Bligh v Earthquake Commission
[2017] NZHC 995
•16 May 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CIV-2013-409-001333 [2017] NZHC 995
BETWEEN DEREK RICKY BLIGH
Plaintiff
AND
THE EARTHQUAKE COMMISSION First Defendant
IAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED Second Defendant
Hearing: 9 May 2017 Appearances:
R Lynn for Plaintiff
N S Wood and J W Upson for First Defendant
P M Smith for Second DefendantJudgment:
16 May 2017
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE MATTHEWS
[1] This proceeding was brought by Mr Bligh against his insurer, IAG New Zealand Limited (IAG) and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) in respect of damage said to have been caused to his home in Waddington, Canterbury, in the sequence of earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. He applies to set aside a judgment of Clark J dated
2 November 2016 in which her Honour entered judgment for the EQC and IAG
under r 10.8 of the High Court Rules.1 EQC and IAG oppose the application.
[2] Rule 10.8 provides that if a defendant appears at a hearing, but the plaintiff does not, the defendant is entitled to judgment dismissing the proceeding, unless the defendant has admitted all or part of the claim, which is not the position in this case. In the circumstances which follow, Mr Bligh did not appear at the trial of his claim
against EQC and IAG.
1 Bligh v The Earthquake Commission [2010] NZHC 2619.
BLIGH v THE EARTHQUAKE COMMISSION and IAG NEW ZEALAND LTD [2017] NZHC 995 [16 May 2017]
[3] Mr Bligh relies on r 10.9:
Judgment following non appearance may be set aside
Any verdict or judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside or varied by the court on any terms that are just if there has, or may have been, a miscarriage of justice.
[4] The Court is required to consider this application in the way directed by the
Court of Appeal in Russell v Cox,2 confirmed in Mathieson v Jones:3
The test against which an application to set aside a judgment should be considered is whether it is just in all the circumstances to set aside the judgment, and the several factors mentioned in the judgments discussed should be taken, not as rules of law, but as no more than tests by which the justice of the case is to be measured, in the context of procedural rules whose overall purpose is to secure the just disposal of litigation.
[5] Since Russell v Cox was decided the High Court has instituted a system of case management. As well, because Mr Bligh’s case was a claim in respect of damage alleged to have been caused to his home by earthquakes in the Canterbury earthquake sequence, it was managed under a specific case management scheme put in place by the Court in Christchurch for such cases. In my opinion the reference to the context of procedural rules in Russell v Cox should, in the present case, include the case management system under which this case was procedurally conducted.
[6] In Russell v Cox, the Court of Appeal noted the following passage from
Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc:4
In approaching an application to set aside a judgment which complies with the rule, the Court is not limited in the considerations to which it may have regard, but three have long been considered of dominant importance. This was accepted by the Chief Justice in the Court below and by all counsel in this Court. They are, 1. That the defendant has a substantial ground of defence; 2. That the delay is reasonably explained; 3. That the plaintiff will not suffer irreparable injury if the judgment is set aside …
2 Russell v Cox [1983] NZLR 654 (CA) at 659.
3 Mathieson v Jones CA198/92, 11 December 1992.
4 Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc [1966] NZLR 975 at 983.
[7] In Russell v Cox the Court went on to say:5
We think that in the light of Evans v Bartlam the passage to which reference has just been made should be read as doing no more than emphasising three matters which, as a matter of commonsense and practice, the Court will generally regard as of importance in deciding whether it is just to set aside a judgment. But it should not be regarded as laying down a general rule that an application to set aside a judgment must satisfy these conditions as a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of the discretion …
[8] In Vermeulen v The Department of Health, Russell v Cox was cited to Thomas J, but he indicated a preference to adhere to the terms of the rule, as he put it, and thus to consider whether the judgment which had been entered should be set aside on the ground that there is or may have been a miscarriage of justice.6 Thomas J also postulated a distinction between an application by a defendant (as in Russell v Cox) from an application by a plaintiff (as here):7
Thirdly, I consider that a distinction may possibly be drawn between an application by a plaintiff to set aside a judgment entered by default and an application by a defendant to set aside a judgment. In the latter case the plaintiff will be held out of the fruits of his or her judgment – assuming that they are eventually successful. It is appropriate then that the defendant demonstrate a sound case why the proceeding should be reinstated. Where the application is the plaintiff’s, however, this consideration does not apply or apply to the same extent. On the contrary, it simply means that the defendants will be called upon to meet the claim, albeit at a later date than that originally contemplated.
[9] In argument, various factors were emphasised by counsel in support of opposing arguments on whether there has been a miscarriage of justice in this case. Before turning to these arguments it is necessary to set out in some detail the events which occurred in the period running up to, and on the day of, the trial.
Events leading up to the entry of judgment
[10] Mr Bligh is retired. He has Parkinson’s disease and heart disease. Since
2010 he has suffered from bowel cancer and he has terminal T cell Lymphoma. He
says that one of the consequences of Parkinson’s disease is that his mind is easily
overwhelmed in stressful situations.
5 At 659.
6 Vermeulen v The Department of Health HC Whangarei A76–85, 6 December 1991.
7 At 4–5.
[11] In November 2012 Mr Bligh engaged companies operated by Mr Bryan Staples to handle his claims for damage he believed had been caused by the earthquakes, against both EQC and IAG. Documents produced in evidence refer to Earthquake Services Limited, EQ East Solutions Limited and Claims Resolution Service Limited. Any distinction between these entities is irrelevant to the issue presently before the Court. I refer to Mr Staples’ companies as CRSL in this judgment.
[12] Material produced by Mr Bligh shows CRSL describing itself as Christchurch’s leading independent earthquake damage assessors. There is reference to a “no win no pay” service being offered. Mr Bligh’s evidence is that his understanding was that he may be required to pay court filing fees, but that if he did not win his case he would not pay legal fees to his lawyer or to EQC or IAG. He was not advised at any point until the last working day before the trial that he may be liable for an adverse costs award by the Court if he did not win. He also recalls Mr Staples saying the arrangement was “no win no pay” so he always thought that if he did not win he would not pay anything.
[13] Mr Bligh says that initially he was required by Mr Staples to be represented by Mr Grant Shand, solicitor, but later he was informed that Mr Shand would no longer be conducting his case, this would be undertaken by Mr Ferguson. Mr Shand is the principal of the firm Grant Shand, and Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss (who assisted Mr Ferguson) are solicitors employed by him.
[14] In December 2015, at the conclusion of the Earthquake List case management process, the Court allocated a seven day fixture for this case, to commence on Monday, 31 October 2016. By August 2016 the majority of the briefs of evidence of witnesses to be called at trial had been served. On 10 October 2016
Davidson J made a pre-trial direction that the Court would inspect Mr Bligh’s home which is in Waddington at 8.30 am on Monday 31 October prior to the hearing commencing in court in Christchurch. On Friday 28 October Mr Ferguson served Mr Bligh’s opening address.
[15] However, on or about 20 October Mr Ferguson rang Mr Bligh’s son, Hayden, and told him that he did not think that Mr Bligh would win his case. Hayden Bligh passed this on to his father. However, in the immediately preceding three weeks, advice from Mr Staples himself differed from the view given by Mr Ferguson to Hayden Bligh. On 28 September Mr Staples came to the property to carry out a site visit and during that visit told Mr Bligh that earthquake damage to his garage alone would put the cost of repair over the EQC cap ($100,000 plus GST) and that he would arrange for builders to visit the site and take the level of the garage roof. The following day Mr Staples published a post on the Facebook page of his company, Earthquake Services Limited. It is titled “Rumours, Rumours, Rumours”. After stating that he wished to dispel some rumours, without identifying them, and reference to an unidentified person called “Ian”, Mr Staples said:
Rumour No. 1. It is true EQC are taking a dying man named Ricky Bligh to Court over an argument about his house located just 12 klms [sic] from the Darfield quake. EQC say it’s not over cap and they are willing to stake HIS life on it. The rumour is my friend Ian is doing this to help my business because the publicity around this case will be enormous. That is NOT true, I doubt my friend Ian even knows about this case as it’s being run by lawyers. It is true the publicity will be great for everyone still stuck in the clutches of EQC. When you hear Ricky’s story, it will give us all the strength not to give up and keep fighting until you get justice. We are doing a video interview with Ricky in the next week or so, stay tuned to our FB. It will wrench your heart.
[16] A few days after that some builders called at Mr Bligh’s property, inspected the garage and informed Mr Bligh that they thought the levels of the garage were “out”. On 5 October three engineers from Terra Consultants carried out an assessment of the property. Mr Bligh does not know who arranged this, or why it was thought that a new engineering report was needed. As by then Mr Ferguson had control over the running of the case and Mr Staples was also involved, it seems likely that one or other arranged this inspection.
[17] Two weeks after that visit, Mr Hayden Bligh received Mr Ferguson’s call. Mr Bligh says that Hayden’s advice that this call had taken place was the first time he had heard that his lawyers doubted that he would win. At that time he did not take issue with Mr Ferguson about this. He did not know him well and he did not want to compromise his relationship before trial by chastising him about his having called Hayden Bligh and not having called him direct.
[18] Events unfolded daily in the week before the trial. On Tuesday, 25 October, Mr Bill Dwyer from CRSL visited the property with another engineer Pavol Csiba. In an email I refer to below, Mr Dwyer describes himself as a commercial and corporate lawyer, and as General Manager, Earthquake Services. They looked at the property and Mr Bligh pointed out to them the damage he believed had been caused by the earthquakes.
[19] On 26 October Mr Bligh was contacted by Ms McInnes who is the assistant to Mr Mark Kearney, another engineer with Terra Consultants, based in Auckland. She said that Mr Kearney wanted to visit the property on 31 October, which was the day the trial was due to start. As Mr Morriss had informed her that the trial Judge would probably be attending the property early that morning, she asked if Mr Kearney could arrive straight after that visit. Mr Bligh agreed to this. Again, it seems that this was organised by CRSL or Mr Ferguson or Mr Morriss.
[20] On Thursday 27 October Mr Ferguson, Mr Morriss and Mr Csiba visited the property. On that occasion Mr Ferguson told Mr Bligh in person, for the first time, that he thought that he had a weak case and should settle. Mr Bligh does not recall Mr Ferguson explaining why he thought the case was weak.
[21] Later that afternoon Mr Ferguson sent Mr Bligh an email explaining his exposure to defence costs if he proceeded with the case and lost in face of an offer that had been made to him by EQC and IAG. Mr Bligh says he did not give this much thought as he could not understand how he could lose the case, a view based on his belief about the extent of the damage to his home caused by the earthquakes.
[22] The next day was the working day before the trial. At 6.43 am, Mr Ferguson sent another email to Mr Bligh repeating the point in his previous email about cost exposure and telling Mr Bligh that it would be difficult to prove earthquake damage. Mr Bligh says that as far as he can recall this was the first time that he had been told that his lawyers thought it would be difficult to prove earthquake damage. Although he had understood that the advisors to EQC and IAG were of this view, he found it confusing that his lawyers were now of this opinion. He had thought that the experts which they had engaged were supportive of the case. He had also understood that
under his agreement with Mr Staples’ firm he would not have to pay if he did not win. He sent an email back within a few minutes, to that effect.
[23] Later that morning a Mr McLean, a quantity surveyor engaged by CRSL, arrived at the property saying he was there to update the cost of rebuilding because the engineer engaged to give evidence had not allowed for asbestos removal or made an allowance for double glazing. This information reinforced Mr Bligh’s understanding that he was claiming for the cost of rebuilding the house, a point made by Mr Ferguson in his email of 27 October, though at variance with the amended statement of claim which seeks the cost of repairs (and which Mr Bligh says he did not see prior to it being filed).
[24] At 12.03 pm Mr Bligh received an email from Mr Dwyer. In this email Mr Dwyer advised that he agreed with Mr Ferguson’s assessment. Mr Dwyer told Mr Bligh that his chances of success were not great, that clause 11 of the services agreement signed in 2012 gave CRSL the right to terminate the agreement in the event he rejected its advice, that its advice was to settle, that in the event he chose to continue with the court proceedings CRSL would terminate its agreement with him, and that while he could continue to use Mr Ferguson as counsel he would have to pay for his services.
[25] Mr Dwyer also advised that Mr Bligh would be liable to pay any costs that may be awarded in favour of EQC and IAG, and that this amount would be substantial. Mr Dwyer said that if he chose to settle in accordance with the advice given, CRSL would waive its fees and costs. Mr Dwyer concluded by saying that if he did not hear from Mr Bligh by the end of the day, CRSL would assume that Mr Bligh was “moving towards trial” and would terminate the agreement.
[26] At 2.39 that afternoon Mr Staples emailed Mr Bligh. He endorsed
Mr Dwyer’s email, and said:
We don’t believe you will win what you think you will. I simply cannot
support a case that [sic] winning is doubtful.
As Bill has stated we will wave [sic] our fee and our own costs. Also I will wave any 3rd party costs that are not recoverable from EQC and the insurer.
Once we cancel the contract you are fully exposed.
Please give instructions to Andrew to start negotiating a deal.
[27] As the events I have described so far are a backdrop to the events which took place between Friday, 28th and the day of the trial, Monday, 31st, I will set out in full Mr Bligh’s description of his position by Friday evening. After saying that he was surprised and shocked by the emails, that he did not respond to them, and that his phone records show a number of conversations with Mr Ferguson, Mr Morriss and Mr Dwyer before Monday morning which he can no longer recall, Mr Bligh says:
59. At this time I still did not understand why Mr Ferguson and now CRSL thought I did not have a good claim. I knew that my Property had suffered earthquake damage and that I was insured. Up until this point I thought that Mr Staples considered that the buildings had to be rebuilt. I thought that he and CRSL supported me and would support me through my court case. They had after all not only assessed my claim but along with Mr Shand had arranged for the court case based on their work. I was confused about why they were threatening to withdraw now, the working day before the hearing, especially when that morning they had sent a QS to do another rebuild assessment of my property. I had been consistently told that my house was a rebuild but now even the estimated cost of repairs to the house that CRSL had given me could not be covered by the amount that they were suggesting I negotiate at. I was in a state of shock and did not know how to respond or what to do.
[28] Notwithstanding all that had been said in the previous few days, on Saturday,
29 October, Mr Ferguson served on EQC and IAG a further brief of evidence of a
Mr Johnstone.
[29] I turn now to the following working day, the day of the trial. Clark J came to Mr Bligh’s home as arranged. She was accompanied by two court officers, four counsel representing EQC and IAG, and Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss. Mr Bligh waited in his car as he was not to attend the site visit. During that time he spoke to Mr Staples by phone. Mr Staples told him that he was not going to win the case because the defendants would throw everything at it, and it was best to negotiate. He told Mr Bligh that if he did not, they would withdraw funding. Mr Bligh says he was confused by what he saw as the mixed messages he had received leading up to the trial, and he did not see how he could lose because he thought the evidence of the damage was conclusive. He therefore told Mr Staples that he would not negotiate.
[30] When everyone but Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss had left, Mr Bligh and Mr Ferguson had a conversation. Mr Ferguson wanted him to negotiate a settlement at an amount below the sum which Mr Bligh considered was needed to reinstate his property to its pre-earthquake state. Mr Bligh told Mr Ferguson that he had a full replacement policy and he was not prepared to settle at the level Mr Ferguson thought he should negotiate at, particularly when CRSL had engaged a quantity surveyor who had given an estimate of the cost of repair and the cost of rebuilding, both of which were significantly higher than Mr Ferguson was now telling him to try to settle at.
[31] Mr Bligh says that as Mr Ferguson was leaving, he told him that he should be at court at 11.00 am, instead of 10.00 am when court was originally meant to begin. Mr Bligh thinks that Mr Ferguson told him that he had to withdraw as counsel but he is not sure. He says he was feeling very overwhelmed by the process and he does not recall if Mr Ferguson explained what the consequences of his withdrawing were. Mr Bligh does recall, however, telling Mr Ferguson that if he was running late to let the Judge know and if necessary let one of the witnesses, Mr John Johnstone, give evidence first.
[32] It will be recalled that Mr Kearney was to visit the property after the Judge’s inspection, as arranged by CRSL. Mr Bligh says there should have been enough time for him to let Mr Kearney into the property so he could do the inspection, and to get to court in time. He says, however, that looking back he now believes that he was too upset by what was happening to think clearly and that he did not understand what was going to happen. Before they left, either Mr Ferguson or Mr Morriss spoke to Mr Kearney by phone to see how far away he was. At that point Mr Kearney’s flight had been delayed and he was just leaving Christchurch Airport and making his way to Mr Bligh’s home in Waddington.
[33] Mr Bligh says that at that time he believed he had no choice but to wait for Mr Kearney to ensure that he had access to his house and garage. Because Mr Ferguson had told him, and earlier his son, Hayden, that his case was weak, Mr Bligh was pinning all his hopes on Mr Kearney who he understood could prove that there was earthquake damage. As Mr Bligh puts it:
I thought he was my last chance to save my case and my home and that it was very important for me to stay with him and point out the before and after damage. At that point, although Mr Kearney had prepared a brief of evidence, he had relied on reports from some of his employees. I thought that it was one thing to rely on the reports and photos from his employees following their visit earlier that month but nothing beats a physical visit. I was also able to show him my before and after photos taken by my Engineer Grant Wilkinson of Ruamoko Solutions in 2007 and 2010.
[34] Mr Kearney arrived about 10.30 am. Mr Bligh showed him the damage in question. He says:
Because Mr Ferguson, Mr Staples and Mr Dwyer did not believe that I could win the case, I thought I needed to make sure Mr Kearney had all the information he needed to be able to prove the earthquake damage in Court. At this point I was absolutely desperate and thought Mr Kearney was perhaps my saviour. His advice and that of his colleagues had been an absolute breath of fresh air. They were very helpful and proactive and I thought that Mr Kearney was therefore my only chance.
[35] At 11.49 am, while he was still at home, Mr Bligh had a call from Mr Ferguson and two minutes later a call from Mr Morriss. He thinks Mr Ferguson told him that he had withdrawn because CRSL had withdrawn its funding. Mr Bligh says that although Mr Ferguson may have explained this to him earlier in the day before he left the property, this was the first time that he thinks he really understood that CRSL had actually withdrawn funding support and that Mr Ferguson would abandon his representation, and that the trial would not proceed. He says Mr Ferguson went on to advise him that it was “absolutely important” for him to get to the court as soon as possible. Mr Morriss said there would be a judgment and that “I either had to contact the court or go in there”. At the time he did not understand what a judgment meant and he was still feeling quite shocked. He needed time to recover. By the time he arrived at court later that day the Judge had already left.
[36] The Judge records the events which unfolded at court in her judgment issued two days later on 2 November. To complete a description of events which occurred on the first day of the trial I set out relevant paragraphs of her Honour’s judgment:
[3] On returning to the court following the site visit I was advised that plaintiff’s counsel wished to address me in chambers concerning a recent development. The matter was called shortly before 11:30am and Mr Ferguson advised that the plaintiff’s litigation funder had terminated his agreement with Mr Bligh on the basis of Mr Bligh’s “non-cooperation”. Consequently Mr Bligh has no ability to pay his legal advisers and in the
absence of any agreement about payment Mr Ferguson sought leave to withdraw.
[4] In response to my concern and queries about Mr Bligh, Mr Ferguson confirmed he had advised Mr Bligh:
(a) that he, Mr Ferguson, would be making an application to the
Court for leave to withdraw;
(b) that Mr Bligh should be in attendance;
(c) that Mr Bligh had been advised of the consequences of the withdrawal of funding; and
(d) in response to Mr Bligh saying he wished to arrange legal aid, that it was unlikely he could do that in the time available before the hearing was due to commence and that Mr Bligh should come and speak to the Court about it but it appeared he had chosen not to do so.
[5] My further exchanges with Mr Ferguson were to satisfy myself that the application to withdraw was not attributable to a breakdown in the relationship which might be reparable.
[6] I viewed as inevitable the grant of Mr Ferguson’s application for leave to withdraw there being no basis upon which Mr Ferguson could be required to commit to completion of a seven-day trial spread over a fortnight. Before formally granting the application I heard from Mr Wood and Mr Smith, counsel for the first and second defendants.
[7] Counsel had only become aware of the withdrawal of funding and of Mr Ferguson’s intended application to withdraw at 11.00am. In circumstances where Mr Bligh had not even turned up, notwithstanding that he had been advised by his counsel to do so, counsel sought judgment dismissing the proceeding. There had been significant wasted costs and serious inconvenience and expense for witnesses including experts.
[8] Mr Ferguson, albeit acknowledging his dubious standing to do so, urged the Court to consider that in not attending Mr Bligh was not being disrespectful. He may have been attempting to arrange legal aid. I draw no inferences from Mr Bligh’s conduct. I have little basis for doing so and I bear in mind that he is very ill.
[37] After his visit to the court Mr Bligh contacted his present solicitors, GCA Lawyers, and saw his counsel, Mr Lynn, of that firm that day. Mr Lynn prepared a memorandum which is dated 31 October 2016, though court records show it was received on 1 November. Again, it is necessary to set out passages from that memorandum, as they explain the information before the Judge at the time she issued her judgment on 2 November. Mr Lynn said:
1. We have been instructed by the Plaintiff, Mr Derek Ricky Bligh, at approximately 6:00pm today.
2. In the time available the Plaintiff has briefly explained:
a. His Counsel has withdrawn on the first day of an 8 day hearing;
b.The Plaintiff was not in Court when this occurred. He had been lead [sic] to believe through his Counsel that he should remain at the property to which these proceedings relate to meet an engineer. This appears to have been a result of a break down in communications between the Plaintiff and Counsel and no disrespect to the Court was intended;
c.Despite withdrawal of his former Counsel, the Plaintiff wishes to see these proceedings to their conclusion.
3. Accordingly the Plaintiff respectfully requests the hearing be adjourned to a later date on the basis that we anticipate being able to act for the Plaintiff going forward.
4. Given the late withdrawal of the Plaintiff’s former counsel (and our late instruction) we have not yet had an opportunity to review the pleadings, evidence and submissions.
5. Practically then, if your Honour were minded to grant an adjournment:
a.Due [to] the Plaintiff’s health there is real urgency that this matter be heard as soon as possible (we are instructed that the Plaintiff suffers from Parkinson’s disease and terminal cancer, and in December 2013 was given a prognosis he was likely to live for a further 3 months to a year). However given the realities of what will be required for new counsel to come to terms with the proceedings we do not believe it is possible to reconvene the proceedings within the current allocated hearing time;
b.For the same reasons we are not in a position [to] advise the Court as to when the Plaintiff may be in a position to reconvene the hearing;
c.However, we expect to be able to come to terms with the proceedings to the extent necessary to be able to address these issues by 3 November 2016, and respectfully request a case management conference be convened at a time convenient to your Honour and Counsel for the Defendants, on or after 3 November
2016, to discuss the steps necessary for this matter to be reconvened.
d.In the circumstances, should an adjournment be granted we respectfully request that costs to date be reserved.
6. A notice of change of representation will be filed tomorrow.
[38] As predicated, documents effecting a change of solicitor were filed on
1 November. Up until that point, and thus throughout Monday, 31 October, Mr Grant Shand had been the solicitor on the record. He had not taken any of the steps required by the High Court Rules to change that position.8 This point is not referred to by the Judge in her judgment.
[39] Her Honour does refer to Mr Lynn’s memorandum, however. Her Honour refers to Mr Lynn’s explanation for why Mr Bligh was not in court when Mr Ferguson sought leave to withdraw. Her Honour said:
[14] ... Because it is an important point, and the explanation is at odds with the explanation given by Mr Ferguson, I set out the relevant paragraph of Mr Lynn’s memorandum which was emailed to the registry on the evening of 31 October.
In the time available the Plaintiff has briefly explained:
The Plaintiff was not in Court when this [withdrawal of counsel] occurred. He had been lead [sic] to believe through his Counsel that he should remain at the property to which these proceedings relate to meet an engineer. This appears to have been a result of a break down in communications between the Plaintiff and Counsel and no disrespect to the Court was intended.
[15] Mr Ferguson has responded to correct one factual aspect of the memorandum. As it is the correction of a key fact I set out Mr Ferguson’s response in full.
On 31 October 2016 counsel for the plaintiff advised the plaintiff that he had to attend the Court for the hearing. He was specifically advised not to wait to meet with the engineer who was looking at the property that morning.
After counsel for the plaintiff was informed that the funder had cancelled its contract with the plaintiff, counsel told the plaintiff again not to wait for the engineer but go to the Court for the hearing.
[16] I accept Mr Ferguson’s account, as I did when he provided it. I accept also that Mr Bligh meant no disrespect to the Court but the fact remains he failed to appear. And the decision not to appear was made in the face of his counsel’s advice.
[17] It seems to me that an attempt is now made by Mr Bligh to offer an explanation for his non-appearance which suggests a misunderstanding of the type which sometimes leads a court to stand a matter down while inquiries are made and to adjourn the trial.
[40] Although by now he had engaged Mr Lynn, neither he nor Mr Bligh had an
opportunity to respond to Mr Ferguson’s view of the information provided by
8 Rule 5.41.
Mr Lynn. There were therefore two factual accounts before the Court. Her Honour
accepted Mr Ferguson’s account.
[41] Her Honour concluded her judgment by stating:
[19] I do not consider an adjournment of the trial is warranted in the circumstances of this case. A court faced with an application for adjournment must take account of the interests of other litigants as well as the public interest in achieving the most efficient use of court resources. The proceeding has been afoot since 2013. The defendants are entitled to certainty and to judgment under r 10.8. Any miscarriage of justice thought to arise from that course may be addressed by an application to set this judgment aside.
[42] Her Honour went on to give Mr Ferguson leave to withdraw and to enter judgment for EQC and IAG under r 10.8. Costs were reserved. Leave to file memoranda was given, but memoranda have not been filed. Rather, the question of costs was raised on the present application.
The issue for determination
[43] There is only one issue in this case: has there been, or may there have been, a miscarriage of justice.
[44] To arrive at their respective positions on this issue, counsel concentrated their argument on the three factors identified in Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc as having long been considered of dominant importance.9 I will discuss these subsidiary issues in turn.
Does Mr Bligh have a case of substance?
[45] It is not the role of the Court on an application to set aside a judgment entered against the plaintiff by default to undertake a detailed analysis of the evidence and form a view on the likely outcome of a trial. That level of factual analysis, and legal analysis, must await the trial which will take place if the default judgment is set aside. Mr Lynn submits that Mr Bligh has a prima facie case against both the first
and second defendants. Mr Wood candidly accepted that he could not submit that
9 Paterson v Wellington Free Kindergarten Association Inc, above n 4, at 983.
Mr Bligh could not establish a case at trial, but he submits that the likelihood is that he will not do so. He says that the Court should be cautious of accepting the evidence of Mr Kearney, on whom Mr Bligh relies, whose evidence Mr Wood says is given on the basis of reports of other persons, and on information provided by the plaintiff, and on photographs. Conversely, witnesses to be called for the defendants both inspected the property and say it has not been damaged by the earthquakes. Mr Smith endorses this submission.
[46] If the approach to this issue described by Thomas J in Vermeulen is adopted little weight would need to be given to this issue in assessment of the principal issue to be decided. I need not diminish the relevance of this factor in the present case; my conclusion is that there is an arguable case and, in my opinion, I need not be satisfied that the case is any stronger than that.
[47] In the days leading up to the trial there was a flurry of activity orchestrated by Mr Bligh’s then advisors, whether Mr Dwyer, Mr Staples, Mr Ferguson or Mr Morriss, apparently aimed at bolstering the evidence which has already been provided as directed by the Court. This included visits by builders, engineers from Terra in Christchurch, a quantity surveyor, Mr Kearney from Terra in Auckland, Mr Bligh’s then legal counsel and Mr Dwyer and Mr Csiba. Why this level of activity was left to the last few days when Mr Bligh’s advisors had had four years to prepare the case, were under case management directions of the Court, and had been given deadlines in relation to finalisation of pleadings and provision of evidence, is a mystery and one which may need examination in another context. In the present context I refrain from making a stronger observation than that it would appear to be an entirely unsatisfactory way to prepare a significant case for trial. This activity, coupled with the adamantly held view of the four persons I have mentioned that Mr Bligh must settle the claim, suggests that in their judgment they had not obtained, even by the last week before trial, evidence which they thought could establish Mr Bligh’s claim on a balance of probabilities. That may well have been the position. I am mindful though that Mr Kearney did in fact come to the property and inspect it, and has now filed evidence by way of affidavit on this application in which he gives a professional opinion that the buildings at Mr Bligh’s property have undergone earthquake-related structural damage. There is, of course, evidence to the
contrary from expert witnesses for EQC and IAG, but short of trial I am not persuaded that the strength of Mr Bligh’s case should be assessed at a level below it being arguable.
Is there a reasonable explanation for Mr Bligh not being present in court?
[48] It is necessary to view Mr Bligh’s actions on the day of the trial in the context of all that occurred in the run up to the trial, which I have set out in detail, and in the context of his health and his consequent ability to cope under stress.
[49] It is also necessary to remember that these events took place at the very end of a period of almost four years during which Mr Shand and his employees had had the running of the case. At the outset and during that period they had encouraged in Mr Bligh an expectation that his case would succeed in achieving an outcome by which his property would be rebuilt. His evidence is that he kept being told by what he saw as Mr Staples’ office (though that may be a generalisation and not technically accurate) that the buildings on his property were more than likely to be rebuilt because the top storey was severely damaged and the local council would not allow the top storey to be built on the existing bottom storey which consisted of unreinforced concrete walls. He says he was told that the opinion of the engineer engaged by his advisors was that the whole property would need to be pulled down and rebuilt. He says these views were repeated to him when a Mr Johnstone and a Mr McLean carried out their investigations, and at one point he was even told that the cost of rebuilding would be more than they had originally thought, perhaps about
$1,400,000. His recollection is that Mr Betts of Urban Structural Services which had been engaged by CRSL told him this.
[50] Only in the final days leading up to the trial did fractures appear in what, on the evidence before me, seems to have been a consistently positive exposition to Mr Bligh of his case. In my opinion it is little wonder that he was confused by the late and apparently sudden change of position about the strength of his case. Nor is it any wonder that he was confused by the stance taken by CRSL on the Friday before the trial, by which he was to be cut loose from his expectation of a “no win no pay” outcome unless he did as he was told. Leaving aside any questions there may
be over the conduct of the two solicitors involved in those communications (Mr Ferguson and Mr Dwyer) and the other two solicitors who were acting on Mr Bligh’s behalf at the same time (Mr Morriss and Mr Shand), but taking into account the state of health and consequent state of mind when under stress that Mr Bligh has deposed to, it is scarcely surprising that by Monday morning the position was entirely unclear to him. On the one hand there were communications saying that funding had been cut, but on the other there were clear indications throughout the week before and on Monday morning that he still had his legal advisors acting for him. Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss were present at the site inspection, and Mr Kearney, a key witness, was on his way.
[51] As I have indicated, there were two conflicting stories about what Mr Bligh was told by Mr Ferguson when Clark J came to make her decision. There are two conflicting stories now. They cannot be resolved on the present evidence. The context, however, of the events of Monday morning is critical to an assessment of how the Court should now act in relation to Mr Bligh not attending court. I accept his evidence that given the sudden and unexpected announcement by his legal team of their views of the weakness of his case, he was justified in placing considerable reliance on Mr Kearney. I accept that he was entitled to remain at his property when Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss left in order to await Mr Kearney’s arrival, which was known to not be far off, and to let him into the house so he could conduct an inspection. This visit had been arranged by one or other of his legal team or related advisors. They must have thought it necessary or they would not have arranged it. Further, they had not called it off even though it must have been obvious to them that if they were not going to appear for Mr Bligh, the trial was not going to proceed. Mr Bligh wanted Mr Kearney’s evidence, so he must have thought the trial was going to proceed.
[52] There remains a question mark about the advice Mr Ferguson gave Mr Bligh, which he says was that Mr Bligh must attend court. Even if that is so, however, Mr Ferguson knew Mr Bligh was remaining at the property to let Mr Kearney in. Once he knew that, it must have been obvious to him, given his decision (or perhaps instruction from Mr Shand and/or CRSL) not to continue to represent Mr Bligh, that Mr Bligh was critically at risk of his case being struck out. In that circumstance, and
knowing Mr Bligh’s state of health, it may be that Mr Ferguson should have insisted that a key be left for Mr Kearney and that Mr Bligh come with him to the city straight away. Be that as it may, it seems that Mr Bligh did not grasp the seriousness of the situation which was going to unfold, and in all the circumstances that I have outlined it is readily understandable why. Mr Bligh did know that he had to go to court, because in the end he did, but he does not seem to have registered the urgency. In my view it is likely that either he was not told in the clearest terms what might occur if he was not there when Mr Ferguson withdrew, or he did not understand it. He says there was reference to a judgment, but he did not understand what that meant.
[53] As soon as he found out what had occurred, he sought other legal advice. It is at least arguable that if he had understood this earlier, and in particular on the previous Friday, he would have gone to seek other legal advice then. If Mr Bligh’s advisors had told him of their views and intentions a good deal earlier, instead of at the last minute, he would have had ample opportunity to engage other solicitors and counsel and protect his position. Why this issue was not raised and faced when all
the briefs of evidence had been exchanged is not explained.10
[54] In this context I will refer to one other point, as it is relevant to the overall assessment of whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. When Mr Ferguson appeared before Clark J in chambers, he sought leave to withdraw. There is no record in the judgment of Clark J that Mr Ferguson sought an adjournment on behalf of Mr Bligh, or even asked that the case be stood down until a little later, to give Mr Bligh time to get to town. Mr Ferguson left Mr Bligh’s property knowing he was still there. He also had an instruction from Mr Bligh to call the first witness, Mr Johnstone. He travelled to town and he appeared in chambers at a time when Mr Bligh had not arrived, yet he knew that Mr Bligh was remaining behind to let Mr Kearney in. It does not seem that he knew how long that would take. As far as can be ascertained on the evidence it does not seem that any further inquiry was
made by Mr Ferguson about where Mr Bligh was.
10 The exchange of evidence in this case was very poorly handled, necessitating the intervention of the Court: see Minute dated 5 August 2016.
[55] The judge records that Mr Ferguson urged her not to consider that by not attending court Mr Bligh was being disrespectful.11 Her Honour accepted that, but Mr Ferguson’s submission missed the point. He must have known what would happen if the case was not adjourned or stood down until Mr Bligh arrived. He had two defendants with the benefit of r 10.8 at their fingertips who were inevitably going to ask the Court to make an order under that rule. I do not have the benefit of
having heard from Mr Ferguson on this point, but the judgment shows that neither an adjournment, nor a direction standing the case down until later in the day, was sought.
[56] At least arguably, the proper course was for Mr Ferguson to explain that his client was not in court, that he had instructions to seek leave to withdraw, to ask for an adjournment or that the case be stood down for a brief period until his client arrived, and to defer seeking leave to withdraw until his client’s interests had been properly protected.
[57] This provisional view is fortified by the provisions of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, which bound Mr Shand, Mr Ferguson and Mr Morriss. Rule 4.2 provides:
Duty to complete retainer
4.2A lawyer who has been retained by a client must complete the regulated services required by the client under the retainer unless –
(a) the lawyer is discharged from the engagement by the client; or
(b) the lawyer and the client have agreed that the lawyer is no longer to act for the client;
(c) the lawyer terminates the retainer for good cause and after giving reasonable notice to the client specifying the grounds for termination.
4.2.1 Good cause includes –
(a) instructions that require the lawyer to breach any professional obligation;
(b) the inability or failure of the client to pay a fee on the agreed basis or, in the absence of an agreed basis, a reasonable fee at the appropriate time;
(c) the client misleading or deceiving the lawyer in a material respect;
11 Bligh v The Earthquake Commission, above n 1, at [8].
(d) the client failing to provide instructions to the lawyer in a sufficiently timely way;
(e) except in litigation matters, the adoption by the client against the advice of the lawyer of a course of action that the lawyer believes is highly imprudent and may be inconsistent with the lawyer’s fundamental obligations.
4.2.2 None of the matters set out in rule 4.1.1 is good cause to terminate a retainer.
4.2.3 A lawyer must not terminate a retainer or withdraw from proceedings on the ground that the client has failed to make arrangements satisfactory to the lawyer for payment of the lawyer’s costs, unless the lawyer has –
(a) had due regard to his or her fiduciary duties to the client concerned; and
(b) given the client reasonable notice to enable the client to make alternative arrangements for representation.
4.2.4 A lawyer who terminates a retainer must give reasonable assistance to the client to find another lawyer.
[58] It will be noted that the definition of good cause in cl 4.2.1(e) does not apply in litigation matters. In any event, whilst it might be arguable that the three lawyers concerned regarded Mr Bligh’s refusal to take their advice on settlement as highly imprudent, it is not immediately apparent how this might also be inconsistent with the fundamental obligations each held in this case.
[59] Further, r 4.2.3 is directly applicable. The reason that each of the lawyers withdrew from acting for Mr Bligh was that CRSL had withdrawn its funding, for the reasons given by Mr Dwyer and Mr Staples. In that circumstance, each of the lawyers concerned was required not to terminate his retainer or withdraw from the proceeding unless he had had due regard to his fiduciary duties to Mr Bligh and, in addition, had given him reasonable notice so as to enable him to make alternative arrangements for representation. Further, r 4.2.4 provides that a lawyer who terminates a retainer must give reasonable assistance to the client to find another lawyer.
[60] There is nothing in the material before me to see that any regard was had to the fiduciary duty Mr Ferguson and Mr Shand owed to Mr Bligh, nor that Mr Bligh was given reasonable notice which would have enabled him to make alternative
arrangements for representation, nor that either of them gave any assistance to
Mr Bligh to find another lawyer.
[61] I do not draw any firm conclusions on the conduct of Mr Shand, Mr Ferguson or Mr Morriss as none of them has been heard on the point. The apparent (but not established) breaches of professional obligations to which Mr Bligh was entitled is a factor which, in my opinion, weighs in favour of a finding on this application in favour of Mr Bligh. The rule in question is directed squarely at ensuring that a party to litigation is not left in the position of Mr Bligh. I add that there is no basis to consider that Mr Morriss was in a position to exercise a judgment or act independently of his senior, Mr Ferguson, or his employer, Mr Shand.
[62] In my opinion, it can fairly be concluded that Mr Bligh acted in the period after the inspection of the house in a way which was aimed at best protecting his claim by ensuring his key witness, whose evidence by then was seen to be even more crucial than it might have been earlier, could re-inspect the house. It is a reasonable conclusion that he did not fully understand the risk to his case that lay in his not immediately going to the court, otherwise it is in my view likely he would have done so, Mr Kearney’s visit notwithstanding. I also take into account the very mixed messages he had been receiving over a period of a few days prior to Monday morning right up to and including the site visit and Mr Kearney’s visit. Both visits could be seen as inconsistent with the position conveyed to him on Friday by his advisors.
[63] For the purposes of this application it is not necessary for me to be satisfied that Mr Bligh had a specific justification for not going to court. It is sufficient to take into account all that occurred on Monday morning and in the days leading up to it in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Will either of the defendants suffer irreparable harm if the judgment is set aside?
[64] There can be no question that setting aside the judgment would be to the detriment of each defendant, in the sense of each having to face the claim once more. In the case of EQC, Mr Wood also pointed out that, as some six years has now passed since the Canterbury earthquake sequence, his client is trying to complete its
outstanding claims, and has restructured the organisation which it put together for its response to those earthquakes. It is now engaged in responding to later events in accordance with its statutory role.
[65] As a consequence, each of the defendants would be put to further expense in continuing to maintain a defence to Mr Bligh’s claim. Conceivably, depending on how Mr Bligh’s claim were handled, should it be reinstated, that could involve further preparation of defence evidence and submissions. Conversely, if the case were to remain on its present footing without material amendments to the pleadings, any variation to the respective cases of the defendants may be comparatively modest.
[66] It is frequently the response of the Court, when setting aside a judgment entered by default against a plaintiff, to make an award of costs to affected defendants, in respect of wasted attendances. Both EQC and IAG seek such orders. This is discussed below. In this case there is no suggestion that setting aside the default judgment and allowing the case to proceed will have an incurable consequence, such as, for example, leaving a defendant exposed because of unavailability of a witness. In my view, any adverse effect on either defendant could be cured by a measure of costs directed at ensuring that reinstatement of the case after the default judgment was fairly compensated.
[67] I find that neither defendant will suffer irreparable injury if the judgment is set aside. Any adverse effect of the case continuing is more than outweighed by the interests of Mr Bligh.
Conclusion
[68] Taking into account all factors, I find that there has been a miscarriage of justice. This should be cured by the judgment being set aside.
[69] As indicated, both EQC and IAG seek costs both on this application, and in respect of the expense to which they have been put as a result of the case not proceeding on its allocated fixture day. Indeed, EQC optimistically seeks costs on the entire proceeding, from the preparation of its statement of defence right through to the entry of the default judgment.
[70] Costs on this application should be reserved. It will be apparent from this judgment that there are significant issues in relation to the conduct of Mr Bligh’s appointed litigation funder and the solicitor and counsel whom that funder required him to instruct. Those issues cannot be decided and should not be the subject of further comment at present, as those involved must have an opportunity to be heard on the issues which I have identified, and any other issues that Mr Bligh may be advised to raise. The Court has power to direct that payment of costs be made by a non party. At this point I do not rule out the prospect of that occurring.
[71] The same applies in relation to the applications for wasted costs. In relation to this aspect of a costs award, there is a further factor to be taken into account. Until it is known how the case will proceed, a fair assessment cannot be made of which part of the attendances of either defendant has been wasted. Plainly enough, this will be the costs of attending in Christchurch, no prior notice of the decision of the plaintiff’s legal advisors and funder having been given to counsel for either defendant. Whether wasted costs extend beyond that will be a matter for analysis at a later point.
[72] For these reasons all issues as to costs are reserved.
Outcome
[73] The judgment entered on 2 November 2016 is set aside. [74] Costs are reserved.
[75] A case management conference will be held in approximately six weeks. Prior to that conference the plaintiff is to file and serve a memorandum setting out with precision how he intends to proceed with the case and proposing a timetable for any amendment to the pleadings, any other intended interlocutory steps, and the position in relation to the provision of further evidence, if any. This is to be filed and served no later than seven working days before the conference and counsel for the defendants are asked to file and serve memoranda in response no later than two working days before the conference.
[76] The issue of costs will not lie in abeyance indefinitely. The defendants have applied for wasted costs. Any application for costs against any non-party is to be filed and served within 20 working days and given its first call at the conference
which will be attended also by any respondent non-party.
J G Matthews
Associate Judge
Solicitors:
GCA Lawyers, Christchurch
Chapman Tripp, WellingtonDuncan Cotterill, Auckland
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