Body Corporate 368533 v Napier City Council
[2019] NZHC 3270
•12 December 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NAPIER REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA AHURIRI ROHE
CIV-2012-441-126
[2019] NZHC 3270
BETWEEN BODY CORPORATE 368533
Plaintiff
AND
NAPIER CITY COUNCIL
First Defendant
AND
OTHER DEFENDANTS
Second – Thirty Fifth Defendants
Hearing: 5 December 2019 Appearances:
G J Kohler QC and K A Lomas for Plaintiff/Respondent H M Rice and L J Fraser for First Defendant/Applicant
P S J Withnall for Twenty-third Defendant and third party (excused from 10.05 am)
Judgment:
12 December 2019
JUDGMENT OF GRICE J
(Application for adjournment of trial)
Introduction
[1] This is an application for an adjournment of a 10 week trial due to begin in the Napier High Court on 11 May 2020. The trial concerns claims for defects resulting from the construction of the West Quay complex which contains 108 units. Napier City Council seeks the adjournment as it says the plaintiff is responsible for slippage in the timetable making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Council to be properly ready for trial in May 2020.
[2] The trial dates were allocated in May 2018. The timetable directions for the exchange of briefs and related documentation and preparation for the trial were made
BODY CORPORATE 368533 v NAPIER CITY COUNCIL [2019] NZHC 3270 [12 December 2019]
in May 2019. It is common ground that the timetable was always going to be tight. Mr Kohler QC for the Body Corporate agrees that there was no fat in the timetable but says that the failures by it in meeting the timetable were minor and should not have prevented Napier City Council preparing its briefs and being ready to go to trial in May 2020. He, however, recognises it may be wise to have further time before trial and is concerned that any compression of the timetable does not flow on to prejudice his client’s ability to prepare for the trial. The Body Corporate opposes the adjournment.
Principles
[3] The principles applying to an application for adjournment are not in contention. The application is made under r 10.2 of the High Court Rules 2016 which provides:
10.2 Adjournment of trial
The court may, before or at the trial, if it is in the interests of justice, postpone or adjourn the trial for any time, to any place, and upon any terms it thinks just.
[4] The interests of justice is the overriding consideration.1 That includes justice to both parties as well as other litigants. It involves a general consideration of the ability of the Court to manage and hear matters efficiently and within a reasonable time frame.
Background
[5] The Body Corporate sues in its own right and on behalf of the 105 residential unit owners in the complex.2 West Quay was built between 2005 and 2007. The claims by the Body Corporate in these proceedings relate to three main issues which says has led to the building being defective: weather tight/structural issues, fire related issues and other issues.
[6] The cost to remedy the defects as set out in the latest statement of claim3 is in excess of $22 million. In the course of argument it became clear that the Body
1 NZ Iron Sands Holdings Ltd v Toward Industries Ltd [2019] NZHC 2516 at [13].
2 There 108 units in the complex but three are commercial units.
3 The seventeenth amended statement of claim.
Corporate will be seeking to increase the claim to in excess of $30 million. The damages include the costs to remedy, based on estimates, plus ancillary costs incurred by it together with the owners’ claims for various intangible losses. The unit owners have assigned their rights to make those claims under Deeds of Assignment to the Body Corporate.
[7] The Body Corporate pleads one cause of action against the first defendant, Napier City Council (the Council). It says that the Council was negligent from the start to the finish of the construction process including in the issue of the building consents and the issue of the code compliance certificate.
[8] Various causes of action are raised against the other defendants including against the head contractor (the ninth defendant), Alexander Construction Company Ltd. It says that Alexander Construction was negligent in building West Quay based on the pleaded defects.
Foreshadowing the application for adjournment
[9] The Council foreshadowed a possible application for adjournment shortly after the plaintiff’s briefs were due on 18 October. Important briefs had not been received. A teleconference was held at the request of the Council on 5 November 2018. By the time of the teleconference Ms Rice for the Council indicated she had received more material but was of the view at that stage that the plaintiff’s delay would encroach on the time to prepare for trial to the extent it would put the defendants and in particular the Council under too much time pressure. Therefore she signalled it might be unjust to maintain the trial dates.
[10] Ms Rice noted even on that date she had not received some of the expert evidence updates. She considered the overdue evidence evidence was crucial to enable her experts to prepare their evidence. She said the briefs still to come related to remedial work and were related to the defects in such a way it was difficult to separate out liability issues from quantum. That was in response to a suggestion by Mr Kohler that the expert evidence which she was awaiting was merely in relation to quantum.
Timetable – critical path
[11] Both at the teleconference on 5 November 2019 and in her submissions today Ms Rice pointed to comments by Associate Judge Johnston made at various case management conferences and recorded in minutes relating to the importance of adhering to the timetable. He referred to the timetable as being a “critical path” with the importance of the plaintiff’s evidence being in its final form by 18 October 2019.4 He said:
[4] The present timetable – which, in a case such as this, needs to be viewed as a critical path – has the plaintiff serving its evidence on 18 October 2019. That is the point in time when the plaintiff’s evidence must be in its final form.
[12] The Associate Judge noted that if there were to be any material slippage in the timetable that it would be open to any party prejudicially affected by that slippage to apply for relief which might include an application to vacate the existing fixture.5
[13] Counsel indicated that at the time the fixture dates (May 2018) were allocated both were anxious to get on with the case and perhaps they did not give sufficient thought to the possibility of slippage. This was especially given the preparation of the defendant’s briefs would be on the eve of the Christmas/summer holiday period so any delays in securing the plaintiff’s briefs would be exacerbated by the holidays.
[14] The outcome of the teleconference held on 5 November 2019 when Ms Rice first expressed the possibility of an application for the adjournment was that time was allocated in the Wellington High Court today to deal with any application for adjournment if it were to be pursued.6 Alternatively the time allocated would be used for case management issues. In the event the application for adjournment was made and heard on that date.7 Case management issues will now need to be dealt with at the next case management conference which has been allocated 20 February 2020.
4 Body Corporate 368533 v Napier City Council, HC Wellington CIV-2012-441-126, 5 September 2019 (Minute).
5 Body Corporate 368533 v Napier City Council, HC Wellington CIV-2012-441-126, 21 August 2019 (Minute).
6 Body Corporate 368533 v Napier City Council, HC Wellington CIV-2012-441-126, 5 November 2019 (Minute).
7 The time allocated was three hours but the hearing time extended to a full day.
Position of other defendants
[15] Counsel for the other defendants variously indicated that they would abide by the decision of the Court, did not oppose the application for adjournment or supported the application. Their responses are as follows:
(a)Seventh and eighth defendants (counsel, J Holt) – support the application.
(b)Ninth and twenty-second – support the adjournment application.
(c)Tenth and eleventh defendants (counsel, K Deobhakta and P McKinnon
– support the application.
(d)Fourteenth and fifteenth defendants (counsel, M Wenley) – support the application (and seek it remain in Napier High Court for trial).
(e)Eighteenth defendant (counsel, G Christie) – supports the application.
(f)Seventeeth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, thirty-second to thirty fifth defendants (counsel, D Neutze) – support the application.
(g)Nineteenth to twenty-first defendants (counsel, M Henaghan and R Tosh) – do not oppose the application.
(h)Twenty-fifth defendant (counsel, T Herbert) – supports the application.
(i)Thirty-first defendant (counsel, J Thompson) – supports the application.
[16] The Council points to three main areas in which there have been delays. These are in the provision of the expert evidence, conveyancing related evidence and documents. I deal with each category.
Expert evidence
[17] Napier City Council provided evidence from its experts about the delays and in particular the effect on their timetable for the preparation of their briefs and related steps including collaboration and conferencing which needed to occur well before trial. A substantial number of affidavits from the experts together with one from a solicitor working on the plaintiff’s file (Caleb Smith) were filed. The witness deponents were:
(a)Joanna Pidgeon, Conveyancing Lawyer.
(b)Mark Powell, Consultant Engineer.
(c)Patrick Hanlon, Quantity Surveyor.
(d)Jason Matthews, Engineer.
(e)Murray Spicer, Structual Engineer.
(f)Robert Nelligan, Fire Engineer.
(g)Stephen Flay, Building Surveyor.
[18] All of the experts indicated that they have been compromised in meeting the timetable dates by the delay in the provision to them of the plaintiff’s expert briefs. They each explained that they had allocated time to examine those briefs based on an understanding that the plaintiff’s briefs would be supplied, in the main, by 18 October 2019.
[19] Many of the experts say they have planned holidays over the Christmas break or have other commitments that they cannot interfere with, including work on other cases with deadlines which can’t be moved. They say they had blocked out time but due to the delays their schedules have been thrown into disarray.
[20] Some of the experts rely on another experts evidence to be completed before they are able to complete theirs. For instance the quantity surveying experts are at the end of the chain because they need to know from the engineering experts the scope of work before they can cost the work. Ms Rice described it as a “jigsaw” with each expert contributing a piece in order.
[21] Another issue that Ms Rice pointed to was the process for the expert’s preparation of their briefs. She noted this is usually collaborative and if the window of time scheduled for collaboration was no longer available the experts need to set a new window of time based on the experts’ availability. This posed further problems.
[22] The plaintiff responds in general terms and says the expert evidence including the quantum evidence had been provided by 29 November 2019. I note however that this was sent by email on a Friday night so the briefs were not properly received until the following Monday, 2 December 2020.
[23] It also appears that there may be further plaintiff briefs to be filed. Ms Rice also pointed to the fact that the plaintiff was seeking to file an amended statement of claim (which would be the 18th amended statement of claim) to include the updated quantum claim and particulars responding to matters raised by the Council. Mr Kohler responded that if necessary he would not file an amended statement of claim and he noted that the updates would not require further statements of defence to be filed as the paragraph numbers would be unaltered.
[24] Ms Rice said the briefs which had been late were important. She gave an example of the plaintiff’s brief of evidence provided by Mr Brocks, a quantity surveyor, whose evidence was only received on 2 December (three days ago). Mr Brocks’ evidence, Ms Rice says increases the estimate of repairs to the vicinity of
$30 million (from the present claim of $22 million) and alters the amount of the remedial damages claimed in each of the three categories of damage (weathertight/structure, fire and other). She says it is impossible to identify why the changes in the categories has occurred without further analysis and comment from her experts. She says she is unsure if it is merely arithmetical or because the scope or work itself has changed.
[25] Ms Rice says that Mr Brock’s brief also attached structural engineering drawings which related to the design of some of the remedial work. She says those plans and works are critical to the claim and its defence. She says the expert engineers for the Council could not undertake their work until they had these structural engineer’s drawings to consider.
[26] Mr Kohler in response said first that the structural drawings related only a minor part of the remedial design and were not central. He had also submitted earlier that the remedial drawings were a quantum rather than a liability matter. He also said the increase in quantum and reallocation of the amounts claimed over the three defect categories was largely due to reassessments of which work fell into which category.
Conveyancing evidence and files
[27] Ms Rice also points to the difficulties she faces in relation to the evidence of an expert conveyancing lawyer whom she had retained to give evidence concerning relevant issues concerning disclosure of the defects to purchases in sales of the units. There are claims listed in the statement of claim by 105 unit owners for various damages such as general damages. These claims have been assigned to the Body Corporate. The claims are under heads such as stigma loss, consequential losses, stress and anxiety. These are claims in addition to the cost of remediating the defects in relation to specified units. The consequential losses were quantified in the 17th statement of claim at $957,375 and the general damages for stress and anxiety at
$2,140,000.
[28] Ms Rice noted that the Council filed an affirmative defence based on voluntary assumption of risk and betterment in October 2019. Ms Rice indicated the information was not available before that date to file the affirmative defence. In addition, she said she had been asking for but had not yet received all the conveyancing files in relation to transactions concerning the relevant units. She said she needed these to provide to her conveyancing lawyer expert, Ms Pidgeon to analyse for the affirmative defence.
[29] Ms Pidgeon says she needs to know the full chain of events to consider the conveyancing practices in place at the relevant times and so needed the details of and the dates of any transactions involving the relevant units and the specific steps the unit
owners took. That is the reason she says she needs files for all conveyancing transactions on all the units.
[30] Ms Pidgeon said she has received only 81 unit owners’ affidavits out of the 105 listed with claims in the statement of claim. She pointed out some defects with the ones she had received, including the fact that they were not signed. Mr Kohler said the outstanding affidavits have been provided in draft and they will be sworn without changes. He said it had merely been difficult to coordinate the swearing of the affidavits.
[31] Ms Pidgeon nevertheless says she expects there to be a significant number of files which should be made available. She says that due to her work and other commitments as well as planned holidays she is unable to deliver her brief of evidence, assuming she received the complete set of documents by 29 November 2019, until the end of April 2020.
[32] Mr Kohler said that the work said to be involved was unnecessary and excessive in the circumstances. Mr Kohler also noted that the Body Corporate had taken assignment of the claims of the unit holders, therefore the only relevant conveyancing files would be those conveying the unit to the unit holder up to the date of the assignment. He said in any event a claim for the conveyancing files should be by application for discovery or particulars which had not been made. He said that based on the assignments nothing further was required to be provided by the plaintiff. He said the plaintiff had to prove its claims based on the assignments and the Council had misapprehended the basis of the plaintiff’s claims.
Documents
[33] Ms Rice said that the plaintiff’s briefs referred to documents which were not annexed but were cross-referenced, in some cases, to documents in a Drop Box8 directory which had not been discovered in the discovery process. The reason for non- discovery was that a container of documents and plans belonging to the head
8 This is an application which allows documents to be stored in files accessible to a number of parties electronically.
contractor (ninth defendant) had not been properly discovered. Therefore, the documents retrieved from a container where they had been stored (including the plans) had not been allocated discovery numbers which would have enabled them to be easily located within the Council’s discovery system.
[34] Mr Kohler explained that the “container” documents had not been properly discovered by the head contractor (Alexander Construction). The head contractor had provided information to the parties about the general nature of the various categories of documents by groupings and where they could be found. However, by chance the plaintiff found that not all the documents and plans in the container had been caught by the builder’s “discovery” information. This apparently included the only copy of the approved plans relating to the construction.
[35] The process for managing those container documents adopted by the plaintiff was that if one of those to documents was referred to by a plaintiff’s witness it was allocated a document number and referred to by that number. This number did not have any relationship to the discovery document numbers. The numbering used included the first symbol @ followed by a file reference and then a unique number. Those container numbered documents were then put in electronic folders within the Drop Box application which was accessible by the defendants.
[36] Ms Rice said she and the team working on the case had not been able to access a substantial number of the container documents referred to in the plaintiff’s briefs. She provided a spreadsheet containing a list of approximately 800 of those documents which were said to either have errors in them or could not be located. Ms Rice said it was up to the plaintiff to ensure any documents referred to in its briefs were accessible documents by either attaching them to the briefs or otherwise making them easily accessible. She said this was not the case here.
[37] Mr Lomas, who had been responsible for managing the Body Corporate documents, addressed the issues raised. The administration manager responsible for managing the documents said in her affidavit that she said that she had worked hard in the short time available to review the Council’s table of 800 documents and to respond to the issues raised. She said the Council had given no detailed explanation
about the nature of the errors complained of and so she had had difficulty determining exactly what the issue was in relation to a number of listed documents. She had reviewed 415 of the document references in the table. From that analysis she found:
(a)There were approximately 145 references from the chronology and common bundle index which had already been identified as errors in the relevant briefs – therefore, the true number of documents involved is 684.
(b)Of the 192 references identified as having errors described as “Doc ID Typo”, 168 were checked. Only two of those documents appeared to have minor typos explained as follows:
(i)The brief of Barry Brown contained a reference to WQ167 when it should have been 1675. This document was a building consent in the paragraph and Mr Brown’s brief sets this out and provides the consent number so there could be no confusion as to what was referred to.
(ii)Mr Tidd’s brief of evidence includes discovery references for all inspection records. The correct reference should have been NCC032.00011 instead of NCC031.11111. This occurred in updating but should have been obvious.
[38] The deponent goes on to describe some typos which had been discovered. She said some related to missing “0s” and/or prefixes which should have been readily apparent to the Council. In some cases she could not identify any problem at all.
[39] It is almost impossible to determine on the material before me whether or not the document reference mistakes or the document references are seriously defective or misleading. However, it is clear that whatever the extent of the errors they have compounded the problems caused by the delays.
[40] Ms Rice acknowledged that she did not, and her team did not, have time to set out the problems into full detail, nor did she have time to check the responses provided by the plaintiff in its filed evidence which was made available on 4 December, the day before this hearing.
[41] It appears that the plaintiff has done its best to provide a workable document system for the “container” documents which had not been allocated discovery numbers. However, given the time constraints and the late cross-referencing of the documents to the plaintiff’s briefs of evidence, it was inevitable there would be some mistakes leading to confusion. The plaintiff also acknowledges that not all the document errors referred to in the 800 odd entries in the Council’s schedule of errors have been checked despite the best endeavours of the administrator. No comment was made by the administrator about document references specifically referred to as creating problems in the affidavit of Mr Powell (the Council’s consultant engineer). Mr Lomas was unable to comment on whether the documents referred to in Mr Powell’s brief had been checked by the administrator or whether they had been included in the approximately 400 documents she had checked for errors.
[42] Nevertheless, it is clear that there were errors in the documents creating problems for the Council in accessing the documents referred to in the briefs. It was up to the plaintiff to make sure that any documents referred to in its evidence were able to be easily located. Given the tight time frame and lateness of the briefs the Council was entitled to expect the documents would be easily accessed. Even minor errors in document numbering can lead to delays while the documents are sifted in an attempt to find the correct document.
[43] In any case such as this there needs to be cooperation by the parties in exchanging and managing the upwards of 20,000 documents involved. Ms Rice acknowledged an obligation was on her and her client to cooperate and she says she has. However, in relation to this matter she says the plaintiff was already late with its briefs of evidence and would have been aware that it was important for the Council to be able to readily and quickly find the documents. Therefore the plaintiff should have ensured this was achievable.
Analysis
[44] The ground advanced by Ms Rice in support of her application for adjournment is supported by evidence from the relevant experts. I do not consider that I can put their evidence to one side, particularly as it pin-points the difficulties they face dealing with the late receipt of the plaintiff’s evidence and responding to it within a timeframe which would allow the trial to commence on 11 May 2020.
[45] For instance, Mr Powell, who is a chartered and registered building surveyor has been engaged by the plaintiff to provide an independent assessment of the construction defects as well as commenting on the roles and responsibilities of other parties to the claim who were involved in the construction process. He noted that here the remedial scope and quantum evidence were particularly closely linked. Mr Powell also pointed out he had not (at the date of his affidavit, 27 November 2019) been able to locate documents referred to in some of the briefs of evidence of the plaintiff’s experts as they were not attached nor did they have document numbers. He said in his affidavit:
27. If there were one or two missing documents I could probably proceed without much difficulty. However, the problem appears to be so widespread in the plaintiff’s experts’ evidence that I question whether there is any point in me even making a start at this point in time.
[46] On the issue of the liability and quantum evidence being only required sequentially he said:
29. Remedial scope and quantum evidence in particular are closely linked. When preparing evidence, experts need to consider each claimed defect, whether it has or could cause damage, breach of the building code, and consequent work scope and cost on a defect-by- defect basis. This necessarily involves cross-reference with the plaintiff’s expert scope and quantum, and liaison between defect experts, including those from different disciplines such as structural and fire engineering and quantum experts.
[47] Mr Powell says that due to his schedule work he had set aside time after 18 October 2019 to work on his brief of evidence for this matter. That has now been disrupted by the delay in the provision of the plaintiff’s evidence. He noted he has a substantial amount of other work on hand including as an expert witness in five High
Court claims (in addition to West Quay) which have been set down for trials in 2020. Preparation time for these had been scheduled around the timetable in this case.
[48] Mr Powell said that assuming he received the plaintiff’s final briefs and copies of the documents by 29 November 2019 on his estimates, due to the intervening commitments he has, he would not be ready to file and sign his final briefs until late June 2020. This is a month after the trial is presently due to start.
[49] The other experts give evidence to similar effect, varying in their time estimate to be ready for trial. One expert estimated it would be August 2020 before his brief of evidence might be available.
[50] Mr Kohler noted the new timeframes suggested by the experts in their evidence were longer than those allowed under the existing timetable. This showed that the Council had merely underestimated its preparation time from the beginning which was not the fault of the plaintiff.
[51] Ms Rice indicated that while she felt there was scope for her to manage the experts so that the time frames were less than the conservative time frames given in the affidavits, there was no possibility she would be able to realistically concertina the timetable to be ready for trial on 11 May. She said the slippage that has already occurred would be compounded by the further inevitable delays given the plaintiff’s indication it would seek to file a further amended statement of claim and its equivocal response over whether or not it might need to file amended briefs, consequent upon any further requirements for remedial work being imposed on the building consent.
[52] Mr Kohler had also acknowledged there was no fat in the timetable for any further slippage but could not confirm there would not be further slippage due to unexpected issues arising particularly involving the building consent.
[53] Given the changes in the amount claimed it would be unrealistic to proceed on the present pleadings. In addition, there are a number of issues which have arisen concerning the evidence, its extent and whether or not it is required in relation to the
owners of the units for which the plaintiff has taken assignment. This may or may not require resolution before trial.
[54] In my view the timetable was already tight and the delays in the service of the plaintiff’s briefs have materially affected the ability of the Council to ready itself for trial. The delays have been exacerbated by the impending Christmas break the problems with the documents and the other commitments of the experts. Such commitments are to be expected given the demand for experts in construction disputes. The likely effect of any defects in accessing documents referred to in the briefs was also foreseeable.
[55] My views are supported by the warnings of the Associate Judge about the critical need to provide the briefs on time. The slippage involved is not just a few days.
[56]As a result:
(a)While it would be preferable to get this matter on for a hearing at the scheduled time, the interests of justice will not be served by retaining the present timetable. Not only the Council but the other defendants will be compromised by the slippage which has already occurred to the timetable. The plaintiffs may also suffer if its preparation time is truncated by the clear need to concertina the timetable.
(b)The Associate Judge made it clear the timetable was a critical path and that the plaintiff’s briefs were required to be filed by 18 October. If the slippage had only been a matter of days there might have been room to manage the timetable however the delays have been ongoing and the evidence supports that. Important evidence in the expert briefs was not provided until the beginning of this week, amended damages amounts have appeared in the briefs and there has been confusion over some of the documents referred to in the briefs.
(c)It is highly likely that there will be further time slippage leading to the late provision of trial evidence and a need for supplementary briefs from both sets of experts. This will lead to lack of time for proper collaboration and consultation between the experts including appropriate conferencing. This will likely, as Mr Powell described it, lead to a “last minute scramble prior to trial”. This will disrupt the hearing and lead to additional cost for the parties.
[57] Therefore, reluctantly I have reached the conclusion that it is in the interests of justice in the wider sense and not only in fairness to the defendants, that the proceedings should be adjourned. In the circumstances the delay to trial caused by an adjournment will not be great as I outline below. Therefore any prejudice caused to the plaintiffs by a delayed start is minimised.
[58] I canvassed with counsel the possibility of adjourning the 10 week trial to commence on 14 September. This would cause difficulties for Mr Kohler, who will be out of the country in the proceeding week. To accommodate that the Registrar has been able to move the fixture to a date commencing 21 September for 10 weeks. Accordingly, I adjourn the trial to commence on 21 September for 10 weeks.
[59] That time has been allocated for hearing in the Wellington High Court. There are difficulties in having the trial in the Napier High Court. Only the No 2 courtroom is available. It is small and would not adequately accommodate the number of parties participating in this trial. Counsel for the plaintiff and the first defendant and with most of the other defendants are agreeable to the matter being heard in the Wellington High Court. However, Mr Wenley, for the 14th defendant, prefers that the matter be heard in Napier. Accordingly, I do not make a direction that it be heard in Wellington but leave counsel to discuss this issue in the meantime and it should be dealt with at the case management conference on 20 February 2020.
[60] Given the difficulties that have been encountered in progressing this matter it appears appropriate that the next case management conference be held in person in the Wellington High Court rather than by way of teleconference. It may be that a number of defendants prefer not to attend that conference. If it is possible to obtain a timetable
agreement in relation to those parties there should be no difficulty in excusing their attendance. However, the plaintiff and first defendant should be represented in person at the case management conference which will be allocated for a half a day on 20 February 2020.
[61] There remains an extant timetable in place which should be followed as far as possible until the timetable review on 20 February 2020. I am also aware that some defendants have actually carried out steps required but the dates need adjustment. It is appropriate that they incorporate those steps and the dates on which they have been carried out in the amended joint timetable to be filed in the usual manner before the timetable conference.
[62] The table format adopted by counsel in setting out their positions on the adjournment and timetabling before this hearing was a very useful way to present their respective positions. If possible that format might be adopted for the next joint memorandum.
Costs
[63] Both parties indicated they intended filing applications for costs in relation to this matter. Initially the Council had indicated it would seek that costs be reserved. If costs cannot be agreed between the parties an application for costs together with supporting memorandum should be filed within 14 days. Any response should be filed within a further 14 days and any reply within a further five days.
Grice J
Solicitors:
Braun Bond & Lomas Ltd, Hamilton Rice Speir, Auckland
1
0