Blake v Thames District Court

[2022] NZHC 1974

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2021-419-000068

[2022] NZHC 1974

UNDER

the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016

BETWEEN

ROGER WILLIAM BLAKE (AKA LIVING MAN: ROGER-WILLIAM: HOUSE OF
BLAKE)
Applicant

AND

THAMES DISTRICT COURT

First Respondent

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & ORS
Second Respondents

MEDSAFE AND ORS

Third Respondents

Hearing:	On the papers
Judgment:	11 August 2022

JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J

(Permission to appeal)

This judgment was delivered by me on Thursday, 11 August 2022 at 11 am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Hamilton. Copy to: Applicant.

BLAKE v THAMES DISTRICT COURT [2022] NZHC 1974 [11 August 2022]

[1]                  Roger-William sought a stay of criminal charges pending his judicial review of related search warrants. I dismissed the stay application.1 Roger-William seeks permission to appeal that decision. Permission is required because of s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016, which restricts appeals from interlocutory applications.

[2]                  Central to my  reasoning  was  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Gill v Attorney-General.2 Gill holds “judicial review should rarely be permitted to … challenge the issue, validity and execution  of  a  search  warrant”3  because:  a  search warrant may be challenged in a criminal case; evidence may be admitted in such a case even when a search warrant is invalid;4 and judicial review is an awkward vehicle in this context. I concluded Roger-William had not demonstrated (extraordinary) cause for a stay given:

(a)He may challenge the validity of the search warrants in his criminal case.

(b)He would not suffer material prejudice without a stay.

[3]                  Roger-William does not accept my reasoning. He considers the decision is replete with error, factual and legal.

[4]                  The Court of Appeal has held a high threshold exists before permission should be given for an interlocutory appeal.5 An applicant must identify an arguable error of law or fact of general or public importance, or of sufficient importance to the applicant to outweigh the lack of general or precedential value.6 Circumstance must warrant further delay.7 The ultimate question is whether the interests of justice are served by granting permission.8

1      Blake v Thames District Court [2022] NZHC 1235.

2      Gill v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 468, [2011] 1 NZLR 433.

3 At [29].

4      Evidence Act 2006, s 30.

5      Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122 at [6].

6 At [6].

7 At [6].

8 At [6].

[5]                  Roger-William acknowledges these principles, but offers arguments with little apparent applicability, including, for  example,  that  he  is  “a  man  of  God”  and  “a Minister of God’s word”. In fairness, Roger-William is a layperson who continues to self-represent.

[6]                  It is not necessary to articulate the (many) errors Roger-William wishes to advance on appeal. It is sufficient to observe none has obvious general or public importance, even assuming all are arguable. Circumstance does not support further delay. It bears repeating Roger-William seeks to stay criminal charges, brought in the public interest. Moreover, he may challenge the validity of the search warrants in his criminal case (which he seeks to stay). That point introduces another: it remains the position Roger-William would not suffer material prejudice without a stay. The interests of justice do not favour permission for these reasons.

[7]                  Roger-William also contends I should not determine permission given my decision is in question. However, as the Court of Appeal has observed, it is “entirely routine for the same judicial officer to make successive determinations” in this context.9

[8]                  An issue of discovery remains outstanding between the parties. I will address this separately by Minute.

Result

[9]The application for permission to appeal is dismissed.

……………………………..

Downs J

9      Napier v Auckland District Court [2022] NZCA 293 at [11].