bosson’s possession of 432 grams of cannabis for supply charge. Crouch involves a lesser quantity of cannabis than Ms Bosson’s case, being 334 grams, and resulted in a starting point of two years’ imprisonment. In comparison, Thomas involved 738 grams of cannabis head packaged in several bags at the appellant's home alongside digital scales, many unused self-sealing plastic bags, another 34 grams of cannabis head and $12,200 cash. A starting point of two years and four months’ imprisonment was considered appropriate.14
[29] Ms Bosson’s offending appears to fall between those two cases, although perhaps closer to Crouch given no cash was found at her address. Therefore, a more appropriate starting point for the possession for supply charge is likely two years and one month’s imprisonment. I am reinforced in this view by looking at Whaanga as this case involved a much greater quantity of cannabis and cash found at the address and it only attracted a starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment.
12 Haeta v R [2024] NZHC 2094.
13 Whaanga v R [2024] NZCA 29.
14 Thomas v R [2022] NZHC 2494 at [13].
[30] From a starting point of two years and eight months, the Judge applied uplifts of four months for the other charges and a further four months for previous convictions for similar offending.
[31] Mr Parry submits that the four-month uplift for the other three charges is stern but within range. He does not seek to dispute this on appeal. Ms Lange submits, instead, that a higher uplift for the other offences could have been warranted, perhaps even double that which was given by the sentencing Judge.
[32] No caselaw was referred to assist me on this point. In the circumstances, I do not consider that the Judge erred by applying the four-month uplift for the other charges. For completeness, I also consider the uplift of four months for similar previous offending was also within range.
[33] I now turn to consider the final ground of appeal before considering whether the overall sentence was manifestly excessive.
Adequacy of credit given for personal circumstances
[34] Mr Parry submits that the five per cent credit for Ms Bosson’s personal circumstances was inadequate. While Mr Parry acknowledges that there was limited material before the sentencing Judge concerning reliance on alcohol and drugs, he says that the PAC report is a sufficient basis to establish that addiction and deprivation were an operative and proximate factor for Ms Bosson’s offending. The PAC report writer, when discussing Ms Bosson’s risk of reoffending, was clear that her risk is inextricably bound up with her struggles with alcohol and gambling. Mr Parry says there is a causative contribution between her offending and her alcohol and drug addictions. He suggests a 15 per cent credit is justified.
[35] Mr Parry also notes that the sentencing remarks do not reference Ms Bosson’s unique family circumstances. He says those circumstances were required to be explicitly considered under s 8(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act 2002 and are particularly relevant when considering the end sentence. Also of note is that the PAC report writer did not interview any of Ms Bosson’s family before making an assessment that there are concerns about the proposed address, given the family’s circumstances. Mr Parry
submits that to the extent that Ms Bosson’s end sentence exceeded a short-term sentence of imprisonment, a discrete discount was warranted to bring Ms Bosson’s sentence within range of a sentence of home detention.
[36] An updating memorandum and affidavit, filed recently by Mr Parry, indicates that the family’s circumstances have now changed from that prior to sentencing. I infer this to mean that less weight is to be placed on Ms Bosson’s family circumstances when determining whether home detention was the appropriate sentence. This change in circumstances also means that the address which the PAC report assessed for the purpose of canvassing non-custodial sentences is no longer available.
[37] I agree with the Police submission that the Judge appropriately acknowledged the causative connection between Ms Bosson’s personal circumstances and the offending by applying the five per cent credit. The extent of that discount is consistent with sentencing principles. A larger credit may have been available if further information, such as an alcohol and drug report, had been available for sentencing. However, the material before the Court, namely the PAC report and letters from Ms Bosson and her daughter, supports the five per cent credit given for personal circumstances. There is no error here.
Conclusion
[38] The Judge erred in attributing the incorrect amount of cannabis for the possession for supply charge to determine the starting point and therefore the starting point was too high. A more appropriate starting point for the possession charge was one of two years and one month’s imprisonment. I consider that the uplifts and credits given by the Judge were within range and do not disturb them on appeal. Therefore, the end sentence would be one of 24.3 months or (rounded down) two years’ imprisonment.
[39] Mr Parry says that if the Court accepts the errors made by the sentencing Judge, then the appropriate end sentence becomes one of a short-term sentence of imprisonment (being two years or less) and Ms Bosson should be granted leave to apply for home detention if a suitable address became available. Mr Parry also says reducing the sentence to become a short-term sentence is significant for Ms Bosson as
it means, unlike a sentence above two years, her release is not dependent on the Parole Board, which provides some certainty for her and her family as to her release date.
[40] When standing back and assessing the sentence of two years and five months’ imprisonment, I consider the end sentence reached by the Judge was manifestly excessive. A different sentence should be imposed, namely a sentence of two years’ imprisonment. I agree with Mr Parry that this is significant such that it would be considered more than tinkering.
[41] As this is now a short-term sentence, it is within range to be commuted to home detention. There is no address available, therefore it is a question of whether leave should be reserved to Ms Bosson to apply for home detention should an address become available.
[42] I do not consider it appropriate to reserve leave for this purpose. I acknowledge Ms Bosson’s concerns about being released from prison to be able to spend time with her family, particularly her mother. That is not a reason alone to reserve leave to commute the sentence to home detention. The PAC report clearly states that Ms Bosson is assessed as having a high risk of reoffending, unless she begins to address her substance abuse and gambling issues and removes herself from her present circle of friends. Further, Ms Bosson has previously offended in a similar manner and has served a sentence of imprisonment for that offending. Ms Bosson then reoffended, which suggests a sterner sentence is necessary to fulfil the purposes of the Sentencing Act, including to denounce and deter Ms Bosson’s conduct. In the circumstances, the sentence to be imposed on appeal is two years’ imprisonment.
Special release conditions15
[43] The PAC report recommends four special conditions on release from prison. Three of the conditions relate to attending assessments for alcohol and drug counselling, problem gambling, and employment and training, together with
15 The judgment was recalled so special release conditions could be addressed. Following consideration of memoranda from the parties the judgment is reissued with special conditions addressed.
attendance and completion of any recommended counselling, treatment or programme. The fourth condition is not to possess, consume or use alcohol or drugs. As already mentioned, the PAC report makes clear Ms Bosson’s ongoing issues with alcohol and its contribution to her offending.
[44] Section 93 of the Sentencing Act 2002 governs the imposition of release conditions for an offender sentenced to a short-term sentence.16 Relevantly, it provides that a special condition must not be imposed unless it is designed to reduce the risk of reoffending by the offender, or facilitate or promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender.17 If the Court imposes special conditions on the offender, it must specify when those conditions expire.18
[45] Ms Bosson takes no issue with the conditions relating to assessments and treatment for alcohol and drug use, problem gambling, and employment and training, nor the condition not to possess or use non-prescribed drugs. The Police agree these conditions are appropriate.
[46] However, the imposition of the proposed condition in relation to alcohol is in issue. Ms Bosson opposes its imposition, while the Police favour it.
[47] Mr Parry submits that the issue as to alcohol abuse by Ms Bosson is addressed by the proposed condition as to assessment and treatment for alcohol use. He says that a complete prohibition on alcohol sits poorly with the rehabilitative intention of the Parole Act 2002 having regard to the non-linear nature of rehabilitation and recovery from alcohol abuse. Mr Parry notes that there is not information before the Court to suggest Ms Bosson is a persistent alcoholic, in particular no Alcohol and Drug (AOD) report was ordered by the District Court before sentencing nor obtained by counsel. He is concerned that imposition of such a rigid condition has the potential to foment reoffending in the sense that it expands the scope of acts or omissions that could see Ms Bosson in breach of her release conditions. Mr Parry also proposes that the release conditions imposed on Ms Bosson should expire six months after her release date as
16 The kinds of special conditions that may be imposed include, without limitation, those set out in s 15(3) of the Parole Act 2002.
17 Sentencing Act 2002, s 93(3)(a) and subs (b).
18 Section 93(2)(b).
this is sufficient for the proposed assessment and treatment, and is consistent with the period for which a sentence of supervision (analogous to release conditions) is commonly imposed.
[48] Ms Lange submits that the imposition of the proposed condition in relation to alcohol will reduce Ms Bosson’s risk of reoffending and facilitate her rehabilitation and reintegration, given the nexus between Ms Bosson’s alcohol use and her offending. Ms Lange also says the special conditions should apply to the sentence expiry date.
[49] I am satisfied that the proposed special condition requiring abstinence from alcohol will reduce Ms Bosson’s risk of reoffending and facilitate her rehabilitation and reintegration. It is clear from the PAC report that alcohol abuse is a significant and longstanding issue for Ms Bosson. An AOD report is not necessary to see this is the case. Ms Bosson’s disclosure to the report writer that she has twice crashed a car under the influence of alcohol since her last period of imprisonment is concerning. These matters are consistent with the submission advanced by Mr Parry on appeal that Ms Bosson’s drug and alcohol problems were causative of the present offending, thus justifying further credit than was allowed by the sentencing Judge. I also record that Ms Bosson did agree to the abstinence condition at the time she was speaking to the report writer, although with some reluctance as she wished to have a drink when her father died. Given that Ms Bosson is presently in prison, an abstinence condition will continue her present status and best promote her participation in the other proposed assessments and treatments. I consider this will also reduce the risk she offends further and promotes her rehabilitation.
[50] For those same reasons, I consider the special conditions should apply to the sentence expiry date.
Result
[51]The appeal is allowed.
[52] I set aside the sentence of two years and five months’ imprisonment and substitute a sentence of two years’ imprisonment.
[53] The standard release conditions set out in s 14 of the Parole Act 2002 automatically apply until the sentence expiry date.
[54] The following special conditions are imposed on Ms Bosson’s release from prison until the sentence expiry date:
(a)To attend an assessment for alcohol and drug counselling as directed by a Probation Officer. To attend and complete any counselling, treatment or programme as recommended by the assessment as directed by and to the satisfaction of a Probation Officer.
(b)To attend an assessment for problem gambling as directed by a Probation Officer. To attend and complete any counselling, treatment or programme as recommended by the assessment as directed by and to the satisfaction of a Probation Officer.
(c)Not to possess, consume or use any alcohol or drugs not prescribed to you.
(d)To attend an assessment and engage with an Employment and Training Consultant as directed by a Probation Officer.
McQueen J
Solicitors:
Pipitea Chambers, Wellington for Appellant Crown Solicitor, New Plymouth for Respondent
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