Bhana v Ranolf Company Limited
[2014] NZHC 763
•15 April 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
CIV2014-463-000036 [2014] NZHC 763
BETWEEN STEPHEN CHIMAN BHANA
First Plaintiff
AND
JASU MATI BHANA Second Plaintiff
AND
RANOLF COMPANY LIMITED First Defendant
AND
JAAFAR HOLDINGS LIMITED Second Defendant
Hearing: 9 April 2014 Appearances:
G C McArthur for the Plaintiffs/Applicants
D Chisholm QC for the Second Defendant/RespondentJudgment:
15 April 2014
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN
This judgment was delivered by me on
15.04.14 at 4:30pm, pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
S C BHANA and J M BHANA v RANOLF CO LIMITED AND JAAFAR HOLDINGS LIMITED [2014] NZHC
763 [15 April 2014]
Hearing outcome
[1] Following counsels’ submissions on 9 April 2014 the Court made orders refusing the plaintiffs’ applications to sustain their caveats, and granting the second defendant’s application for removal of those caveats upon presentation of memoranda of transfer in connection with the mortgagee sale of the properties in question.
[2] Immediately following the hearing the Court issued a minute confirming the
making of these orders and referring to the Court’s refusal to grant a stay of those.
The plaintiffs’ application
[3] On 25 February 2014 the plaintiffs filed an originating application for orders that certain caveats not lapse pursuant to s 145A of the Land Transfer Act 1952.
[4] The matter was first called before me on 7 March 2014. In my minute following that call I noted that the Court had no advice confirming service of the application and that although no application had been filed for the making of interim orders to sustain the caveats, such orders would be granted until the next call of the matter on 7 April 2014.
[5] Then on 20 March 2014 the Court scheduled a telephone conference. In the outcome of that the Court directed a hearing upon the application to proceed on 9
April 2014. At that time the Court made directions for the filing of submissions and associated documents. The Court noted a half day would be available for the hearing.
The second defendant’s application
[6] The following day on 21 March 2014 the second defendant Jaafar Holdings Limited (Jaafar) filed its own application for the removal of the plaintiffs’ caveats on the condition that memoranda of transfer are presented for registration to the District Land Registrar for the sale of the relevant properties by Jaafar as first registered mortgagee.
[7] Mr Chisholm for Jaafar has advised that the plaintiffs’ counsel and solicitors were emailed a copy of Jaafar’s application on 20 March 2014. It had the hearing date noted on the application as 9 April 2014 i.e. that same date scheduled to hear the plaintiff’s application to sustain their caveats.
[8] On 8 April 2014 the plaintiffs filed a notice of opposition to Jaafar’s application for removal of the caveats on grounds that they had an arguable case for prior unregistered interests to that of the registered interest of Jaafar. Also it claims the indefeasibility of Jaafar’s mortgage interest was challenged on the basis:
(i) Due to oppressive conduct in the way Jaafar increased its fees and interest on its mortgage and wrongly exercised mortgagee sale rights... and in preferring interests of parties apparently associated with Jaafar, when exercising a mortgagee sale, Jaafar was fraudulent against the interests of the owner of the registered proprietor or was at least guilty of moral turpitude.
(ii) That Jaafar was not registered pursuant to the Financial Service Providers (Registration and Dispute Resolution) Act 2008 as it was required to be and therefore the loan agreement and mortgage was an illegal contract pursuant to s 5 of the Illegal Contracts Act 1990, and therefore ought to be set aside and be void.
[9] In a memorandum filed in support counsel, Mr McArthur, complained that because Jaafar’s application was a separate matter to the one being brought by the plaintiffs that it should be a separate proceeding and be given a separate CIV number and a date of first call.
[10] Mr McArthur says he telephoned the Court and learned that the Court after speaking with Mr Chisholm had in fact ordered via the Registrar that the application be joined into the same proceeding. Mr McArthur doubts the Registrar has power to make those orders and that it seems contrary to the usual process whereby an application is filed in the Court, given a date and then is returned for service.
[11] Mr McArthur said that only two days prior to the Court hearing upon the plaintiffs’ applications did he acquire knowledge “of the true situation”. He submitted he and the plaintiffs were disadvantaged in responding to that application.
[12] With reference to the challenge to the indefeasibility of Jaafar’s interest Mr McArthur claims that the indefeasibility provisions of the Land Transfer Act are not straightforward and the factual material in relation to those would have to be gone into in detail.
[13] Mr McArthur argued that separate considerations may be involved in those separate applications which the plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to address. In particular the plaintiffs have proper claims suggesting lender fraud by the second defendant. Also, that Jaafar’s mortgagee claims may lack formal integrity and therefore could be considered illegal.
[14] Mr McArthur argues the plaintiffs have not had sufficient opportunity to address these matters given the lack of time available to respond to Jaafar’s application.
[15] Therefore he sought an extension of time to allow proper affidavit evidence to be provided in opposition.
Court’s ruling requiring the hearing of both applications on 9 April 2014
[16] Having heard submissions from counsel the Court ruled that both the plaintiffs’ application to sustain caveats and the second defendant’s application for a removal of those caveats, be heard together.
[17] In its consideration of Mr McArthur’s submissions and by its decision to reject those, the Court stated that the plaintiffs have indeed had sufficient time to respond and further that they have not previously pursued claims of fraud or illegality by their own applications to sustain the caveats, or in their unsuccessful attempts to challenge Jaafar’s exercise of its mortgagee sale process.
[18] Further, and even if Jaafar was not a registered financial provider that would not, on the facts of this case, have precluded Jaafar exercising its mortgagee powers as it has.
[19] These two applications are really parts of the whole; they concern the plaintiffs’ claims of a caveatable interest in the face of Jaafar’s attempts to conclude the formalities in the outcome of its mortgagee sale of the security properties. In that process and even if it is arguable the plaintiffs do hold a caveatable interest, the Court can direct nevertheless that caveats be removed for the mortgagee’s purpose of formalising a transfer of the security properties.
[20] For these reasons and in that background of matters the Court directed both applications be heard together.
The plaintiffs’ challenge to the second defendant’s claim of an indefeasible
interest per s 62 of the Land Transfer Act 1952
[21] In essence the subject of both applications concern Jaafar’s claims of the indefeasibility of its first registered mortgage interests. In respect of those the Land Register discloses that the mortgage to Jaafar was registered on 18 July 2012 immediately upon the transfer of title from Ashok Bhana and the second plaintiff Jasu Bhana to the first defendant (Ranolf) on 18 July 2012. About 9 years earlier on
23 October 2003 the properties in question had been transferred by the first plaintiff to Ashok Bhana and the second plaintiff.
[22] The Register discloses that caveats by the plaintiffs were registered on 2
December 2013. On 13 January 2014 there was registered a withdrawal of the caveat of the second plaintiff. Subsequently a caveat of the second plaintiff was registered on 13 January 2014 and a caveat of the first plaintiff was registered on 14
January 2014.
[23] It is those two caveats filed on 13 and 14 January 2014 which are the subject
of the plaintiffs’ applications to sustain the caveats, which Jaafar opposes.
[24] Both plaintiffs have filed affidavits in support of their applications to sustain the caveats.
[25] The first plaintiff (Stephen Bhana) claims an interest as mortgagee pursuant to an agreement to mortgage created by the “transfer of the relevant properties from me in my capacity as trustee of the Hira Bhana Trust to Ashok and Jasu Bhana in their capacities as trustees of the Ranolf Trust”.
[26] Stephen Bhana deposes that the properties were sold by him to Ashok and Jasu Bhana on 7 August 2003 and that after payment of a sum paid in cash the balance was:
Secured by a Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt which gave me as trustee mortgagee rights over the property. I have not found that Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt. It will be somewhere in the records of the Tauranga based solicitors who dealt with the matter in 2003. I have just not had time because the time constraints of these proceedings. I will try to locate it and file a further affidavit with it.
[27] The plaintiffs claim the debts owed are protected by their caveats remaining in place.
[28] In Mr Stephen Bhana’s affidavit he refers to efforts being made to obtain a copy of documents to prove that when he sold the properties to Ashok Bhana and the second plaintiff that deeds of acknowledgment of debt were signed which the parties agreed would constitute an agreement to mortgage.
[29] Partway through the Court’s hearing of these applications the first plaintiff (it is assumed) came into the Court. Shortly after at the request of Mr McArthur, the Court took a brief adjournment. When the hearing resumed Mr McArthur advised that Mr Bhana had obtained photocopies of documents including relevant deeds of acknowledgement of debt and of a resolution of the trustees of the Ranolf Trust.
[30] Mr McArthur requested the Court to receive copies of those documents. Over Mr Chisholm’s objection the Court agreed to view those documents. It seems those documents were prepared by lawyers. Regardless, it is unclear from the evidence what arrangements were made regarding claims of mortgageable interests to be preserved upon a transfer of the property to Ranolf nearly nine years later. With respect to that transaction there is no document provided supporting claims of an ongoing registrable interest.
Opposition to the plaintiffs’ claims of a caveatable interest
[31] In Jaafar’s opposition to the applications to sustain caveat it is claimed and it is not challenged that the plaintiffs were covenantors and guarantors of the loan agreement pursuant to which the first defendant (Ranolf) and the plaintiffs expressly agreed to grant the first registered mortgage to Jaafar.
[32] The present situation concerning Mr Stephen Bhana’s claims of a priority interest have been the subject of two previous attempts to apply for an interim injunction to restrain Jaafar’s attempts as mortgagee to sell the property. In affidavits in support of those attempts Mr Stephen Bhana confirmed that he was the settler of the Ranolf Trust (of which he was the trustee) and that the second plaintiff Jasu Bhana was a director and sole shareholder of Ranolf.
[33] That interim injunction application filed by Ranolf was to be heard on 13
November 2013 but on the day prior, Ranolf withdrew its application.
[34] On the day of the mortgagee sale auction (28 November 2013) Ranolf and Mr Stephen Bhana made a further application to restrain the mortgagee sale but this was dismissed by order of the High Court.
[35] Jaafar wishes to exercise its rights to complete agreements entered into for the sale of the properties in question. It says prejudice is caused by the plaintiffs’ caveats.
[36] Jaafar as mortgagee agreed to sell the properties to an entity called Eastlight Asset Trading No3 Limited (Eastlight) but that company was unable to complete the sales and the agreements were accordingly cancelled. Since, Jaafar has now agreed to sell the properties to M F Campbell (or nominee) by agreements dated 30 January
2014. Settlement was due on 7 February 2014. The plaintiffs’ caveats prevent a
transfer settlement.
[37] Jaafar advises that after the sale of the properties there will be a shortfall owing to it; that the plaintiffs as guarantors will be liable for the shortfall. Jaafar says the plaintiffs continued to attempt to interfere with the mortgagee sale process.
[38] Jaafar claims that s 62 of the Land Transfer Act confirms the priority of its first registered mortgage even if Ranolf may have previously agreed to grant mortgages to the plaintiffs. Also that such previous mortgages would have been in breach of the plaintiffs and/or Ranolf ’s agreement to grant “first registered mortgages” and a “first and exclusive registered mortgage” pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement and the agreement to grant “first mortgages” was recorded in Ranolf’s solicitors extension letter dated 11 July 2012.
[39] It is clear the plaintiffs, as guarantors and covenantors under the loan agreement to Jaafar, expressly agreed to Ranolf granting first registered mortgages over the properties in question. Neither plaintiff, when applying to Jaafar for short term finance, disclosed their now belated claim that Ranolf had previously agreed to grant mortgages to them. Also, claims of interests in the caveats that mortgages already existed, need to be assessed by reference to the fact that:
(a) No such claim was made in the injunction proceedings;
(b)The initial caveats lodged at the time of Jaafar’s mortgagee sale proceedings asserted claims to an agreement to mortgage dated 28
November 2013 (i.e. the date of mortgagee sale).
The evidence
[40] The evidence on behalf of Jaafar is supplied by Mr H A Ali a shareholder and director of Jaafar. He confirmed the terms of the loan agreement and in particular the commitment of the plaintiffs to grant first registered mortgages to Jaafar, which were subsequently registered.
[41] When the Ranolf loans were unpaid Jaafar proceeded to mortgagee sale. A
mortgagee auction was originally scheduled for 24 October 2013 but Ranolf, under
the direction of Stephen Bhana, applied for an interim injunction to restrain the same. As earlier mentioned, the day before the injunction hearing, Ranolf withdrew its application for an injunction. At that time Jaafar agreed not to sell the property by mortgagee sale before 22 November 2013. The mortgagee sale was rescheduled for
28 November 2013.
[42] On the morning of the mortgagee sale on 28 November 2013 Ranolf again applied for an interim injunction to restrain the mortgagee sale. That application was dismissed on that day and the mortgagee sale proceeded. At that time Jaafar entered into agreements for sale and purchase of all properties, including those now the subject to the plaintiffs caveat applications.
[43] Issues arose regarding the integrity of the purchasers with whom agreements for sale and purchase were concluded. In respect of the properties subject to the caveats Jaafar agreed at the mortgagee sale auction to sell those to an entity called Eastlight Asset Trading No3 Limited. Jaafar assumed that Eastlight was acting bona fida but it transpired it was unable to complete the purchases and it failed to settle.
[44] Mr Ali deposes:
Jaafar was accordingly obliged to resell these properties. The difficulty faced however was that Mr Bhana and his nominees conduct in pushing up the prices at the auction had essentially “burned off” legitimate purchases. When Jaafar’s agent came to attempt to market the properties again in January 2014, the properties had been tainted by the previous process. The other potentially interested parties had discovered that the prices previously achieved at the mortgagee sale were artificially high. Jaafar’s agents were unable to procure previous bidders to make offers at their previous bid levels.
[45] Since, Jaafar has as mortgagee entered into further agreements for sale and purchase.
[46] Mr Ali notes that whilst the plaintiffs’ first caveats claimed an interest as mortgagee pursuant to an agreement to mortgage contained in a deed of acknowledgment of debt dated 28 November 2013, the replacement caveats seek to claim caveatable interests in respect of a mortgage that was granted in 2003. Mr Ali says he had no knowledge of any such claim and that it cut across the plaintiffs and
Ranolf’s agreement to grant registered first mortgages to Jaafar in the term loan
agreement and in the subsequent extension in the terms of the mortgages.
[47] Mr Ali confirms that as at 21 February 2014 its mortgage secures repayment of an amount of $1,381,943.86.
[48] In a reply affidavit Stephen Bhana deposes that when he was dealing with Jaafar when raising a loan he did not think of the earlier mortgage interests; that he had not read every clause of the mortgage agreement and the issue of prior mortgages was not raised with him. Mr Bhana blames his lawyer who he says had a business relationship with Mr Ali “going back 30 years”. He says he did not intentionally mislead Jaafar about the existence of the earlier mortgages.
[49] Then Mr Bhana complains about what he considers is Jaafar’s unconscionable conduct. He said Jaafar agreed to lend at reasonable rates but then increased fees to $20,000 and interest to 18 per cent in December 2012 and then in April 2013 he said Jaafar required a facility fee of $85,000 and an interest rise of
4 per cent.
[50] Mr Bhana said there was “no way Ranolf… could pay these increases which were not accepted, and as I saw it were designed to drive the company to the situation where mortgagee sales would be forced, to in turn allow Jaafar's interested connections to obtain the property as a steal”.
[51] Then Mr Bhana says “Jaafar ought not to have been lending in any event as it was not registered under the Financial Markets Authority, and was not on the Financial Services Providers Register. It was my understanding that the mortgages were therefore an illegal contract. Also there was no disclosure given as required by law”.
[52] Mr Bhana wanted to proceed to argue the illegality of the contract and for the caveats to remain pending that determination. He says otherwise irrefutable damage would be suffered by him and his sister (the second plaintiff) if the sales proceeded.
[53] Regarding the injunction applications Mr Bhana complains about his lawyer and says he did not get a fair hearing. Mr Bhana believes that associates of Jaafar are bidding for the contracts. He says the purchaser Eastlight did not settle because of the lack of funds but because of the caveats which remained on the title. He says Eastlight “is not an associate or a friend of mine. It was always willing to settle as I understood it at a more reasonable price than has currently been agreed to subsequently and in my understanding Eastlight was at all times willing to settle as long as it got free title”.
[54] It is the plaintiffs position that the caveats were lodged to protect agreements to mortgage which arose in 2003. They say the properties were owned by the Bhana Family Trust through Ranolf. They believe they have been the victim of a scheme of parties connected to Jaafar to obtain the properties at fire sale prices. Their application is made pursuant to s 145A of the Land Transfer Act 1952. They believe they have a reasonably arguable case to sustain their caveat. They argue that the mortgage of Jaafar ought to be set aside because of concerns regarding Jaafar’s loan and mortgage contract which threatens the security and value likely to occur with the mortgagee sale process.
Considerations
[55] Jaafar’s position is that Ranolf has been in breach of the loan agreement and mortgage since 15 December 2012; that despite having been given time to refinance or sell the properties, the loan remained unpaid and Property Law Act notices were served in July and August 2013.
[56] Regarding Ranolf’s claim of oppression Jaafar notes that Ranolf never agreed to Jaafar’s rollover terms and accordingly they were never implemented – that interest continues to accrue at the previously agreed 12 per cent ordinary and 15 per cent default rates. Regarding claims of illegality because Jaafar was not registered under the FSP Act at the time of the loan Mr Chisholm submits and the Court accepts that Jaafar’s failure to register does not taint the loan agreement and the mortgage but that even if it was tainted Jaafar would be entitled to relief under s 7 of the Illegal Contracts Act because Ranolf was acting with legal advice at all times and it
received the actual funds on commercial terms. Further that the interest rates charged were not oppressive.
[57] Mr Chisholm submits and the Court accepts that by their position the plaintiffs are attempting to relitigate issues raised in the previous injunction applications which were either not pursued or were dismissed by the High Court. If the plaintiffs thought that their grounds based upon claims of illegality or impropriatory by Jaafar had any merit then they could have been dealt with previously. Indeed, they could have brought those in support of their own application under s 145A, but did not.
[58] Mr Chisholm submits and the Court accepts that the attempt to challenge indefeasibility of title is untenable; also that no issue of prejudice arises by the fact that Jaafar's own response application has been filed because clearly both applications deal with the same essential matter in issue i.e. whether the plaintiffs are entitled to sustain their caveat.
[59] Claims of mortgage misbehaviour or unlawful action are not, on the evidence available, able to be sustained. They are untenable. Also, they have no cause or connection to indefeasibility claims under s 62 particularly when the plaintiffs expressly agreed to grant an exclusive first mortgage to Jaafar.
[60] Even assuming the plaintiffs can prove the existence of caveatable interest the Court accepts there is no reason thereby to subjugate the first registered mortgagee’s interest of Jaafar. It is clear that the plaintiffs expressly agreed to grant Jaafar a “first and exclusive mortgage and to ensure that the first defendant (Ranolf) as mortgagor “must not create or allow the creation of or allow to remain any mortgage, charge or other security interest in the land without the prior written consent of the mortgagee”.
[61] It is clear that Jaafar’s first registered mortgage takes priority over any previous unregistered mortgage particularly when there can be no question of Land Transfer Act fraud (which is not pleaded nor is it even slightly supported by evidence) and because the plaintiffs expressly agreed to Jaafar’s priority.
[62] It appears from Mr McArthur’s submissions that the plaintiffs’ primary argument is based upon a procedural issue about whether or not a mortgagee should seek removal of a caveat pursuant to s 145A or s 143.
[63] The Court accepts there is no reason in principle to limit the mortgagee’s
reliance to s 143 in particular given that conditions can be placed on removal under s
145A.
[64] The purpose of Jaafar’s recent application in seeking an order that the plaintiffs’ caveats are discharged it is to ensure that memoranda of transfer can be presented to the District Land Registrar. Regardless, it does not prevent the Court from removing caveats if they serve no useful purpose. The fact is that the caveats (even assuming that the plaintiffs’ claim of rights existed) are purporting to protect rights that are contrary to the plaintiffs’ contractual obligations.
[65] Stephen Bhana blames numerous other people for the position he is now in including his former solicitor and his first barrister. He also blames his second barrister for not putting “arguments in respect of defective Property Law Act notices” and he claims that “I believe I did not get a fair hearing on that application although I do appreciate that it was at late notice”. Despite this it seems it was clear that submissions raising alleged defects in the mortgagee sale process were argued and were rejected by the High Court.
[66] Stephen Bhana blames his present lawyer for making a mistake when lodging the first caveats claiming an interest granted on 28 November 2013. Complaints of that nature provide remedies elsewhere than in the context of the current proceeding.
[67] It seems effectively that this Court is being asked to reconsider the injunction arguments that have already been rejected. Of course it is an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to essentially attempt to relitigate issues already addressed as a means of sustaining the caveats.
[68] The sole issue in this case is whether in light of Jaafar’s rights as first registered mortgagee, the plaintiffs’ claimed rights as an unregistered mortgagee existed and if so, can be sustained.
[69] In the Court’s view they cannot. The relevant documents plainly declare that the plaintiffs expressly agreed as covenantors to Jaafar exercising its rights and powers on the mortgagor’s default; that the process for the initiation and conduct of the mortgagee sale process has been properly observed. In that outcome Jaafar has completed agreements for sale and purchase dated 7 February 2014 to sell the property. Besides, a number of issues arise regarding the plaintiffs claims:
(a) The plaintiffs’ evidence does not support claims in the caveats that Ranolf as registered proprietor ever agreed to grant mortgages over the properties to the plaintiffs because they were not a party to the agreements for sale and purchase that Stephen Bhana says supports his claim of a registrable interest.
(b)There is no evidence provided to support the claim in the caveats that Ranolf ever agreed to the granting of mortgages over any of the properties.
(c) The plaintiffs’ evidence does not establish that Ranolf as registered proprietor (whether or not it was a trustee) ever agreed to the granting of mortgages over its various properties to the plaintiffs.
[70] Regardless and whether or not Ranolf ever agreed to grant the plaintiffs mortgages Jaafar is entitled to priority and to exercise its rights as first mortgagee by reason of the operation of s 105 of the Land Transfer Act 1952.
[71] In this case the plaintiffs’ claim of an interest has been lodged after registration of Jaafar’s mortgage. There is no real concern about issues arising between what a Court can do under s 145A or s 143. The Court agrees with Mr Chisholm that it is common now for orders under 143, 145 and 145A to be subject to
conditions and therefore the Court can simply make an order under s 145A that the caveat be removed on the condition that transfers are presented by the mortgagee.
[72] In this case and out of an abundance of caution it appears Jaafar has filed its own application under s 143 that seeks such an order. The Court agrees that an order can accordingly be made under s 145A or s 143 that removes the caveats in question on the presentation of a memorandum of transfer.
General principles
[73] The usual test is that if a caveator can show a reasonably arguable case for a claim of an interest in land then the caveat will be sustained. The Court will then consider whether the balance of convenience is better served by allowing the caveat to remain registered notwithstanding it may prevent a caveatee from disposing of the land to another party.
[74] The present approach of the Court is that considerations of the balance of convenience should only apply to exceptional cases and that otherwise a Court should err in favour of preserving the caveat. First the Court needs to be completely satisfied that no undue prejudice to a caveator’s interests will result, such as where the caveat provides no practical advantage as will occur if there is no equity in a property to support an unregistered second mortgage.
[75] The Court has the discretion to remove a caveat even if a prima face caveatable interest is established, if the caveat serves no useful purpose. 1 The Court has previously ordered under s 145A the removal of caveats protecting an unregistered second mortgage because there would be no proceeds to receive after payment of the first mortgagee.2 In that case the first mortgagee was not relying on its power of sale under s 105 but simply claiming priority to the funds received from
the sale as first mortgagee.
1 See Hinde McMoreland Sim commentary para 10.010.
2 Westminster Finance v Marac Finance CIV 2009-404-3350
Conclusions
[76] In this case the Court has no hesitation in exercising its discretion to remove the caveats. The caveats serve no useful purpose and are interfering with Jaafar’s right to sell the properties as mortgagee under s 105. The plaintiffs are purporting to enforce rights that are expressly contrary to their agreements to comply with the loan agreement and the mortgage, and by which agreement effectively, they have promised there was no other mortgage interest.
[77] It seems clear that there will be a shortfall to Jaafar following the sale of the properties. Jaafar is presently in breach of agreements for sale and purchase by reason of the delay in settlement. If Stephen Bhana has any issue regarding the purchase prices received then he has the ability to question mortgagee sale prices like any other mortgagor but that should not be done in the context of a caveat application.
Judgment
[78] The Court orders that the caveats be removed on presentation of the memoranda of transfer.
[79] Jaafar also seeks an order for indemnity costs against the plaintiffs as guarantors pursuant to their loan agreement and the mortgage. The Court directs memoranda as to costs be filed and exchanged by 16 May 2014. The submissions of the second defendant are to be delivered by 2 May 2014. A decision on costs will
issue in due course.
Associate Judge Christiansen
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