Blake v Blake
[2021] NZHC 2583
•1 October 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA
TE ROTORUA-NUI-A-KAHUMATAMOMOE ROHE
CIV-2020-463-18
[2021] NZHC 2583
BETWEEN BARTLEY BLAKE
Applicant
AND
MAYSIE BLAKE
First Respondent
HMR LIMITED
Second Respondent
Hearing: 16 July and 16 September (via VMR) 2021 Counsel:
J Billington QC and K Lellman for Applicant
D Chambers QC and E Armstrong for First Respondent
Judgment:
1 October 2021
Reissued:
8 October 2021
ANONYMISED JUDGMENT OF WHATA J
Re leave to appeal
This judgment was delivered by me on 1 October 2021 at 4.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ………………………….
Solicitors: Tompkins Wake, Tauranga
LeeSalmonLong, Auckland
BLAKE v BLAKE [2021] NZHC 2583 [1 October 2021]
[1] The parties seek leave to appeal my interim judgment of 12 April 2021, determining an appeal from the Family Court concerning claims under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA).1 The applications for leave engage three findings. First, I assumed that Mr Blake held a 100 per cent shareholding in a company, SC Limited (SCL), valued at $23.7 m. This percentage shareholding and valuation are not accepted by Mr Blake. Second, under s 9A(2) of the PRA, I found that Mr and Mrs Blake should share relationship property valued at approximately $110 m equally. Mr Blake maintains he is entitled to at least 60 per cent of that relationship property value. Third, I refused to vest land held by an asset holding company in Mrs Blake. She insists that she should have this property.
Background
[2] The background and my reasons are set out in my interim judgment and my final judgment. It is not necessary to repeat that detail here. The following provides the relevant context for the proposed appeal issues.
Share valuation
[3] The most significant property interests comprise shares in HMR Limited (HML) and a subsidiary of that company, SCL, together with personal assets. Complicating matters, just over three months prior to separation, Mr Blake entered into a shareholding agreement with his son John (the SHA) to enable the sale of the shares in SCL to the John Blake Trust (JBT). Prior to the date of relationship property valuation, 8.4 per cent of the shares were sold to the JBT in accordance with the formula set out in the SHA. Referring to Regal Castings v Lightbody, I found that Mr Blake intended to defeat Mrs Blake relationship property claim in respect of the value of those shares and that the consideration paid by the JBT for them was inadequate.2 However, rather than require the JBT to pay compensation (as John, through the JBT, had altered his position in good faith and for valuable consideration), I considered the
1 [Blake] v [Blake] [2020] NZFC 212 [Family Court judgment]; and [Blake] v [Blake] [2021] NZHC 756 [Interim judgment]. I issued final judgment on 1 October 2021: [Blake] v [Blake] [2021] NZHC 2590 [Final judgment].
2 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [143] citing Regal Castings v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87, [2009] 2 NZLR 433 [Regal Castings].
just solution was to simply put Mrs Blake in the position she would have been had the shares not been sold and, like the Family Court, base the share valuation on a 100 per cent shareholding of SCL.3
Section 9A(2)4 division
[4] The Family Court found that Mrs Blake's contribution to the increase in value of HML was equal in all respects, except for Mr Blake's pre-marriage contribution to the subsidiaries, including SCL.5 The Court concluded that a 20 per cent differential was justified given Mr Blake's pre-marriage contribution, in the form of property and skills.6 In contrast, I considered that a differential of that scale was not warranted given that the increase in the value of SCL had already been discounted through the application of a "key person allowance" to accommodate Mr Blake's personal characteristics, or the absence of them, in fixing the fair market value of SCL. 7 I also found, referring to observations by Arnold J in Scott v Williams, that this is a clear case involving a lengthy marriage wherein the non-earning spouse has enabled the earning spouse to devote his time to his business and, accordingly, it was not reasonably possible to separate out Mrs Blake's contribution from Mr Blake's innate earning ability.8
Restaurant premises
[5] Mrs Blake runs a hospitality business out of a property owned by HML. I declined to make orders vesting that property in Mrs Blake,9 rejecting an argument that I should follow the approach in Clayton v Clayton:10 namely, that the powers and entitlements under a trust deed were relationship property and thus amenable to
3 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [146]. The Family Court proceeded on the basis that the JBT had acquired the shares in good faith and for valuable and adequate consideration and so relief under s 44 of the PRA was not available. The Court found, however, that fair market valuation at 100 per cent shareholding could be used because Mr Blake could force the buy-back of the shares. I disagreed with the Family Court Judge in terms of the power to force a buy-back and about the availability of relief under s 44 of the PRA, but I agreed that SCL should be valued at a 100 per cent and I disagreed with the Family Court.
4 Of the PRA.
5 Family Court judgment, above n 1, at [225].
6 At [225].
7 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [129].
8 At [131]–[133], citing Scott v Williams [2017] NZSC 185, [2018] 1 NZLR 507.
9 Pursuant to s 33 of the PRA.
10 Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551.
relationship property orders.11 I expressed doubt as to whether the Court has the power to make such an order and, in any event, refused to do so because, whatever powers might exist in relation to the property, it was not property acquired after the relationship commenced.
The issues
[6]The issues raised by the proposed grounds of appeal are:12
Mr Blake
(a)whether the SHA formula should have been used to fix share value for SCL;
(b)in respect of s 44 of the PRA and the share sale to the JBT:
(i)whether I misapplied Regal Castings in finding that Mr Blake had the requisite intention to defeat Mrs Blake's relationship property claim; and
(ii)whether I was wrong to find that JBT did not pay "adequate" consideration for the shares, as required by s 44(2)(b);
(c)whether I was wrong to grant relief under ss 18C or 25 of the PRA; and
(d)whether I was wrong to disturb the Family Court's distribution under s 9A(2) of the PRA.
11 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [164].
12 A much broader list of matters is noted in the application for leave and then refined in submissions. These are reproduced as Appendix A. The issues listed here are the main issues identified in oral argument. Issues relating to the family home and interest have been resolved: see Final judgment, above n 1.
Mrs Blake
(e)Whether the reasoning in Clayton v Clayton as to when a spouse may be considered to have an "interest" in the land held by a trust applies to assets held by a company.
Threshold for leave
[7] The threshold for leave is well settled. The proposed appeal must raise some question of law or fact capable of bona fide and serious argument in a case involving some interest, public or private, of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay of the further appeal. As stated in Waller v Hider, the Court of Appeal is not engaged in the general correction of error.13 Rather, its primary function is to clarify the law and to determine whether it has been properly construed and applied by the Court below.14 Where findings are non-concurrent, and there is a real issue of law or principle at stake, the threshold may be met. However, the principle expressed in s 1N(d) of the PRA must be carefully weighed: issues arising under the Act should be resolved as inexpensively, simply and speedily as is consistent with justice. This calls for close examination of the utility of the proposed appeals.
The share valuation and transfer
[8] The issues raised at [6](a), (b) and (c) concern the valuation of the shares used to fix the relationship property value. Mr Blake's primary claim is that the SHA should govern the valuation of the shares. His counsel, Mr Billington QC, contends that the SHA confers a right of veto on John, the effect of which is to cap fair market share value in accordance with the SHA valuation formula. He also claims that:
(a)Regal Castings is not authority for the proposition that knowledge is sufficient to infer an intention to defeat, and accordingly I misapplied Regal Castings in coming to the view that Mr Blake intended to defeat Mrs Blake's property claim;
13 Waller v Hider [1998] 1 NZLR 412 (CA) at 412.
14 At 412.
(b)the SHA served a valid commercial purpose, namely a succession plan; and
(c)there is no evidence to support a finding that the consideration paid as at the date of the transfer of shares was inadequate.
[9] While some of the subsidiary issues may have some technical merit, Mr Blake's primary claim is not capable of serious argument. On the case to be advanced by him, the SCL share value is at most $13.99 m.15 This is about $9.7 m, or 41 per cent less, than the fair market value (applying orthodox valuation methodology) adopted by the Family Court as modified by this Court of about $23.7 m.16 This results in a corresponding reduction in the value of the relationship property to be shared between Mr and Mrs Blake. 17 Given that the SHA was only executed just over three months prior to separation and in the face of Mrs Blake's longstanding objection to any such sale, and that as between them, only Mr Blake stood to benefit from it after separation (through the succession plan), a valuation based on the SHA would be manifestly unjust and is not capable of serious argument.
[10] As to the subsidiary arguments, contrary to Mr Billington's contentions otherwise:
(a)There are concurrent findings of fact that both Mr Blake and John Blake knew that Mrs Blake objected to any share sale until her interest had been recognised.18
15 This is based on a valuation made by Mr Glass, for Mr Blake, at 91.6 per cent share value. In submissions, Mr Billington also identified the difference as $18 m, citing [78] of the Interim judgment. This appears to be based on a comparison to Mr Graham’s valuation, which was not adopted by either Court. The difference however does not take into account cl 5.2 of the SHA under which John can obtain shares at a 30 per cent discount, which according to Mr Davis reduces the share value to $12.014 m for the date of separation and $11.339 m for the March 2018 shareholding.
16 The only material difference between my judgment and the Family Court’s judgment is that I required an adjustment to the insurance costs used in the formulation of equity value.
17 Mr Davis and Mr Graham agreed that the value of the subsidiaries forms part of the value of HML and thus the value of the relationship property.
18 See Family Court judgment, above n 1, at [255] and Interim judgment, above n 1, at [143].
(b)There are concurrent findings of fact that the transfer of the shares would lead to a reduction in relationship property value.19
(c)Regal Castings20 and Horsfall v Potter21 are clear authority for the proposition that where, as here, property is transferred in circumstances where a partner must have known that the alienating of property will hinder, delay or defeat the relationship property claim of the other partner, an intention to defeat may be inferred.
(d)As recorded in the interim judgment, there is ample evidence showing that the shares were sold at grossly under fair market value, applying orthodox valuation principles.22 The JBT also underpaid for the shares in the sum of $291,000 less than what the SHA formula provided. 23
(e)While there is no valuation evidence about the orthodox fair market value as at the date of the SHA or the share transfers, the relative difference between those valuations will be the same given that the respective methodologies for calculating future maintainable earnings (FME) and income capitalisation will be the same.
(f)Any decline in the value of the shares held by Mr Blake is simply a function of the SHA willingly entered into by him and for his benefit, the valuable consideration for which is the succession plan.
19 See Family Court judgment, above n 1, at [243], [245], [249], [250] and [309]. As noted in the Interim judgment, above n 1, at n 34, the share value difference of $1.8 m assessed by the Family Court is based on a fair market value of $26.3 m, a share transfer of 9.4 per cent and assumes the JBT only paid $684,000. The correct values are $23.7 m, 8.4 per cent and $833,270, so the actual difference is $1,157,530. The Family Court did not consider this to be an issue because of the determination that a shareholding of 100 per cent should be assumed and that there was sufficient value in the relationship property to satisfy Mrs Blake’s claim. The Family Court also found it was not necessary to make an adjustment order under s 18C of the PRA as that aspect had been dealt with when determining the parties’ respective contributions to the increase in the value of HML (at [310]).
20 Regal Castings, above n 2, at [54].
21 Horsfall v Potter [2017] NZSC 196, [2018] 1 NZLR 638 at [96].
22 See Interim judgment, above n 1, at [65]-[78] and [85] for summary of the expert valuation evidence. Refer also n 72–74.
23 See Interim judgment, above n 1, at n 120.
[11] In these circumstances, while appellate argument about the nuanced application of Regal Castings might be justified in the right case, this is not it. I see no merit in allowing leave to appeal on Mr Blake's proposed grounds of appeal in [6](a) and (b).
[12] I acknowledge, as recorded in the interim judgment at [145] and [146], that the effect of s 18C (or s 25) was not argued before me and I was not in a position to accurately assess the net effect of the sales of the shares to the JBT. Ordinarily, that fact might attract an appeal on orthodox fairness grounds, as would an argument about lack of jurisdiction. But this would belie three important facts:
(a)First, if I am wrong about jurisdiction, the counterfactual must be an order against John for compensation to ensure that Mrs Blake is not made worse off by Mr Blake's breach of s 44.
(b)Second, the order was made to provide relief to John who acted in good faith, not Mr Blake who stands to benefit from the voidable disposition both in terms of the succession plan and the corresponding reduction in the value of relationship property to be shared with Mrs Blake.
(c)Third, both the Family Court and this Court valued the relationship property on the same basis, namely that HML held 100 per cent of the shares in SCL. There has been ample opportunity in both Courts to test the fairness of that approach, including as to final quantum after all necessary cash and other adjustments.
[13] Finally, s 18C (in terms of post-separation transactions) and s 25 (which applies generally) plainly confer very broad powers on the Court to achieve what is just. It is inconceivable that the Court could not remedy a $9.7 m diminution in relationship property value caused by a property transaction entered into in breach of s 44, and in a way that ensures that Mrs Blake is not made worse off.
[14] For these reasons, I decline to grant leave to appeal on issues [6](a), (b) and (c).
The s 9A(2) division
[15] Issue [6](d) deals with the division of the relationship property. While it is expressed as a single issue, Mr Blake's proposed appeal point effectively identifies multiple grounds of appeal, namely:
(a)the Family Court decision was an exercise of discretion and there was no qualifying error;
(b)I failed to address or appear to have overlooked the fact that "pre- marriage contribution" includes "the experience and attributes acquired by Mr Blake within the business prior to the marriage" rather than simply the existence of separate property;
(c)I was wrong to take into account key person risk and a corresponding multiplier as a matter of law and fact;
(d)there is no other value that Mr Blake can obtain from SCL other than from the fair market share value so it must include recognition of his personal contribution;
(e)I misinterpreted Judge Wills' application of the presumption of equal contribution laid out in Scott v Williams,24 insofar as she identified it as a starting point only, and found that Mr Blake's skills were "uncommon";25 and
(f)I was wrong to reduce the inflation-adjusted value of Mr Blake's separate property at the date of marriage from $5.5 m to $3.5 m as an acknowledgment of Mrs Blake's claimed indirect contributions, because her contributions should be recognised by the percentage share of the increase she is awarded.
24 Scott v Williams, above n 8.
25 Family Court judgment, above n 1, at [219].
[16] The first ground is a new argument and contradicts the position adopted by Mr Blake at the hearing on appeal from the Family Court.26 It is now far too late to make this argument. Furthermore, I found that the Judge's 60 / 40 division was "irreconcilable" with the basis upon which she approached her analysis, namely that in a long relationship such as this one, the increase in value of an asset is most likely to arise from the joint efforts of the parties;27 that is, in short, I found she was plainly wrong.28
[17] The second ground is wrong.29 As noted in the final judgment, while my interim judgment does not disaggregate the pre- and intra-marriage personal contribution of skill and attributes as the Family Court does, Mr Blake's personal contribution is expressly acknowledged but dismissed as providing justification for a 20 per cent differential for the reasons which are plainly addressed to the value of his skills and attributes.30
[18] The third ground is plainly wrong in law. As Rose v Rose exemplifies, how relationship property value is derived is relevant to the s 9A(2) assessment.31 In this case, a key person discount-to take into account the risk of Mr Blake's absence-was applied with the effect of reducing the earnings multiplier and thus the value of the SCL shares. While the materiality of the key person allowance may be disputable, it is not seriously arguable this fact is irrelevant as a matter of law on the issue of personal contribution to relationship property value.
[19] The third ground also appears paradoxical. Mr Blake supports a share value based on the absence of his personal contribution to future profitability, while at the same time claiming a greater percentage of the same share value because of his personal contribution to it. Furthermore, if Mr Blake wanted to claim a greater share of the value of SCL based on his personal contribution of his skills and attributes to
26 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [57].
27 Family Court judgment, above n 1, at [219].
28 Interim judgment, above n 1, at [133].
29 As explained by Mr Davis in his affidavit on economic disparity. Refer also to my Final judgment, above n 1, at [37].
30 Final judgment, above n 1, at [37].
31 Rose v Rose [2009] NZSC 46, [2009] 3 NZLR 1. In that case the fact that the increase in value was attributable to inflation had a marked effect on the division of the relationship property.
future profitability, he could have advanced a valuation approach fully inclusive of it.32
[20] The fourth ground-Mr Blake's argument there is no other obtainable value to reflect Mr Blake's personal contribution to SCL's value-cuts both ways. Like Mr Blake, Mrs Blake can obtain no greater relationship property value in respect of any future profitability attributable to Mr Blake's personal contribution of skills and attributes to SCL. The value of the impact of the key person risk allowance has now been assessed at approximately $4.35-7.2 m.33 In reality, the share value obtained is simply a function of the fact that HML and SCL are worth more to Mr Blake than to a third party.34 This issue therefore is moot as between them for the purpose of a fair division of relationship property value.
[21] The fifth ground is not about the misapplication of the presumption of equal contribution laid out in Scott v Williams. It appears to be accepted by Mr Blake that the presumption of equal contribution applies to intra-marriage contributions. Rather, it is centrally a complaint about the weight to be afforded to pre-marriage contribution of skill and attributes.
[22] The sixth ground simply reiterates the central complaint that all of Mr Blake's pre-marriage contribution should have been afforded distinct credit over and above the inflation-related increase in the separate property value. It also appears to misunderstand the outcome and the basis of SCL's share value, namely the capitalisation of profits in perpetuity. As a consequence of my decision, Mr Blake retains 85 per cent of the inflation-adjusted share value of SCL at inception: that is, 85 per cent of the value of the capitalisation of SCL profits in perpetuity at inception of the marriage.35
32 As the expert for Mrs Blake effectively did: Mr Graham valued SCL at $32 m as compared to Mr Davis’ fair market valuation at $17.6 m and the valuation favoured by the Court of $23.7 m. Assuming Mr Blake advanced Mr Graham’s share value, for example, he may then have reasonably claimed that this value includes any profits associated with Mr Blake’s personal contribution.
33 See discussion in my Final judgment, above n 1, at [38]–[40].
34 See the observations of William Young J in Scott v Williams, above n 8, at [416] and following, and my Final judgment, above n 1, at [31]-[33].
35 See my Final judgment, above n 1, at n 37.
[23] Finally, as also explained in the final judgment, on the approach to share value Mr Blake advances, his pre-marriage contribution, including his skills and attributes, is already captured by the inflation adjusted share value of SCL at inception. Moreover, if his pre-marriage contribution of skills and attributes has not been captured by that share value,36 it must be a relatively small value compared to the value of the 2018 key person discount and dwarfed by the value of the joint contribution of Mr and Mrs Blake over the course of a 30-year marriage.
[24] Overall, therefore, Mr Blake's primary complaint is that I failed to recognise his pre-marriage contribution of skills and attributes and should have ignored the key person allowance. I agree with Ms Chambers that issue [6](d) raises no real issue of law or principle or matter of general or public interest and simply seeks to relitigate fact specific merits. Therefore, an appeal point of unfettered scope in respect of the s 9A(2) division as proposed by Mr Blake is not justified. However, I cannot discount the reasonable possibility that the Court of Appeal might take a different view of the relevance of the key person discount and the weight to be afforded to Mr Blake's pre marriage contribution of skills and attributes. Therefore, given the quantum in issue, I consider that leave to appeal should be granted on two issues:
(a)Was the High Court wrong to have regard to the key person discount?
(b)Did Mr Blake's pre-marriage contribution of skills and attributes justify a 20 per cent differential in the relationship property division?
Does Clayton v Clayton apply to companies?
[25] Ms Armstrong, for Mrs Blake, submits that it is seriously arguable that the principle in Clayton v Clayton-that trust property is amenable to relationship property orders-applies to properties held by a company.37 I accept that this point on appeal, in the right case, may be a matter of general or public interest. But this is not the right case. The concurrent findings of this Court and the Family Court are that vesting is
36 As also noted in the Final judgment, at n 38, it may be that the 1986 earnings multiple of 4.6 applied by Mr Davis to derive this value included a key person discount, but that seems highly unlikely given Mr Davis’ evidence in answer to question to the Family Court judge that “ I .. sort of.. simply dropped [it] in there”.
37 Clayton v Clayton, above n 10.
not appropriate. Furthermore, while Mrs Blake does not get orders vesting the property in her, she receives an equivalent monetary value for 50 per cent of the property and so there is not substantive unfairness in the result. Leave to appeal on this ground is therefore declined.
Outcome
[26] I decline both Mr Blake's and Mrs Blake's applications for leave to appeal in respect of the issues listed at [6](a)-(c) and (e).
[27]I grant leave to appeal on two issues, namely:
(a)Was the High Court wrong to have regard to the key person discount as part of the s 9A(2) evaluation?
(b)Did Mr Blake's pre-marriage contribution justify a 20 per cent differential in the relationship property division under s 9A(2)?
Costs
[28]Costs on the leave applications are to lie where they fall.
APPENDIX A
Mr Blake's notice of appeal, dated 11 May 2021, lists the following grounds of appeal:
4.1 Valuation of [HMR Limited] ("[HML]") and [SC Limited] ("[SCL]")
4.1.1 The High Court erred when assessing the value of [HML]'s shareholding in [SCL] by failing to take into account, or give effect to [SCL] Shareholder Agreement with the [John Blake Trust] ("[JBT]") dated 31 March 2016 ("the SHA").
4.1.2 The High Court erred in determining the value of assets owned by [HML] but not fixing the value of the Mr [Blake's] separate property [HML] shares.
4.1.3 Alternatively, if the valuation formula in the SHA was not to be followed, did the High Court err in upholding the Family Court decision to use 5.5 as the multiple to assess fair market value?
4.1.4 Did the High Court err in determining that at 31 March 2018 [HML] had 100% of the shares in [SCL], not 91.6%?
4.1.5 Did the High Court err in failing to take account when confirming the Family Court valuation, the effect of taxation and other costs which would be incurred when withdrawing funds from [HML] in order to satisfy any monetary judgment?
4.1.6 Did the High Court err in not applying s.1M and s.2G(2) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) to determine the value of Mr [Blake's] [HML] shares at a date other than 31 March 2018 and thus fail to provide for a just division of the relationship property?
4.1.7 Did the High Court err in not considering and making orders under s33(4) of the PRA so as to provide for a just division between the parties?
4.2 S44 and S18C PRA - Disposition of [SCL] shares by [HML]
4.2.1 Did the High Court err in making orders under s44 PRA in relation to the sale by [HML] of its [SCL] shares to the [John Blake Trust] ("[JBT]")?
4.2.2 Did the High Court err in finding Mr [Blake] intended to defeat Mrs [Blake's] relationship property claim by the sale of [SCL] shares to the [JBT]?
4.2.3 Did the High Court err in finding the consideration paid by [JBT] for the [SCL] shares was inadequate?
4.2.4 Did the High Court err in finding the 8.4% of the [SCL] shares were transferred to [JBT] after separation and that s.18C applied when 3% of the shares were transferred on 31 March 2016, before the date of separation?
4.2.5 Did the High Court err in finding the sale by [HML] of shares in [SCL] to [JBT] infringed s.44 PRA, and in using s.44(2) PRA, to order that the [HML] shareholding in [SCL] should be based on a 100% shareholding when calculating the [HML] share value?
4.2.6 Did the High Court err in determining the proper remedy under s.44 of the PRA was to proceed with the valuation of [HML] as if the sale of shares to [JBT] had not occurred?
4.3 Application of s9A(2) PRA - Increase attributable to the actions of Mrs [Blake] and value of her contributions
4.3.1 Did the High Court err in conflating Mrs [Blake's] contributions to the relationship with contributions by her to the increase in value of the [HML] shares?
4.3.2 Did the High Court err and fail to give due recognition to the principles of separate property pursuant to s9 PRA when reducing the inflation-adjusted value of Mr [Blake's] separate property at the date of marriage from
$5.5million to $3.5million as an acknowledgment of Mrs [Blake's] claimed indirect contribution?
4.3.3 Did the High Court err when fixing as equal the parties' respective contributions to the increase in value of Mr [Blake's] [HML] shares under s9A(2) i.e. 50%?
4.3.4 Did the High Court err in finding a lengthy traditional marriage was of itself to be counted as a contribution to the increase in value of Mr [Blake's] separate property, the [HML] shares?
4.3.5 Did the High Court err in failing to give due recognition to the overall justice of a monetary judgment and an equal division of the increase in value of Mr [Blake's] separate property shares thus leaving Mr [Blake] with all the risk of the [SCL] valuation?
4.4 S182 Family Proceedings Act 1980 - [the family home] conditions
4.4.1 Did the High Court err in vesting [the family home] in the [M Blake Trust]?
4.4.2 Alternatively, if vesting of [the family home] in the M Blake Trust was to occur, did the High Court err in failing to determine the conditions of the first option ordered by the Family Court and determining the conditions were not a proper point of appeal?
4.5 Interest Claim
4.5.1 Did the High Court err in ordering Mr [Blake] to pay Mrs [Blake] interest to compensate her from the date of valuation, 31 March 2018, to the date of hearing at first instance, 29 April 2019?
4.5.2 If not, and alternatively, did the High Court err in failing to fix the interest rate to be paid by Mr [Blake], which rate should be compensatory, not punitive, should recognise the mix of assets and valuation dates, have regard
to the current economic environment and be consistent with the principles of s.1M.
5
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