Bloomfield v The Queen

Case

[2010] NZSC 77

13 July 2010

No judgment structure available for this case.

ORDER: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE DATABASE PENDING COMPLETION OF TRIAL.  PUBLICATION IN A LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST REMITTED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 57/2010
[2010] NZSC 77

KELLY LOUISE BLOOMFIELD

v

THE QUEEN

Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard and McGrath JJ

Counsel:M A Kennedy for Applicant
M D Downs for Crown

Judgment:13 July 2010 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

[1]       This is an application for leave to appeal in relation to a pre-trial ruling admitting evidence of a statement made by the applicant to the police.  She is facing a charge of offering to supply methamphetamine.  It seems that she took $3,000 from a man called Garside and agreed to use it to buy methamphetamine for him.  She lost the money.  Mr Garside then took the car in which she had been travelling.  She complained to the police about the taking of the car.  The police located the car which was being driven by Mr Garside.  She went to the police station and was interviewed there in her capacity as a complainant.  Another police officer interviewed Mr Garside.  In her interview she at first told a rather unlikely story.  The detective who had been interviewing Mr Garside then intervened.  Unfortunately no written record of that intervention was made until some months later.  On her own account the applicant said that the detective had told her that “everyone has put it on me” and that, if she did not tell the truth now, matters were going to be worse for her and that she just needed to tell the truth.  She was cautioned and had her rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 explained to her.  It seems clear that she must have understood that from now on she was being treated as a suspect in relation to the proposed transaction with methamphetamine.  It also seems clear that she understood her rights since she then asked to speak to a lawyer.  That was facilitated.  After she had finished speaking to a lawyer, Ms Kennedy, she was asked if she wished to answer questions and agreed to do so.  She then admitted that the money that she had obtained from Mr Garside was for buying methamphetamine on behalf of Mr Garside.

[2]       We consider that it is not arguable that the statement was extracted by oppression as defined in s 29 of the Evidence Act 2006.  The applicant seems to be trying to introduce for the first time an argument that there was also a breach of r (4) of the Practice Note - Police Questioning (s 30 (6) Evidence Act 2006)[1] issued by the Chief Justice, namely a failure to explain to the applicant the substance of the statement made by Mr Garside to the detective.  That seems inherently implausible, for the essence of what Mr Garside had said, that he had given her the money to buy drugs on his behalf, does appear to have been put to her.  If she had not known that this was now the subject of the police inquiry, that would surely have emerged when she contacted the lawyer, who would have sought an explanation from the police.  None was sought and, when further questioned, the applicant does not seem to have been at all taken by surprise by the subject matter of the questions.

[1] [2007] 3 NZLR 297.

[3]       There was a breach of r (5) of the Practice Note because of the failure to use a video recording or otherwise record the remarks made by the detective when he intervened in the interview which was being carried out with the applicant.  However, the Court of Appeal[2] accepted that there had been such a breach.  It nevertheless found that the statement subsequently made was not improperly obtained.  In doing so, the Court expressly took into account the identified breach, as required by s 30 (6) of the Evidence Act.  It is said for the applicant that the Court failed to carry out the exercise required by subs (2) and (3) but we consider that the Court was plainly entitled to dispense with a full discussion and go straight to the determinative point, which was that there was an absence of any real dispute about what the detective had said to the applicant.  The Court also agreed with the District Court Judge's assessment, which it had set out in some detail, and so in reality it had considered the matter more fully.

[2]      R v Bloomfield [2010] NZCA 222.

[4]       Lastly, we should mention a complaint by the applicant that the hearing of the Court of Appeal was originally scheduled as a leave hearing only but the Court proceeded to grant leave and then dismissed the appeal.  That matter is a meritless technicality as the substance of the appeal was obviously fully argued during the hearing.  It is not suggested that the applicant could have put forward anything further.

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington


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