Body Corporate 82981 v AIG Insurance New Zealand Limited
[2025] NZHC 1099
•8 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-003332 [2025] NZHC 1099
UNDER the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908
BETWEEN BODY CORPORATE 82981
Plaintiff
AND AIG INSURANCE NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Defendant
Hearing: 1 May 2025
Appearances: D R Kalderimis KC and T Nelson for the Plaintiff V S Wethey and E I D Fox for the Defendant
Judgment: 8 May 2025
Reissued: 16 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF VAN BOHEMEN J
[application for tailored discovery]
This judgment was reissued by me on 16 May 2025 under r 11.10 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……………………………..
Counsel/Solicitors:
D R Kalderimis KC, Wellington | T Nelson, Auckland Chapman Tripp, Wellington
Fee Langstone, Auckland
BODY CORPORATE 82981 v AIG INSURANCE NEW ZEALAND LTD [2025] NZHC 1099 [8 May 2025]
[1] This judgment concerns an application for tailored discovery in a proceeding set down for hearing on 5 August 2025 in a dispute between Body Corporate 82981, the body corporate for the Dominion Building at 78–80 Victoria Street, Wellington, and its insurer, AIG Insurance New Zealand Ltd (AIG), over the scope of cover under the contract of insurance between AIG and the Body Corporate entitled AIG Associations Combined Liability Insurance (the Policy).
Relevant background
[2] In a proceeding brought under pt 18 of the High Court Rules 2016, the Body Corporate seeks a declaration on the interpretation of the Policy and, in particular, on the scope of a clause in the Policy under which AIG declined the Body Corporate cover for costs incurred in defending a claim commenced in 2017 by two unit owners in the Dominion Building seeking damages and other relief against the Body Corporate and four current or former members of the committee of the Body Corporate.
[3] AIG declined cover on the basis of a clause which excluded liability relating to mould and other building defects (the Mould Exclusion). The Body Corporate alleges the Mould Exclusion should not be interpreted to exclude the costs for which it sought cover.
[4]The Body Corporate seeks a declaration that the Mould Exclusion:
(a)applies only in respect of the General & Products Liability insuring clause in the Policy but not in respect of the Association Liability, Management Liability and Association Reimbursement insuring clauses; or
(b)in any event, does not exclude AIG’s liability for defence costs in respect of the claims brought by the two unit owners.
[5] Accordingly, the interpretation, and thus the scope and effect, of the Mould Exclusion will be the focus of the hearing on 5 August 2025.
[6] The Body Corporate seeks discovery of published documents available to the parties before they entered into the Policy; published documents relating to the introduction of the Mould Exclusion into the standard form AIG policy; and published documents relating to AIG’s amendment of the scope of the Mould Exclusion after the parties had entered into the Policy. It also seeks discovery of any such documents held by Marsh Ltd, as agent for AIG.
The Policy and the Mould Exclusion
[7]The Policy relevantly defined cover under the Policy as follows:
Cover under these Insuring Clauses is afforded solely with respect to Claims first made against an Insured during the Policy Period … that are reported to the Insurer as required by this policy:
Professional Liability
The Insurer shall pay the Loss of any Insured
due to a Claim for Professional Liability.
Management Liability
The Insurer shall pay the unindemnified Loss of any Insured Person due to a claim for any Management Liability.
Association
Reimbursement
The Insurer shall pay an Association to the extent it has indemnified Loss of any Insured Person due to a Claim for Management Liability.
Association Liability
The Insurer shall pay the Loss of any Association due to a Claim made against the Association for any Management Liability.
…
General & Products Liability
The Insurer agrees to indemnify the Insured for all amounts which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay as a result of Claims or Legal Proceedings for Personal Injury or Property Damage.
[8]The Mould Exclusion clause relevantly provided:
This policy shall not cover Loss or make any payment in connection with any
Claim arising out of, based upon or attributable to any:
…
Liability for any Personal Injury or Property Damage or any other loss, injury, damage, cost or expense, including, but not limited to, losses, costs or expenses related to, arising from or associated with clean-up, remediation,
containment, removal or abatement, caused directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by:
(a)Any Fungus(i), Mould(s), mildew or yeast, or
(b)Any Spore(s) or toxins created or produced by or emanating from such Fungus(i), Mould(s), mildew or yeast, or
(c)Any substance, vapour, gas, or other emission or organic or inorganic body or substance produced by or arising out of any Fungus(i),
Mould(s), mildew or yeast, or
(d)Any material, product, building component, building or structure, or any concentration of moisture, water or other liquid within such material, product, building component, building or structure, that contains, harbours, nurtures or acts as a medium for any Fungus(i), Mould(s), mildew, yeast, or Spore(s) or toxins emanating therefrom,
Regardless of any other cause, event, material, product and/or building component that contributed concurrently or in any sequence to that loss, injury, damage, cost or expense.
The application for tailored discovery
[9]The Body Corporate seeks tailored discovery of three categories of documents:
(a)Category One: marketing materials published between 2014 and 2017 (inclusive) describing the scope of cover under the Policy and/or the scope of the Mould Exclusion.
(b)Category Two: documents relating to the introduction of the Mould Exclusion to the standard form terms of the Policy, to the extent that any documents were published to the market generally or sent by AIG to its customers or potential customers.
(c)Category Three: documents relating to amendments since, in or around 2018 of AIG’s standard policy wording concerning any mould/building defect exclusion, including documents relating to the addition, retention, or deletion of such an exclusion from the General Liability, Management Liability or Association Liability cover sections to the extent any documents were published to the market generally or sent by AIG to its customers or potential customers.
[10] An affidavit of Jamin Tomlinson of AIG suggested that the Policy, including the Mould Exclusion, were likely to have been drafted by Marsh and presented to AIG to underwrite. In light of this information, Mr Kalderimis KC, counsel for the Body Corporate, orally amended the last clause of Categories Two and Three to read “or sent by AIG, or its agent Marsh, to its customers or potential customers”.
Submissions for the Body Corporate
[11] Mr Kalderimis submits that the documents are relevant to the interpretation of the Policy, in particular the scope of the Mould Exclusion, and as stated by the Supreme Court in Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd, would assist in ascertaining:1
… the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.
[12] Mr Kalderimis says the documents in Category One constitute background knowledge available to the parties at the time and would inform meaning by showing how the Mould Exclusion was explained to the market, which would have informed objective meaning at contract formation. He notes the documents are limited to documents available to customers or potential customers generally and do not comprise pre-contract negotiations between AIG and the Body Corporate. He also notes that Category One documents may cast light on whether the Mould Exclusion was presented as having an industry-specific meaning; for example, that it was intended only to apply to general liability cover.
[13] Mr Kalderimis says the same arguments apply to the Category Two documents and that the category is limited to documents published to the market generally or sent to AIG’s customers or potential customers. He notes that in Local Government Mutual Trustees Ltd v Napier City Council, which also concerned a mould/building defect exclusion, the Supreme Court analysed the evolution of the wording of the exclusion when interpreting its meaning.2 Mr Kalderimis says the Category Two documents are
1 Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd [2014] NZSC 147, [2015] 1 NZLR 432, at [60].
2 Local Government Mutual Funds Trustee Ltd v Napier City Council [2023] NZSC 97, [2023] 1 NZLR 184 at [61]–[66].
also relevant to ascertaining the commercial purpose of the Mould Exclusion; in particular, any risks that AIG intended to exclude.
[14] Mr Kalderimis says that, while the Category Three documents post-dated the Policy, they may illuminate the purpose of the changes made by AIG; that is, whether the change was to restrict or to clarify the scope of the original language of the Mould Exclusion.
[15] Mr Kalderimis notes that AIG does not deny that documents within the three categories exist. Rather, it says the documents were probably prepared by Marsh and that it is for the Body Corporate rather than AIG to seek them from Marsh. However, Mr Kalderimis submits that, if Marsh went to AIG with the proposed language of the Mould Exclusion to be included in the Policy as Mr Tomlinson says, then Marsh was acting as AIG’s agent, and it is for AIG, and not the Body Corporate, to obtain them.
[16] Mr Kalderimis says the discovery sought is proportionate; Category One comprises marketing documents describing the scope of cover over a four-year period, whereas Categories Two and Three target specific amendment events. Moreover, each category extends only to documents published or distributed externally.
[17] Mr Kalderimis contests AIG’s assertion that the tailored discovery sought by the Body Corporate would be more expansive and expensive than standard discovery and says AIG has produced no credible evidence of the time and cost likely to be involved in complying with the requested orders. He says the task should be able to be confined using relevant keyword searches and modern document management programmes. He also says the Body Corporate is happy to take a pragmatic and proportionate approach and to cooperate with AIG in establishing relevant search parameters.
Submissions for AIG
[18] Ms Wethey for AIG submits that the documents do not relate to matters at issue in the proceeding. Ms Wethey observes that the Body Corporate’s statement of claim does not plead that marketing materials published between 2014 and 2017 or documents relating to the introduction of the Mould Exclusion bear on the
interpretation of the Policy, or that the documents were available to the Body Corporate when the Policy was entered into. Ms Wethey refers to the caution issued by the Supreme Court in Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd that post-contract documents often fail to cross the relevance threshold.3
[19] Ms Wethey notes that since the Policy and the Mould Exclusion were likely drafted by Marsh rather than AIG, the documents sought by the Body Corporate are unlikely to exist in its records. She also invites the Court to accept that Marsh would not have been acting as AIG’s agent because AIG simply underwrote the policy that Marsh brought to the Body Corporate in its capacity as broker and agent for the Body Corporate. However, Ms Wethey submits even if Marsh was also agent for AIG, it remained the Body Corporate’s agent. Either way, it is for the Body Corporate, and not AIG, to approach Marsh.
[20] Ms Wethey refers to an affidavit of Stephanie Koks in which Ms Koks states that a USB stick of underwriting files collected from AIG’s offices contains 30,479 separate files in 5,347 folders and that the files do not appear to be neatly organised. Ms Wethey says it would involve a great deal of time and expense to review these files in order to find any documents held by AIG within the categories sought by the Body Corporate. For these reasons, Ms Wethey says the costs of the discovery sought would be disproportionate and beyond the scope of what would be required for standard discovery. Ms Wethey also submits that it would be unjust for the Court to order discovery against AIG while the Body Corporate is not required to undertake any discovery in the proceeding it initiated.
Analysis
[21] The Body Corporate’s application raises questions as to the admissibility of the documents, their relevance to the questions at issue in the proceeding and, if they are relevant, whether orders should be made for their disclosure. The last question raises the subsidiary questions of whether AIG should be ordered to disclose documents held by Marsh and whether it would be disproportionate to order disclosure. AIG has raised
3 Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd [2021] NZSC 85, [2021] 1 NZLR 696 at [90].
the further question of whether tailored or standard discovery should be ordered. For convenience, I deal with that last question first.
Standard or tailored discovery?
[22] Under r 8.7 of the High Court Rules, a party undertaking standard discovery must disclose all documents within its control that are documents on which that party relies, or which adversely affect the case of that party or another party, or which support another party’s case.
[23] Rule 8.8 requires that tailored discovery must be ordered where the interests of justice require more or less discovery than standard discovery would involve. The rule acknowledges that tailored discovery may involve less than standard discovery, as is usually assumed to be the case, but that is not necessarily so.
[24] In the present case, there may not be a great deal of difference in the scopes of standard and tailored discovery. The question at issue is the scope and effect of the Mould Exclusion. If standard discovery is ordered, both parties would have to disclose all documents within their control that are admissible and relevant to that question. If tailored discovery is ordered, that obligation would be limited to the parameters set in the Body Corporate’s application. To that extent, tailored discovery would probably be more limited than standard discovery but perhaps not significantly so. But the obligation to disclose would fall only on AIG.
[25] Contrary to Ms Wethey’s submission, there is no inherent injustice in that. It is the Body Corporate that has sought discovery, not AIG. AIG has not asked for discovery. It has not suggested that the Body Corporate would have documents in the categories specified in the Body Corporate’s application that AIG does not have. But because the Body Corporate seeks documents that were published to the market generally as well as to other AIG customers, it is much more likely that AIG rather than the Body Corporate will have the documents.
[26] For these reasons, I am satisfied that, if an order for discovery is made, it should be an order for tailored discovery.
Are the documents admissible?
[27] In Bathurst Resources, the Supreme Court confirmed that admissibility is determined by the laws of evidence, in particular the Evidence Act 2006, which has primacy in all questions of admissibility, unless there is some inconsistency between that Act and another enactment.4
[28] Section 7 of the Evidence Act sets out the fundamental principle that all relevant evidence is admissible unless it is inadmissible or excluded under the Evidence Act or another Act. The section also provides that evidence that is not relevant is not admissible, and that evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to prove or disprove anything of consequence to the determination of the proceeding. In that respect, relevance under s 7 is similar in effect to the test for discovery in r 8.7 of the High Court Rules, which requires disclosure of documents on which a party relies, or which adversely affect the case of that party or another party, or which support another party’s case.
Are the documents relevant to the question at issue in the proceeding?
[29] There can be little doubt that all the documents sought by the Body Corporate would have a tendency to prove or disprove the central question at issue in the substantive proceeding; namely, the scope and effect of the Mould Exclusion. Category One and Category Two documents may tend to prove or disprove what the Policy was intended to cover and, in that context, what the Mould Exclusion was intended to exclude in relation to the insuring clauses in the Policy. Category Three documents may tend to prove or disprove whether the post-contract amendments were made to effect a substantive change in the scope of the Mould Exclusion or were made to clarify the scope of the Mould Exclusion.
[30] Category One and Category Two documents clearly fall within the factual matrix within which the Policy was entered into. They are not evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions or of their bilateral pre-contractual negotiations. The documents concern what AIG represented to customers or potential customers about the scope of
4 At [54] – [59].
cover provided under the Policy and about the purpose and effect of the Mould Exclusion. As Mr Kalderimis says, they are documents which would have been part of the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties at the time of the contract.
[31] The Category Three documents are not evidence of AIG’s conduct post-dispute per se, which the Supreme Court has said is unlikely to be admissible.5 That is, they are not evidence of what AIG may have said or done in response to the Body Corporate’s claim which, as the Supreme Court has observed, may well be self-serving.6 Rather, they are evidence of what AIG represented to customers generally about the scope of the Mould Exclusion, before and after it was amended. In that respect they are, as Tipping J said in Vector Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, evidence that may tend to establish a fact or circumstances capable of demonstrating objectively what meaning the parties intended their words to bear at the time the Policy was entered into.7
[32] For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the three categories of documents are admissible and relevant.
Should an order for discovery be made?
[33] There are no discovery provisions in pt 18 of the High Court Rules. However, pt 18 proceedings are subject to ordinary case management,8 and, while pt 18 contemplates that there will usually be no need for discovery, discovery procedures can be invoked where good reason is shown.9
[34] As Lang J observed in Sky City Entertainment Group Ltd v MPF Parking NZ Ltd, it is not usual for discovery to be ordered in a proceeding brought under pt 18
5 At [98].
6 At [90].
7 Vector Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd [2010] NZSC 5, [2010] 2 NZLR 444, at [31].
8 Clarkson v Clarkson [2020] NZHC 2211, (2020) 5 NZTR 30-016 at [14].
9 Jordan v First City Trust No 2 Ltd (in liq) HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-1776, at [35] — which concerned a proceeding under the predecessor provisions of pt 18 and which also made no specific provision for discovery.
of the High Court Rules.10 However, Lang J also observed that tailored discovery can nonetheless be ordered in some cases.11
[35] In Sky City, Lang J declined to order discovery of pre-contractual negotiations because the party seeking discovery had not identified in its pleadings how those negotiations might be relevant to the interpretation of the agreement in question.12
[36] It is not apparent from Lang J’s decision whether he was stating a requirement specific to discovery of pre-contractual negotiations or articulating a principle of more general application. In any event, I do not consider that, for discovery to be ordered, the party seeking discovery must plead in its statement of claim that a document or documents are relevant to the interpretation of the contract at issue. What matters is whether the documents sought are relevant to the issues pleaded.
[37] As Richardson J reaffirmed in New Zealand Rail Ltd v Port Marlborough New Zealand Ltd:13
[Documents] must be relevant in the sense of being capable of advancing a party’s case or of damaging the case of its adversary. Relevance is determined by the pleadings and an order is not to be made unless the Court is satisfied that it is reasonably necessary.
The pleadings both identify and limit the issue in the case.
[38] Or, as Asher J said in Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd in relation to an application for tailored discovery:14
The starting point in such a consideration of appropriate tailored discovery orders must be an analysis of the issues. Discovery categories will reflect the issues and will only be ordered for the discovery of documents that are relevant to those issues. Except in exceptional circumstances, these issues will be discernible from a review of the pleadings.
[39] It is plain that the Body Corporate’s statement of claim identifies and limits the issue in contention: the scope and effect of the Mould Exclusion. For the reasons already given, I am satisfied that the three categories of documents sought are relevant
10 Sky City Entertainment Group Ltd v MPF Parking NZ Ltd [2023] NZHC 1818 at [19].
11 At [19].
12 At [20].
13 New Zealand Rail Ltd v Port Marlborough New Zealand Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 641 (CA) at 644.
14 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd [2012] NZHC 726, at [13].
to that issue and that the Body Corporate has shown good reason for the documents to be disclosed. They are directly relevant to the issues in contention and, absent disclosure by AIG, are otherwise unlikely to be before the Court. As Lord Wilberforce said in Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen:15
In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating.
[40] The categories of documents sought by the Body Corporate clearly come within that description of documents that should be before the Court.
Are documents held by Marsh in AIG’s control?
[41] Under r 8.19, a party undertaking tailored discovery must disclose documents that are or have been in that party’s control and are in the categories for which discovery is ordered. It follows that, if a tailored discovery order is made, AIG must disclose all documents that are or have been in its control.
[42] Ms Wethey does not say explicitly that documents held by Marsh are not in AIG’s control but says AIG should not be required to disclose documents held by Marsh because Marsh was either the agent of both the Body Corporate and AIG or of the Body Corporate alone. As Mr Kalderimis says, with some vigour, that is not the issue. The issue is whether documents held by Marsh are within AIG’s control.
[43] In his affidavit, Mr Tomlinson says it is his understanding — which appears to be AIG’s understanding — that the Policy was part of scheme provided by Marsh to various body corporates around New Zealand, that Marsh is likely to have drafted the Policy, including the Mould Exclusion, and that the Policy was then presented to AIG to underwrite. In her submissions, Ms Wethey emphasises this underwriting aspect, as if to suggest the contract of insurance was between Marsh and the Insured, with AIG then underwriting insurance that Marsh agreed to provide.
15 Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W. L. R. 989, at 995-996.
[44] However, that is not how the Policy is presented or reads. It is titled “AIG Associations Combined Liability Insurance” and is stamped with AIG’s logo on every page. Most importantly, it is a contract between the Insurer, AIG, and the Policyholder. While Marsh may be broker for the policyholder when presenting a policy offered by AIG, if Marsh was responsible for developing the content of the policy offered by AIG before it was presented to policyholders, as appears to have been the case, it can only have been acting as agent for AIG in so doing. It follows that documents held by Marsh in that connection are or have been in the control of AIG and must be disclosed if AIG is ordered to provide discovery.
Is the discovery sought disproportionate?
[45] As Asher J observed in Cathay Pacific, the concept of proportionality is central to tailored discovery.16 In Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd, Asher J held that proportionality must be assessed in accordance with Part 1 of the Discovery Checklist in the High Court Rules.17
[46] AIG has made no attempt to assess the material it says it has located in terms of the Discovery Checklist. It simply refers to the numbers of files and folders in the USB produced by Ms Koks and the size of the task it says reviewing those files will entail.
[47] By contrast, in its application the Body Corporate has identified the documents sought by category, subject matter, date range or event and type of document. These are matters identified in cl 3 of the Discovery Checklist in pt 1 of sch 9 of the High Court Rules. Mr Kalderimis has also referred to the use of keyword searches and document management programmes, and the Body Corporate’s willingness to cooperate with AIG in developing a pragmatic and proportionate approach in any search. These too are matters identified in cl 3 of the Discovery Checklist. In response to my question, Mr Kalderimis also says the Body Corporate is content to receive one version of any document published to the world at large or generally to customers of AIG.
16 Commerce Commission v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, above n 13, at [13].
17 Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760, [2018] NZAR 600 at [14].
[48] I am satisfied that, within the parameters specified and the techniques proposed by the Body Corporate, the discovery sought is not disproportionate in size or to the nature of the questions at issue in the substantive proceeding.
Result
[49] For all the above reasons, I am satisfied that the documents sought by the Body Corporate are admissible and relevant, and that an order for tailored discovery of those documents should be made. Accordingly, I grant the Body Corporate’s application and make the order below.
[50] I am also satisfied that the order should extend, as far as Category Two and Category Three are concerned, to documents held by Marsh as agent for AIG that were published to the market generally or sent to AIG’s customers or potential customers. As requested by Mr Kalderimis, I consider it appropriate to make directions dealing with the documents held by Marsh.
Orders and directions
[51]I make the following orders:
1. AIG Insurance New Zealand Ltd (AIG) is to provide tailored discovery of documents within the following categories:
(a)Marketing materials published between 2014 and 2017 (inclusive) describing the scope of cover under the AIG Associations Combined Liability Insurance Policy and/or the scope of the mould/building defect exclusion in that policy.
(b)Documents relating to the introduction of the mould/building defect exclusion in the standard form terms of the AIG Associations Combined Liability Insurance Policy, to the extent that any documents were:
(i)published to the market generally; and/or
(ii)sent by AIG, or its agent Marsh Ltd, to AIG’s customers or potential customers, including Body Corporate 82981.
(c)Documents relating to amendments, since in or around 2018, of AIG’s standard policy wording (for the “Association Edge Liability” policy) concerning any mould/building defect exclusion, including documents relating to the addition, retention, or deletion of such an exclusion from the General Liability (Section A7), Management Liability (Section A1) or Association Liability (Section A2) cover sections, to the extent any documents were:
(i)published to the market generally; and/or
(ii)sent by AIG, or its agent Marsh Ltd, to AIG’s customers or potential customers, including Body Corporate 82981.
2. Subject to [52] below, AIG is to provide the discovery required by Order 1 by 16 June 2025 by:
(a)filing and serving an affidavit of documents in accordance with r 8.15 of the High Court Rules 2016; and
(b)making the documents available for inspection in accordance with r 8.27.
[52] To ensure the effective implementation of the above orders, I make the following directions:
(a)Within five working days of this judgment, AIG is to request Marsh Ltd in writing to provide AIG as soon as reasonably possible any documents it holds within the categories specified in the order.
(b)Within 10 working days of receiving those documents from Marsh Ltd, AIG is to provide discovery and inspection of those documents in accordance with rr 8.15 and 8.27 of the High Court Rules.
Costs
[53] As the Body Corporate was the successful party, it is entitled to costs. Despite Mr Kalderimis’s oral submission at the hearing that AIG should be required to pay increased or indemnity costs because of its position on disclosure of documents held by Marsh, I consider costs are payable on 2B basis. However, if the Body Corporate wishes to seek costs on some other basis or the parties are otherwise unable to agree costs, memoranda may be filed as follows:
(a)Any memoranda of no more than five pages by the Body Corporate may be filed by 28 May 2025.
(b)Any memoranda of no more than seven pages by AIG may be filed by
12 June 2025.
Timetable directions
[54] Because of the proximity of the substantive hearing, Mr Kalderimis asked that I make timetable directions for the filing of the parties’ evidence and submissions. Ms Wethey observed that AIG’s ability to comply with those directions would depend on the time taken to review the documents it holds and when it receives documents from Marsh. To accommodate that concern, Mr Kalderimis said the Body Corporate would not object if discovery was completed after AIG has filed its evidence.
[55] I consider it sufficient to make the directions requested and to reserve leave to apply if it is necessary to vary the directions. On that basis, I make the following timetable directions:
(a)The Body Corporate’s affidavit(s) are to be filed and served by
1 July 2025.
(b)AIG’s affidavit(s) are to be filed and served by 15 July 2025.
(c)The Body Corporate’s submissions, a common bundle of documents and a bundle of authorities are to be filed and served by 22 July 2025.
(d)AIG’s submissions, any additional documents and any additional authorities are to be filed and served by 29 July 2025.
G J van Bohemen J
1
7
1